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Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
p. 357

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum in divinis possit poni totum universale.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere totum universale. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. Per Damascenum1, qui dicit, «quod in divinis commune est, ut substantia, particulare, ut atomus»: ergo si est ibi commune et particulare, ergo universale, quia particulari non respondet aliud commune quam universale.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per definitionem2 universalis et particularis. «Universale enim est quod praedicatur de pluribus; particulare de uno solo»; sed has rationes est invenire in divinis: ergo etc.

3. Item, omne quod est in plus et est univocum, est universale ad illa, respectu quorum est in plus3; sed essentia sive substantia est in plus quam persona, et in plus univocum, quia4 dicit unam naturam repertam in illis secundum identitatem: ergo etc.

4. Item, in divinis est communicabile et incommunicabile; aut ergo eodem, aut alio et alio. Non eodem; quia illud non est intelligibile, quod ex eodem veniat communitas et proprietas, convenientia et differentia formaliter5: ergo alio et alio: ergo si alio est communicabile, alio incommunicabile, ergo cum communicabile sit ratione eius quo est, incommunicabile ratione eius quod est, ergo quo est et quod est in divinis sunt per differentiam; sed ubi haec sunt per differentiam, ibi est universale et particulare: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto aliquid simplicius, tanto universalius6; sed divina essentia est simplicissima: ergo ibi maxime est ratio universalis.

Contra: 1. Boethius7 dicit, quod nec est universale nec particulare.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia ubicumque est universale, ibi est una forma multiplicabilis vel multiplicata8; in cuius rei signum omne,

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quod significat quoniam universaliter, potest addi omni universali; sed in Deo non est una forma vel natura multiplicabilis nec multiplicata nec recipit signum universale, ut dicatur omnis Deus: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubi est particulare, ibi est forma vel natura ut hic et nunc9; sed divina natura sive in se, sive in hypostasibus non est hic et nunc, sed semper et ubique: ergo nec in se nec in hypostasibus est ibi particulare.

4. Item, ubi est particulare et universale, universale est simplicius particulari10: ergo cum in Deo non sit simplicior essentia quam persona, quia in persona nullum est accidens, nullum principium constitutivum: ergo etc.

5. Item, omnis natura, in qua est universale et particulare, est in genere determinato; et omnis talis est limitata11: ergo cum divina natura sit infinita, patet etc.

Conclusio. Licet in divinis sit ratio communis et proprii, communicabilis et incommunicabilis, minime tamen ibi est ratio universalis et particularis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod, cum fides nostra12 ponat trinitatem et unitatem in divinis, necessario ponit convenientiam et distinctionem. Et quia convenientia non est nisi in communicabili a pluribus13 et communi, distinctio autem non est nisi in proprio et incommunicabili, necessario in divinis ponitur ratio communis et proprii, communicabilis et incommunicabilis.

Sed cum in Deo et14 creaturis sit distinctio suppositorum, aliter est in Deo quam in creaturis. Distinctio enim suppositorum maior est quam distinctio accidentalis; unde quamvis innotescat per accidentia15, tamen non fit per accidentia. Accidentibus enim circumscriptis, adhuc est intelligere supposita differre; et cum non fiat per accidentia consequentia16, oportet quod fiat ab origine vel ab originali principio. Ab origine est, quando unum differt ab altero, quia emanat ab eo; idem enim a se emanare non potest. Talis distinctio suppositorum est in Deo, sed haec17 non potest esse in creatura, scilicet distinctio solum per originem; nam nulla creatura potest alteri totam suam essentiam dare. Si ergo dat partem, necesse est, quod alia differentia sit ibi quam originis; et ideo est differentia ab originali principio. Haec autem non est forma in se, quia dicit quid communicabile18, nec materia in se, quia dicit quid indistinctum19: ergo hoc facit forma, ut adveniens materiae. Quia enim adveniens materiae accipit partem, non totam20 materiam, hinc est, quod ipsam distinguit, et ipsam distinguendo trahi-

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tur in partem et limitatur et fit hic et nunc et unum numero et particulare.

Quoniam igitur in divinis non est additio ad materiam nec tractio in21 partem, ideo non cadit in divinis universale nec particulare, sicut ostendunt rationes ad hoc inductae in opponendo.

