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Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
p. 347

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum circumincessione.

Quarto quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit aequalitas cum circumincessione. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo auctoritate Domini, Ioannis decimo quarto1: Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est.

2. Item, Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum2: «Propter unitatem naturae totus Pater est in Filio et Spiritu sancto».

3. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia in

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quocumque est substantia vel essentia Patris, est Pater: sed substantia Patris est in Filio: ergo Pater est in Filio3, eadem ratione est Filius in Patre.

4. Item, omne cognitum est in cognoscente vel per veritatem, vel per similitudinem; sed Pater cognoscit Filium quantum ad hypostasim et proprietatem: ergo Filius est in Patre: aut ergo4 quantum ad veritatem, aut quantum ad similitudinem veritatis. Non quantum ad similitudinem, quia tunc esset Filius in Patre sicut creatura: ergo quantum ad veritatem: eadem ratione et5 Pater in Filio: ergo circumincessio est ibi.

5. Item, omne quod est comparatum ad alterum, aut est in illo, aut extra illum. Si ergo Filius comparatur ad Patrem, aut est in illo, aut extra. Si in eo, eadem ratione et Pater in eo: si extra eum; sed illa, quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt per substantiam: ergo Pater et Filius substantialiter differunt.

6. Item, maior est convenientia in divinis, quam sit generis ad species vel totius ad partes; sed propter convenientiam generis ad species genus est in speciebus et e converso; et similiter totum in partibus et e converso6: ergo multo fortius in divinis Pater est in Filio et e converso.

Contra: 1. Si Pater est in Filio et e converso, ergo Pater est in Patre. Sicut enim sequitur in praedicando, quod quidquid praedicatur in plus vel aeque de aliquo, praedicatur de omni eo quod est sub eo7: ergo similiter, si aliquid est in aliquo, necesse est, quod in eodem sit omne quod est in eo: ergo si Filius est in Patre, omne quod est in Filio, est in Patre: sed Pater est in Filio: ergo Pater est in Patre.

2. Item, quandocumque duo simplicia eiusdem generis simul sunt, ita quod unum est in altero, non distinguuntur ab invicem, sicut punctus est in puncto. Si ergo Pater et Filius sunt omnino simplices; si Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre, non videtur, quod distinguantur.

3. Item, si duae essentiae divinae essent, impossibile esset, quod una esset in alia, quia una non posset illabi alii, quoniam utraque esset aeque spiritualis et summe spiritualis: ergo si duae personae sunt aeque et summe spirituales, impossibile est, quod una sit in altera; et illud8 videtur, quia Deus non potest esse in creatura, quin ei illabatur. Si ergo persona est in persona, videtur omnino ei illabi.

4. Item, quaero, quid significet hoc quod est esse in Patre, utrum dicatur secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Si secundum relationem, hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit in littera9, quod «propter unitatem naturae totus Pater est in Filio et Spiritu sancto». Si secundum substantiam; sed10 quae secundum substantiam dicuntur, conveniunt tribus: ergo hoc quod est esse in Patre convenit Filio et Spiritui sancto et Patri: ergo Pater est in Patre, quod non conceditur.

5. Item, cum dicitur: Pater est in Filio, et Filius in Patre, aut importatur eadem habitudo, aut altera. Si eadem, cum Filius sit in Patre ut in principio, tunc similiter Pater esset11 in Filio ut in principio; quod simpliciter est absurdum. Si non importatur eadem habitudo: ergo sicut12 non est circumincessio, cum dicitur: genus est in specie, et species in genere, similiter nec in proposito esset circumincessio.

6. Item, Filius est de Patre et apud Patrem, et non convertitur: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod non convertatur, quodsi Pater est in Filio, quod Filius sit in Patre.

7. Item, novem modi essendi in13 sunt in crea-

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turis. Primo modo sicut pars in toto; secundo modo sicut totum in partibus; tertio modo sicut species in genere; quarto modo sicut genus in speciebus; quinto modo sicut forma in materia; sexto modo sicut rectum sive motum in regente; septimo modo sicut res in suo fine; octavo modo sicut contentum in continente; et nonum addit Boethius, scilicet14 sicut accidens in subiecto. Quaeritur ergo, quo istorum modorum sit Pater in Filio et e converso; et cum nullum horum sit dare, videtur quod nullo modo sit.

CONCLUSIO.

