Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 33
Quaestio II.
Utrum proprietas sit essentia.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur de comparatione proprietatis ad essentiam, et quaeritur, utrum proprietas sit essentia. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia Ecclesia cantat1: «In personis adoretur proprietas»; sed nihil est adorandum latria nisi divina essentia: ergo etc. Unde Bernardus2: «Illam proprietatem, quae Deus non est, non mihi adorabilem credo».
2. Item, essentia est in persona, similiter3 et proprietas: aut ergo sunt ibi per differentiam, aut per indifferentiam. Si per differentiam: ergo persona est composita, quod est inconveniens. Si per indifferentiam omnimodam: ergo proprietas est essentia, et essentia est proprietas.
3. Item, proprietas aut est aliquid, aut nihil. Si nihil: ergo aut persona non distinguitur, aut distinctio personae nihil est. Si aliquid est: sed omne quod est aliquid est essentia vel creata, vel increata; sed proprietas non est essentia creata, hoc manifestum est: ergo increata.
4. Item, omne quod est, aut est Deus, aut melius Deo aut minus bonum aut maius: proprietas ergo aut est Deus, aut melius aut minus aut maius. Sed maius non potest esse, quia Deus est quo maius excogitari non potest4. Minus non potest esse, quia tunc Pater esset minor, quam sit ipse: ergo est Deus.
Contra:
1. Augustinus dicit et habetur supra, distinctione decima octava5: «Non eo est Deus quo Pater, sed deitate est Deus, paternitate est Pater»: ergo deitas non est paternitas, immo aliud et aliud.
2. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Haec est conceptio animi per se vera6, quod non est idem principium distinguendi et uniendi, formaliter loquendo; sed essentia est ratio uniendi, proprietas autem ratio distinguendi: ergo essentia et proprietas non sunt idem.
3. Item, nulla proprietas proprie praedicatur de aliqua essentia sive substantia, nisi sit in illa: ergo si proprietates dicuntur de divina essentia, ergo sunt in illa. Sed proprietas ponit rem suam circa subiectum, in quo est: ergo cum rei proprietas sit respectus, et ad respectum sequatur distinctio, de necessitate proprietates ponunt distinctionem circa divinam essentiam, si sunt in illa. Sed hoc est inconveniens: ergo etc.
4. Item, si essentia est proprietas, aut ergo per se, aut per accidens: si per se, ergo cuicumque inest essentia, et paternitas; sed hoc est falsum: ergo si est vera, est vera per accidens. Ergo cum in divinis non sit ponere accidens, nec per accidens patet etc.
5. Item, si proprietas est divina essentia, cum divina essentia vel substantia sit creatrix et creet7, ergo proprietas creat; quod non conceditur. Quaeritur igitur, quare conceditur, quod paternitas sit essentia, et quod etiam sit adoranda, non tamen, quod sit creatrix vel sapiens.
Conclusio.
Licet essentia et proprietas habeant diversum modum se habendi, quia essentia dicit absolutum, proprietas vero respectum ad terminum; tamen essentia est proprietas, et e converso.
Respondeo: Sicut Magister tangit in littera8, aliquorum positio fuit et imponitur Pictaviensi, quod proprietas nec sit essentia nec in essentia, sed solum assistens. — Sed ista positio manifeste improbata est, quia necesse est, quod sit divina essentia, si est aliquid.
Propter hoc ad intelligentiam obiectorum intelligendum, sicut praenotatum est9, quod relatio ratione comparationis ad subiectum transit in substantiam, et ideo proprietas est divina substantia; ratione vero comparationis ad terminum sive obiectum remanet; et quantum ad hoc est distinctiva10 et differt ab essentia, non quia dicat aliam essentiam, sed alium modum se habendi, qui per comparationem ad essentiam vel personam dicit modum, nihil addens; in comparatione vero ad correlativum vere dicit rem11 et distinctionem: et ideo non est vanitas in ratione intelligendi nec compositio in re, sed vera distinctio. Et quoniam iste respectus non dicit aliud quam essentiam, ipsi comparatus, similiter nec aliud quam personam: ideo vere est essentia et persona. — Sed quia ulterius respectus ille non est essentiae ad aliud, sed personae ad personam; ideo respectus et relationes, proprie loquendo, sunt in personis, non in essentia: quia personae secundum eos referuntur et distinguuntur, in essentia autem non, quia12 nec refertur nec distinguitur. Sunt tamen in essentia divina, loquendo communiter et improprie, ut dicatur in divina essentia esse omne quod est divina essentia, vel omne quod est in essentia vel persona.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod alio est Deus, alio est Pater; dicendum, quod ablativus facit rationem dicendi vel denominandi; unde et alietas, per ablativum significata, attenditur solum quantum ad modum, non quantum ad essentiam, ut patet.