1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur de Damasceno, dicendum, quod improprie Damascenus posuit particulare pro incommunicabili.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod universale est quod praedicatur de pluribus; dicendum, quod ista est ratio communicabilis; universalis autem non est, nisi secundum quod realiter intelligitur multiplicari22 in illis. Similiter solvendum de particulari.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est in plus et est univocum etc.; dicendum, quod universale est in plus, ita quod simplicius, et fit in23 minus per additionem ad illud; non autem sic in Deo.

4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum eodem sit24 communicabile et incommunicabile; dicendum, quod alio et alio; quia, sicut dicit Augustinus25, «alio est Deus, et alio Pater»; sed non alio et alio secundum rem, sed secundum rationem: quia deitate est Deus, paternitate Pater, et paternitas non est aliud re ab essentia, quoniam paternitas est essentia; est tamen aliud ratione. Et quia ablativus dicit rationem, ideo non eodem est Deus, quo Pater26. — Et si obiicias: aut rationi illi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil; dicendum, quod ratio illa per comparationem ad essentiam non est nisi modus, sed per comparationem ad aliam personam est res. Et hoc patet, quoniam habere essentiam ab alio et non habere non dicit rem aliam, sed solum modum; habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio dicit realem differentiam, quia nulla res est a se et ab alio27.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de simplici, dicendum, quod est simplex possibile ad additionem, et tali modo universale est simplex; alio modo simplex, quia privat compositionem et additionem, et haec repugnantia non consonat universalitati: et tali modo divina essentia est simplex, quae nullo modo trahibilis est in partem per additionem, sicut trahitur universale: et ideo non est universale.

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Scholion

I. Sententia communis affirmat, in divinis esse quidem rationem communis et proprii, minime vero rationem universalis et particularis, sive speciei et individui. Unde notanda est differentia inter universale et commune, particulare et proprium sive incommunicabile. Licet enim omne universale sit commune, non tamen omne commune est universale. Universale enim praedicabile, de quo est hic sermo, opponitur particulari, «quod, ut dicit Alex. Hal., eo dicitur, quod partem capiat communis naturae», et est aliquod superius, quod per differentias contrahi potest ad sua inferiora, ita ut in eis realiter multiplicetur. Commune vero in genere est unum in pluribus; quod dupliciter potest esse, scil. vel multiplicatum in pluribus, et tunc idem est ac universale; vel non multiplicatum, ut essentia divina, quae una est in tribus personis (cfr. supra d. 5. dub. 2.). In hoc sensu speciali commune retinet nomen genericum et distinguitur ab universali.

II. Pro explicatione ampliore haec referimus ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.): «In Deo non est ponere esse universale, nec esse singulare vel particulare; habet tamen esse divinum de utroque quod est perfectionis. Universale enim est in multis et dicitur de multis, quia non est totum, quod sunt singularia, sicut homo non dicit totum, quod est Socrates, sicut quantitatem et qualitatem et operationem, quae tamen sunt in esse Socratis... Sed cum dicitur Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus, dicitur esse divinum in multis, sed non de multis. Cum enim dico Deus, dico totum esse Patris, totum esse Filii. Esse ergo de multis imperfectionis est in esse universali, unde non convenit esse divino; sed esse in multis convenit, quia hoc est virtutis et nobilitatis».

«Similiter particulare dicitur quod est in uno solo; non tamen est de multis. Quod non sit de multis perfectionis est, quia dicit totum esse; sed esse in uno solo imperfectionis est, quia nobilius est esse in multis quam in uno. Ideo esse divinum est in multis, non in uno solo, esse, inquam, in multis non multiplicatum, sed unum. — Item est loqui de particulari sive individuo tribus modis: uno modo secundum quod dicitur esse a materia; alio modo secundum quod ab accidentibus; tertio modo secundum quod a forma signata et singulari». Deinde probat, quod nullo istorum modorum esse possit singulare in Deo, et concludit: «Cum igitur Deitas nullo modo plurificetur in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, non se habet Deitas ad Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum ut universale ad singulare». Bene autem monet Dionys. Carth. (loc. cit.), illa verba esse de multis sensum habere, esse partem sive aliquid eorum, quae sunt multa vel in multis. Hoc patet ex tota Alexandri argumentatione. Ipse non negat divinam essentiam praedicari de tribus personis analogo modo, sicut omne universale, quod est in multis, praedicatur de multis.