In divinis personis est summa et perfecta circumincessio ratione unitatis essentiae cum distinctione personarum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod15, sicut auctoritates probant et rationes, in divinis est summa et perfecta circumincessio. Et haec vocatur16 circumincessio, qua dicitur, quod unus est in alio et e converso; et hoc proprie et perfecte in solo Deo est, quia circumincessio in essendo ponit distinctionem simul et unitatem. Et quoniam in solo Deo est summa17 unitas cum distinctione, ita quod distinctio est inconfusa et unitas indistincta: hinc est, quod in solo Deo est circumincessio perfecta. Et patet ratio huius, quia ratio circumincessionis est perfecta unitas essentiae cum distinctione personarum. Et quoniam hoc est proprium solius Dei, ideo et circumincessio talis, secundum quod dicit Hilarius et Magister inducit in littera18.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod Pater in Filio et Filius in Patre, ergo Pater19 in se; dicunt quidam, quod argumentum non valet, quia mutatur habitudo eius quod est in; quia in una dicit habitudinem principiati ad principium, in alia autem habitudinem principii ad principiatum. Tamen illud non oportet dicere, quia sicut iam patebit20, in non dicit diversam habitudinem. Nec tamen sequitur, immo est accidens ibi, eo quod in notat distinctionem, sicut accidens est hic: Petrus est similis Paulo, et Paulus Petro: ergo Petrus est similis Petro; ita et in proposito intelligendum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod21 simplicia simul existentia confunduntur in unum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando simplicia habent distingui penes illud, in quo sunt, sicut punctus et unitas ab eo, in quo est. Sed quando se ipsis distinguuntur et in22 se ipsis substantificantur, tunc, quamvis sint simul, non confunduntur; et tales sunt hypostases divinae. Et huius simile, quamvis perfecte non possit in creatura inveniri, tamen Dionysius23 ponit exemplum in luminibus, quae multa sunt in eodem aere inconfusa: et huius signum est, quia, quando luminare aufertur, secum24 trahit lumen suum, nihil de aliis convellens. Et ratio huius est, quia lumina in aere non distinguuntur penes id in quo25.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod essentia non est in essentia nisi per illapsum etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia ubi est essentiarum diversitas, si una est in altera, oportet quod una sit aliquo modo materialis alteri; sed quando26 personae differunt, salva essentiae unitate, una est in alia, quia essentia unius est essentia alterius; et ita, sicut idem non illabitur sibi, ita nullus potest esse ibi illapsus.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quid significet hoc quod est esse in Patre; dicendum, quod, sicut Sancti innuunt, sicut aequale dicit respectum secundum unitatem quantitatis, et simile secundum unitatem qualitatis27, similiter hoc quod est esse in Patre, secundum unitatem substantiae. Unde sicut aequale

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simul importat substantiam cum relatione, sicut patebit infra28, ita et hoc quod est esse in. Et sicut, cum dicitur originalis Patri, arctatur ad standum pro aliis personis, ita et in proposito intelligendum.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum importetur eadem habitudo; dicendum sine praeiudicio, quod sic, quantum est de ratione nominis. Sicut enim, cum dicitur: Pater est similis Filio et e converso, non importatur alia et alia habitudo: ita nec in hoc quod est esse in29, quia importat relationem identitatis sive consubstantialitatis. Unde si dicatur: Pater est similis Filio et e converso, non dicitur alia habitudo: sic in proposito, quia significat hoc quod est esse in Patre idem quod est esse Patri consubstantialem. Et uniformiter accipitur consubstantialis, cum dicitur de Patre et Filio. Et hoc patet, quia si non diceret consimilem habitudinem, non esset circumincessio, sicut nec est, quando dicitur creatura esse in Deo, et Deus esse in creatura; quia alia importatur habitudo in utraque.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod quaeritur de hoc quod est apud etc.; dicendum, quod quaedam praepositiones important habitudinem repugnantiae, ut contra; quaedam distantiae, ut hoc quod est ad et prope; quaedam causae, ut de et ex; quaedam convenientiae, ut in et cum. Primae et secundae nullo modo recipiuntur30, sed tertiae et quartae sic, et tertiae non conversim, sed quartae conversim, quia convenientia est relatio aequiparantiae.

Ad 7. Ad ultimum solvendum, quod iste est singularis modus essendi in, qui non continetur inter illos, nec potest reperiri proprie in creaturis.

