Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 23
QUAESTIO II.
Utrum in divinis nomine substantiae et subsistentiae convenienter utendum sit.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomen substantiae dici debeat in divinis vel etiam subsistentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Augustinus libro quinto de Trinitate1: «Deus absque ulla dubitatione dicitur substantia, vel si melius appellatur, essentia».
2. Item, tam Boethius2 quam Augustinus de Trinitate dicunt, quod aliorum nominum genera, ut
magnitudo, bonitas etc., transeunt in substantiam: si ergo substantia non transit in aliud, constat substantiae nomen proprie dici; nam si non proprie, aeque bene diceretur, quod substantia transit in alia, sicut e converso.
3. Item, ratio substantiae secundum Philosophum3 est quod est ens per se; sed solus Deus propriissime est ens per se: ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo.
4. Item, ratio substantiae secundum Augustinum4 est dici ad se et absolute; sed ibi est proprie dici ad se, ubi nulla est dependentia: ergo si hoc est in Deo, ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Augustinus septimo de Trinitate5: «Inconveniens est dicere de Deo, quod substet bonitati suae»; sed si de bonitate, eadem ratione et de qualibet proprietate: ergo, simpliciter loquendo, inconveniens est dicere, ipsum esse substantiam.
2. Item, Boethius in libro de Trinitate6: «Deus non est substantia, sed supra omnem substantiam»: ergo hoc nomen substantia proprie est in creaturis et non in Deo.
3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione: quia7 omne quod substat, habet aliquid inhaerens; sed in Deo non est inhaerens neque inhaerentia: ergo nec substantia.
4. Item, omne quod substat alii8, componitur illi; ergo ubi non est compositio nec nomen compositionis, ibi nec nomen substantiae: ergo cum in divinis non sit compositio, patet etc.
Conclusio. Substantia, quatenus dicit stare per se, non per aliud, proprie dicitur in divinis; quatenus dicit substare accidenti inhaerenti, non admittitur; quatenus dicit substare sive alii distinguenti sive alii perficienti, recipitur, sed magis propter imperfectionem nostri intellectus quam secundum proprietatem divini esse.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen substantiae a duplici proprietate potest dici, videlicet a per se stando, non per aliud; et9 sic proprie est in divinis, et magis etiam proprie quam in creaturis; vel a substando alii vel aliis, et hoc est10 tripliciter: vel alii inhaerenti, et sic falso et improprie dicitur in divinis, quia proprietates in divinis non sunt accidentes nec inhaerentes; vel alii distinguenti, et sic dicitur in divinis non omnino improprie nec omnino proprie, quia proprietas illa non inhaeret, sed distinguit11, et ideo non facit subsistere sive substare, quasi sub alio stare, sed existere, quasi ab alio esse — et hinc est, quod Richardus dicit in libro de Trinitate12, quod «melius dicitur existentia quam substantia» — vel quia substat alii ut perficienti, et sic dicitur res naturae substare respectu essentiae. Et iste modus magis est circa nostrum intelligere quam circa divinum esse, quia13, sicut patebit in sequenti problemate, ex nostro intellectu evenit talis modus dicendi, non ex proprietate divini esse.
I. Secundum duplicem proprietatem, quae in substantia potest attendi, scilicet stare per se et substare aliis (cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 5. 6.), datur etiam responsio duplex ad quaestionem. Secundum primam proprietatem substantia recto transfertur ad divina; substantia in secundo sensu sive substare aliis iterum tripliciter potest intelligi, cui distinctioni respondet triplex responsio.
II. Quoad sententiam Richardi a S. Victore, quod in divinis melius dicatur existentia quam subsistentia, observandum est, quod ipse intelligit subsistens in sensu stricto pro eo quod per se distinctum est a proprietate, quae in ipso est ut in subiecto; existens vero pro eo quod per se est distinctum ex modo originis. «Sed alii doctores S. Scripturae subsistentias large accipiunt pro qualitercumque per se existentibus hypostasibus, et ideo personas divinas subsistentias vel substantias vocant». Ita B. Alber., hic a. I. ad. 2; cfr. etiam S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 3. ad 1.