III. Fundamentum solutionis ad 4. est distinctio inter essentiam et proprietatem, de quo cfr. supra d. 13. q. 3. et Scholion; d. 8. p. II. q. 2; d. 33. q. 2, et praecipue d. 26. q. 1. et Scholion. — Quaestio de principio individuationis in fine responsionis tangitur, de qua in II. Sent. d. 3. plura dicenda.

IV. De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 1. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 3. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 12. 13; S. p. I. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation

QUESTION II.

Whether in the divine [persons] a universal whole can be posited.

Secondly it is asked, whether in the divine [persons] a universal whole is to be posited. And that it is, is seen [thus]:

1. Through the Damascene1, who says that "in the divine [persons] the common is, as substance, the particular, as an atom [individual]": therefore if there is there the common and the particular, therefore [there is] a universal, since to the particular there corresponds no other common than the universal.

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen through the definition2 of the universal and the particular. "For the universal is what is predicated of many; the particular of one alone"; but these accounts are to be found in the divine [persons]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, everything which is "in more" and is univocal, is universal with respect to those things, in regard to which it is "in more"3; but the essence or substance is "in more" than person, and "in more" univocally, since4 it expresses one nature found in them according to identity: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in the divine [persons] there is the communicable and the incommunicable; therefore either by the same [thing], or by one [thing] and another. Not by the same; because that is not intelligible, that out of the same there should formally come community and property, agreement and difference5: therefore by one and another: therefore if by one [thing it is] communicable, by another incommunicable, then since the communicable is by reason of that by which it is, [and] the incommunicable by reason of that which it is, therefore that by which it is and that which it is in the divine [persons] are [there] through difference; but where these are through difference, there is universal and particular: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the simpler something is, the more universal6 [it is]; but the divine essence is the most simple: therefore there most of all is the account of the universal.

On the contrary: 1. Boethius7 says, that there is neither universal nor particular [there].

2. Likewise, this same thing is seen by reason, since wherever there is universal, there is one form multipliable or multiplied8; in token of which everything,

which signifies as though universally, can be added to every universal; but in God there is not one form or nature multipliable nor multiplied, nor does it receive a universal sign, so that it might be said every God: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, where there is particular, there is form or nature as here and now9; but the divine nature, whether in itself, or in the hypostases, is not here and now, but always and everywhere: therefore neither in itself nor in the hypostases is there particular there.

4. Likewise, where there is particular and universal, the universal is simpler than the particular10: therefore since in God the essence is not simpler than the person, because in person there is no accident, no constitutive principle: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every nature in which there is universal and particular is in a determinate genus; and every such [nature] is limited11: therefore since the divine nature is infinite, it is plain etc.

Conclusion. Although in the divine [persons] there is the account of common and proper, of communicable and incommunicable, nevertheless there is by no means there the account of universal and particular.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted, that, since our faith12 posits trinity and unity in the divine [persons], it necessarily posits agreement and distinction. And since agreement is only in what is communicable to many13 and common, but distinction is only in what is proper and incommunicable, necessarily in the divine [persons] there is posited the account of common and proper, of communicable and incommunicable.

But since in God and14 creatures there is distinction of supposits, it is otherwise in God than in creatures. For the distinction of supposits is greater than accidental distinction; whence although it is made known through accidents15, nevertheless it is not made through accidents. For when accidents have been removed, it is still possible to understand supposits to differ; and since it is not made through consequent accidents16, it is necessary that it be made from origin or from an originative principle. From origin it is, when one differs from another, because it emanates from it; for the same cannot emanate from itself. Such distinction of supposits is in God, but this17 cannot be in a creature, namely distinction only through origin; for no creature can give to another its whole essence. If therefore it gives a part, it is necessary that there be there another difference than that of origin; and therefore there is difference from an originative principle. But this is not form in itself, since it expresses something communicable18, nor matter in itself, since it expresses something undistinguished19: therefore this form does as coming to matter. For since the [form] coming to matter receives a part, not the whole20 matter, hence it is, that it distinguishes it [the matter], and by distinguishing it [the form] is drawn

into a part and is limited and becomes here and now and one in number and particular.

Since therefore in the divine [persons] there is no addition to matter nor drawing into21 a part, therefore in the divine [persons] there falls neither universal nor particular, as the reasons brought forward in the opposing arguments show.

1. To that, then, which is first objected from the Damascene, it must be said, that the Damascene improperly posited particular for incommunicable.