Scholion

I. Circumincessio (περιχώρησις) per duplicem praepositionem (circum-in) aliquo modo exprimit duplicem sensum vocabuli Graeci, scilicet invadere et capere. Nostris temporibus saepe vocatur circuminsessio, quod vocabulum tamen minus aptum esse videtur, ut profundus sensus vocabuli Graeci exprimatur. Pro intelligentia quaestionis notandum est, quod saltem tria ad circumincessionem requiruntur: nempe inexistentia actualis unius in alio; realis distinctio eorum qui circumincedunt; intima eorum praesentia et consubstantialitas. Hinc sequitur, nullam creaturam hoc modo in alia esse posse, nec ipsum Deum proprie circumincessive inesse alicui creaturae, sed in solo Deo esse circumincessionem perfectam, ut docet sanctus Doctor in corp. Ceterum sequitur circumincessio, ut bene docet Richard. a Med. (loc. infra cit.), «ex hoc firmissimo fundamento credito, quod in tribus personis una essentia est. Ex quo enim quaelibet persona est in essentia sicut suppositum in natura, et essentia in qualibet persona sicut natura in supposito, sequitur, quamlibet personam per suam essentiam esse in alia, alio tamen modo, quam natura sit in supposito et suppositum in natura» etc., nempe quia requiritur aliqua differentia vel distinctio ad hoc, quod unum sit in alio.

II. Quoad solut. ad 1. S. Doctor primam responsionem merito reiicit. Est enim hic fallacia accidentis. Esse in alio enim importat distinctionem unius ab alio; esse in se vero tollit omnem distinctionem. Fallaciter ergo concluditur: Pater est in Filio, scil. ut distinctus ab eo, et e converso: ergo est in se, cum sit indistinctus omnino. Sic enim fit transitus a distinctione ad identitatem. Exemplum in littera positum rem magis explicat. Sic patet, quod Aristotelica regula: quidquid praedicatur de aliquo etiam de omni, quod sub illo est, praedicatur, in applicatione fallere potest. Richard. a Med. tamen eandem obiectionem aliter solvit.

Quintam obiectionem eodem modo solvit S. Thom. (hic q. 3. a. 2. ad 3.; S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 3.).

III. In conclusione omnes conveniunt; et S. Thom., in Summa ad probandam conclusionem iisdem tribus argumentis utitur, quae apud S. Bonav. sunt 3. 4. 5. in fundam. — Inepte Durandus et Aureolus hoc 5. argumentum (quod S. Thomas habet 2. loco) impugnare nituntur. — Cfr. Scot., hic q. 2; Report., hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 2; S. I. q. 42. a. 5; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 9. in fine. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 33. q. 10. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 2.

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English Translation

QUESTION IV.

Whether in divine matters there is equality with circumincession.

Fourthly it is asked whether in divine matters there is equality with circumincession. And that there is, is shown:

1. First, by the authority of the Lord, John 141: I am in the Father, and the Father is in me.

2. Likewise, Augustine, On Faith to Peter2: «On account of the unity of nature the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit».

3. Likewise, this same is shown by reason, because in whatever the substance or essence of the Father is, there is the Father: but the substance of the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Son3, by the same reasoning the Son is in the Father.

4. Likewise, every thing known is in the knower either through truth or through likeness; but the Father knows the Son with respect to hypostasis and property: therefore the Son is in the Father: either, then4, with respect to truth, or with respect to likeness of truth. Not with respect to likeness, because then the Son would be in the Father as a creature [is]: therefore with respect to truth: by the same reasoning also5 the Father [is] in the Son: therefore there is circumincession there.

5. Likewise, everything that is compared to another is either in it, or outside it. If, then, the Son is compared to the Father, he is either in him, or outside. If in him, by the same reasoning also the Father [is] in him: if outside him; but those things, of which one is outside the other, differ by substance: therefore the Father and the Son differ substantially.

6. Likewise, the agreement in divine matters is greater than that of genus to species or of whole to parts; but on account of the agreement of genus to species the genus is in the species and conversely; and likewise the whole [is] in the parts and conversely6: therefore much more strongly in divine matters the Father is in the Son and conversely.

On the contrary: 1. If the Father is in the Son and conversely, then the Father is in the Father. For just as it follows in predicating that whatever is predicated more broadly than or equally with something is predicated of everything which is under it7: therefore likewise, if anything is in something, it is necessary that in the same there be everything that is in it: therefore if the Son is in the Father, everything which is in the Son is in the Father: but the Father is in the Son: therefore the Father is in the Father.

