Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27
QUAESTIO I. Utrum verbum in divinis dicatur essentialiter, an notionaliter.
Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur primo utrum verbum dicatur essentialiter, vel notionaliter. Et quod dicatur notionaliter, ostenditur:
1. Primo auctoritate canonis. Beatus Ioannes1 elegantissime exprimens incarnationem dicit: Verbum caro factum est; sed unio non est facta nisi in persona Filii: ergo verbum non exprimit nisi personam Filii, et proprie: ergo etc.
2. Item, Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate2: «In Trinitate non dicitur verbum nisi Filius, neque donum nisi Spiritus sanctus».
3. Item, Anselmus in Monologio3: «Apertissimum est, quia nec ille cuius est verbum, potest esse verbum suum, nec verbum potest esse ille cuius est verbum».
4. Item, ratione videtur, quia verbum est quod emanat a mente per modum conceptionis4; ergo verbum de se dicit conceptum; sed esse conceptum et genitum sunt idem, sed genitum est notionale: ergo etc.
5. Item, verbum dicitur quod emanat per modum perfectae expressionis5; sed esse imaginem est proprium Filii: ergo et verbum.
6. Item, omne verbum dicit respectum ad dicentem6; sed esse respectivum in divinis est notionaliter dictum, si dicat respectum ad personam; sed dicens non potest esse nisi persona: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Quod dicatur essentialiter, ostenditur sic. Sicut dicit Augustinus nono de Trinitate capitulo decimo7: «Verbum est cum amore notitia»; sed notitia est essentialiter dictum: ergo etc.
2. Item, verbum est, quo res manifestatur et exprimitur8; sed manifestari est cuiuslibet personae, et manifestatio est essentialis: ergo et verbum. Si tu dicas, quod non dicitur manifestatio simpliciter, sed manifestatio alterius: obiicitur tunc, quia Spiritus sanctus est manifestativus Filii, Ioannis decimo sexto9: Ille me clarificabit etc.
3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per comparationem ad dicentem, quia verbum dicitur respectu dicentis: sed dicentes sunt tres, sicut dicit Anselmus in Monologio10: «Unusquisque in Trinitate se
dicit»: ergo verbum est trium. Sed nihil est trium nisi essentiale: ergo etc.
4. Item, sicut dicit Anselmus in Monologio11: «Dicere nihil aliud est quam cogitando intueri»; sed hoc est essentiale: ergo et verbum. Si dicas, quod dicere, secundum quod essentialiter dicitur, non habet correspondens verbum; contra: sicut dicit Anselmus12, «Pater se dicendo generat Verbum»; sed omnis actus, secundum quem persona reflectitur supra se, est essentialis: ergo et dicere, prout est essentiale, respondet verbum: ergo etc.
5. Item, hoc ostenditur per comparationem ad id quod per verbum dicitur. Nihil medium inter creaturam et Creatorem est notio vel notionale, quoniam medium aequaliter distat ab extremis; sed Verbum est medium, quoniam omnia per Verbum facta sunt13: ergo etc.
CONCLUSIO. Verbum aeternum in divinis dicitur tantum notionaliter, non essentialiter.
Respondeo: Ad hoc dixerunt aliqui quod dicere tripliciter accipitur in divinis. Uno modo dicere est idem quod intelligere; alio modo, idem quod generare; unde Augustinus14 exponit illud Genesis primo: «Dixit, id est Filium genuit, in quo omnia disposuit»; tertio modo, dicere idem est quod creare; et verbum non respondet ei quod est dicere, in quantum increatum, nisi secundum quod dicere idem est quod generare; et ita convenit soli Patri.
— Sed istud non videtur intelligibile, quod sit loqui sine verbo, et quod aliquid sit dicere, cui non respondeat verbum, sicut nec generare sine genito, nec nosse15 sine notitia. Et hoc etiam ipse modus loquendi et intelligendi abhorret, quod dicat aliquis et loquatur sine omni verbo.
Ideo voluerunt aliqui dicere, quod sicut dicere accipitur essentialiter et personaliter, quia tres sunt qui dicunt, sicut dicit Anselmus16, ita et verbum dicitur essentialiter et personaliter. Et secundum istam viam solvere nituntur obiecta ad utramque partem. — Sed hoc est contra Augustinum et contra Anselmum expresse. Nam Augustinus17 dicit, quod «verbum eo ipso quod verbum, dicitur ad alterum». Similiter Anselmus: «Apertissimum est, quod verbum non est ille cuius est verbum». Et hoc patet etiam per auctoritates Augustini, quas Magister adducit in littera18, et Anselmus in Monologio hoc expresse negat.