2. To that which is objected, that the universal is what is predicated of many; it must be said, that this is the account of the communicable; but it is not [the account] of the universal, except according as it is really understood to be multiplied22 in them. Similarly is to be solved [the question] of the particular.

3. To that which is objected, that [it] is "in more" and univocal etc.; it must be said, that the universal is "in more", in such a way that [it is] simpler, and becomes "in"23 less by addition to it; but not so in God.

4. To that which is asked, whether by the same [thing]24 [there is] communicable and incommunicable; it must be said, that by one and another; because, as Augustine says25, "by one [thing] he is God, and by another Father"; but not by one and another according to thing, but according to reason: because by deity he is God, by paternity Father, and paternity is not a thing other than the essence, since paternity is the essence; nevertheless it is other in reason. And since the ablative expresses reason, therefore he is not God by the same [thing] as he is Father26. — And if you object: either to that reason there corresponds something in reality, or nothing; it must be said, that that reason by comparison to the essence is only a mode, but by comparison to another person is a thing. And this is plain, since to have essence from another and not to have [it from another] does not express a different thing, but only a mode; but to have from another and not to have from another does express a real difference, since no thing is from itself and from another27.

5. To that which is last objected concerning the simple, it must be said, that there is a simple [that is] open to addition, and in this way the universal is simple; in another way [there is] a simple, because it excludes composition and addition, and this incompatibility is not consonant with universality: and in this way the divine essence is simple, which in no way is drawable into a part by addition, as the universal is drawn: and therefore it is not universal.

Scholion

I. The common opinion affirms that in the divine [persons] there is indeed the account of common and proper, but by no means the account of universal and particular, or of species and individual. Whence is to be noted the difference between universal and common, particular and proper or incommunicable. For although every universal is common, nevertheless not every common is universal. For the universal predicable, of which is the present discourse, is opposed to the particular, "which, as Alex. of Hales says, is so called because it takes a part of the common nature", and is something superior, which through differences can be contracted to its inferiors, in such a way that in them it is really multiplied. But the common in genus is one in many; which can be in two ways, namely either multiplied in the many, and then it is the same as universal; or not multiplied, as the divine essence, which is one in three persons (cf. above d. 5, dub. 2). In this special sense the common retains the generic name and is distinguished from the universal.

II. For a fuller explanation we report these things from Alex. of Hales (place cited below): "In God there is not to be posited universal being, nor singular or particular being; nevertheless divine being has of each [whatever] is of perfection. For the universal is in many and is said of many, since it is not the whole that the singulars are, just as man does not express the whole that Socrates is, such as the quantity and quality and operation, which nevertheless are in Socrates' being... But when it is said God Father, God Son, God Holy Spirit, divine being is said to be in many, but not of many. For when I say God, I express the whole being of the Father, the whole being of the Son. To be of many therefore is of imperfection in universal being, whence it does not befit divine being; but to be in many befits [it], because this is of power and nobility."

"Similarly the particular is said to be that which is in one alone; nevertheless it is not of many. That it is not of many is of perfection, because it expresses the whole being; but to be in one alone is of imperfection, because it is more noble to be in many than in one. Therefore divine being is in many, not in one alone, being, I say, in many not multiplied, but one. — Likewise one can speak of the particular or individual in three modes: in one mode according as it is said to be from matter; in another mode according as [it is] from accidents; in a third mode according as [it is] from a determined and singular form." Then he proves that in none of these modes can there be the singular in God, and concludes: "Since therefore the Deity is in no way pluralized in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Deity does not stand to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit as the universal to the singular." But Dionys. Carth. (place cited) well notes, that those words to be of many have the sense of to be a part or some one of those things, which are many or in many. This is plain from the whole argumentation of Alexander. He himself does not deny that the divine essence is predicated of the three persons in an analogous way, just as every universal, which is in many, is predicated of many.

III. The foundation of the solution to [argument] 4 is the distinction between essence and property, concerning which cf. above d. 13, q. 3 and Scholion; d. 8, p. II, q. 2; d. 33, q. 2; and especially d. 26, q. 1 and Scholion. — The question of the principle of individuation is touched on at the end of the response, concerning which more must be said in II Sent., d. 3.