2. Likewise, whenever two simples of the same genus are at the same time, such that one is in the other, they are not distinguished from one another, just as a point is in a point. If, then, the Father and the Son are altogether simple; if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, it does not seem that they are distinguished.

3. Likewise, if there were two divine essences, it would be impossible that one should be in the other, because one could not enter into the other [illabi], since each would be equally spiritual and supremely spiritual: therefore if two persons are equally and supremely spiritual, it is impossible that one be in the other; and this8 is plain, because God cannot be in a creature without entering into it [illabi]. If, then, person is in person, it seems that he wholly enters into it.

4. Likewise, I ask what this being in the Father signifies, whether it is said with respect to substance, or with respect to relation. If with respect to relation, this is against Augustine, who says in the text [of the Master]9, that «on account of the unity of nature the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit». If with respect to substance; but10 the things which are said with respect to substance belong to the three: therefore this being in the Father belongs to the Son and to the Holy Spirit and to the Father: therefore the Father is in the Father, which is not conceded.

5. Likewise, when it is said: the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, either the same regard is imported, or another. If the same, since the Son is in the Father as in [his] principle, then likewise the Father would be11 in the Son as in [his] principle; which is simply absurd. If the same regard is not imported: therefore just as12 there is no circumincession when it is said: the genus is in the species, and the species in the genus, likewise neither in the matter at hand would there be circumincession.

6. Likewise, the Son is from the Father and with the Father, and it is not converted: therefore by parallel reasoning it seems that, if the Father is in the Son, it is not converted that the Son be in the Father.

7. Likewise, nine modes of being in13 are in creatures. In the first mode, as a part in a whole; in the second mode, as the whole in the parts; in the third mode, as a species in a genus; in the fourth mode, as a genus in species; in the fifth mode, as form in matter; in the sixth mode, as the directed or moved [thing] in the director; in the seventh mode, as a thing in its end; in the eighth mode, as the contained in the container; and a ninth Boethius adds, namely14 as accident in subject. It is asked, then, by which of these modes the Father is in the Son and conversely; and since none of these can be granted, it seems that he is in no way [therein].

CONCLUSION.

In the divine persons there is the highest and perfect circumincession by reason of the unity of essence with the distinction of persons.

I respond: It must be said that15, as the authorities and the reasons prove, in divine matters there is the highest and perfect circumincession. And this is called16 circumincession, by which it is said that the one is in the other and conversely; and this properly and perfectly is in God alone, because circumincession in being posits distinction together with unity. And since in God alone is there the highest17 unity together with distinction, in such a way that the distinction is unconfused and the unity undistinguished: hence it is that in God alone is there perfect circumincession. And the reason for this is plain, because the account of circumincession is perfect unity of essence together with distinction of persons. And since this is proper to God alone, therefore also such circumincession [is], according as Hilary says and the Master adduces in the text18.

To 1. To that which is objected, namely that the Father [is] in the Son and the Son in the Father, therefore the Father19 [is] in himself; some say that the argument is not valid, because the regard of that which is in is changed; because in one [it] expresses the regard of the principled to the principle, in the other however the regard of the principle to the principled. Yet it is not necessary to say this, because as will be plain shortly20, in does not express a diverse regard. Nor however does it follow, but rather it is by accident there, in that in notes a distinction, just as it is by accident here: Peter is like Paul, and Paul like Peter: therefore Peter is like Peter; so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

To 2. To that which is objected, that21 simples existing simultaneously are confounded into one; it must be said that this is true when the simples have to be distinguished by reason of that in which they are, just as a point and a unit [are distinguished] from that in which they are. But when they are distinguished by themselves and in22 themselves are made substantive, then, although they are simultaneous, they are not confounded; and such are the divine hypostases. And a similitude of this, although it cannot perfectly be found in a creature, nevertheless Dionysius23 sets forth an example in lights, which are many in the same air without confusion: and the sign of this is that, when a luminary is removed, it draws its own light with it24, plucking nothing of the others. And the reason for this is, because the lights in the air are not distinguished by reason of that in which [they are]25.

To 3. To that which is objected, that essence is not in essence except by entering into [it], etc.; it must be said that the case is not similar, because where there is a diversity of essences, if one is in the other, it is necessary that one be in some way material to the other; but when26 persons differ, the unity of essence being preserved, one is in the other, because the essence of the one is the essence of the other; and so, just as the same does not enter into itself, so there can be no entering-in there.