Propter hoc intelligendum, quod dicere idem est quod loqui; loqui autem est dupliciter, vel ad se, id est apud se, vel ad alterum. Loqui ad se nihil aliud est quam aliquid mente concipere. Mens autem concipit intelligendo, et intelligendo aliud concipit simile alii, intelligendo se concipit simile sibi, quia intelligentia assimilatur intellecto. Mens igitur dicendo se apud se concipit per omnia simile sibi; et hoc est verbum conceptum19. — Alio modo dicere ad alterum est conceptum mentis exprimere; et huic dicere respondet verbum prolatum.
Dicendum ergo, quod sicut in nobis dupliciter accipitur dicere, ita in Deo. Nam dicere Dei apud se, hoc est intelligendo concipere; et hoc est generare prolem similem sibi, et huic dicere respondet verbum natum, id est Verbum aeternum. Alio modo dicere est exterius se exprimere, et sic idem est dicere quod se per creaturam declarare, et huic dicere respondet verbum creatum et verbum temporale.
Concedendum ergo, quod verbum sicut et dicere dupliciter accipitur, scilicet aeternaliter et tem-
poraliter. Et verbum temporaliter20 creatum nec est Deus nec est in Deo, sed creatura respectu Dei. Verbum aeternum est Deus, et est illius solius, cuius est concipi, sicut dicere est illius solius, cuius est concipere. Ideo rationes probantes verbum dici notionaliter, sunt simpliciter concedendae.
1. 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod verbum est notitia, et verbum est manifestativum; dicendum, quod nec hoc nec illud est tota ratio verbi, sicut nec nosse est tota ratio dicere vel manifestare, sed necesse est, quod cadat ibi conceptum; ideo cum notitia concepta et manifestatio per conceptum sit per solum Filium, non Spiritum sanctum, ideo patet illud quod obiicitur.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo in comparatione ad dicentem, dicendum, quod dicere non dicitur essentialiter, nisi secundum quod dicitur respectu verbi creati, et secundum quod notat effectum temporalem; secundum vero quod dicit respectum aeternum, sic solus unus est dicens.
4. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod dicere non est aliud quam cogitando intueri; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi intuitus non est sine concepto21, ut in nobis et in Patre; sed in Filio non est, similiter nec in Spiritu sancto. Quamvis enim se intelligant, tamen non concipiunt prolem, quia non est in eis fecunditas ad generandum. — Si quaeras rationem huius, Augustinus te docet decimo quinto22 de Trinitate: ratio huius, quia nos non intelligimus nisi per intelligentiam, et illa semper est genita. In illa autem Trinitate beata aliter est quam in imagine, quia quaelibet persona intelligit. Et ideo intelligere non dicit ibi rationem concipiendi, ac per hoc non complectitur totam rationem dicendi vel verbi in Deo, ut in nobis.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod actus reflexus supra se etc.; dicendum, quod, sive dicatur apud se, sive exterius ad alterum, utroque modo implicat apud se actum absolutum et respectivum. Dicere enim apud se est cogitando sive intelligendo conceptum gignere; et ratione primi est reflexio, sed ratione secundi est relatio. Similiter dicere exterius est se vel conceptum declarando aliquid extra formare. Unde dicere utroque modo reflectitur supra dicentem et dictum: supra dicentem, ratione actus23 absoluti; supra dictum, ratione comparati. Et sic manifesta est illa obiectio, quoniam dicere non tantum est absolutum; et ideo non est essentiale semper.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum est medium; dicendum, quod duplex est medium, scilicet essentiae et intelligentiae; et Verbum non est medium in essendo, sed extremum, quoniam ipsum Verbum omnia fecit — sed solum in intelligendo — quia Pater per Verbum omnia fecit. Et hoc infra melius dicetur24.
I. Nomen et ratio verbi (quod in homine vel verbum exterius prolatum, vel in mente productum esse potest) ad Deum translatum est, de quo vide infra q. 1. Ab ipso Seraphico infra q. 3. in corp. verbum mentis accurate definitur, scilicet quod sit «similitudo expressa et expressiva, concepta vi spiritus intelligentis, secundum quod se vel aliud intuetur»; in qua definitione quatuor tanguntur, ut ibi exponitur. Cum Seraphico et aliis multis convenit S. Thomas (S. I. q. 27. a. I.) dicens: «Quicumque intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex eius notitia procedens» (cfr. ibid. q. 34. a. 1.). Dissentiunt autem S. Thomas et Scotus in re secundaria. Ille docet, quod verbum intellectus creati, formaliter loquendo, non est ipsa intellectio, sed est similitudo formalis et expressa rei cognitae per actum intelligendi. Scotus vero (I. Sent. d. 27. q. I.) affirmat, illud esse ipsam intellectionem actualem. De hac opinionum differentia conferri possunt Caietanus, ad S. I. q. 27. a. 1, et Rada, tom. I. controv. 7.