IV. On the question itself: Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 48, m. 1, a. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 2; S. I, q. 3, a. 5. — B. Albert, here a. 12, 13; S. p. I, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 43, q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. III. de Fide orthod. c. 6. Vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 9. In quo textu Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 habet Antonius pro atomus.
    Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6. See here in the text of the Master, c. 9. In which text the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, has Antonius in place of atomus.
  2. Vat. cum cod. cc distinctionem, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 exhibentibus definitionem, quae sumta est ex Aristot., 1. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.).
    The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] distinctionem ("distinction"), with the other codices and edition 1 however exhibiting definitionem ("definition"), which is taken from Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 5 (c. 7).
  3. Haec definitio universalis colligitur ex Aristot., II. Poster. c. 14. (c. 12.). Vide supra p. I. huius d. q. 4. arg. 1. ad opp.
    This definition of the universal is gathered from Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] II, c. 14 (c. 12). See above, p. I of this distinction, q. 4, arg. 1 on the opposite side.
  4. Fide codd. K T Z substituimus quia pro ambiguo quod.
    On the authority of codices K, T, Z we have substituted quia in place of the ambiguous quod.
  5. Antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 lectionem formaliter pro personalis restituimus, quae certe melior est.
    We have restored the reading of the older manuscripts and of edition 1, formaliter in place of personalis, which is certainly the better.
  6. Cfr. Libr. de Causis, prop. 4. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum uno alteroque codice minus bene maxima; plures codd. ut A F H cc ff omittunt est.
    Cf. the book On Causes, proposition 4. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition with one or another codex less well [reads] maxima; several codices such as A, F, H, cc, ff omit est.
  7. Libr. de Trin. c. 1. et 2, ubi haec propositio sententialiter sive tanquam conclusio continetur; ostendit siquidem ibi Boethius, quod propter summam substantialem Dei indifferentiam seu unitatem et simplicitatem «nulla in eo sit diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo, atque idcirco nec numerus», ex quibus praedicta propositio consequitur. Vide Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 1. — Mox codd. F G post quod satis bene addunt in divinis, codd. H M vero Deus.
    Book On the Trinity, c. 1 and 2, where this proposition is contained in substance or as a conclusion; for Boethius shows there that on account of the supreme substantial indifference of God, that is, his unity and simplicity, "there is in him no diversity, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents, and therefore not even number," from which the aforesaid proposition follows. See Alex. of Hales, S. p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 1. — Soon after, codices F, G after quod fittingly add in divinis, but codices H, M [add] Deus.
  8. Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 13.) universale definit: quod pluribus natura inesse natum est. — Mox addendo coniunctionem quoniam praestamus lectionem mss. et ed. 1, quam genuinam iudicamus, quia respondet verbis Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 5. (c. 7.) et ibid. II. c. 1. (c. 10): οὐ γὰρ πᾶν καθόλου σημαίνει, ἀλλ' ὅτι καθόλου, et versioni a Boethio factae (qua et schola et in specie S. Doctor uti solebant): Omne enim non universale significat, sed quoniam universaliter (ed. Migne, Patrol. lat. tom. 64. col. 322 et 348). Vide Nicolaum de Orbellis O. Min. (floruit circa 1480) in Expositione logicae supra textum Mag. Petri Hispani, c. de Propositione.
    In this respect Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 43 (VI, c. 13) defines the universal: that which is by nature apt to be in many. — Soon after, by adding the conjunction quoniam we offer the reading of the manuscripts and of edition 1, which we judge genuine, because it corresponds to the words of Aristotle, On Interpretation I, c. 5 (c. 7) and ibid. II, c. 1 (c. 10): ou gar pan katholou sēmainei, all' hoti katholou, and to the version made by Boethius (which both the Schools and St. [Bonaventure] in particular were accustomed to use): For not every [sign] signifies the universal, but [the] "as though universally" (ed. Migne, Patrol. lat. tome 64, col. 322 and 348). See Nicholas of Orbellis O.F.M. (flourished about 1480) in his Exposition of Logic on the text of Master Peter of Spain, c. On the Proposition.
