Bonaventure

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum nomen essentiae in divinis convenienter adhibeatur; insuper quaeritur de differentia nominum essentia, subsistentia, substantia et persona.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum nomen essentiae dici [debeat] in divinis. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Augustinus septimo de Trinitate¹: «Essentia vere ac proprie dicitur in divinis, ita ut forte solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam».

2. Item, hoc nomen qui est est nomen, quod ipse Deus sibi imposuit²; ergo si ipse proprie se nominat, Deus proprie dicitur qui est; sed de quocumque proprie dicitur qui est, proprie potest dici in ipso³ essentia: ergo et in divinis dicitur essentia.

3. Item, inter omnia nomina nomen essentiae est absolutissimum, unde essentia secundum Avicennam⁴ dicitur rei quidditas nomine absoluto; cum ergo in divinis sit omnimoda absolutio: ergo et nomen essentiae.

Contra: 1. Non intelligimus Deum nisi in creaturis et per⁵ creaturas; sed nominatio Dei est per nostrum intelligere: ergo nullum nomen absolutum omnino debet poni in Deo.

2. Item, quaero, in quo differant nomen substantiae et⁶ essentiae? Nam substantia aut dicit commune, aut suppositum. Si suppositum: ergo superfluit nomen personae; si commune: ergo superfluit

nomen essentiae: ergo cum debeamus labia nostra circumcidere in loquendo de Deo, nequaquam debet hoc nomen poni in Deo⁷.

3. Item, quaeritur gratia huius de necessitate et sufficientia et differentia istorum quatuor nominum: essentia, subsistentia, substantia et persona.

Conclusio. Nomen essentiae convenienter adhibetur in divinis; ratio et sufficientia quatuor nominum explicantur.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod ista quatuor nomina sive vocabula⁸ in genere respondent quatuor vocabulis in Graeco, quae sunt: usia, usiosis, hypostasis et prosopon, ut usia respondeat essentiae, usiosis substantiae, hypostasis subsistentiae et prosopon personae.

Ratio autem et sufficientia horum⁹ quatuor nominum ab aliquibus accipitur sic. In divinis est accipere communicabile et incommunicabile, et hoc ex veritate et necessitate fidei, quae dicit Deum trinum et unum.

Et cum nos¹⁰ debeamus intelligere in Deo, quod vere est, per id quod videmus in his inferioribus, maxime secundum nobiles et primas et praecipuas conditiones; cum in communi in inferioribus inveniatur quod est et qui est¹¹, ratione cuius significatur in concretione et in abstractione, ut dicatur homo et humanitas: sic in divinis intelligimus, quamvis non intelligamus in differentia illa duo. Ideo et in abstractione significamus¹² per hoc nomen deitas, et in concretione per hoc nomen Deus. Et ideo imposuimus ei nomen, quo significaretur ipsum quo est, et hoc est essentia; et ipsum quod est, et hoc est substantia; et ita haec duo nomina accipiuntur ex parte communis.

Est etiam in divinis accipere, quod est incommunicabile, et hoc est quid distinctum, sive quis distinctus. Et hoc quidem contingit dupliciter intelligi sive significari: vel in quantum distinguibile, et hoc per nomen subsistentiae sive hypostasis; vel in quantum distinctum, et hoc per nomen personae. Et licet in Deo nihil differant distinguibile et distinctum, quia potentia in eo semper actui est coniuncta, tamen contingit duplici nomine significari¹³.

Unde differunt ista quatuor nomina secundum modum intelligendi, sicut quo est, quod est, qui est, quis est¹⁴. Et quoniam in Deo idem est quo est et quod est ex una parte, et distinguibile et distinctum ex alia secundum rem, Sancti accipiunt et substantiam et essentiam pro eodem; similiter et hypostasis nomine utuntur Graeci pro supposito actu distincto. Unde distinctio per quo et quod est, et per distinguibile et distinctum in nominibus¹⁵ divinis non facit diversitatem nisi secundum rationem intelligendi.

Fuerunt etiam¹⁶ alii volentes dicere, quod substantia et essentia accipiuntur ex parte communis, sed differenter, quia illud commune contingit intelligi sub duplici ratione: una est, quod omnia indigent¹⁷ eo, ut sint; alia est, quod ipsum non eget aliis. Primo modo dicitur essentia, a qua et per quam omnia sunt; secundo modo substantia, quoniam per se stat, omnibus¹⁸ aliis circumscriptis. Subsistentia vero sive hypostasis et persona accipiuntur ex parte incommunicabilis et differunt. Quamvis enim utrumque nomen dicat quid distinctum, tamen hypostasis dicit suppositum substantiae distinctum, sed persona dicit distinctum proprietate nobili.