II. Transferendo nomen verbi ad divina, differentia attendenda est inter verbum in Deo et in creatis, atque omnia, quae sunt imperfectionis, sunt excludenda (infra q. 4.). Inter alia, quae discrimen inter verbum creatum et increatum important, haec duo notamus: primo, quod verbum creatum est effectus; increatum est tantum terminus productionis. Secundo, verbum creatum non praesupponit intellectionem, sed producitur, ut intellectio fiat; increatum vero praesupponit intellectionem essentialem et ingenitam, ipsumque est terminus conceptionis et productionis, qua Pater sibi exprimit talem conceptum omnino sibi similem.
III. Dicere in Deo dupliciter distinguitur (hic in corp.), scilicet aeternaliter et temporaliter, quod latius explicatur II. Sent. d. 13. dub. 3. — Loquendo de dictione aeterna, omnes concedunt, eam esse actum intellectus, ac duplicem actum intellectus esse ponendum in Deo, alium essentialem et tribus personis communem, quo unaquaeque persona se et alias personas et omnia intelligit; alium notionalem, quo Pater producit sive dicit Verbum per memoriam fecundam. Dissentit tamen Scotus a S. Thoma in re secundaria: ille enim vult, dictionem et intellectionem essentialem duos esse actus distinctos vel disparatos, dum Angelicus ponit, dictionem contineri in intellectione essentiali et tantum addere expressionem et relationem. De hac controversia, quae potius de nomine quam de re alicuius momenti esse videtur, videsis Caietanum, ad S. I. q. 34. a. 1, et Rada, controv. 8. — S. Bonaventuram in hac parte potius
cum Scoto convenire, observat Barth. de Barberiis (tom. 1. disp. 12. q. 6. n. 376.) contra Forestum et alios; quod satis insinuatur in hac quaest. in corp. et praecipue ad 3. et 4., et q. 3. in corp. (cfr. etiam d. 32. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4, et a. 2. q. 1. ad 8.).
IV. Prima opinio, quae in responsione commemoratur, etiam a B. Alberto hic a. 6. proponitur. Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 62. m. 2.) sex modos profert, quibus accipi possit in Deo verbum et dicere, scilicet essentialiter, non connotando aliquid in creatura (Pater dicit se); essentialiter, cointelligendo aliquo modo verbum (quia cointelligitur intelligentia, quae appropriatur Filio); notionaliter (Pater loquitur Verbum); notionaliter et connotando effectum in creatura (Pater loquitur nobis in Filio); essentialiter et connotando effectum indistincte trium personarum (locutus est Dominus ad sathan). Idem in solut. ad 2. distinguit in Deo dicere verbum et dicere rem.
Nihilominus inter S. Doctorem et Alexandrum non est contradictio nisi in modo loquendi, ut S. Bonav. in saepius laudato Prologo (cfr. pag. 472, col. II.) evidenter demonstrat his verbis: «In secunda autem nemo me arbitrabitur discordasse, qui scit distinguere inter propria et transsumtiva. Sicut enim dicens, non esse verum risum sine ore, nec esse verum volantem sine alis, non contradicit ei, qui dicit, pratum sine ore ridere, et sagittas sine alis volare; sic qui dicit, nomen loquendi vel dicendi, proprie sumtum, non esse sine verbo, sicut nec generare sine filio, non contradicit ei, qui dicit, loqui vel dicere sic transsumi posse et secundum aliquam significationem transsumtivam dici de aliquo sine verbo generato. In his igitur et in omnibus aliis, si quis adspiciat diligenter et pie, inveniet, me a patrum et maiorum vestigiis non fuisse ausum recedere» (Cfr. etiam q. seq. in corp. de verbo improprie dicto).
