← Back to Distinction 23

Dist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 404

ARTICULUS I. De translatione nominum persona, substantia, essentia ad divina.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum nomen personae convenienter ad divina translatum sit.

Primo ergo quaeritur, utrum debuerit ibi1 transferri nomen personae ad divina. Quod autem2 nomen personae non debeat dici in divinis, ostenditur sic:

1. Augustinus quinto de Trinitate, et habetur in opposito in littera3: «Dictum est: tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur»: ergo videtur, quod solum ad fugam haereticorum et non secundum veritatem et proprietatem dicatur persona in divinis.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia persona nominat particulare4, et non quodcumque, sed rationalis naturae; sed a quocumque removetur superius, et inferius: ergo cum in divinis non sit dicere particulare, similiter nec erit dicere personam.

3. Item, particulare rationalis creaturae est compositissimum inter omnia creata. Nam compositum est ex substantia corporali et spirituali, et rursus corporalis inter omnes videtur maiorem compositionem habere: ergo cum persona sit nomen particularis, et hoc summe compositi, et in divinis est summa simplicitas, patet quod in divinis non debet5 dici nomen personae.

4. Item, vocabula nostra debent respondere Graecis, ut unitas fidei ostendatur; sed Graeci non utuntur vocabulo prosopon in divinis, quod est idem quod persona: ergo cum ipsi proprius habeant vocabula quam nos6, nec nos debemus uti.

Contra:

1. Persona dicitur quasi per se sonans, sive per se unum7; sed per se unum propriissime recipitur in Deo: ergo et persona secundum suum nomen.

2. Item, persona dicitur habens suam naturam intellectualem ab aliis distinctam; sed in Deo est ponere habentem naturam intellectualem et ab aliis distinctam, sicut supra ostensum est de pluralitate personarum8: ergo etc.

3. Item, persona nominat mihi ultimum in genere rationalis naturae; sed rationalis sive intellectualis natura est nobilior inter creata9, et rursus, ultimum in illa est completissimum, quia ei nulla potest fieri additio: ergo si quidquid completionis est, ponendum est in Deo propriissime, patet etc.

4. Item, persona dicit dignitatem. Unde in ecclesiasticis personae dicuntur habentes dignitatem aliquam notabilem10: ergo cum dignitas propriissime sit in Deo, nomen personae propriissime in Deo ponendum est.

Conclusio. Nomen personae convenienter et proprie in divinis dicitur ad significandam distinctionem et proprietatem nobilissimam suppositorum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod persona de sui ratione dicit suppositum11 distinctum proprietate ad dignitatem pertinente. Et hoc patet in sua etymologia, et in aequipollenti suo.

In etymologia, quia persona dicitur quasi per se unum12. Per se autem unum proprie dicitur unum, quod est omnino distinctum ab aliis et in se indistinctum13. Rursum, persona dicitur a personando, quasi a se resonando; resonare autem dicitur quod in sono praeeminet aliis; et ideo persona dicitur suppositum distinctum habens dignitatem, et ratione huius dignitatis, cum deberet per naturam vocabuli dici pérsona, penultima correpta, dicitur persóna, penultima producta.

Similiter ratio huius significationis accipitur ab aequipollenti in lingua Graeca, quod est prosopon. Apud Graecos prosopon dicebatur, sicut narrat Boethius14, homo larvatus, qui quidem solebat fieri in tragoediis: et hoc fiebat propter duo: una ratio erat ad distincte repraesentandum eum, de quo fiebat

