Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19
ARTICULUS UNICUS. Quod a Deo excludi debeant omnes rationes inaequalitatis.
### QUAESTIO I. Utrum in divinis ponendum sit totum integrale.
Circa primum, quod sit1 ponere totalitatem integritatis, videtur:
1. Per Augustinum primo, et habetur in littera2: Tota Trinitas est in singulis personis: ergo aut est ibi implicatio falsi, aut est ibi totalitas; sed non est ibi implicatio falsi: ergo est ibi totalitas.
2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia ubi quantitas, ibi totalitas et integritas. Sed in divinis est quantitas virtutis: ergo saltem secundum illam et integritas.
3. Item, ubi pluralitas, ibi integritas, quia omnis pluralitas constat ex unitatibus; sed in Deo est pluralitas, quia trinitas: ergo in Deo est integritas. Si dicas, quod illa pluralitas non integratur, quia nihil plus est in tribus quam in uno — ergo si tantum est in tribus, quantum est in uno, ergo tantum credit et aeque plene credit qui credit, unum solum esse suppositum, sicut qui credit, tres esse personas; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.
4. Item, si aliquid est aequale alicui, eodem addito, adhuc erit aequale; ergo si aliquid est totum ad aliquid, eodem addito, adhuc erit totum; sed tres est totum ad unum: ergo tres personae ad unam personam3.
5. Item, omne quod praedicatur de aliquibus simul et de nullo per se, est totum integrum ad illa4; istud constat et non habet instantiam; sed trinitas praedicatur de tribus personis simul et de nulla per se: ergo etc.
6. Item, omne quod removetur ab aliquo, differt ab illo genere, vel specie, vel numero, vel est totum ad illud; sed trinitas removetur a Patre, quia Pater non est trinitas, nec differt genere, vel specie, vel numero: ergo etc.
Contra: 1. Ambrosius in libro de Trinitate5: «In divinis nullam ponimus totalitatem, quia non est ibi quantitas nec numerus».
2. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne6 integrum est compositum ex partibus; sed Deus est summe simplex: ergo in Deo nulla est totalitas nec integritas.
3. Item, omnis pars sub ratione partis habet esse imperfectum respectu totius, quia ex aliquibus
omnino perfectis non resultat tertium7: ergo cum in divinis nihil imperfectionis sit ponendum, non est ibi pars: ergo a relativis8 nec totum.
4. Item, omne totum est maius sua parte: sed ubi infinitas, ibi non est maius et minus: ergo nec totalitas: sed in divinis est infinitas: ergo.
5. Item, omne totum est resolubile vel secundum rem, vel secundum intellectum; et omne resolubile est corruptibile: ergo cum in Deo nihil sit corruptibile, non erit resolubile, et ita nec totum.
Conclusio. Ratio totalitatis, prout exprimit aliquid perfectum, convenit Deo; sed prout habet respectum ad partes, nec totalitas nec partialitas in Deo poni potest.
Respondeo: Totum sive totalitas uno modo dicitur absolute: et sic totum idem est quod perfectum9. Alio modo dicitur totum per comparationem ad partem; et sic dicitur totum quod habet partem et partem sive partes10.
Primo modo bene est ponere totalitatem in Deo, secundo11 non, nec etiam partialitatem; totalitatem non, quia aufert simplicitatem; partialitatem non, quia tollit perfectum; neutrum, quia tollit aequalitatem summam.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Augustino, qui dicit, quod tota Trinitas etc.; dicendum, quod totum accipit pro perfecto, vel totum ibi accipitur privative, quia privat hoc quod est esse partem extra partem. Unde tantum valet tota essentia, quantum valet non habens partem extra vel intra.
