Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27
QUAESTIO IV. Utrum de notionibus sive proprietatibus liceat contrarie opinari.
Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum peccatum sit contrarie de notionibus sive proprietatibus opinari.
Et quod non, videtur:
1. Quoniam Sancti contrarias opiniones habuerunt de Scripturis, et tamen non peccaverunt, sed solum erat eis poena. Unde Augustinus1: «Falsa pro veris approbare non est natura hominis instituti, sed poena damnati».
2. Item, Hieronymus2: «Quod de Scripturis veritatem non habet, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua probatur»; sed notiones non habent veritatem a Scripturis, sed inventae sunt a magistris: ergo licet multa ibi eadem ratione contemnere, qua probare.
3. Item, hoc videtur ratione, quia numerus notionum et huiusmodi non sunt de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem; sed contrarie opinari licet in his quae non spectant ad viam salutis, et hoc sine peccato: ergo et in notionibus3.
4. Item, si est ibi peccatum, aut ergo fidei, aut morum. Non fidei, quia non est contra articulos; non morum, quia credere falsum non respicit mores: ergo nullum peccatum.
Contra:
1. De duobus contrarie opinantibus circa notiones necessarium est alterum dicere falsum circa divina; sed mendacium circa divina est mendacium in christiana religione, et hoc est gravissimum peccatum4: ergo etc.
2. Item, duobus contrarie opinantibus circa notiones, necesse est alterum decipi et errare; sed error circa divina est periculosissimus. Unde Augustinus primo de Trinitate5: «Nec periculosius alicubi erratur, nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur». Si ergo error circa humanitatem Christi est peccatum: ergo et circa notiones multo fortius.
3. Item, cum proprietates sint ipse Deus, qui dicit vel credit, quod non sunt proprietates esse vel non esse quod sunt, dicit de Deo quod non est; sed qui dicit, Deum non esse quod est, vel e converso, errat errore peccati: ergo cum alter sic6 opinantium sit huiusmodi, ergo etc.
4. Item, sicut dicit Augustinus7: «Non solum ille mentitur qui dicit falsum, sed etiam qui asserit dubium»; sed uterque opinantium dicit quid dubium, quia nulla opinio duorum est certa: ergo mentitur uterque. Sed qui mentitur circa Deum peccat mortaliter vel venialiter, sed ut plus mortaliter: ergo uterque peccat.
CONCLUSIO. In iis quae circa notiones ab Ecclesia non sunt determinata, licet contraria opinari, non autem praesumtuose asserere.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod contrarie opinari vel potest esse circa ea quae spectant ad doctrinam christianae religionis, vel circa ea quae spectant ad doctrinam humanae inquisitionis. Circa ea quae spectant ad doctrinam humanae inquisitionis licet contrarie opinari et asserere; opinari quidem8, quia illa non faciunt ad salutem, asserere, eo quod nostrae inquisitioni subiecta sunt. — In his quae spectant ad doctrinam religionis distinguendum est. Nam quaedam sunt de9 necessitate fidei, quaedam de certitudine Scripturae, quaedam sunt his annexa, ut sunt illa quae faciunt ad fidei explicationem et Scripturae expositionem.
Circa ea quae sunt de necessitate fidei, opinari contraria simpliciter est peccatum in altero, scilicet qui falsum opinatur. Et si sit simplex opinio, est peccatum erroris; si autem assertio et defensio, non tantum error, sed haeresis dicenda est.
In his autem quae sunt de certitudine Scripturae, ignorantes Scripturas licet contrarie opinari; nec est culpa, ut si unus simplex homo credat, quod Iacob fuit pater Isaac, alter non, sed e converso. Et primus, licet quidem hoc suspicetur vel opinetur, non peccat10, quia ignorat Scripturam. Scientes autem Scripturam non licet, immo alter peccat si simpliciter opinetur. Si autem defendat, haereticus est iudicandus, quoniam contradicit Scripturae sacrae.