p. 406

sermo; alia ratio erat ad melius resonandum vel personandum. Et ista duo conveniunt dictis15 duabus proprietatibus: et ideo ab hoc nomine prosopon apud Graecos tractum est hoc nomen persona apud Latinos. Et quia in ecclesiasticis maxime attenditur distinctio dignitatum, tractum est primo ad significandum honorem in ecclesiasticis. Deinde, quia individuum rationalis naturae distinctum est ab aliis, et hoc proprietate dignitatis inter creaturas, hinc est, quod extensum est ad significandum suppositum rationalis naturae. Demum16, quia in Deo est reperire suppositum distinctum proprietate nobilissima, Spiritu sancto dictante, translatum est ad divina17, quia ibi res nominis propriissime invenitur, quamvis ipsum nomen prius aliis sit impositum. Concedendum est ergo, quod in divinis proprie et convenienter nomen personae accipitur.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod dictum est, non ut diceretur; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur pro tempore illo, in quo nomen personae secundum usum aequivalebat substantiae; et ideo dictum est, non ut diceretur quod persona consueverat significare, sed dictum est quasi translatum, ne taceretur, id est, ne confessio fidei diminuta esse probaretur.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona nominat particulare: dicendum, quod particulare de ratione sui nominis importat partem et imperfectionem; sed persona de ratione sui nominis importat completionem; ideo ponitur in divinis, quamvis non particulare; et bene, quia in divinis nomen speciei proprie dicitur, et nomen generis improprie18.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona nominat compositissimum; dicendum, quod hoc accidit, quia individuum rationalis naturae creatae est in genere et ideo multis differentiis distat, cum distinguatur qualitate; sed in divinis est distinctio sola origine, et praeterea19 non est in genere; et ideo non oportet, quod sit ibi aggregatio differentiarum.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod apud Graecos20 non utuntur aequipollenti, scilicet prosopon; dicendum, quod ratio utendi apud Latinos non tam fuit proprietas quam penuria, quia non habebant quid responderent. Et ratio huius fuit, quia substantia secundum communem usum idem sonat quod essentia; Graeci autem habebant proprium vocabulum, scilicet hypostasis, quo utuntur: et ideo non sunt coacti transferre, ut nos.

Scholion

I. Conclusio affirmativa probatur per definitionem personae. Haec definitio eruitur tum ex etymologia vocabuli Latini, tum ex aequipollenti termino Graeco prosopon (προσωπον).

Circa verba in solut. ad 2: «In divinis nomen speciei proprie dicitur, et nomen generis improprie», cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 4; et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4; et quoad particulare et universale d. 19. p. II. q. 2.

De conceptu personae cfr. infra d. 25. per totam, et d. 34. a. I. q. 1.

II. De conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. I, et q. 67. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq.; Report. d. 25. q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 2; S. I. q. 29. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. I; S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. I. et 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. I. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 53. q. I. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic. q. I.

---

English Translation

ARTICLE I. On the transferring of the names "person," "substance," "essence" to the divine.

Question I. Whether the name "person" is conveniently transferred to the divine.

First, then, it is asked whether the name "person" ought there1 to be transferred to the divine. That, however2, the name "person" ought not to be said in divine matters is shown thus:

1. Augustine in the fifth [book] On the Trinity, and it is had in the contrary [position] in the littera3: «It was said: three persons, not in order that this might be said, but lest it be passed over in silence»: therefore it seems that "person" is said in divine matters only for the sake of fleeing heretics, and not according to truth and propriety.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason, since "person" names a particular4, and not just any [particular], but [one] of rational nature; but from whatever the higher [genus] is removed, the lower also [is removed]: therefore, since in divine matters there is no saying of a particular, likewise there will be no saying of "person" either.

3. Likewise, the particular of rational creature is the most composite among all created things. For it is composed of bodily and spiritual substance, and again the bodily seems to have a greater composition than all [others]: therefore, since "person" is the name of a particular, and that of one supremely composite, and in divine matters there is supreme simplicity, it is plain that in divine matters the name "person" ought not5 to be said.

4. Likewise, our terms ought to correspond to the Greek [terms], so that the unity of faith may be shown; but the Greeks do not use the term prosopon in divine matters, which is the same as persona: therefore, since they themselves have terms more proper than we6, we also ought not to use [it].

On the contrary:

1. "Person" is said as if per se sonans ("sounding through itself"), or per se unum ("one through itself")7; but per se unum is most properly received in God: therefore "person" too, according to its name.

2. Likewise, "person" is said [to be] one having its intellectual nature distinct from others; but in God [there is] to be posited [one] having an intellectual nature and distinct from others, as has been shown above concerning the plurality of persons8: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, "person" names to me the ultimate in the genus of rational nature; but rational or intellectual nature is the more noble among created things9, and again, the ultimate in it is the most complete, since to it no addition can be made: therefore, if whatever is of completion is to be posited in God most properly, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, "person" expresses dignity. Whence in ecclesiastical matters those having some notable dignity are called persons10: therefore, since dignity is most properly in God, the name "person" is most properly to be posited in God.

Conclusion. The name "person" is said conveniently and properly in divine matters to signify the distinction and the most noble property of the supposits.