2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod est ibi quantitas virtutis; dicendum, quod quantitas virtutis stat cum summa simplicitate; ideo abstrahit a totalitate et integritate.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ubi pluralitas, ibi integritas12 etc.; dicendum, quod pluralitas in creaturis duo dicit. Dicit enim aliquorum distinctionem, et ex ipsis unius multitudinis13 constitutionem. Primum quidem reperitur in divinis, quia ibi est distinctio vere; secundum non, quia ubi constitutio est, ibi constituentia minus habent quam totum14, quod constituunt, et ita essentialiter differunt ab invicem. In divinis autem non sic, quia cum Pater15 habeat totam essentiam, non partem, non potest minus habere nec essentialiter differre. Et ideo dicendum, quod in divinis recipitur16 pluralitas ratione distinctionis. Sed quia pluralitas est totum ratione constitutionis, et haec non est in divinis; ideo non sequitur, quod sit ibi totalitas; est tamen ibi vere unitas et pluralitas17, et tantum est in unitate, quantum in pluralitate, sed non tot modis. Et quia fides non tantum est respectu essentiae vel magnitudinis, sed etiam modi essendi, patet quod obiicitur, quod non tantum credit qui credit unam personam, quantum qui credit plures.
4. Ex hoc patent sequentia, quia unum est pars trium, secundum quod dicit18 unitatem, et tria trinitatem. Sed cum additur hoc nomen persona, distrahitur et non manet illa ratio unitatis, ideo nec ratio partialitatis.
5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedicatur simul et removetur19 etc.; dicendum, quod hoc20 non solum convenit totalitati respectu partis, sed etiam pluralitati respectu unitatis; quae quamvis non teneat rationem partis21 propter diminutionem et imperfectionem22, tenet tamen rationem unitatis propter principium et distinctionem.
Unde quod totum removeatur a partibus et non23 differat, hoc non est ratione constitutionis principaliter, sed ratione distinctionis. Et quoniam in divina pluralitate, quamvis non sit unius maioris constitutio, quia tamen ibi est distinctio, ideo sic removetur, et sic praedicatur sicut totum in creaturis.
I. Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis notandum, quod S. Doctor hic in corp. et ad 1. verbum totum sumit triplici modo. Potest enim intelligi vel positive vel privative; si positive, tunc iterum vel proprie i. e. comparative ad partes, et sic totum est idem ac habens partes; vel absolute, et sic significat perfectum. Si autem accipitur privative, tunc significat ens, quod non habet partes, sicut sunt omnia indivisibilia v. g. anima. In primo sensu totum minime potest transferri ad Deum, bene vero in secundo ac tertio sensu. His suppositis, quaestio resolvitur quoad totalitatem duplici conclusione; deinde negativa solutio extenditur etiam ad partialitatem.
II. Pro intelligentia 3. 5. et 6. oppositi et solutionis notandum, quod natura totius integralis importat, quod totum praedicetur de omnibus partibus simul, sed de nulla parte per se. Ratio huius est non tantum, quia distinguuntur partes, sed etiam quia totum est inaequale in comparatione ad suas partes. Verum quidem est, quod etiam Trinitas non praedicatur de aliqua persona per se, tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod Trinitas sit totum integrale relate ad singulas personas, quia non propter aliquam inaequalitatem Trinitatis ad singulas personas, sed solummodo propter distinctionem personarum ista praedicatio fieri nequit. Unde recte replicatur in 3. oppos.: «Illa pluralitas (personarum) non integratur (i. e. non facit totum integrum), quia nihil plus est in tribus quam in uno». Sic etiam verba in solutione: «Ubi constitutio est, ibi constituentia minus habent quam totum», facile intelliguntur, quia manifestum est, quod quando partes constituunt unum totum, partes minus sunt quam totum. In divinis non est sic, quia pluralitas personarum non constituit totum, ut ibi a S. Doctore bene explicatur.
Pro solut. ad 4. notandum, quod numerus in divinis non habet plenam rationem numeri, quia etsi personae sunt distinctae per suas personales proprietates, tamen conveniunt in una numero essentia; sed numerus secundum plenam sui rationem importat numeratorum distinctionem in essentia. Unde tres unitates personales sunt quidem plures quam una, non tamen sunt plures vel plus in essentia; ita fere Richard. a Med., loc. infra cit. et ad mentem Seraphici Doctoris, cfr. infra d. 24. praecipue a. 3. q. 1.