To 4. To that which is asked, what this being in the Father signifies; it must be said that, as the Saints intimate, just as equal expresses a regard according to unity of quantity, and like according to unity of quality27, likewise this being in the Father, [expresses a regard] according to unity of substance. Hence just as equal

simultaneously imports substance together with relation, as will be plain below28, so also this [is the case for] being in. And just as, when originating from the Father is said, [the term] is restricted to standing for the other persons, so also it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

To 5. To that which is asked, whether the same regard be imported; it must be said without prejudice, that yes, so far as it pertains to the account of the name. For just as, when it is said: the Father is like the Son and conversely, not different and different regards are imported: so neither in this being in29, because it imports the relation of identity or of consubstantiality. Hence if it is said: the Father is like the Son and conversely, not a different regard is said: so in the matter at hand, because this being in the Father signifies the same as being consubstantial with the Father. And consubstantial is taken uniformly, when said of the Father and the Son. And this is plain, because if it did not express a like regard, there would not be circumincession, just as neither is there [circumincession], when the creature is said to be in God, and God to be in the creature; because a different regard is imported in each case.

To 6. To that which is asked concerning this [particle] with, etc.; it must be said that certain prepositions import a regard of repugnance, like against; certain ones [a regard] of distance, as this to and near; certain ones [a regard] of cause, as from and out of; certain ones [a regard] of agreement, as in and with. The first and second are in no way received30, but the third and fourth are, and the third not convertibly, but the fourth convertibly, because agreement is a relation of equiparance.

To 7. To the last [it must be said] in solving, that this is a singular mode of being in, which is not contained among those, nor can it properly be found in creatures.

Scholion

I. Circumincession (περιχώρησις) by the double preposition (circum-in) in some way expresses the double sense of the Greek word, namely to invade and to contain. In our times it is often called circuminsession, which word however seems less apt for expressing the profound sense of the Greek word. For the understanding of the question it must be noted that at least three things are required for circumincession: namely the actual existence-within of one in the other; the real distinction of those who circumincede; their intimate presence and consubstantiality. Hence it follows that no creature can be in another in this way, nor can God himself properly be present circumincessively in any creature, but only in God is there perfect circumincession, as the holy Doctor teaches in the body [of the question]. Furthermore circumincession follows, as Richard of Mediavilla rightly teaches (loc. cited below), «from this most firm foundation believed, that in the three persons there is one essence. For from the fact that any person whatsoever is in the essence as a supposit in a nature, and the essence in any person whatsoever as a nature in a supposit, it follows that any person whatsoever is, through his own essence, in another, in another mode, however, than the [way in which] nature is in the supposit and the supposit in the nature» etc., namely because some difference or distinction is required for this, that one be in the other.

II. As to the solution to [argument] 1: the Holy Doctor rightly rejects the first answer. For there is here a fallacy of accident. To be in another imports distinction of one from the other; to be in oneself however removes every distinction. So fallaciously it is concluded: the Father is in the Son, namely as distinct from him, and conversely: therefore he is in himself, since he is altogether undistinguished. For thus there comes about a transition from distinction to identity. The example placed in the text explains the matter more fully. So it is plain that the Aristotelian rule — whatever is predicated of something is predicated also of every thing which is under it — can fail in application. Richard of Mediavilla nevertheless solves the same objection differently.

The fifth objection St. Thomas solves in the same way (here q. 3, a. 2, ad 3; Summa I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 3).