  9. Porphyr., de Praedicab., individuum seu particulare definit: «Cuius collectio proprietatum nunquam in alio quolibet eadem erit». Inter has proprietates principatum obtinent locus et tempus. Cfr. Boeth., de Trin. c. 1, qui loco principatum dat, et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.), qui et loci et temporis mentionem facit ac de universali per oppositionem ad particulare iuxta translationem Boethii haec adiungit: Universale autem, quod est in omnibus, impossibile est sentire; neque enim hoc aliquid est neque nunc neque ubi (οὐ γὰρ τόδε οὐδὲ νῦν); neque enim utique esset universale; quod enim semper est et ubique, universale dicimus esse. — Ultima verba intelligas de perpetuitate et ubiquitate negativa i. e. illa quae abstrahit ab omni determinato tempore et loco; non autem de positiva i. e. illa quae se extendit ad omnia tempora et loca, et quae soli divinae naturae per se singulari (neutiquam universali) convenit, de qua in hoc agitur argumento. — Codd. L O ibi est materia et forma loco ibi est forma vel natura.
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, defines the individual or particular: "Whose collection of properties will never be the same in any other whatsoever." Among these properties place and time hold the chief place. Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 1, who gives the chief place to place, and Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 24 (c. 31), who makes mention of both place and time, and concerning the universal in opposition to the particular, according to Boethius's translation, adds these words: But it is impossible to perceive the universal, which is in all things; for it is not this something nor now nor where (ou gar tode oude nun); nor would it indeed be universal; for what always is and everywhere, we call universal. — The last words you are to understand of negative perpetuity and ubiquity, i.e., that which abstracts from every determinate time and place; not however of positive [perpetuity and ubiquity], i.e., that which extends itself to all times and places, and which befits the divine nature alone, [as] of itself singular (and by no means universal), about which there is question in the present argument. — Codices L, O [read] ibi est materia et forma in place of ibi est forma vel natura.
  10. Vide Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie et Differentia, et Aristot., I. Poster. c. 20. (c. 24.), ubi ex hoc deducit, demonstrationem universalem esse praestantiorem particulari.
    See Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. on Species and Difference, and Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 20 (c. 24), where from this he deduces that universal demonstration is more excellent than particular.
  11. Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 4.
    Cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 4.
  12. Ed. 1 vera pro nostra.
    Edition 1 [reads] vera in place of nostra.
  13. Intellige haec verba in sensu passivo, ita ut sensus sit: nisi in aliquo, quod aptum est communicari seu haberi a pluribus. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit a.
    Understand these words in the passive sense, so that the sense is: only in something which is apt to be communicated or to be had by many. — The Vatican edition, against the authority of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, omits a.
  14. Vat. repetit hic in, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition repeats here in, which is missing in the manuscripts and edition 1.
  15. Alluditur ad supra in 3. fundam. a nobis allatam definitionem individui. Collectio accidentalium proprietatum, quibus individuum nobis innotescit, hoc versu continetur: Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen.
    Allusion is made to the definition of the individual brought forward by us above in the 3rd fundamentum. The collection of accidental properties, by which the individual becomes known to us, is contained in this verse: Form, figure, place, time, stock, fatherland, name.
  16. Ed. 1 consequenter, in qua lectione interpunctionem mutes necesse est. Paulo infra post ab altero in ed. 1 additur solum.
    Edition 1 [reads] consequenter, in which reading it is necessary that you change the punctuation. A little below, after ab altero, in edition 1 solum is added.
  17. Ex pluribus mss. ut A T Y etc. substituimus haec pro hoc. — De ratione, quam S. Doctor hic affert, plura vide supra d. 9. q. 1.
    From several manuscripts such as A, T, Y etc. we have substituted haec in place of hoc. — Concerning the reason which the Holy Doctor here brings forward, see more above d. 9, q. 1.
  18. Sensum istorum verborum accipe a S. Doctore, II. Sent. d. 3. p. I. a. 2. q. 3. in corp., ubi fusius de principio individuationis agit: «Rursus, quomodo forma sit tota et praecipua causa numeralis distinctionis, valde difficile est capere; cum omnis forma creata, quantum est de sui natura, nata sit habere aliam sibi similem, sicut et ipse Philosophus (VII. Metaph. text. 35. — ed. Paris., VI. c. 13.) dicit, etiam in sole et luna esse». — Idem dicit S. Thomas de formis materialibus seu per se non subsistentibus, in Comment. super VII. Metaph. lect. 13. et in opusculo de Individuatione. — Ex mss. et edd. 1. 2. 3. ante communicabile supplevimus quid.
    Take the sense of these words from the Holy Doctor, II Sentences, d. 3, p. I, a. 2, q. 3, in the body [of the article], where he treats more fully of the principle of individuation: "Again, how form is the total and chief cause of numerical distinction, is very difficult to grasp; since every created form, as far as its nature is concerned, is born to have another like itself, as also the Philosopher himself (Metaphysics VII, text 35 — ed. Paris, VI, c. 13) says, [exists] also in the sun and moon." — The same St. Thomas says of material forms or [forms] not per se subsistent, in his Commentary on Metaphysics VII, lect. 13, and in the opusculum On Individuation. — From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied quid before communicabile.