III. Scot., de hac q. et duabus seqq. Report. hic q. 3.[?] — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 12; S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 1. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. et 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 1. a. 4. — Durand., de hac 1. et 4. q. hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. 3.
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ARTICLE UNIQUE. That all accounts of inequality must be excluded from God.
### Question I. Whether an integral whole is to be posited in divine things.
As to the first [question], that one ought1 to posit a totality of integrity, it seems [yes]:
1. By Augustine first, [as] is had in the text [of the Master]2: The whole Trinity is in each of the persons: therefore either there is there an implication of falsehood, or there is there a totality; but there is not there an implication of falsehood: therefore there is there totality.
2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason, since where there is quantity, there is totality and integrity. But in divine things there is the quantity of virtue: therefore at least according to it [there is] also integrity.
3. Likewise, where there is plurality, there is integrity, since every plurality is composed of unities; but in God there is plurality, since [there is] trinity: therefore in God there is integrity. If you say that that plurality is not made integral, since nothing more is in three than in one — then if there is just as much in three as in one, then he who believes that there is only one supposit believes just as much, and as fully, as he who believes that there are three persons; but this is false: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if something is equal to something, when the same is added, it will still be equal; therefore if something is a whole in relation to something, when the same is added, it will still be a whole; but three is a whole in relation to one: therefore three persons in relation to one person3.
5. Likewise, everything which is predicated of certain things together and of none singly is an integral whole in relation to them4; this stands and admits of no instance to the contrary; but trinity is predicated of the three persons together and of none singly: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, everything which is removed from something either differs from it in genus, or species, or number, or is a whole in relation to it; but trinity is removed from the Father, since the Father is not the trinity, nor does it differ in genus, or species, or number: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. Ambrose, in his book On the Trinity5: «In divine things we posit no totality, since there is there neither quantity nor number».
2. Likewise, by reason it seems [so], since every6 integral [whole] is composed of parts; but God is supremely simple: therefore in God there is no totality nor integrity.
3. Likewise, every part under the account of a part has imperfect being with respect to the whole, since from things which are altogether perfect7 no third thing results: therefore since in divine things nothing of imperfection is to be posited, there is no part there: therefore from the relatives8 no whole either.
4. Likewise, every whole is greater than its part: but where there is infinity, there is no greater and lesser: therefore neither totality: but in divine things there is infinity: therefore [no totality].
5. Likewise, every whole is resolvable either in reality or in the intellect; and everything resolvable is corruptible: therefore since in God nothing is corruptible, [God] will not be resolvable, and so neither a whole.
Conclusion. The account of totality, insofar as it expresses something perfect, befits God; but insofar as it has reference to parts, neither totality nor partiality can be posited in God.
I respond: Whole or totality is said in one way absolutely: and so whole is the same as perfect9. In another way whole is said by comparison to a part; and so that is called whole which has part and part, or parts10.
In the first way, totality is well posited in God; in the second11 not, nor partiality either; not totality, because it removes simplicity; not partiality, because it destroys the perfect; neither, because it destroys the highest equality.
1. To that, therefore, which is objected from Augustine, who says the whole Trinity etc.; it must be said that he takes "whole" for "perfect," or "whole" is taken there privatively, since it denies what it is to be part outside of part. Hence "whole essence" is worth as much as "not having part outside or within."
2. To that which is objected secondly, that there is there a quantity of virtue; it must be said that the quantity of virtue stands together with the highest simplicity; therefore it abstracts from totality and integrity.
3. To that which is objected, that where there is plurality, there is integrity12 etc.; it must be said that plurality in creatures says two things. For it expresses the distinction of certain things, and from these very things the constitution13 of one multitude. The first is indeed found in divine things, since there is truly distinction there; but the second is not, since where there is constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole14 which they constitute, and so they essentially differ from one another. But in divine things it is not so, since since the Father15 has the whole essence, not a part, he cannot have less, nor essentially differ. And therefore it must be said that in divine things plurality is received16 by reason of distinction. But because plurality is a whole by reason of constitution, and this is not in divine things, therefore it does not follow that there is totality there; nevertheless there is truly there unity and plurality17, and there is as much in unity as in plurality, but not in as many modes. And because faith is not only with respect to essence or magnitude, but also to the mode of being, it is plain [as to] what is objected, that he who believes one person does not believe as much as he who believes several.