I respond: It must be said that "person," from its own account, expresses a supposit11 distinct by a property pertaining to dignity. And this is plain in its etymology, and in its equivalent.

In its etymology, since "person" is said as if per se unum ("one through itself")12. Now per se unum is properly called one which is altogether distinct from others and undivided in itself13. Again, "person" is said from personando ("sounding through"), as if "resounding from itself"; and "to resound" is said of that which in sound stands out above others; and therefore "person" is called a distinct supposit having dignity, and by reason of this dignity, although by the nature of the word it ought to be said pérsona, with the penult shortened, it is said persóna, with the penult lengthened.

Likewise the account of this signification is taken from the equivalent in the Greek tongue, which is prosopon. Among the Greeks prosopon meant, as Boethius14 narrates, a masked man, [a thing] which used to be made in tragedies: and this was done on account of two [reasons]: one reason was for distinctly representing him about whom the speech was being made; the other reason was for better resounding or sounding through. And these two correspond to the said15 two properties: and therefore from this name prosopon among the Greeks was drawn this name persona among the Latins. And because in ecclesiastical matters the distinction of dignities is especially attended to, it was first drawn to signify honor in ecclesiastical [persons]. Then, since the individual of rational nature is distinct from others, and this by a property of dignity among creatures, hence it is that it was extended to signify the supposit of rational nature. Finally16, since in God there is to be found a supposit distinct by a most noble property, with the Holy Spirit dictating, it was transferred to the divine17, because there the reality of the name is most properly found, although the name itself was first imposed on others. It is to be conceded therefore, that in divine matters the name "person" is properly and conveniently received.

To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that it was said, not in order that it might be said; it must be said that Augustine speaks for that time in which the name "person" according to usage was equivalent to "substance"; and therefore it was said, not in order that it might be said [in the way that] "person" had been accustomed to signify, but it was said as if transferred, lest it be passed over in silence, that is, lest the confession of the faith should be proved to be diminished.

To 2. To that which is objected, that "person" names a particular: it must be said that "particular," from the account of its name, imports a part and imperfection; but "person," from the account of its name, imports completion; therefore it is posited in divine matters, although not "particular"; and rightly, because in divine matters the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly18.

To 3. To that which is objected, that "person" names what is most composite; it must be said that this happens because the individual of created rational nature is in a genus and therefore is distant by many differences, since it is distinguished by quality; but in divine matters the distinction is by origin alone, and besides19 [God] is not in a genus; and therefore it is not necessary that there should there be an aggregation of differences.

To 4. To that which is objected, that among the Greeks20 they do not use the equivalent, namely prosopon; it must be said that the reason for using [it] among the Latins was not so much propriety as poverty, since they did not have what they might respond. And the reason for this was that "substance" according to common usage sounds the same as "essence"; the Greeks, however, had their own term, namely hypostasis, which they use: and therefore they were not compelled to transfer [it], as we [were].

Scholion

I. The affirmative conclusion is proved through the definition of "person." This definition is drawn both from the etymology of the Latin word, and from the equivalent Greek term prosopon (προσωπον).

Concerning the words in the solution to [objection] 2: «In divine matters the name of a species is properly said, and the name of a genus improperly», cf. above d. 8, p. II, dub. 4; and Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4; and as to particular and universal, d. 19, p. II, q. 2.

On the concept of person cf. below d. 25 throughout, and d. 34, a. I, q. 1.