Ad 2. Ad illud similiter quod obiicitur, quod non idem est principium distinguendi et uniendi; patet responsio, quia proprietas distinguit in eo, quod differens non essentia, sed modo; qui modus non dicit compositionem, quia transit in substantiam; nec dicit solum intellectum, quia res est et manet respectu obiecti.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non praedicatur de substantia, nisi13 quod est in substantia; di-
cendum, quod non praedicatur de substantia ut de subiecto, nec per inhaerentiam sed solum de persona sic praedicatur. Unde de essentia praedicatur, quia essentia et proprietas sunt unum in persona, non quia unum sit in alio.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, utrum praedicetur per se, aut per accidens; dicendum, quod per se, quia per personam; non per accidens, quia persona non est aliud ab essentia. Quoniam igitur res divinae superexcedunt res inferiores, sic et praedicatio praedicationem.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod si essentia creat, et proprietas; dicendum est ad hoc, quod quamvis proprietas sit essentia, tamen essentia non supponit proprietatem, nec e converso. Unde non sequitur, quod illud quod convenit essentiae, conveniat personae, vel e converso; aliqua tamen conveniunt et proprietati, aliqua non.
Ad quaestionem incidentem. Unde notandum, quod quaedam dicuntur de divina essentia in se, ut puta illa quae dicuntur in oppositione ad creaturam, ut immensa, increata et huiusmodi; et haec dicuntur de proprietatibus. Aliqua dicuntur de divina essentia ut in personis, ut esse communicabilem, et esse in tribus unam; talia conveniunt essentiae, ut habet rationem formae, et in hoc differt ratio essentiae et proprietatis; et talia non dicuntur de proprietatibus. Rursus aliqua dicuntur de essentia ut esse principium actionis, ut esse potentem, sapientem, volentem, ut creare; et talia non dicuntur de proprietatibus. Unde notandum, quod adiectiva essentialia, quae essentiam in se respiciunt ut diversam a creatura, dicuntur de proprietatibus; quae autem de ipsa formaliter, sive ut est forma, vel ut est principium, non dicuntur. Et sic patent omnia quaesita.
I. In hac quaestione docetur, quomodo se habeant proprietates ad essentiam. Difficultates principales in praecedenti quaest. et supra d. 26. q. 1. explicatae sunt. Conclusiones ipsae duobus corollariis magis determinantur, scil. quomodo proprietates sint in personis et in essentia.
II. Sensus solutionis ad 1. est: licet ablativus importet habitudinem in ratione causae formalis, quae secundum rem non est in Deo, tamen secundum rationem intelligendi ponenda est; et hoc sufficit, ut dicatur: non eo (id est non ea ratione sive formalitate) est Deus, qua est Pater. Sed Gilbertus, distinguens paternitatem realiter a deitate, falso intellexit ista verba in hoc sensu: quantum ad id quod est Pater, non est Deus (cfr. hic dub. 1.). — De praedicatione per inhaerentiam in solut. ad 3. cfr. quaest. seq., et infra d. 34. q. 2. — Solut. ad 4. eruitur ex hoc principio, quod, cum res divinae in infinitum excedant intellectum creatum, interdum etiam regulae logicae deficiunt, ut haec regula, quod omnis praedicatio sit vel per se, vel per accidens. Nam utrumque negatur quoad propositionem essentia est proprietas. Quoad praedicationem per se hoc intelligendum videtur de tali praedicatione in sensu stricto, cum S. Thomas (S. 1. q. 39. a. 6. ad. 2.) in casu simili istam praedicationem admittat. — Plura attentione digna leguntur in solut. ad 5. — Duae quaestiones huc spectantes a S. Bonaventura explicite non tractantur, quae inter Scholasticos, praesertim Thomistas et Scotistas disputabantur, scilicet, utrum relatio includatur in ratione essentiae, et vice versa, quod negat Scotus cum multis aliis. Alia est, utrum relationes praecise sumtae dicant perfectionem, quod iterum Scotus negat. Interpretes S. Bonaventurae ipsum ad utramque partem trahere volunt. Probabilius nobis videtur, ipsum saltem in secunda quaestione favere potius Scoto, ut vult Barth. de Barberiis, tom. I. disp. 13. q. 3.