Secundae opinioni favet S. Thom. in Comment. (hic q. 2. a. 2.). Idem autem in Sum. (1. q. 34. a. 4.) omnino consentit Seraphico dicens: «Verbum in divinis, si proprie sumitur, est nomen personale tantum». — Singularis prorsus et falsa est opinio Durandi (hic q. 3.) asserentis, verbum in Deo proprie dici essentialiter, et non nisi per appropriationem de Filio; quae doctrina consequitur ex alia eiusdem opinione singulari, quod nec Filius per intellectum, nec Spiritus S. per voluntatem procedat.
V. Alex. Hal. et S. Thom., locis citt. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. 2, et Report. q. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. p. I. tr. 8. q. 35. m. 3. a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 58. q. 2. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3. — Biel, de hac et seq. q. hic q. 3.
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QUESTION I. Whether 'word' in divine matters is said essentially or notionally.
As to the first [point], then, it is asked first whether 'word' is said essentially or notionally. And that it is said notionally is shown:
1. First, by the authority of canon [Scripture]. Blessed John1, most elegantly expressing the incarnation, says: The Word was made flesh; but the union was not made except in the person of the Son: therefore 'word' expresses nothing but the person of the Son, and properly: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, Augustine, fifteenth [book] On the Trinity2: «In the Trinity 'word' is said only of the Son, and 'gift' only of the Holy Spirit».
3. Likewise, Anselm in the Monologion3: «It is most evident that neither he whose word it is can be his own word, nor can the word be he whose word it is».
4. Likewise, by reason it appears so, since 'word' is what emanates from the mind by way of conception4; therefore 'word' of itself signifies a concept; but to be conceived and to be begotten are the same, and to be begotten is notional: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, 'word' is said of what emanates by way of perfect expression5; but to be image is proper to the Son: therefore so also is 'word'.
6. Likewise, every word signifies a relation to one speaking6; but to be relative in divine matters is said notionally, if it signifies a relation to a person; but a speaker can be nothing but a person: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. That it is said essentially is shown thus. As Augustine says in the ninth [book] On the Trinity, chapter ten7: «A word is knowledge with love»; but knowledge is said essentially: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, a word is that by which a thing is manifested and expressed8; but to be manifested belongs to any person, and manifestation is essential: therefore so also is 'word'. If you say that it is not called manifestation simply, but manifestation of another: it is then objected, since the Holy Spirit is the one who manifests the Son, John sixteen9: He shall glorify me, etc.
3. Likewise, this same thing is shown by comparison to the speaker, since 'word' is said in respect to the speaker: but speakers are three, as Anselm says in the Monologion10: «Each one in the Trinity says himself»: therefore the word is of three. But nothing is of three save what is essential: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, as Anselm says in the Monologion11: «To say is nothing other than to behold by thinking»; but this is essential: therefore so also is 'word'. If you say that to-say, in so far as it is said essentially, has no corresponding word; on the contrary: as Anselm says12, «The Father, by saying himself, generates the Word»; but every act in which a person reflects upon itself is essential: therefore also to to-say, in so far as it is essential, there corresponds a word: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, this is shown by comparison to that which is said through the word. Nothing intermediate between creature and Creator is a notion or notional, since an intermediate stands equally distant from the extremes; but the Word is intermediate, since all things were made through the Word13: therefore etc.
CONCLUSION. The eternal Word in divine matters is said only notionally, not essentially.
I respond: To this some have said that to-say is taken in three ways in divine matters. In one way to-say is the same as to understand; in another way, the same as to generate; whence Augustine14 expounds that [text] of Genesis one: «He said, that is, He begot the Son, in whom He arranged all things»; in a third way, to-say is the same as to create; and 'word' does not correspond to that which is to-say, in so far as [it is] uncreated, except in so far as to-say is the same as to generate; and thus it belongs to the Father alone.
— But this does not seem intelligible, that there be a speaking without a word, and that something be a saying to which no word corresponds, just as there is no generating without something begotten, nor knowing15 without knowledge. And this very mode of speaking and understanding shrinks from anyone saying or speaking without any word.
Therefore some have wished to say that just as to-say is taken essentially and personally, since there are three who speak, as Anselm says16, so also 'word' is said essentially and personally. And by this way they strive to solve the objections on either side. — But this is expressly against Augustine and against Anselm. For Augustine17 says that «a word, by the very fact that it is a word, is said in relation to another». Similarly Anselm: «It is most evident that the word is not he whose word it is». And this is also plain through the authorities of Augustine which the Master adduces in the littera18, and Anselm in the Monologion expressly denies this.