II. On the conclusion: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 66, m. I, and q. 67, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following [questions]; Reportata d. 25, q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 2; Summa I, q. 29, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. I; Summa p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. I and 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. I, a. I. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 53, q. I, 2. — Durandus, on this and the following, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. I.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. ad divina debeat loco debuit ibi, sed contra codd., quorum tamen plures cum ed. 1 habent debuit.
    The Vatican [edition] [reads] ad divina debeat in place of debuit ibi, but against the codices, of which however the majority, with ed. 1, have debuit.
  2. Licet particula ibi superabundare videatur, exigentibus tamen plurimis mss. et ed. I, eam inseruimus. Mox in plurimis mss. et ed. I omittitur minus congrue nomen personae. Dein Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 Et quod loco Quod autem.
    Although the particle ibi ("there") seems superabundant, nevertheless, on the demand of very many manuscripts and ed. I, we have inserted it. Soon afterwards, in very many manuscripts and ed. I, nomen personae ("the name of person") is, less suitably, omitted. Then the Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] Et quod in place of Quod autem.
  3. Hic, c. I. in fine.
    Here, c. I, at the end.
  4. Cfr. supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. — Mox lectionem, qua ponitur simpliciter loco similiter, quaeque in mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 communissima est, minus idoneam iudicamus, nisi verba simpliciter nec sumantur pro omnino nec seu nullo modo.
    Cf. above d. 19, p. II, q. 2. — Soon after, the reading by which simpliciter ("simply") is placed in place of similiter ("likewise"), and which is most common in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, we judge less suitable, unless the words simpliciter nec be taken for omnino nec ("not at all") or nullo modo ("in no way").
  5. Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus debet pro oportet.
    On the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted debet ("ought") for oportet ("it is needed").
  6. Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice hic repetit verba et non utuntur. Paulo ante cod. V post utuntur addit hoc, et cod. O ponit per prius loco proprius.
    The Vatican [edition], with only one or another codex, here repeats the words et non utuntur ("and they do not use"). A little before, cod. V after utuntur adds hoc ("this"), and cod. O places per prius ("by what is prior") in place of proprius ("more properly").
  7. Vat. et recentior cod. cc una. Dein ed. 1 post sed adiungit esse per se sive, dum e contra cod. T breviter hoc loco per se unum habet.
    The Vatican [edition] and the more recent cod. cc [read] una ("one"). Then ed. 1 after sed adds esse per se sive ("to be through itself or"), while on the contrary cod. T in this place briefly has per se unum.
  8. Dist. 2. q. 2. — Paulo ante fide multorum mss. ut FGH I P Q S T V W X etc. et ed. I post intellectualem adiecimus particulam et, quam cod. S etiam eodem modo in maiori propositione exhibet. Dein nonnulli codd. ut T W in minori distinctum pro distinctam.
    Distinction 2, q. 2. — A little before, on the authority of many manuscripts such as FGH I P Q S T V W X etc. and ed. I, after intellectualem we have added the particle et ("and"), which cod. S also exhibits in the same manner in the major proposition. Then several codices such as T W [read] in the minor distinctum in place of distinctam.
  9. Cod. aa praemittit omnia. Paulo infra communior mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 lectio ponit quod pro quidquid.
    Cod. aa prefixes omnia ("all"). A little below, the more common reading of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 places quod ("which") in place of quidquid ("whatever").
  10. In Comment. super Ioannem, c. 1, 23, n. 50 (Supplem. Bonelli, tom. I) S. Bonav. ait: Personae dignae et eminentes personae ecclesiasticae vocantur. — Vat. aliaeque edd. in hoc argumento, sicut et infra in corp. quaest., legunt ecclesiis pro ecclesiasticis; plurimi codd. propter abbreviationem verbi sunt ambiguae lectionis; codd. H ee cum ed. 1 in corp. quaest. ecclesiasticis clare exhibent scriptum, quae lectio et contextu et definitione ex Commentario super Ioan. modo allata et iure canonico confirmatur.
    In the Commentary on John, c. 1, 23, n. 50 (Bonelli's Supplement, tom. I) St. Bonaventure says: Worthy and eminent persons are called ecclesiastical persons. — The Vatican [edition] and other editions in this argument, as also below in the body of the question, read ecclesiis ("in churches") in place of ecclesiasticis ("ecclesiastical [persons]"); very many codices, on account of the abbreviation of the word, are of ambiguous reading; codices H ee with ed. 1 in the body of the question clearly exhibit ecclesiasticis in writing, which reading is confirmed both by the context and by the definition just adduced from the Commentary on John and by canon law.