Fuerunt alii, qui voluerunt dicere, quod ista quatuor nomina distinguuntur per communicabile et incommunicabile, secundum quod potest unumquodque dupliciter significari: vel in abstractione, vel in concretione. Nam communicabile potest significari¹⁹ in abstractione, et sic dicitur essentia; vel in concretione ad suppositum, et sic dicitur substantia. Similiter incommunicabile potest significari in abstractione, et sic dicitur subsistentia sive hypostasis; vel in concretione, et sic dicitur persona.

Sed tamen omnes isti modi habent calumniam. Primus quidem, qui sumitur per distinguibile et distinctum, quia Graeci utuntur vocabulo hypostasis, ubi nos utimur persona, et ita pro supposito distincto. Et Damascenus²⁰ dicit, quod «hypostasis est substantia cum proprietatibus»; et ita significat actu distinctum. Secundus modus similiter²¹ habet calumniam, quia essentia non videtur aliquo modo significari ut in ratione causae respectu aliorum, cum sit nomen absolutissimum. Tertius modus habet calumniam similiter, quia substantia significat in abstractione, sicut essentia; et praeterea dubium est, utrum sit intelligere hypostases, abstractis proprietatibus; et ideo si non est intelligere, quomodo contingit significare?

Et propterea quartus modus dicendi est, quod cum fides dicat, Deum esse trinum et unum²², in quantum dicit unum, non possumus intelligere unum, quin intelligamus quod est et quo est unum; et quo est unum est illud quo est, et quod est unum est illud quod est. Primum est essentia, secundum substantia. Si intelligimus trinum, necesse est, quod²³ intelligamus eum qui distinguitur, et quo distinguitur. Quo distinguitur est proprietas: ille autem qui distinguitur semper significatur ut distinctus. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel ut distinctus proprietate quacumque, vel ut distinctus proprietate nobili sive notabili²⁴. Primum significatur nomine subsistentiae, quae dicitur prima substantia²⁵, et convenit non tantum individuo hominis, sed etiam asini. Secundum significatur per hoc nomen persona, quod importat nobilem proprietatem et non convenit nisi supposito rationalis creaturae²⁶. Quia Graeci utuntur nomine hypostasis, sicut nos nomine personae, ideo dicit Boethius²⁷, quod Graeci utuntur nomine hypostasis pro supposito rationalis naturae. His visis patent obiecta.

Ad 1. Quod autem obiicitur, quod non debemus Deum nominare absolute; dicendum, quod quamvis nominemus Deum per creaturas, tamen etiam per creaturas cognoscimus, eum habere esse absolutum. Alia patent.

QUESTION III.

Whether the name "essence" is fittingly used in divine matters; and there is also asked the difference of the names essence, subsistence, substance, and person.

Thirdly it is asked, whether the name essence may [or: ought to] be said in divine matters. And that [it] so [should be], it seems:

1. Augustine, in book seven On the Trinity¹: «Essence is truly and properly said in divine matters, so much so that perhaps God alone ought to be called essence».

2. Likewise, this name who is (qui est) is the name which God himself imposed upon himself²; therefore if he properly so names himself, God is properly called who is; but of whatever who is is properly said, essence³ can properly be said in him: therefore essence too is said in divine matters.

3. Likewise, among all names the name essence is the most absolute; whence essence according to Avicenna⁴ is called the quiddity of a thing under an absolute name; since therefore in divine matters there is every-way absoluteness: therefore [there is] also the name essence.

On the contrary: 1. We do not understand God except in creatures and through⁵ creatures; but the naming of God is through our understanding: therefore no absolute name at all ought to be put in God.

2. Likewise, I ask: in what do the name substance and⁶ essence differ? For substance signifies either the common, or the supposit. If the supposit: then the name person is superfluous; if the common: then the name essence is superfluous: therefore, since we ought to circumcise our lips in speaking of God, this name ought by no means to be put in God⁷.

3. Likewise, by reason of this it is asked concerning the necessity, sufficiency, and difference of these four names: essence, subsistence, substance, and person.

Conclusion. The name "essence" is fittingly used in divine matters; the rationale and sufficiency of the four names are explained.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that these four names or terms⁸ in their genus correspond to four terms in Greek, which are: usia, usiosis, hypostasis, and prosopon — so that usia corresponds to essentia, usiosis to substantia, hypostasis to subsistentia, and prosopon to persona.