III. On the conclusion all agree; and St. Thomas, in the Summa, to prove the conclusion, uses the same three arguments which in St. Bonaventure are 3, 4, 5 in the fundamenta. — Ineptly Durandus and Aureolus strive to attack this 5th argument (which St. Thomas has in the 2nd place). — Cf. Scotus, here q. 2; Reportata, here q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 2; Summa I, q. 42, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 9, at the end. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, 2nd principal, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 33, q. 10. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 2. — Biel, here q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 10. et 11.
    Verses 10 and 11.
  2. Cap. 1. n. 4. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 4.
    Chapter 1, n. 4. See here the text of the Master, c. 4.
  3. Unus alterque codex ut GV addit ergo.
    One or another codex, such as G and V, adds ergo.
  4. In Vat. omissum ergo supplevimus ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
    Ergo, omitted in the Vatican edition, we have supplied from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.
  5. Ope antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 restituimus particulam et. Cod. Z post Pater adiungit est.
    By the help of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have restored the particle et. Codex Z after Pater adds est.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 23. (c. 3.). Vide infra arg. 7. ad opp. — Verba et similiter usque e converso desiderantur in Vat. et cod. cc, quae tamen in ceteris mss. et ed. 1 inveniuntur.
    Cf. Aristotle, IV Physics, text 23 (c. 3). See below, argument 7 for the opposite. — The words et similiter through e converso are missing in the Vatican edition and codex cc, but they are found in the other manuscripts and edition 1.
  7. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Denominativis in fine: Quando alterum de altero praedicatur ut de subiecto, quaecumque de eo quod praedicatur dicuntur, omnia etiam de subiecto dicentur. Haec propositio innuit principium affirmativi syllogismi, quod vocatur dici de omni. Vide Aristot., I. Prior. c. 1 seqq. — Aristot., II. Poster. c. 14. (c. 12.) ait: «Dico autem in plus esse quaecumque insunt quidem unicuique universaliter, at vero et alii». Haec sunt, ut ibi innuitur, duplicis rationis; quaedam sunt ita in plus, ut sint etiam extra genus, ut sunt conceptus primi analogi v. g. esse aliquid respectu ternarii; quaedam vero sunt ita in plus, ut tamen non sint extra genus, cuiusmodi sunt conceptus univoci generici v. g. esse numerum imparem respectu ternarii. Porphyrius libr. de Praedicab. ponit superabundat loco est in plus. Hinc verbis quidquid praedicatur in plus vel aeque intellige praedicatum, quod vel est maioris extensionis v. g. genus, vel eiusdem extensionis ac subiectum v. g. genus cum differentia specifica et proprium. Cfr. Boeth., Dialogus 1. in Porphyr., c. de Genere.
    Aristotle, On the Categories, c. On Denominatives, at the end: When one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, whatever things are said of that which is predicated, all are also said of the subject. This proposition intimates the principle of the affirmative syllogism, which is called being said of all. See Aristotle, Prior [Analytics] I, c. 1ff. — Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] II, c. 14 (c. 12), says: «I call more broadly [predicated] those things which inhere in each universally, but also in another». These are, as is there intimated, of a twofold account; some are more broadly in such a way that they are also outside the genus, as are the concepts of the first analogues, e.g. to be something with respect to the ternary; others however are more broadly in such a way that they are nevertheless not outside the genus, of which sort are univocal generic concepts, e.g. to be an odd number with respect to the ternary. Porphyry, in the book On the Predicables, puts superabundat in place of est in plus. Hence by the words whatever is predicated more broadly or equally understand a predicate which is either of greater extension, e.g. genus, or of the same extension as the subject, e.g. genus with specific difference, and proprium. Cf. Boethius, Dialogue 1 on Porphyry, c. On Genus.
  8. Vat. ita loco illud, sed contra mss., quorum tamen plures ponunt istud, et ed. 1 cum uno alterove codice ut X per illud. Mox substituendo quia Deus non potest pro ambiguo quod Deus non possit exhibemus lectionem cod. T, cum qua et codd. H Z et ed. 1 conveniunt in eo, quod habent potest loco possit; cod. K, retento possit, substituit cum pro quod; cod. H per hoc quod. — Paulo ante cod. A divinae loco duae, et Vat. contra cod. T aliosque cum ed. 1 sint pro sunt.
    The Vatican edition has ita in place of illud, but against the manuscripts; nevertheless several of them put istud, and edition 1, with one or another codex such as X, [reads] per illud. Soon after, by substituting quia Deus non potest for the ambiguous quod Deus non possit we present the reading of codex T, with which codices H, Z and edition 1 agree in this, that they have potest in place of possit; codex K, retaining possit, substitutes cum for quod; codex H, per hoc quod. — A little earlier codex A has divinae in place of duae, and the Vatican edition, against codex T and others with edition 1, sint in place of sunt.