  11. In multis mss. deest suppositum, sed minus congrue; ed. 1 quid pro suppositum. Mox Vat., contra mss. et ed. 1, perperam pertinens pro pertinente. — Infra d. 25. a. 1. q. 2. ad 4. allatis tribus definitionibus personae quartam adiungit S. Doctor his verbis: A magistris definitur sic: persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad nobilitatem pertinente.
    In many manuscripts suppositum is missing, but less suitably; ed. 1 [reads] quid in place of suppositum. Soon after, the Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and ed. 1, wrongly [reads] pertinens in place of pertinente. — Below, d. 25, a. 1, q. 2, ad 4, after three definitions of "person" have been adduced, the Holy Doctor adds a fourth in these words: By the masters it is defined thus: a person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to nobility.
  12. Ita S. Isidorus, si audias B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 10. q. 44. m. 1, sed idem in Comment., I. Sent. d. 23. a. 2. hoc Simoni Tornacensi adscribit. — Vat., contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 una, sed minus bene.
    So St. Isidore, if you listen to Bl. Albert, Summa p. I, tr. 10, q. 44, m. 1; but the same [Albert] in [his] Commentary, I Sent. d. 23, a. 2, ascribes this to Simon of Tournai. — The Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and ed. 1, [reads] una ("one"), but less well.
  13. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 11 (IV. c. 6.): Universaliter namque quotcumque non habent divisionem, quatenus non habent, eatenus unum dicuntur. Et X. text. 9 (V. c. 3.): Quod vero indivisibile aut non divisum, unum. Libr. III. Phys. text. 68 (c. 7.): Quoniam unum est indivisibile, quodcumque unum sit. — Paulo infra post quasi communiorem mss. et ed. I lectionem exhibemus substituendo a se loco per se; forte melius legeretur a per se. Dein aliqui codd. cum ed. I eminet loco praeeminet.
    Aristotle, V Metaphysics, text 11 (IV, c. 6): For universally, whatever things do not have division, insofar as they do not have [it], to that extent they are called one. And X, text 9 (V, c. 3): But what is indivisible or undivided [is] one. Book III Physics, text 68 (c. 7): Since one is indivisible, whatever is one. — A little below, after quasi, we exhibit the more common reading of the manuscripts and ed. I by substituting a se in place of per se; perhaps it would be better read a per se. Then some codices with ed. I [read] eminet ("stands out") in place of praeeminet ("stands out above").
  14. Haec etymologia nominis persona invenitur in Boeth., de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi, c. 3, his verbis: Persona vero dicta est a personando, circumflexa penultima. Quod si acuatur antepenultima, aperte a sono dicta videbitur.
    This etymology of the name persona is found in Boethius, On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ, c. 3, in these words: "Persona" indeed has been said from "personando," with the penult circumflexed. But if it be accented on the antepenult, it will plainly seem to have been said from sound.
  15. Vat. cum cod. cc praedictis.
    The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] praedictis ("aforesaid").
  16. Ex multis mss. ut FGT etc. et ed. I substituimus Demum pro Deinde.
    From many manuscripts such as FGT etc. and ed. I we have substituted Demum ("finally") for Deinde ("then").
  17. Vat. cum cod. cc, sed aliis codd. et ed. I obnitentibus, de.
    The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc — but with other codices and ed. I resisting — [reads] de [in place of ad].
  18. In codd. aa bb additur: Propter quod dicit Augustinus, quod Deus sine quantitate est magnus, sine qualitate bonus; in cod. H vero nomen speciei, ut bonus et magnus, nomen generis, ut qualis et quantus, qui et additionem, quam ex codd. aa bb notavimus, in margine exhibet.
    In codices aa bb is added: On account of which Augustine says that God is great without quantity, [and] good without quality; but in cod. H [is added] the name of a species, such as "good" and "great," the name of a genus, such as "what kind" and "how much," which [codex] also exhibits in the margin the addition which we have noted from codices aa bb.
  19. Supple: Deus, vel: divina persona. — Pauci codd. ut Z bb ee propterea loco praeterea, lectio non spernenda; alii pauci ut K V persona pro praeterea. — De hac responsione vide plura apud Richard. de S. Vict., IV. de Trin. c. 13–16.
    Supply: God, or: the divine person. — A few codices such as Z bb ee [read] propterea ("for that reason") in place of praeterea ("besides"), a reading not to be spurned; a few others such as K V [read] persona in place of praeterea. — On this response see more in Richard of St. Victor, IV On the Trinity, c. 13–16.
  20. Ita fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. contra Vat., quae legit Graeci. Paulo infra fide mss. et ed. I post habebant substituimus quid pro quod.
    So nearly all the codices with the first six editions, against the Vatican [edition], which reads Graeci ("the Greeks" [nominative]). A little below, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. I, after habebant we have substituted quid ("what") for quod ("which").
← Dist. 23, Divisio TextusDist. 23, Art. 1, Q. 2→