4. From this the following [points] are clear, since one is a part of three, according as it expresses18 unity, and three [express] trinity. But when this name person is added, [the term] is drawn off and that account of unity does not remain, therefore neither the account of partiality.
5. 6. To that which is objected, that it is predicated together and removed19 etc.; it must be said that this20 not only befits totality with respect to a part, but also plurality with respect to unity; which, although it does not hold the account of part21 on account of diminution and imperfection22, nevertheless holds the account of unity on account of [its being a] principle and [having] distinction.
Hence [the fact] that the whole is removed from the parts and does not23 differ [from them], this is not principally by reason of constitution, but by reason of distinction. And since in the divine plurality, although there is no constitution of one greater [thing], nevertheless because there is distinction there, therefore it is in this way removed, and in this way predicated, just as a whole [is removed and predicated] in creatures.
I. For the understanding of this question it must be noted that the holy Doctor here, in the corpus and in [the reply] to 1, takes the word whole in a threefold mode. For it can be understood either positively or privatively; if positively, then again either properly, i. e. comparatively to parts — and so "whole" is the same as "having parts"; or absolutely, and so it signifies "perfect." But if it is taken privatively, then it signifies a being which does not have parts, as are all indivisibles, e. g. the soul. In the first sense whole can least of all be transferred to God, but well in the second and third sense. These things being supposed, the question is resolved as to totality by a twofold conclusion; then the negative solution is extended also to partiality.
II. For the understanding of [objections] 3, 5, and 6 of the opposite [side] and of the solution it must be noted that the nature of an integral whole implies that the whole be predicated of all the parts together, but of no part singly. The reason for this is not only that the parts are distinguished, but also that the whole is unequal in comparison to its parts. It is indeed true that the Trinity is not predicated of any one person singly; nevertheless from this it does not follow that the Trinity is an integral whole in relation to the individual persons, since not on account of any inequality of the Trinity to the individual persons, but solely on account of the distinction of the persons, this predication cannot be made. Hence the rejoinder in [objection] 3 of the opposite [side] is correctly made: «That plurality (of the persons) is not made integral (i. e. does not make an integral whole), since nothing more is in three than in one». So also the words in the solution: «Where there is constitution, there the constituents have less than the whole» are easily understood, since it is manifest that when parts constitute one whole, the parts are less than the whole. In divine things it is not so, since the plurality of the persons does not constitute a whole, as is well explained there by the holy Doctor.
For the solution to [objection] 4 it must be noted that number in divine things does not have the full account of number, since although the persons are distinguished by their personal properties, nevertheless they agree in one essence numerically; but number, according to its full account, implies a distinction of the things numbered in essence. Hence three personal unities are indeed more than one, yet they are not more or greater in essence; thus, more or less, Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. below, and according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, cf. below d. 24, especially a. 3, q. 1.
III. Scotus, on this question and the two following, Reportata here q. 3.[?] — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 12; Summa p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 1, q. incidens. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 3 and 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st principium, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 43, q. 1, a. 4. — Durandus, on this 1 and 4 q. here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the following questions here q. 3.
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- Cod. X cum ed. 1 adiungit quaeritur.Cod. X with edition 1 adds quaeritur ("is asked").
- In ed. 1 additur ibi.In edition 1 ibi ("there") is added.