In his autem quae sunt annexa fidei vel Scripturae, aut una opinio sequitur ad fidem et Scripturam, et ad alteram sequitur oppositum; et tunc dicendum, quod ante pertractationem11 licet contrarie opinari, sed post pertractationem non licet, immo peccatum est, sicut fuit de opinione Porretani circa proprietates. Dicebat enim, illas non esse Deum, et ad hoc consequitur contrarium fidei. Cum enim Ecclesia adoret proprietatem, tunc adoraret non Deum et non Deus esset adorandus. Unde si, postquam ostensum est sibi inconveniens, non retractasset errorem, fuisset ab Ecclesia haereticus iudicatus; sed retractavit in concilio Rhemensi, ut dicit Bernardus12. — In his autem quae sunt annexa fidei et non sequuntur nec repugnant13, quia dubia sunt, licet opinari; sed non licet asserere, quia opinari est rationis conferentis, sed asserere dubium circa Deum est rationis superbientis.
Epilogus. Concedendum ergo, quod uterque opinans si asserat, peccat, non propter errorem, sed propter praesumtionem; et sic concedendum, quod licet ibi contraria opinari.
Solutio oppositorum.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod mendacium in christiana religione etc.; dicendum quod non14 est mendacium, quia neuter dicit contra credulitatem; non in christiana religione, quia non est de necessitate fidei vel morum.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod error ille est periculosus; dicendum, quod verum est, in quantum est contrarius fidei; sed si est de his quae non spectant ad fidem, non est verum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod peccat qui dicit, Deum non esse quod est etc.; dicendum, quod illud verum est, si sit determinatum per fidem vel Scripturam; aliter non peccat, nisi asserat vel defendat.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod concedendum est. Nam qui propria auctoritate de Deo asserit vel affirmat, quod nec Scriptura nec fides dicit nec ad eas sequitur, praesumtuosus est iudicandus etiam si verum dicat; et si dubitat corde et affirmat ore, mendax est; si utroque modo asserit, superbus est.
Gilbertus Porretanus, putans, relationes et proprietates in Deo esse assistentes, inde arguit, eas non esse Deum (cfr. infra d. 33. q. I.). Unde orta est quaestio, utrum doctrina de notionibus spectet ad fidem. Quae hic de fide tanguntur, explicantur diffuse III. Sent. d. 25, praecipue a. 1, q. 1.3. — Consentiunt alii magistri: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 68, m. 1, a. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 5; S. I, q. 32, a. 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26, a. 14. — Petr. a Tar., I. Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic princ. 2, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 26, q. 5.
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QUESTION IV. Whether it is permitted to hold opposing opinions concerning the notions or properties.
Fourthly and lastly it is asked whether it is a sin to hold opposing opinions concerning the notions or properties.
And that [it is] not, it seems:
1. Because the saints held opposing opinions concerning the Scriptures, and yet did not sin, but it was only a punishment to them. Whence Augustine1: «To approve falsehoods for truths is not the nature of man as instituted, but the punishment of one condemned».
2. Likewise, Jerome2: «What does not have truth from the Scriptures, is despised with the same ease with which it is proved»; but the notions do not have truth from the Scriptures, but were devised by the masters: therefore it is permitted to despise many things there by the same reasoning by which one proves [them].
3. Likewise, this seems [so] by reason, since the number of the notions and such things are not among those things which are necessary for salvation; but it is permitted to hold opposing opinions in those things which do not pertain to the way of salvation, and this without sin: therefore also concerning the notions3.
4. Likewise, if there is a sin there, then either of faith or of morals. Not of faith, since it is not against the articles; not of morals, since to believe a falsehood does not regard morals: therefore no sin.