III. Terminus res naturae, hic in corp. et alibi saepe occurrens, sumtus est ex S. Hilario (de Trinit. IX. n. 3.) et significat suppositum. Cfr. infra d. 34. q. I. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 29. a. 2. in corp. dicit: «Substantia dicitur res naturae, secundum quod supponitur alicui naturae communi, sicut hic homo est res naturae humanae».
IV. In conclusionibus omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 1. a. 3. § 1., et q. 57. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. 3. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 13. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R., q. 2. collater. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 5. n. 31. seqq., a. 68. q. 1. n. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2.
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QUESTION II.
Whether in divine matters the names substance and subsistence are to be fittingly used.
Secondly it is asked, whether the name substance — or also subsistence — ought to be said in divine matters. And that [it] so [should be], it seems:
1. Augustine, in book five On the Trinity1: «God is without any doubt called substance, or, if it be more rightly called, essence».
2. Likewise, both Boethius2 and Augustine On the Trinity say that the genera of the other names — such as
magnitude, goodness, etc. — pass over into substance: if therefore substance does not pass over into another, it is established that the name substance is properly said [of God]; for if [it were] not properly [said], it would equally well be said that substance passes over into the others, just as conversely.
3. Likewise, the account of substance according to the Philosopher3 is "that which is being-through-itself"; but God alone is most properly being-through-itself: therefore the name substance is most properly in God.
4. Likewise, the account of substance according to Augustine4 is "to be said in relation to itself and absolutely"; but it is properly said "in relation to itself" there, where there is no dependence: therefore if this is in God, therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Augustine in the seventh [book] On the Trinity5: «It is unfitting to say of God, that he stands under (substet) his goodness»; but if [unfitting] of goodness, by the same reasoning [it is unfitting] also of any property whatever: therefore, simply speaking, it is unfitting to say that he himself is a substance.
2. Likewise, Boethius in the book On the Trinity6: «God is not a substance, but above every substance»: therefore this name substance is properly in creatures and not in God.
3. Likewise, this same [point] is seen by reason: since7 everything which substands has something inhering [in it]; but in God there is neither anything inhering nor inherence: therefore neither [is there] substance.
4. Likewise, everything which substands another8 is composed with it; therefore where there is neither composition nor the name of composition, there [is] neither the name of substance: therefore since in divine matters there is no composition, it is clear etc.
Conclusion. Substance, insofar as it signifies "to stand through itself, not through another", is properly said in divine matters; insofar as it signifies "to substand an inhering accident", it is not admitted; insofar as it signifies "to substand either another distinguishing [property] or another perfecting [nature]", it is received, but more on account of the imperfection of our intellect than according to a property of the divine being.
I respond: It must be said that the name substance can be said from a twofold property, namely from "standing through itself, not through another"; and9 thus it is properly in divine matters, and even more properly than in creatures; or from "substanding another or others", and this10 in three ways: either [substanding] an inhering [accident], and so [the name] is falsely and improperly said in divine matters, since the properties in divine matters are neither accidents nor inhering; or [substanding] another distinguishing [property], and so it is said in divine matters not altogether improperly nor altogether properly, since that property does not inhere, but distinguishes11, and therefore it does not make [the divine] subsist or substand, as it were "to stand under another", but [rather to] exist, as it were "to be from another" — and hence it is that Richard says in the book On the Trinity12, that «existentia is better said than substantia» — or because [the supposit] substands another as a perfecting [nature], and so the thing of nature (res naturae) is said to substand with respect to the essence. And this mode is more about our understanding than about the divine being, since13, as will be clear in the following problem, this manner of speaking arises from our intellect, not from a property of the divine being.
I. According to the twofold property which can be considered in substance — namely, to stand through itself and to substand others (cfr. above, d. 8, p. II, dub. 5, 6) — a twofold response is also given to the question. According to the first property, substance is rightly transferred to divine matters; substance in the second sense, or "to substand others", can again be understood in three ways, to which distinction a threefold response corresponds.