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 5. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. unica; Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 39. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. 5. 6; S. p. I. tr. 9. q. 39. m. 2. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Aegid. R., hic I. princ. q. 2. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 55. q. 5.
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Question II.
Whether property is essence.
Second, inquiry is made concerning the comparison of property to essence, and it is asked whether property is essence. And that it is so seems to be shown:
1. Because the Church sings1: «Let property be adored in the persons»; but nothing is to be adored with latria except the divine essence: therefore etc. Whence Bernard2: «That property, which is not God, I do not believe to be adorable to me».
2. Likewise, essence is in the person, and similarly3 property: therefore either they are there by difference, or by indifference. If by difference: then the person is composite, which is unfitting. If by indifference of every kind: then property is essence, and essence is property.
3. Likewise, property is either something or nothing. If nothing: then either the person is not distinguished, or the distinction of the person is nothing. If it is something: but everything that is something is essence, either created or uncreated; but property is not created essence — this is manifest: therefore uncreated.
4. Likewise, everything that is, either is God, or is better than God, or is less good, or is greater: therefore property either is God, or is better, or less, or greater. But it cannot be greater, because God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived4. Nor can it be less, because then the Father would be less than himself: therefore it is God.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine says, and it is held above in distinction eighteen5: «It is not by that by which he is Father that he is God, but by deity he is God, by paternity he is Father»: therefore deity is not paternity, but rather one thing and another.
2. Likewise, this seems by reason. This is a conception of the mind true through itself6, that the principle of distinguishing and of uniting is not the same, formally speaking; but essence is the ground of uniting, while property is the ground of distinguishing: therefore essence and property are not the same.
3. Likewise, no property is properly predicated of any essence or substance unless it is in it: therefore if properties are said of the divine essence, then they are in it. But property places its thing about the subject in which it is: therefore since the property of a thing is a relation, and from a relation distinction follows, of necessity properties place a distinction about the divine essence, if they are in it. But this is unfitting: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if essence is property, then it is so either per se or per accidens: if per se, then to whatever essence belongs, paternity also belongs; but this is false: therefore if it is true, it is true per accidens. Therefore since in the divine there is no place for the accidental, neither can it be per accidens: this is plain etc.
5. Likewise, if property is the divine essence, since the divine essence or substance is creator and creates7, then property creates; which is not conceded. It is asked, therefore, why it is conceded that paternity is essence, and that it is also to be adored, yet not that it is creator or wise.
Conclusion.
Although essence and property have a different mode of being-toward, because essence states the absolute, but property a relation to a term; nevertheless essence is property, and conversely.
I respond: As the Master touches in the text8, the position of certain ones was — and is imputed to the Poitevin — that property is neither essence nor in essence, but only assistant. — But this position has been manifestly disproved, because it is necessary that it be the divine essence, if it is anything.
For this reason, for the understanding of the objections, it must be understood, as has been noted before9, that relation by reason of comparison to its subject passes into substance, and therefore property is divine substance; but by reason of comparison to its term or object it remains; and as to this it is distinctive10 and differs from essence, not because it states another essence, but another mode of being-toward, which by comparison to essence or person states a mode adding nothing; whereas in comparison to the correlative it truly states a thing11 and a distinction: and therefore there is no vanity in the account of understanding nor composition in the thing, but a true distinction. And since this relation states nothing other than essence, when compared to it, and likewise nothing other than person: therefore it truly is essence and person. — But because furthermore that relation is not of essence to another, but of person to person; therefore relations and references, properly speaking, are in the persons, not in the essence: because the persons according to them are referred and distinguished, but the essence is not, because12 it is neither referred nor distinguished. Yet they are in the divine essence, speaking commonly and improperly, so that it is said that whatever is divine essence, or whatever is in essence or person, is in the divine essence.