On the contrary:
1. Concerning two persons holding opposing opinions about the notions, it is necessary that one say something false concerning divine matters; but a lie concerning divine matters is a lie in the Christian religion, and this is the gravest sin4: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, when two are holding opposing opinions about the notions, it is necessary that one be deceived and err; but error concerning divine matters is most dangerous. Whence Augustine, On the Trinity book one5: «Nowhere is it more dangerous to err, nor more fruitful is anything found». If, then, error concerning the humanity of Christ is a sin: therefore also concerning the notions much more strongly.
3. Likewise, since the properties are God himself, whoever says or believes that the properties are not, or are not what they are, says of God that which he is not; but whoever says that God is not what he is, or conversely, errs with the error of sin: therefore since one of those holding opinions in this way6 is of this kind, therefore etc.
4. Likewise, as Augustine says7: «Not only does he lie who says what is false, but also he who asserts what is doubtful»; but each of those holding opinions says something doubtful, since no opinion of [these] two is certain: therefore each lies. But whoever lies concerning God sins mortally or venially, but more often mortally: therefore each sins.
CONCLUSION. In those things concerning the notions which have not been determined by the Church, it is permitted to hold opposing opinions, but not to assert them presumptuously.
I respond: It must be said that to hold opposing opinions can be either concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of the Christian religion, or concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry. Concerning those things which pertain to the doctrine of human inquiry it is permitted both to hold opposing opinions and to assert [them]; to opine indeed8, because those things do not bear on salvation, [and] to assert, because they are subject to our inquiry. — In those things which pertain to the doctrine of religion a distinction must be made. For some are of9 the necessity of faith, some of the certitude of Scripture, [and] some are annexed to these, as are those things which serve for the explication of the faith and the exposition of Scripture.
Concerning those things which are of the necessity of faith, to hold opposing opinions is simply a sin in the one [party], namely in him who opines what is false. And if it be a simple opinion, it is the sin of error; if however assertion and defense, it must be called not only error but heresy.
In those things, however, which are of the certitude of Scripture, it is permitted to those ignorant of the Scriptures to hold opposing opinions; nor is it a fault, as if one simple man should believe that Jacob was the father of Isaac, [and] another not, but the converse. And the first, although indeed he should so suspect or opine, does not sin10, because he is ignorant of Scripture. To those, however, knowing Scripture it is not permitted; rather the [other] one sins if he simply opine. If, however, he should defend [it], he must be judged a heretic, since he contradicts Sacred Scripture.
In those things, however, which are annexed to faith or to Scripture, either one opinion follows upon faith and Scripture, and the opposite follows upon the other; and then it must be said that before due treatment11 it is permitted to hold opposing opinions, but after due treatment it is not permitted, rather it is a sin, as was the case with the opinion of [Gilbert] of Poitiers concerning the properties. For he was saying that they are not God, and from this there follows the contrary of the faith. For since the Church adores the property, it would then adore what is not God and what is not God would be adored. Whence if, after the unfittingness had been shown to him, he had not retracted the error, he would have been judged a heretic by the Church; but he retracted at the council of Reims, as Bernard says12. — In those things, however, which are annexed to faith and neither follow nor are repugnant13, because they are doubtful, it is permitted to opine; but it is not permitted to assert, because to opine is [the act] of conferring reason, but to assert what is doubtful concerning God is [the act] of presumptuous reason.
Epilogue. It must therefore be conceded that each opining party, if he should assert, sins, not on account of error, but on account of presumption; and so it must be conceded that it is permitted to hold opposing opinions there.
Solution of the opposites.
1. To that which is objected, that [there is] a lie in the Christian religion etc.; it must be said that it is not14 a lie, since neither says against [the rule of] belief; [it is] not in the Christian religion, since it is not of the necessity of faith or of morals.
2. To that which is objected, that that error is dangerous; it must be said that this is true insofar as it is contrary to faith; but if it is concerning those things which do not pertain to faith, it is not true.
3. To that which is objected, that he sins who says that God is not what he is etc.; it must be said that this is true, if it has been determined by faith or by Scripture; otherwise he does not sin, unless he assert or defend.