Now the rationale and sufficiency of these⁹ four names is taken by some thus. In divine matters there is to be taken the communicable and the incommunicable, and this from the truth and necessity of the faith, which says God [is] threefold and one.

And since we¹⁰ ought to understand in God what truly is, through that which we see in these lower [things], chiefly according to the noble, primary, and principal conditions; since in the common in the lower [things] there is found that which is (quod est) and who is (qui est)¹¹, by reason of which it is signified in concretion and in abstraction — so that one says man (homo) and humanity (humanitas) — so in divine matters we understand [the same], although we do not understand those two as in [actual] difference. Therefore also we signify¹² in abstraction by this name deity (deitas), and in concretion by this name God (Deus). And therefore we have imposed on him a name by which the that-by-which-it-is itself (ipsum quo est) might be signified, and this is essence; and the that-which-is itself (ipsum quod est), and this is substance; and so these two names are taken on the side of the common.

There is also to be taken in divine matters that which is incommunicable, and this is a distinct what (quid distinctum) or a distinct who (quis distinctus). And this indeed it happens to be understood or signified in two ways: either insofar as distinguishable, and this through the name subsistence or hypostasis; or insofar as distinct, and this through the name person. And although in God the distinguishable and the distinct in no way differ — because in him potency is always conjoined to act — nevertheless it happens [that they are] signified by a twofold name¹³.

Whence these four names differ according to the mode of understanding, like that-by-which-it-is, that-which-is, who is, which one is (quo est, quod est, qui est, quis est)¹⁴. And since in God the quo est and quod est on the one side, and the distinguishable and distinct on the other, are the same in reality, the Saints take both substance and essence for the same; likewise the Greeks too use the name hypostasis for an actually distinct supposit. Whence the distinction by quo and quod est, and by distinguishable and distinct, in the divine names¹⁵ does not make a diversity except according to the rationale of understanding.

There were also¹⁶ others who would say that substance and essence are taken on the side of the common, but differently, because that common can be understood under a twofold rationale: one is, that all things stand in need¹⁷ of it, in order to be; another is, that itself stands not in need of others. In the first way it is called essence, from which and through which all things are; in the second way substance, since it stands through itself, with all¹⁸ others set aside. Subsistence, however — or hypostasis — and person are taken on the side of the incommunicable and they differ. For although each name says a distinct what, nevertheless hypostasis signifies the distinct supposit of substance, but person signifies the distinct [supposit] by a noble property.

There were others who would say that these four names are distinguished through communicable and incommunicable, according as each can be twofold signified: either in abstraction, or in concretion. For the communicable can be signified¹⁹ in abstraction, and so it is called essence; or in concretion to a supposit, and so it is called substance. Likewise the incommunicable can be signified in abstraction, and so it is called subsistence or hypostasis; or in concretion, and so it is called person.

But yet all these modes have a fault [habent calumniam — i.e. are open to objection]. The first, indeed, which is taken by way of distinguishable and distinct, [has a fault] because the Greeks use the term hypostasis where we use person, and so for a distinct supposit. And John Damascene²⁰ says that «hypostasis is substance with properties»; and so it signifies an actually distinct [thing]. The second mode likewise²¹ has a fault, because essence does not seem in any way to be signified as in the rationale of a cause with respect to others, since it is the most absolute name. The third mode has a fault similarly, because substance signifies in abstraction, just as essence; and besides, it is doubtful whether it is [possible] to understand hypostases with the properties abstracted; and therefore if it is not [possible] to understand [them so], how does it happen that one signifies [them]?

And therefore the fourth mode of speaking is that, since the faith says God to be threefold and one²², insofar as it says one, we cannot understand one without understanding that which is (quod est) and that by which it is one (quo est unum); and the by-which it is one is that quo est, and that which is one is that quod est. The first is essence, the second substance. If we understand threefold, it is necessary that²³ we understand him who is distinguished and that by which he is distinguished. That by which he is distinguished is the property; but he who is distinguished is always signified as distinct. And this can be in two ways: either as distinct by any property whatever, or as distinct by a noble or notable property²⁴. The first is signified by the name subsistence, which is called first substance²⁵, and belongs not only to the individual of [the species] man, but also of [the species] ass. The second is signified by this name person, which imports a noble property and belongs only to a supposit of a rational creature²⁶. Because the Greeks use the name hypostasis as we [use] the name person, therefore Boethius²⁷ says that the Greeks use the name hypostasis for a supposit of rational nature. With these things seen, the objections are clear.

To 1. As for what is objected, that we ought not to name God absolutely; it must be said that, although we name God through creatures, yet through creatures also we know that he has absolute being. The others are clear.