To the arguments:
To 1. To that which is objected, that by one thing he is God, by another he is Father; it must be said that the ablative makes the manner of speaking or denominating; whence also the otherness signified by the ablative is regarded only as to mode, not as to essence, as is plain.
To 2. Likewise to that which is objected, that the principle of distinguishing and of uniting is not the same; the response is plain, because property distinguishes in this — that what differs does so not by essence, but by mode; which mode does not state composition, because it passes into substance; nor does it state only an intellectual concept, because it is a thing and remains in respect to the object.
To 3. To that which is objected, that nothing is predicated of substance unless13 it is in substance; it must be
said that it is not predicated of substance as of a subject, nor by inherence, but only of the person it is so predicated. Whence it is predicated of the essence, because essence and property are one in the person, not because the one is in the other.
To 4. To that which is objected, whether it is predicated per se or per accidens; it must be said per se, because through the person; not per accidens, because the person is not other than the essence. Therefore, since divine things exceed inferior things, so also predication exceeds predication.
To 5. To that which is finally objected, that if essence creates, so also property; it must be said to this that, although property is essence, yet essence does not suppose property, nor conversely. Whence it does not follow that what belongs to the essence belongs to the person, or conversely; yet some things belong also to the property, others not.
To the incidental question. Whence it must be noted that some things are said of the divine essence in itself, namely those which are said in opposition to the creature, such as immense, uncreated, and the like; and these are said of the properties. Some things are said of the divine essence as in the persons, such as to be communicable, and to be one in three; such things belong to the essence as it has the relation of form, and in this differ the account of essence and the account of property; and such things are not said of the properties. Again, some things are said of the essence as being the principle of action, such as to be powerful, wise, willing, to create; and such things are not said of the properties. Whence it must be noted that essential adjectives which regard the essence in itself as diverse from the creature are said of the properties; but those which regard it formally, either as it is form, or as it is principle, are not said. And thus all the things asked are made plain.
I. In this question is taught how properties stand toward the essence. The principal difficulties have been explained in the preceding question and above at d. 26, q. 1. The conclusions themselves are further determined by two corollaries, namely how properties are in the persons and in the essence.
II. The sense of the solution to the first [objection] is: although the ablative imports a relation in the manner of a formal cause — which according to the thing is not in God — nevertheless according to the manner of understanding it must be posited; and this suffices for it to be said: not by that by which (that is, not by that account or formality) he is God, by which he is Father. But Gilbert, distinguishing paternity really from deity, falsely understood these words in this sense: as to that which is Father, he is not God (cf. here dub. 1). — On the predication by inherence in the solution to the third [objection], cf. the following question, and below d. 34, q. 2. — The solution to the fourth [objection] is drawn from this principle: that since divine things exceed the created intellect to infinity, sometimes even the rules of logic fail, as this rule, that every predication is either per se or per accidens. For both are denied of the proposition essence is property. As regards predication per se, this seems to be understood of such predication in a strict sense, since St. Thomas (S. I, q. 39, a. 6, ad 2) in a similar case admits this predication. — Many things worth attention are read in the solution to the fifth. — Two questions bearing on this matter are not explicitly treated by St. Bonaventure, which were disputed among the Scholastics, especially the Thomists and Scotists, namely whether relation is included in the account of essence, and conversely, which Scotus with many others denies. The other is whether relations precisely taken state perfection, which again Scotus denies. Interpreters of St. Bonaventure wish to draw him to either side. It seems to us more probable that he himself, at least in the second question, favors rather Scotus, as Bartholomew of Barberiis maintains, vol. I, disp. 13, q. 3.
III. Alex. of Hales, S. pt. I, q. 68, m. 5, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. unica; Report. here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 39, a. 1. 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3. 5. 6; S. pt. I, tr. 9, q. 39, m. 2, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1. 2. — Giles of Rome, here I principle, q. 2. 3. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 55, q. 5.
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- In Praefatione de Ss. Trinitate, cuius auctor esse perhibetur aut Pelagius papa, aut S. Ambrosius.In the Preface of the Most Holy Trinity, whose author is reputed to be either Pope Pelagius or St. Ambrose.
- Libr. V. de Consid. c. 7. n. 15: Si quartam divinitatem adiicere placet; interim ego hanc, quae Deus non est, persuasi.Book V On Consideration, c. 7, n. 15: «If it pleases [anyone] to add a fourth divinity; meanwhile I am persuaded that this one, which is not God, [is not adorable to me]».