4. To that which is objected last, it must be said that it is to be conceded. For he who on his own authority asserts or affirms concerning God that which neither Scripture nor faith says nor follows from them, is to be judged presumptuous even if he speak the truth; and if he doubts in his heart and affirms with his mouth, he is a liar; if he asserts in both modes, he is proud.
Gilbert of Poitiers, supposing the relations and properties in God to be [merely] assistants [adjacent to him], thence argued that they are not God (cf. below d. 33, q. 1). Whence arose the question whether the doctrine of the notions pertains to faith. The points of faith touched on here are explained at length in III Sent. d. 25, especially a. 1, q. 1, 3. — Other masters consent: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 68, m. 1, a. 2. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 5; Summa I, q. 32, a. 4. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 26, a. 14. — Petrus a Tarantasia, I Sent. d. 33, q. 1, a. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here princ. 2, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 26, q. 5.
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- Libr. I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5.Book I, Retractations, c. 9, n. 5.
- In Matth. c. 23, 35, in quo textu et etiam paulo inferius in minori huius argumenti codd. G H Z aa bb pro veritatem exhibent auctoritatem, quae vox et in originali exstat.On Matthew, c. 23, [v.] 35; in which text and also a little below in the minor [premise] of this argument the codices G H Z aa bb in place of veritatem exhibit auctoritatem, which word also stands in the original.
- In Vat. et in cod. cc desideratur conclusio ergo et in notionibus, quae in omnibus aliis codd. habetur.In the Vatican [edition] and in cod. cc the conclusion ergo et in notionibus is missing, which is found in all the other codices.
- Cfr. August., de Mendacio ad Consent. c. 3. n. 4. et passim.Cf. Augustine, On Lying, to Consentius, c. 3, n. 4, and elsewhere.
- Cap. 3. n. 5. — Vat. in textu citato alibi pro alicubi; cod. G paulo superius pro sed error circa substituit sed errare circa, et dein consequenter periculosissimum pro periculosissimus.[De Trinitate I,] c. 3, n. 5. — The Vatican [edition] in the cited text [reads] alibi in place of alicubi; cod. G a little above substitutes sed errare circa in place of sed error circa, and then consequently periculosissimum in place of periculosissimus.
- Cum aliquibus codd. ut H Z et ed. 1 adiecimus sic, quod in Vat. desideratur.With some codices such as H Z and ed. 1 we have added sic, which is missing in the Vatican [edition].
- De Mendacio, c. 3. n. 3, secundum sensum. — Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc falso substituit Verum pro Deum, et subinde eadem sola post ut plus interiicit qui; lectionem ut plus, quae idem significat ac ut plurimum, sumsimus ex cod. T; alii cum Vat. omittunt ut, ed. 1 autem omittit sed ut plus mortaliter.On Lying, c. 3, n. 3, according to the sense. — Toward the end of the argument the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc wrongly substitutes Verum in place of Deum, and shortly after it alone interjects qui after ut plus; the reading ut plus, which signifies the same as ut plurimum ("for the most part"), we have taken from cod. T; others with the Vatican [edition] omit ut, but ed. 1 omits sed ut plus mortaliter.
- Textum, quem Vat. sic distortum et mutilatum exhibet: asserere, quia illa non faciant ad salutem. Asserere autem contraria in his quae etc., restauravimus ex mss. et ed. 1. Mox voci religionis cod. V praemittit christianae.The text, which the Vatican [edition] exhibits distorted and mutilated thus: asserere, quia illa non faciant ad salutem. Asserere autem contraria in his quae etc., we have restored from the manuscripts and ed. 1. Soon afterwards cod. V prefixes christianae to the word religionis.