II. As regards the opinion of Richard of St. Victor, that in divine matters existentia is better said than subsistentia, it is to be observed that he understands subsistens in a strict sense for that which is per se distinct from the property which is in it as in a subject; whereas existens [he takes] for that which is per se distinct by mode of origin. «But other doctors of Sacred Scripture take subsistences broadly for hypostases existing per se in any way whatever, and therefore they call the divine persons subsistences or substances». So Bl. Albert, here a. 1, ad 2; cfr. also St. Thomas, S. I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1.
III. The term res naturae (thing of [a] nature), here in the body and elsewhere often occurring, is taken from St. Hilary (On the Trinity IX, n. 3) and signifies supposit. Cfr. below, d. 34, q. 1. — St. Thomas, S. I, q. 29, a. 2, in the body, says: «Substance is called res naturae, insofar as it is supposited under some common nature, just as this man is the res naturae of human [nature]».
IV. In the conclusions all agree. Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 48, m. 1, a. 3, § 1, and q. 57, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, 3. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following, here a. 1; S. p. I, tr. 10, q. 13, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, on this and the following, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Aegid. R. (Giles of Rome), q. 2, collater. 1 and 2. — Henr. of Ghent, S. a. 32, q. 5, n. 31 ff., a. 68, q. 1, n. 4. — Dionys. the Carthusian, here q. 1, 2.
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- Cap. 2. n. 3.[August., V. de Trin.] c. 2, n. 3.
- Libr. de Trin. c. 4; et August., V. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11. seq. — Mox aliqui codd. ut VX transeant pro transeunt. Dein fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 bis posuimus transit loco transeat. Codd. V aa post nomen satis bene addunt ibi.[Boethius,] book On the Trinity, c. 4; and Augustine, V On the Trinity, c. 10, n. 11 ff. — Soon after, some codices such as VX [read] transeant in place of transeunt. Then, on the witness of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have twice set transit in place of transeat. Codices V, aa, after nomen, rightly add ibi.
- Aristot. substantiam communiter negative definit, ut in libr. de Praedicam. c. de Substantia: «Neque de subiecto aliquo dicitur, neque in subiecto aliquo est»; et V. Metaph. text. 13 (IV. c. 8.): «Ultimum subiectum, quod non dicitur de alio»; positive autem libr. I. Phys. text. 27. seq. (c. 3.), ubi ipsam vocat: «illud quod vere est», et VII. Metaph. text. 1 (VI. c. 1.): «simpliciter ens». Ex his verbis vel etiam ad oppositionem accidentis, quod secundum Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 35. (IV. c. 30.) alteri inest, seu cuius esse est alteri inesse, haec vulgaris definitio substantiae formata esse videtur, quae occurrit et in Ioan. Damasc. Dialectica c. 4, et in Averrois Comment. VII. Metaph. text. 18: Substantiae, quia sunt existentes per se. — In fine argumenti ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus propositionem ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo, quae in Vat. et cod. recentiore cc perperam deest. Paulo ante auctoritate plurium mss. ut HLMNOYZ post propriissime est adiecimus ens.Aristotle commonly defines substance negatively, as in the book On the Categories, ch. On Substance: «Neither is it said of any subject, nor is it in any subject»; and Metaphysics V, text 13 (IV, c. 8): «The ultimate subject, which is not said of another»; positively, however, [in] book I Physics, text 27 ff. (c. 3), where he calls it: «that which truly is»; and Metaphysics VII, text 1 (VI, c. 1): «being simply». From these words — or also from the opposition to accident, which according to Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 35 (IV, c. 30), is in another, or whose being is to be in another — this common definition of substance seems to have been formed, which occurs both in John of Damascus, Dialectica c. 4, and in Averroes, Commentary on Metaphysics VII, text 18: Substances, because they are things existing per se. — At the end of the argument, from the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the proposition ergo nomen substantiae propriissime est in Deo ("therefore the name substance is most properly in God"), which is wrongly absent from the Vatican edition and the more recent codex cc. A little before, on the authority of several manuscripts such as HLMNOYZ, we have added ens after propriissime est.
- Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 9: «Absurdum est autem, ut substantia relative dicatur: omnis enim res ad se ipsam subsistit: quanto magis Deus»? Et ibidem c. 5. n. 10: «Utrumque (essentia et substantia) ad se dicitur, non relative ad aliquid». — Mox codd. W Y sed loco ergo si, et codd. V X differentia pro dependentia.Book VII On the Trinity, c. 4, n. 9: «It is absurd that substance be said relatively: for every thing subsists in relation to itself: how much more God!»? And in the same place, c. 5, n. 10: «Each (essence and substance) is said in relation to itself, not relatively to something». — Soon after, codices W, Y [read] sed in place of ergo si, and codices V, X [read] differentia in place of dependentia.
- Cap. 5. n. 10: Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat et subsit Deus bonitati suae.[Augustine, VII de Trin.] c. 5, n. 10: It is impious, however, to say that God should subsist and stand under (subsit) his own goodness.
- Cap. 4: Nam substantia in illo non est vere substantia, sed ultra substantiam.[Boethius, de Trin.] c. 4: For substance in him is not truly substance, but beyond substance.
- Vat. cum cod. cc omittit quia. Paulo infra post non est in nonnullis mss. ut BSWY aa additur aliquid.The Vatican edition with codex cc omits quia ("since"). A little below, after non est, in some manuscripts such as B, S, W, Y, aa is added aliquid ("anything").
- Vat. contra auctoritatem mss. et ed. 1 minus distincte aliquid pro alii.The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, less distinctly [reads] aliquid ("something") in place of alii ("another").
- Codd. inter se non conveniunt; maior pars eorum cum ed. 1 exhibet et, pro quo aliqui ut ATVX sed, aliqui cum Vat. si. Mox post magis in multis mss. ut AFGITVXYZ etc. et ed. 1 adiungitur etiam, quod Vat. omittit.The codices do not agree among themselves; the greater part of them with edition 1 exhibits et, in place of which some such as ATVX [read] sed, some with the Vatican edition [read] si. Soon after, after magis, in many manuscripts such as AFGITVXYZ etc. and edition 1 is appended etiam ("also"), which the Vatican edition omits.
- Aliqui codd. ut ATW cum ed. 1 omittunt est. Dein post inhaerenti cod. O addit et haec est propria acceptio substantiae.Some codices such as ATW with edition 1 omit est. Then after inhaerenti, codex O adds et haec est propria acceptio substantiae ("and this is the proper acceptation of substance").
- Plura de hoc vide infra d. 33. q. 2. — In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur sed distinguit, quae tamen verba exstant in aliis codd. et ed. 1. Mox verbis ab alio esse cod. O praemittit sub alio sistere id est, ubi et multi codd. ut ACFIKMSTUXY cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 quia pro quasi.See more on this below, d. 33, q. 2. — In the Vatican edition and codex cc the words sed distinguit are wanting, which words however stand in the other codices and in edition 1. Soon after, before the words ab alio esse, codex O places sub alio sistere id est, where also many codices such as ACFIKMSTUXY with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [read] quia in place of quasi.
- Libr. IV. c. 20: «Personae rectius dicuntur existentiae, quam substantiae vel subsistentiae». — Ex quibus ultimis verbis Vat. pro textu selegit subsistentia, dum codd. cum sex primis edd. exhibent substantia. Mox ex codd. W bb (ee a secunda manu) claritatis gratia adiecimus alii post substat.[Richard of St. Victor,] book IV, c. 20: «Persons are more correctly called existences than substances or subsistences». — From these last words the Vatican edition selected subsistentia for the text, while the codices with the first six editions exhibit substantia. Soon after, from codices W, bb (ee by a second hand), for the sake of clarity, we have added alii after substat.
- Vat. cum cod. cc, ceteris codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, et pro quia. In fine responsionis codd. X Z divinae essentiae loco divini esse.The Vatican edition with codex cc, with the other codices and edition 1 resisting, [reads] et in place of quia. At the end of the response, codices X, Z [read] divinae essentiae ("of the divine essence") in place of divini esse ("of the divine being").