- In plurimis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 desideratur similiter.In very many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 the word similiter (similarly) is missing.
- Boeth., III. de Consol. prosa 10.Boethius, On the Consolation [of Philosophy], book III, prose 10. [The phrase "than which nothing greater can be conceived" is in fact Anselmian; the Quaracchi editors evidently cite Boethius for the underlying axiom of the supreme good.]
- In Magistri, c. 3. Cfr. et supra d. 6. dub. 2, et d. 19, lit. II. q. 2. ad 1.In the Master [Lombard], c. 3. Cf. also above d. 6, dub. 2, and d. 19, littera II, q. 2, ad 1.
- Pro per se vera codd. L quia per se nota. Paulo inferius pro autem Vat. cum paucis mss. et ed. 1 est. Cfr. Anselm., Monolog. c. 13.For per se vera (true through itself) codices L read quia per se nota (because known through itself). A little below, for autem (but) the Vatican edition with a few manuscripts and the first edition reads est (is). Cf. Anselm, Monologion, c. 13.
- Cap. 1. — Pictaviensis, qui subinde commemoratur, non est ille Petrus Pictaviensis, qui Cancellarius fuit Universitatis Parisiensis scripsitque «Quinque libros Sententiarum» (†1205), sed est Gilb. Porretanus, Episcopus quondam Pictaviensis. — Aliquanto inferius verbis divina essentia cod. T praefigit in.Chapter 1. — The Poitevin who is repeatedly mentioned is not that Peter of Poitiers who was Chancellor of the University of Paris and wrote the Five Books of Sentences (†1205), but rather Gilbert Porreta, formerly Bishop of Poitiers. — Somewhat below, before the words divina essentia (divine essence) codex T prefixes in.
- Sic codd. G H K R T V X Y π et alii, Vat. distincta. Paulo inferius pro qui codd. bb quia, et dein post personam Vat. interiicit solum.Thus read codices G H K R T V X Y π and others; the Vatican edition reads distincta (distinct). A little below, for qui (which) codices bb read quia (because), and then after personam (person) the Vatican edition interjects solum (only).
- Quaest. praeced., et d. 26. q. 2. — Paulo post pro divina substantia cod. bb divina essentia.The preceding question, and d. 26, q. 2. — A little after, for divina substantia (divine substance) codex bb reads divina essentia (divine essence).
- Intellige: aliquid, sive entitatem relativam, quae, dum nihilo opponitur, res vocatur.Understand: something, that is, a relative entity, which, when it is opposed to nothing, is called a thing.
- Vat., omissis vocibus non, quia nec, non particula in ante essentia, sic: essentia autem nec refertur etc. Nostra lectio est communis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Paulo superius post secundum eos cod. T adiicit tantum. Pro Sunt tamen in essentia divina codd. G H K P Q S T V et alii sed tamen in divina essentia. In fine corp. ante essentia cod. T omittit in.The Vatican edition, omitting the words non, quia nec and the particle non before in essentia, reads thus: but the essence is not referred etc. Our reading is the common one of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. A little above, after secundum eos (according to them) codex T adds tantum (only). For Sunt tamen in essentia divina (yet they are in the divine essence) codices G H K P Q S T V and others read sed tamen in divina essentia (but yet in the divine essence). At the end of the body, before essentia, codex T omits in.
- Codd. aa bb clarius: quia proprietas non distinguit in eo quod differunt in essentia. Cod. M post differens inserit est.Codices aa, bb more clearly: «because property does not distinguish in that they differ in essence». Codex M after differens inserts est (is).
- Postulante contextu, ex cod. Z restituimus nisi. Plures codd. ut X V aa bb cc pro nisi quod minus bene exhibent quod non. Mox post dicendum, quod supple: proprietas. Dein pro ut de subiecto non pauci codd. perperam vel de subiecto, cod. L ut substantia.As the context demands, we have restored nisi (unless) from codex Z. Several codices, such as X V aa bb cc, less well read quod non (what does not) instead of nisi quod. Soon after dicendum, quod supply proprietas (property). Then for ut de subiecto (as of a subject) not a few codices wrongly read vel de subiecto (or of a subject); codex L reads ut substantia (as substance).