- Ed. 1 rectitudine, Vat. cum ceteris edd. et codd. necessitate, sed infra, ubi eadem formula repetitur, certitudine, quod vocabulum certe sensum rectius exprimit. — Codd. G K aa post de inserunt necessitate vel; dein cod. P pro certitudine substituit necessitate, et paulo post ed. 1 ignorantibus pro ignorantes.Ed. 1 [reads] rectitudine, the Vatican [edition] with the other editions and codices [reads] necessitate, but below, where the same formula is repeated, certitudine, which word certainly expresses the sense more rightly. — Codices G K aa after de insert necessitate vel; then cod. P substitutes necessitate in place of certitudine, and a little later ed. 1 [reads] ignorantibus in place of ignorantes.
- Verba non peccat desiderantur in non paucis codd.; in codd. aa bb eorum loco legitur non est haereticus. Paulo ante Vat., non suffragantibus codd., post licet quidem omittit hoc et post opinetur adiungit falsum, tamen; dein pro Scientes substituit Scienti (cod. ee Scientibus), et post immo supprimit alter, pro quo codd. M X Z cum ed. 1 [legunt] necessario.The words non peccat are missing in not a few codices; in codices aa bb in their place is read non est haereticus. A little before, the Vatican [edition], without the support of the codices, omits hoc after licet quidem and adds falsum, tamen after opinetur; then in place of Scientes substitutes Scienti (cod. ee Scientibus), and after immo suppresses alter, in place of which codices M X Z with ed. 1 [read] necessario.
- Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 hic et paulo inferius percontationem pro pertractationem.The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and of ed. 1, here and a little below [reads] percontationem in place of pertractationem.
- Serm. 80. in Cant. n. 8. 9. Vide et infra d. 33. a. 1. q. 1, ubi plura de opinione Gilb. Porretani exhibentur.Sermon 80 on the Canticle, n. 8, 9. See also below d. 33, a. 1, q. 1, where more is shown about the opinion of Gilbert of Poitiers.
- Hoc est secundum membrum disiunctionis, quam S. Doctor facit ad ea quae sunt annexa fidei; quare cod. T, quem sequimur, post verba In his bene subiungit autem. Pro et non sequuntur plures codd. ut A C F G K exhibent nec sequitur, et codd. H I P Q T W nec sequitur error. Dein post repugnant Vat., nullo suffragante cod., interponit ei, et paulo inferius post asserere cum paucis codd. dubium circa Deum. — Verba immediate subsequentia: opinari est rationis conferentis, accipe in sensu S. Doctoris, III. Sent. d. 24. a. 2. q. 2. sic loquentis: «Uno modo dicitur opinio assensio unius partis cum formidine alterius; alio modo dicitur opinio assensio animae generata ex rationibus probabilibus», ita scil., ut sit actus rationis, quo comparatione inter argumenta probabilia diversarum sententiarum facta, uni sententiae adhaeret, non excludendo possibilitatem, quod altera sententia sit vera.This is the second member of the disjunction which the holy Doctor makes for those things which are annexed to faith; wherefore cod. T, which we follow, after the words In his well adds autem. In place of et non sequuntur several codices such as A C F G K exhibit nec sequitur, and codices H I P Q T W [exhibit] nec sequitur error. Then after repugnant the Vatican [edition], with no codex supporting, interposes ei, and a little below after asserere with a few codices [adds] dubium circa Deum. — The words immediately following — opinari est rationis conferentis — take in the sense of the holy Doctor speaking thus in III Sent. d. 24, a. 2, q. 2: «In one way opinion is called the assent to one part with fear of the other; in another way opinion is called the assent of the soul generated from probable arguments», so namely, that it be an act of reason by which, when comparison is made between the probable arguments of different positions, one adheres to one position, not excluding the possibility that the other position be true.
- Supple: est mendacium. — In Vat. sic legitur: credulitatem in Christiana religione; lectio corrupta.Supply: est mendacium ("[it] is a lie"). — In the Vatican [edition] is read thus: credulitatem in Christiana religione; a corrupt reading.