On account of this, it must be understood that to-say is the same as to-speak; but to-speak is in two ways, either to oneself, that is, with oneself, or to another. To speak to oneself is nothing other than to conceive something in mind. But the mind conceives by understanding, and understanding another it conceives a likeness of the other, [and] understanding itself it conceives a likeness of itself, since the intelligence is assimilated to what is understood. The mind, therefore, by saying itself with itself, conceives [what is] in every way like itself; and this is the conceived word19. — In another way, to-say to another is to express the concept of the mind; and to this to-say there corresponds the uttered word.
It must therefore be said that just as in us to-say is taken in two ways, so in God. For to-say of God with himself is to conceive by understanding; and this is to generate offspring like to himself, and to this to-say there corresponds the born word, that is, the eternal Word. In another way to-say is to express oneself outwardly, and so to-say is the same as to declare oneself through a creature, and to this to-say there corresponds the created word and the temporal word.
It must therefore be conceded that word, like to-say, is taken in two ways, namely eternally and temporally. And the word created temporally20 is neither God nor in God, but a creature in respect to God. The eternal Word is God, and is of him alone whose [property] it is to be conceived, just as to-say is of him alone whose [property] it is to conceive. Therefore the reasonings proving that 'word' is said notionally are simply to be conceded.
1. 2. To that which is objected, that the word is knowledge, and the word is what manifests; it must be said that neither this nor that is the whole account of 'word', just as to know is not the whole account of to-say or to manifest, but it is necessary that something conceived fall there [as well]; therefore, since knowledge conceived and manifestation through a concept are through the Son alone, not the Holy Spirit, therefore that which is objected is plain.
3. To that which is objected concerning 'word' in comparison to the speaker, it must be said that to-say is not said essentially, except in so far as it is said in respect to the created word, and in so far as it notes a temporal effect; but in so far as it signifies an eternal relation, so [the] one alone is the speaker.
4. As to that, then, which is objected, that to-say is nothing other than to behold by thinking; it must be said that this is true where intuition is not without a concept21, as in us and in the Father; but in the Son it is not so, nor likewise in the Holy Spirit. For although they understand themselves, yet they do not conceive offspring, since there is no fecundity in them for begetting. — If you ask the reason for this, Augustine teaches you in the fifteenth [book] On the Trinity22: the reason for this is that we do not understand except by understanding [intelligentia], and that is always begotten. But in that blessed Trinity it is otherwise than in the [created] image, since each person understands. And therefore to understand does not there signify the account of conceiving, and through this it does not embrace the whole account of saying or of word in God, as it does in us.
5. To that which is objected, that the act reflects upon itself, etc.; it must be said that, whether it be said with oneself or outwardly to another, in either mode it implies with itself an absolute act and a relative one. For to-say with oneself is to beget a concept by thinking or by understanding; and by reason of the first there is reflection, but by reason of the second there is relation. Similarly to-say outwardly is to form something outside by declaring oneself or one's concept. Whence to-say in either mode reflects upon the speaker and what is said: upon the speaker, by reason of the absolute act23; upon what is said, by reason of what is compared. And thus that objection is manifest, since to-say is not only an absolute; and therefore is not always essential.
6. To that which is objected, that the Word is intermediate; it must be said that intermediate is twofold, namely [intermediate] of essence and of intelligence; and the Word is not intermediate in being, but extreme, since the Word himself made all things — but only in understanding — since the Father made all things through the Word. And this will be better said below24.
I. The name and account of 'word' (which in man can be either a word uttered outwardly, or one produced in the mind) is transferred to God, on which see below q. 1. By the Seraphic [Doctor] himself below at q. 3 in the body, the word of the mind is accurately defined, namely that it is «an expressed and expressive likeness, conceived by the power of an understanding spirit, in so far as it intuits itself or another»; in which definition four things are touched, as is there expounded. With the Seraphic [Doctor] and many others St. Thomas agrees (Summa I, q. 27, a. 1) saying: «Whoever understands, by the very fact that he understands, something proceeds within him, which is a conception of the thing understood, proceeding from his knowledge of it» (cf. ibid. q. 34, a. 1). But St. Thomas and Scotus disagree on a secondary matter. The former teaches that the word of a created intellect, formally speaking, is not the act of understanding itself, but is a formal and expressed likeness of the thing known through the act of understanding. Scotus on the other hand (I. Sent. d. 27, q. 1) affirms that it is the actual act of understanding itself. On this difference of opinions one may consult Cajetan, on Summa I, q. 27, a. 1, and Rada, vol. I, controversia 7.