  9. Hic, c. 4.
    Here, c. 4.
  10. Fide multorum mss. ut A H K M S T W X Y Z etc. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus sed, quod minus bene abest a Vat. — Mox post substantiam in cod. X additur de Deo.
    On the testimony of many manuscripts such as A, H, K, M, S, T, W, X, Y, Z, etc. and editions 1, 2, 3 we have supplied sed, which is less aptly absent from the Vatican edition. — Soon after, following substantiam, in codex X de Deo is added.
  11. Ed. 1 erit. Paulo post in plurimis antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 perperam similiter pro simpliciter.
    Edition 1 [reads] erit. A little later in most of the older manuscripts and in edition 1, similiter is wrongly [given] in place of simpliciter.
  12. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. si pro sicut, et paulo ante contra plurimos codd. importatur altera pro non importatur eadem.
    The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions, [reads] si in place of sicut, and a little earlier, against very many codices, [reads] importatur altera in place of non importatur eadem.
  13. In multis mss. sicut et in ed. 1 ac Vat. deest praepositio in, sed male et contra codd. H M V ff. — Octo horum modorum ponuntur ab Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 23. (c. 3.), et nonum addit, ut S. Doctor paulo infra dicit, Boethius, 1. in Categor. seu Praedicam. Aristot. c. de Denominativis.
    In many manuscripts, as also in edition 1 and in the Vatican edition, the preposition in is missing, but wrongly and against codices H, M, V, ff. — Eight of these modes are set forth by Aristotle, IV Physics, text 23 (c. 3), and the ninth is added, as the holy Doctor says a little below, by Boethius, 1 on the Categories or Praedicamenta of Aristotle, c. On Denominatives.
  14. Plures codd. ut A F G I S T V X Y etc. quia, et pauci ut H Z cum ed. 1 quod loco scilicet. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus modorum, deinde substituimus nullum horum pro nullo illorum.
    Several codices such as A, F, G, I, S, T, V, X, Y, etc. [read] quia, and a few such as H, Z with edition 1 [read] quod in place of scilicet. Soon after, on the testimony of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied modorum, then we have substituted nullum horum in place of nullo illorum.
  15. Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 quia, sed minus apte.
    The Vatican edition, against very many codices and edition 1, [reads] quia, but less aptly.
  16. Respectu huius propositionis magna diversitas in codd. invenitur; sic loco haec, quod a pluribus mss. ut I S V aa cc et ed. 1 exhibetur, alii ut K X Z bb ponunt cum Vat. hic, cod. O hoc; dein aliqui tantum codd. et Vat. notatur pro vocatur; codd. A R T verba Et haec vocatur circumincessio omittunt. Mox pauci codd. ut K O quia loco qua, et demum paulo infra cod. T haec pro hoc.
    With respect to this proposition great diversity is found in the codices; thus in place of haec, which is presented by several manuscripts such as I, S, V, aa, cc and edition 1, others such as K, X, Z, bb put with the Vatican edition hic, codex O hoc; then only some codices and the Vatican [read] notatur in place of vocatur; codices A, R, T omit the words Et haec vocatur circumincessio. Soon after, a few codices such as K, O [read] quia in place of qua, and lastly, a little below, codex T [reads] haec in place of hoc.
  17. Praestamus antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 lectionem addendo summa, quod et loci veritas exigit.
    We prefer the reading of the older manuscripts and of edition 1 by adding summa, which the truth of the passage also requires.
  18. Hic, c. 4. — Plures codd. ut A K G H Z cum ed. 1 adducit loco inducit.
    Here, c. 4. — Several codices such as A, K, G, H, Z with edition 1 [read] adducit in place of inducit.
  19. Vat. contra plurimos mss. et ed. 1 addit hic et paulo ante post Pater verbum est.
    The Vatican edition, against very many manuscripts and edition 1, adds hic, and a little earlier, after Pater, the word est.
  20. Infra ad 3; cf. etiam dub. 6.
    Below, [in the response] to [argument] 3; cf. also dubium 6.
  21. Ex antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus quod.
    From the older codices and edition 1 we have supplied quod.
  22. Codd. V X ita pro in.
    Codices V, X [read] ita in place of in.
  23. De Div. Nom. c. 2. § 4: Etenim videmus in domo, multis unitis lampadibus, ad unum aliquod lumen unita omnium omnia lumina et unam claritatem indiscretam relucentem, et non etiam quis, ut arbitror, poterit alicuius lampadis lumen ab aliis ex omnia lumina continenti aere discernere, et videre sine altera parte alteram partem, totis in totis inconfuse contemperatis. Sed si etiam unam quis ardentium subduxerit domo, coibit et proprium totum lumen, nullum quiddam aliorum luminum in semetipsa complectens, aut suimet alteris relinquens. Erat enim earum, quod quidem dixi, omnium ad omnia perfectissima unitas, incommixta universaliter, et nulla parte confusa: et haec, existente in corpore aere, et ex materiali igne pendente lumine.