- Hic, c. 4, ubi haec verba Augustini afferuntur: «Propter unitatem naturalem totus Pater in Filio et Spiritu sancto est, totus quoque Spiritus sanctus in Patre et Filio est. Nullus horum extra quemlibet ipsorum est propter naturae divinae unitatem». Et c. 6, ubi Augustinus inter cetera dicit: «Pars ergo Trinitatis esse non potest quicumque unus in tribus». Ex quibus verbis propositio illa obiectionis formata esse videtur. — Vat. hic et infra in principio respons. ad hanc obiectionem praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et sex primarum edd. essentia loco Trinitas, pro quo codd. PQ divinitas.Here, c. 4, where these words of Augustine are alleged: «On account of the natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit also is in the Father and the Son. None of these is outside any of them, on account of the unity of the divine nature». And c. 6, where Augustine among other things says: «No one therefore who is one of the three can be a part of the Trinity». From which words the proposition of that objection appears to have been formed. — The Vatican edition, here and below at the beginning of the response to this objection, against the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and the six first editions, [reads] essentia in place of Trinitas, in place of which codices PQ [read] divinitas.
- Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. contra pro ergo. — Cum ergo incipit replicatio.The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions, [reads] contra in place of ergo. — With ergo begins the rejoinder.
- Sensus argumenti est: Si verum est axioma: duae res aequales remanent aequales, si utrique additur idem, etiam verum erit hoc axioma: si aliquid est totum ad aliquid, remanet totum, si subiecto et praedicato idem additur; unde si in propositione: tres est totum ad unum, addo vocabulum persona ad tres et unum, non alteratur veritas eiusdem.The sense of the argument is: If the axiom is true that two equal things remain equal, if the same [thing] is added to each, then this axiom too will be true: if something is a whole in relation to something, it remains a whole, if the same is added to subject and predicate; whence if, in the proposition three is a whole in relation to one, I add the word person to three and to one, the truth of the same is not altered.
- Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 31. (IV. c. 26.) ait: «Totum dicitur cuius nulla pars eorum abest, ex quibus totum natura (i. e. secundum propriam naturam) dicitur; et quod continet contenta, ut unum quid illa sint; hoc autem dupliciter: aut enim ut unumquodque unum, aut ex his illud unum. Ipsum enim universale et quod omnino ut totum quippiam ens dicitur, sic est universale, ut multa continens, eo quod de singulis praedicatur... Ceterum continuum et finitum, cum e pluribus inexistentibus unum quid sit, maxime quidem potentia, non actu». Quae verba Scotus, Comment. in hunc locum, ita explicat: Et per hoc dat intelligere duplex totum, scil. totum universale, cuius quaelibet pars est ipsum totum, quatenus tale totum praedicatur de suis partibus, praedicatione dicente: hoc est hoc; aliud totum integrale, quod ex suis partibus constituitur, tamen nulla eius pars est ipsum totum, quia nullum tale totum de suis partibus praedicatur.Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 31 (IV, c. 26), says: «That is called a whole of which no part is absent of those from which the whole is said by nature (i. e. according to its proper nature); and that which contains its contents so that they are some one thing; this in two ways: either as each one is one, or [so that] from these [is constituted] that one. For the universal itself, and what in every way is called something existing as a whole, is universal in this way: as containing many things, in that it is predicated of singulars… Moreover the continuous and the finite, since out of many indwelling [parts] it is some one thing, [is so] above all in potency, not in act». Which words Scotus, in his Commentary on this passage, so explains: And by this he gives [us] to understand a twofold whole, namely the universal whole, of which each part is the whole itself, inasmuch as such a whole is predicated of its parts, by a predication saying: this is this; another, the integral whole, which is constituted from its parts, yet no part of it is the whole itself, since no such whole is predicated of its parts.
- Seu libr. I. de Fide c. 2. n. 19; et III. de Spir. S. c. 13; n. 93. ait: Quomodo enim pluralitatem recipit unitas divinitatis, cum pluralitas numeri sit, numerum autem non recipit divina natura?Or rather book I On the Faith, c. 2, n. 19; and III On the Holy Spirit, c. 13, n. 93, [where] he says: For how does the unity of divinity admit plurality, since plurality is of number, but the divine nature does not admit number?
- In cod. M additur totum.In cod. M totum is added.
- Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 14. (VI. c. 13.). Vide supra pag. 311 nota 7.Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 14 (VI, c. 13). See above p. 311 note 7.