II. In transferring the name word to divine matters, attention must be paid to the difference between word in God and in created things, and all that pertains to imperfection must be excluded (below q. 4). Among the other things which import the distinction between created and uncreated word, we note these two: first, that the created word is an effect; the uncreated [word] is only the term of a production. Secondly, the created word does not presuppose understanding, but is produced in order that understanding may take place; the uncreated, however, presupposes essential and unbegotten understanding, and itself is the term of the conception and production by which the Father expresses to himself a concept altogether like to himself.
III. To-say in God is distinguished in two ways (here in the body), namely eternally and temporally, which is more broadly explained at II. Sent. d. 13, dub. 3. — Speaking of eternal saying, all concede that it is an act of the intellect, and that a twofold act of the intellect is to be posited in God: another essential and common to the three persons, by which each person understands itself and the other persons and all things; another notional, by which the Father produces or says the Word through fruitful memory. Yet Scotus disagrees from St. Thomas on a secondary matter: for the former wishes that essential saying and understanding be two distinct or disparate acts, while the Angelic [Doctor] holds that saying is contained in essential understanding and only adds expression and relation. On this controversy, which seems to be rather about the name than about the substance of any moment, see Cajetan on Summa I, q. 34, a. 1, and Rada, controversia 8. — That St. Bonaventure in this matter agrees rather with Scotus is observed by Bartholomaeus de Barberiis (vol. 1, disp. 12, q. 6, n. 376) against Forestus and others; which is sufficiently insinuated in this question in the body and especially [in the replies] to 3 and 4, and at q. 3 in the body (cf. also d. 32, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4, and a. 2, q. 1, ad 8).
IV. The first opinion, which is mentioned in the response, is also proposed by Bl. Albert, here a. 6. Alexander of Hales (Summa p. I, q. 62, m. 2) puts forward six modes in which word and to-say can be taken in God, namely: essentially, not connoting anything in a creature (the Father says himself); essentially, co-understanding the word in some way (because there is co-understood the intelligence which is appropriated to the Son); notionally (the Father speaks the Word); notionally and connoting an effect in a creature (the Father speaks to us in the Son); essentially and connoting the effect indistinctly of the three persons (the Lord spoke to Satan). The same [author] in the solution to [obj.] 2 distinguishes in God to say a word and to say a thing.
Nevertheless between the Holy Doctor and Alexander there is no contradiction except in the mode of speaking, as St. Bonaventure plainly demonstrates in the often-praised Prologue (cf. p. 472, col. II) in these words: «In the second [point] no one will judge me to have disagreed, who knows how to distinguish between proper [terms] and transferred [terms]. For just as one who says that there is no true laughter without a mouth, nor true flying without wings, does not contradict him who says that the meadow laughs without a mouth, and arrows fly without wings; so he who says that the name speaking or saying, properly taken, is not without a word, just as there is no generating without a son, does not contradict him who says that 'to speak' or 'to say' can be transferred in this way and according to some transferred signification be said of something without a generated word. In these things therefore and in all others, if anyone will look diligently and piously, he will find that I have not dared to depart from the footsteps of the fathers and elders» (cf. also the following question in the body, on the word improperly so called).
The second opinion is favored by St. Thomas in his Commentary (here q. 2, a. 2). The same [author], however, in the Summa (1, q. 34, a. 4) altogether agrees with the Seraphic [Doctor], saying: «Word in divine matters, if properly taken, is a personal name only». — Quite singular and false is the opinion of Durandus (here q. 3) asserting that word in God is properly said essentially, and only by appropriation of the Son; which doctrine follows from another singular opinion of his, namely that neither does the Son proceed by intellect, nor the Holy Spirit by will.
V. Alexander of Hales and St. Thomas, locc. citt. — Scotus, in both Scripta here q. 2, and Reportata q. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 6; Summa p. I, tr. 8, q. 35, m. 3, a. 3. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 2 princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 58, q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, on this and the following questions here q. 3. — Biel, on this and the following question here q. 3.
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- Cap. 1, 14. — Mox pro sed codd. A T si.[John] ch. 1, [v.] 14. — Soon after, in place of sed ("but"), codices A T [read] si ("if").
- Cap. 17, n. 29. In originali hic locus sic incipit: tamen non frustra in hac Trinitate non dicitur verbum etc.Ch. 17, n. 29. In the original this passage begins thus: yet not without reason in this Trinity is 'word' said, etc.
- Cap. 38.Ch. 38.
- Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12. seqq.; et Anselm., Monolog. c. 11. — Deinde codd. aa bb voci conceptum, quod bis occurrit, bis adiungunt vocabulum mentis.Cf. Augustine, IX On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 12 and following; and Anselm, Monologion c. 11. — Then codices aa bb to the word conceptum ("concept"), which occurs twice, twice append the word mentis ("of the mind").
- Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 11. n. 16; et Anselm., Monolog. c. 10. — Codd. P Q W addunt quod est esse imaginem, et cod. [?] adiungit ergo verbum dicitur quod emanat per modum imaginis.Cf. Augustine, IX On the Trinity, c. 11, n. 16; and Anselm, Monologion c. 10. — Codices P Q W add which is to be image, and cod. [?] adds therefore 'word' is said of what emanates by way of image. (The codex siglum is illegible in the OCR.)
- Cfr. August., VII. de Trin. c. 2. n. 3; et Anselm., Monolog. c. 38.Cf. Augustine, VII On the Trinity, c. 2, n. 3; and Anselm, Monologion c. 38.
- Num. 13.n. 13.
- Cfr. August., IX. de Trin. c. 7. n. 12; et Ioan. Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 21, ubi verbum vocatur animi nuntius. — Mox pro essentialis, quod habent Vat. et ed. 1 cum codd. A FLT, alii codd. et edd. aequalis; codd. aa bb aequaliter.Cf. Augustine, IX On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 12; and John Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith c. 21, where the word is called the messenger of the soul. — Soon after, in place of essentialis ("essential"), which the Vatican [edition] and ed. 1 have with codices A FLT, other codices and editions [read] aequalis ("equal"); codices aa bb aequaliter ("equally").
- Vers. 14.Verse 14.
- Cap. 62: Pater et Filius et eorum Spiritus unusquisque se ipsum et alios ambos dicit.Ch. 62: The Father and the Son and their Spirit, each one says himself and both the others.
- Cap. 63: Nihil autem aliud est summo spiritui huiusmodi dicere quam quasi cogitando intueri, sicut nostrae mentis locutio nihil aliud est quam cogitantis inspectio.Ch. 63: Nothing else is it for the supreme spirit thus to say than as it were to behold by thinking, just as the speech of our mind is nothing other than the inspection of the one thinking.
- Monolog. c. 33, ubi ostenso generaliter, mentem rationalem cogitando formare imaginem et verbum, dicit: Hoc itaque modo quis neget, summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est Verbum suum?Monologion c. 33, where, having shown generally that the rational mind by thinking forms an image and a word, he says: Who therefore would deny in this way that the supreme wisdom, when by saying itself it understands, begets a likeness consubstantial to itself, that is, its own Word?
- Ioan. 1, 3.John 1:3.
- Libr. II. de Genes. ad lit. c. 6. n. 13: Non ergo Deus toties dixit: fiat illa vel illa creatura, quoties in hoc libro repetitur Et dixit Deus. Unum quippe Verbum ille genuit, in quo dixit omnia, priusquam facta sunt singula. Cfr. et ibid. libr. I. c. 3. n. 8, et c. 6. n. 12; nec non Enarrat. in Ps. 61, v. 12, n. 18, quae in seq. q. allegatur.Book II On Genesis according to the Letter, c. 6, n. 13: God therefore did not so often say: 'let this or that creature be made,' as often as in this book is repeated And God said. For he begot one Word, in which he said all things before the individual things were made. Cf. also ibid. book I, c. 3, n. 8, and c. 6, n. 12; and also Enarrationes in Psalmos 61, v. 12, n. 18, which is cited in the following question.
- Vat. cum cod. cc perperam nosci. Paulo inferius fide plurium codd. ut FPQTW etc. reposuimus vocem aliquis, quae in Vat. desideratur.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc wrongly [reads] nosci ("to be known"). A little below, on the faith of the majority of codices such as FPQTW etc., we have restored the word aliquis ("anyone"), which is wanting in the Vatican [edition].