    On the Divine Names, c. 2, § 4: For we see in a house, when many lamps are lit, all the lights of all united into some one light, and a single undivided brightness shining forth, and no one, as I think, will be able to discern the light of some one lamp from the others in the air containing all the lights, and to see one part without the other part, since the wholes are blended into the wholes without confusion. But if one should withdraw any one of the burning [lamps] from the house, also its own whole light will go [with it], embracing nothing of the other lights in itself, nor leaving any of itself to the others. For there was, as I said, of these [lights] a most perfect unity of all to all, wholly unmixed and confused in no part: and this, while the air subsists in [its] body, and the light depends from the material fire.
  24. In Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 deest secum.
    In the Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, secum is missing.
  25. Cod. Y addit sunt; codd. vero B D H adiiciunt sed penes suas origines, a quibus cod. O in eo tantum discedit, quod loco penes habet per.
    Codex Y adds sunt; codices B, D, H add sed penes suas origines ("but by reason of their origins"), from which codex O differs only in this, that in place of penes it has per.
  26. Vat. perperam et contra mss. nec non sex primas edd. [omittit quando].[?]
    The Vatican edition wrongly and against the manuscripts and the first six editions [omits quando].[?]
  27. In cod. O additur essentialis vel substantialis, et paulo ante cum nomine quantitatis coniungitur virtualis. Mox post in Patre cod. G adiungit est, sed melius suppletur dicit respectum.
    In codex O essentialis vel substantialis is added, and a little earlier with the word quantitatis is joined virtualis. Soon after, following in Patre, codex G adds est, but it is better supplied [as] dicit respectum.
  28. Dist. 31. p. I. q. 2. — Paulo infra post quod est plurimi codd. ut A C G I K L O P Q R S T U W Y etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt esse, sed male. Dein fide mss. loco hoc quod est substituimus cum dicitur, cui codd. O Z adiungunt satis bene aliqua persona est.
    Distinction 31, part I, q. 2. — A little below, after quod est, very many codices such as A, C, G, I, K, L, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, W, Y, etc. with editions 1, 2, 3 omit esse, but wrongly. Then on the testimony of the manuscripts in place of hoc quod est we have substituted cum dicitur, to which codices O, Z add, fittingly enough, aliqua persona est.
  29. Multi codd. ut paulo supra cum edd. 1, 2, 3 perperam omittunt esse. Mox post Unde auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus additum sicut, quod tamen multi codd. paulo infra loco significat ponunt, et respectu cuius cod. O (cum quo fere convenit cod. I) post consubstantialem addit sic esse in Filio idem est quod esse Filio consubstantialem, sed ad rem minus congruenter. Aliqui mss. ut V X verbis in proposito praefigunt particulam et; dein a multis codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 post idem quod omittitur est, et a pluribus mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 substituitur Patrem pro Patri.
    Many codices, as a little above, with editions 1, 2, 3 wrongly omit esse. Soon after Unde on the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out the added sicut, which however many codices a little below put in place of significat, and with respect to which codex O (with which codex I almost agrees) after consubstantialem adds sic esse in Filio idem est quod esse Filio consubstantialem, but less congruously to the matter. Some manuscripts such as V, X prefix to the words in proposito the particle et; then by many codices and editions 1, 2, 3 after idem quod est is omitted, and by several manuscripts with editions 1, 2, 3 Patrem is substituted for Patri.
  30. Supple: propositione; pro qua suppletione elidenda substituit Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 utroque pro utraque. — Subaudi: in divinis. — Mox Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, tertiae sic quod loco et tertiae, pro quo cod. M exhibet licet tertiae. In cod. O quartum divisionis membrum subdividitur, in quantum quaedam praepositiones important habitudinem convenientiae simpliciter, quaedam cum subauctoritate et ultimae nullo modo reciprocantur.
    Supply: propositione ("with a proposition"); for which supplied word, in order to elide it, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, substitutes utroque for utraque. — Understand: in divinis ("in divine matters"). — Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] tertiae sic quod in place of et tertiae, for which codex M presents licet tertiae. In codex O the fourth member of the division is subdivided, insofar as certain prepositions import a regard of agreement simply, certain ones with sub-authority, and the last [are] in no way reciprocated.
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