  19. Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3.) materiam describit: Dico autem materiam, quae per se ipsam neque quid neque quantum nec aliquid aliud quippiam dicitur, quibus ens determinatur. Vide etiam I. Metaph. text. 17. (c. 8.), ubi ait: Quando namque nihil erat discretum (translat. arabico-latina: Quoniam autem in fundamento naturae non est aliquid distinctum), palam quia nihil erat verum dicere de substantia illa... nec enim quale aliquid id possibile esse nec quantum nec quid.
    In this respect Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 8 (VI, c. 3) describes matter: I call matter that which through itself is said to be neither what nor how much nor anything else of those by which being is determined. See also Metaphysics I, text 17 (c. 8), where he says: For when nothing was discrete (Arabic-Latin translation: But since in the foundation of nature there is nothing distinguished), it is plain that there was nothing true to say about that substance... for it was not possible that it be either of some quality or of some quantity or some what.
  20. In Vat. malo omittitur totam, quod tamen exstat in mss. et ed. 1, a quibus etiam, uno alterove tantum codice excepto, paulo infra lectio Vat. trahit loco trahitur emendatur.
    In the Vatican edition totam is wrongly omitted, which nevertheless stands in the manuscripts and in edition 1, by which also, with only one or another codex excepted, a little below the Vatican reading trahit is corrected in place of trahitur.
  21. Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 hic ad pro in et mox vel loco nec.
    The Vatican edition, against the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and of edition 1, [reads] here ad in place of in, and soon after vel in place of nec.
  22. Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 multiplicatum.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the codices and of edition 1, [reads] multiplicatum.
  23. Plurimi mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent verbum fit loco sic et particulam in, quam Vat. omittit. Mox Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 male substituit sicut pro sic, post quam particulam plures codd. ut G H K T etc. adiiciunt est.
    Most manuscripts with edition 1 exhibit the verb fit in place of sic and the particle in, which the Vatican edition omits. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and edition 1, badly substitutes sicut for sic, after which particle several codices such as G, H, K, T etc. add est.
  24. Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus sit.
    On the authority of the older manuscripts and of edition 1 we have supplied sit.
  25. Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11: Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est. Cfr. etiam supra d. 6. dub. 2. et infra d. XXXIII lit. Magistri circa finem, ubi August. Serm. I. in Psalm. 68. n. 3. affertur.
    Book VII, On the Trinity, c. 6, n. 11: Wherefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father himself, [it is] not [that] by which he is Father, but [that] by which he is. Cf. also above d. 6, dub. 2 and below d. XXXIII, in the text of the Master near the end, where Augustine, Sermon 1 on Psalm 68, n. 3 is brought forward.
  26. Plura de hoc vide infra d. 33. q. 2. et dub. 4. — Mox post primum aut in Vat. et cod. cc additur tunc, quod deest in aliis mss. et ed. 1.
    See more on this below d. 33, q. 2 and dub. 4. — Soon after, after primum aut in the Vatican edition and codex cc there is added tunc, which is missing in the other manuscripts and in edition 1.
  27. Ad pleniorem praedictorum intelligentiam vide ea quae S. Doctor supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. ad 1. dicit. Cfr. etiam infra d. 26. q. 1. ad 2. et d. 34. q. 2. ad 7. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. incongrue haberi essentiam ab alio et non haberi loco habere essentiam ab alio et non habere et mox nullum pro nulla[?] res. Cod. T esse autem ab alio et non esse ab alio loco habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio, in qua propositione multi codd. cum ed. 1 minus bene et non habere ab alio. Dein aliqui codd. sed ab alio pro et ab alio.
    For a fuller understanding of the foregoing see what the Holy Doctor says above d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1. Cf. also below d. 26, q. 1, ad 2 and d. 34, q. 2, ad 7. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and of the first six editions, incongruously [reads] haberi essentiam ab alio et non haberi in place of habere essentiam ab alio et non habere, and soon after nullum[?] in place of nulla res. Codex T [reads] esse autem ab alio et non esse ab alio in place of habere autem ab alio et habere non ab alio, in which proposition many codices with edition 1 less well [read] et non habere ab alio. Then some codices [read] sed ab alio pro et ab alio.
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