- Verba Anselmi hic citata vide supra arg. 3, ad oppos. — Vat., alium Anselmi textum (c. 63.) respiciens, ubi iste Doctor dicit, non esse tres dicentes... nec plura, quae dicuntur, post verba proxime antecedentia qui dicunt addit et qui dicuntur, codd. nec non edd. obnitentibus. Paulo superius eadem Vat. sola pro sicut dicere accipitur habet cum dicere accipiatur, et consequenter postea ideo pro ita et, quae est lectio nostra, cui suffragantur codd. T W et etiam cod. F, in quo verbis transpositis legitur et ita. Alii codd. cum sex primis edd. pro ita et substituunt quod.For the words of Anselm here cited, see above arg. 3, ad oppos. — The Vatican [edition], looking to another text of Anselm (c. 63), where this Doctor says that there are not three speakers... nor several [things] that are said, after the immediately preceding words qui dicunt ("who say") adds et qui dicuntur ("and which are said"), with the codices and editions resisting. A little above, the Vatican alone, in place of sicut dicere accipitur ("as 'to-say' is taken"), has cum dicere accipiatur ("when 'to-say' is taken"), and consequently afterwards ideo ("therefore") for ita et ("so also"), which is our reading, supported by codices T W and also cod. F, in which with transposed words is read et ita. Other codices with the first six editions in place of ita et substitute quod ("that").
- Libr. VII de Trin. c. 2, n. 3. — Textum integrum Anselmi habes supra fundam. 3.Book VII On the Trinity, c. 2, n. 3. — You have the entire text of Anselm above at fundament 3.
- Cap. 3. — Locus Monologii proxime citatus est cap. 63, ubi Anselmus ait: Licet igitur unusquisque seipsum, et omnes invicem se dicant; impossibile tamen est, in summa essentia esse verbum aliud praeter illud, de quo iam constat, quod sic nascitur ex eo, cuius est Verbum, ut et vera eius dici possit imago et vere Filius eius sit. In quo mirum quiddam et inexplicabile video. Ecce enim cum manifestum sit, unumquemque, scilicet Patrem et Filium et Patris Filiique Spiritum, pariter se et ambos alios dicere, et unum solum ibi esse Verbum; nullatenus tamen ipsum Verbum videtur posse dici Verbum omnium trium, sed tantum unius eorum. Constat enim, ipsum esse imaginem et Filium eius, cuius est Verbum. — Non pauci codd. post Monologio omittunt hoc, cuius loco in aliis codd. ut A G K V X legitur et.Ch. 3. — The most recently cited passage of the Monologion is c. 63, where Anselm says: Although therefore each one says himself, and all say one another in turn; nevertheless it is impossible that in the supreme essence there be any other word besides that of which it is already established that it is born from him whose Word it is, in such wise that it can truly be called his image and is truly his Son. In which I see something marvelous and inexplicable. For behold, since it is manifest that each one — namely the Father and the Son and the Spirit of the Father and the Son — equally says himself and both the others, and that there is there one Word only; yet in no way does the Word himself seem to be able to be called the Word of all three, but only of one of them. For it is established that he is the image and the Son of him whose Word he is. — Not a few codices after Monologio omit hoc, in place of which in other codices such as A G K V X is read et.
- Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 10. et 32. — Pro verbis subsequentibus Alio modo sola Vat. substituit Loqui autem sive.Cf. Anselm, Monologion cc. 10 and 32. — For the words following Alio modo ("In another way") the Vatican alone substitutes Loqui autem sive ("But to-speak or").
- Vat. subiicit est, quod removimus auctoritate codd. T Z.The Vatican [edition] adds est ("is"), which we have removed on the authority of codices T Z.
- Vat. cum cod. cc et, ed. 1 cum cod. ff nec. Mox pro conceptum codd. A V conceptio. Porro Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1 pro ideo cum ponit quia, pro sit habet fit, et in fine addit secundo. Denique pro ideo patet plures codd. incongrue et sic.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] et ("and"), ed. 1 with cod. ff [reads] nec ("nor"). Soon after, in place of conceptum ("concept"), codices A V [read] conceptio ("conception"). Further, the Vatican against the codices and ed. 1, in place of ideo cum ("therefore since") puts quia ("since"), in place of sit ("be") has fit ("becomes"), and at the end adds secundo ("secondly"). Finally, in place of ideo patet ("therefore [it] is plain") several codices incongruously [read] et sic ("and thus").
- Cap. 7. n. 12.Ch. 7, n. 12.
- In Vat. deest vocabulum actus, quod ex vetustioribus codd. restituimus.In the Vatican [edition] the word actus ("act") is missing, which we have restored from the older codices.
- In quaest. seq. Cfr. etiam d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. — Paulo superius post ipsum Verbum plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt omnia, quod utique cum Vat. supplendum est. — Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 37.In the following question. Cf. also d. 32, a. 2, q. 2. — A little above after ipsum Verbum most codices with ed. 1 omit omnia ("all things"), which must in any case be supplied with the Vatican [edition]. — Cf. Anselm, Monologion c. 37.