- Id est, concludendo ex habitudine unius relativi ad aliud, nempe partis ad totum.That is, concluding from the relation of one relative to another, namely of part to whole.
- Vide Anselm., Proslog. c. 18, et de Fide Trin. c. 3. Cfr. supra pag. 161 nota 1.See Anselm, Proslogion c. 18, and On the Faith of the Trinity c. 3. Cf. above p. 161 note 1.
- Aristot., III. Phys. text. 64. (c. 6.): Totum vero et perfectum aut omnino idem sunt, aut natura inter se affinia.Aristotle, Physics III, text 64 (c. 6): Whole and perfect are either altogether the same, or by nature akin to one another.
- Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 31. (IV. c. 26.). Vide supra arg. 5. ad opp.Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 31 (IV, c. 26). See above arg. 5 ad oppositum.
- In codd. V X satis bene additur vero modo. Paulo infra cod. Z perfectionem pro perfectum. Dein ed. 1 post neutrum, quia bene addit utrumque.In codices V X there is well added vero modo ("but in [this] way"). A little below cod. Z [reads] perfectionem in place of perfectum. Then ed. 1 after neutrum, quia well adds utrumque ("both").
- Ex cod. Y supplevimus integritas.From cod. Y we have supplied integritas.
- Ita plures mss. ut FGHPQY cum ed. 1; alii cum Vat. multiplicationis.Thus several manuscripts such as FGHPQY with ed. 1; others with the Vatican edition [read] multiplicationis.
- Cod. O quaelibet persona loco Pater.Cod. O [reads] quaelibet persona in place of Pater.
- Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus recipitur pro reperitur, et paulo infra ex pluribus mss. ut ACSTV cc et ed. 1 haec pro hoc. Multi codd. ut AFGHISTVZ etc. cum ed. 1 erat totum loco est totum.On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted recipitur in place of reperitur, and a little below, from several manuscripts such as ACSTV cc and ed. 1, haec in place of hoc. Many codices such as AFGHISTVZ etc., with ed. 1, [read] erat totum in place of est totum.
- Vat. cum cod. cc est tamen naturae unitas et personarum pluralitas, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra multi codd. cum Vat. Sed quia loco Et quia contra codd. GH et ed. 1.The Vatican with cod. cc [reads] est tamen naturae unitas et personarum pluralitas ("there is nevertheless a unity of nature and a plurality of persons"), but the authority of the other manuscripts and ed. 1 stands against [it]. A little below many codices, with the Vatican, [read] Sed quia in place of Et quia, against codices GH and ed. 1.
- Supple cum ed. 1 unum, quae et mox ponit adderetur pro additur.Supply with ed. 1 unum ("one"), which also soon after puts adderetur in place of additur.
- Ita brevissime mss. et ed. 1, dum Vat. obiicitur quod omne, quod praedicatur simul et de nullo etc. Et ad sequens: omne quod removetur etc.Thus very briefly the manuscripts and ed. 1, while the Vatican [reads] obiicitur quod omne, quod praedicatur simul et de nullo etc. And for what follows: omne quod removetur etc.
- Cod. Z incongrue hic addit scilicet in divinis, et mox post imperfectionem adiungit quam scilicet dicit pars.Cod. Z incongruously adds here scilicet in divinis ("namely in divine things"), and soon after imperfectionem appends quam scilicet dicit pars ("which, namely, the part expresses").
- Vat. perperam, quia argumentationi minus respondet, et absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit non. Argumentationis summa in hoc est: ratio, quare totum i. e. Trinitas removetur a Patre, nec tamen ab ipso differt sicut totum a [parte, non est ratione constitutionis principaliter, sed ratione distinctionis].The Vatican wrongly, since it corresponds less to the argumentation, and without the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions, omits non. The sum of the argumentation is this: the reason why the whole, i. e. the Trinity, is removed from the Father, yet does not differ from him as a whole [does] from [a part, is not principally by reason of constitution, but by reason of distinction].