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Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO III.

Utrum in divinis personis poni possit principium materiale.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum in divinis personis sit ponere principium materiale. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Quandocumque aliquis vel aliquid est de aliquo, ita quod ipsum est distinctum, et illud, de quo est, indistinctum, est de illo tanquam de materiali principio1; sed persona Filii est de substantia Patris, et persona distinguitur, substantia dicit quid indistinctum: ergo est sicut materiale principium.

2. Item, sicut efficiens et finis sunt causae correlativae, ita forma et materia2 — forma enim dicitur respectu materiae — sed in Deo est ponere causam formalem, «ipse enim est forma», ut dicit Boethius3: ergo in Deo est ponere materiam.

3. Item, videtur quod causa materialis magis competat Deo quam aliquod genus causarum, quia materia in his inferioribus dat existentiam et permanentiam propter sui incorruptionem, unde fundamentum est existentiae creatae4: si ergo Deus sive divinum esse habet existentiam sive permanentiam per fundamentum incorruptibile, videtur quod Deo maxime competat ratio materialis principii, ergo etc.

4. Item, in rebus creatis finitas a forma venit, sed infinitas a materia5; sed omne quod est in Deo, est infinitum: ergo cum Deo maxime conveniat passio consequens principium materiale, maxime competit et ipsum.

5. Item, quamvis in Deo sit summa et omnimoda simplicitas, tamen nos ponimus in Deo quod est et quo est vere, sed tamen6 per indifferentiam: ergo pari ratione videtur, quod in Deo possit poni materia et forma, tamen per indifferentiam.

6. Item, omnis distinctio est a forma7, ergo circumscripta omni forma creata, materia non distinguitur, ergo non est aliud a Deo, ergo est Deus, quia omne quod est et non distinguitur a Deo, est Deus: videtur ergo, quod materiale principium sit ipse Deus, et ita competere divinis personis8.

Contra: 1. Boethius in libro de Trinitate9: «Forma sine materia non potest esse subiectum», et loquitur de Deo: ergo in Deo non erit ratio principii materialis.

2. Item, materia inter omnia entia est imperfectissimum, unde et Augustinus dicit in libro Confessionum10, quod prope nihil est; sed Deus est omnino perfectissimus: ergo omnino in eo nihil invenitur imperfectionis: ergo nec quod est materiae.

3. Item, materia est principium patiendi11, unde pati est a materia. Omne igitur, in quo est materia, est natum pati et recipere; sed nihil tale est omnipotens; in hoc enim, quod pati potest, deficit a posse: ergo in omnipotente nullo modo est materiale principium.

4. Item, si materia est in Deo, aut respectu

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sui12, aut aliorum. Si respectu aliorum: cum ergo materia sit ens in potentia ad alia nec distinguatur ab aliis rebus, sed per eas perficiatur, tunc Deus reciperet complementum a creatura nec ab ea distingueretur, quod absurdum est. Si autem materia est13 in Deo respectu sui, aut pure est materia, aut aliquid aliud. Si pure materia: ergo non est ens14. Et praeterea, nihil est materia sui ipsius: ergo oportet, quod ibi sit aliquid cum materia: et si hoc, ergo divinum esse est compositum et mixtum: ergo nec Deus habet esse simplex ac per hoc nec esse primum, et ita non est Deus.

CONCLUSIO.

In Deo nullo modo, nec proprie nec transumtive, poni potest materiale principium.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in Deo nullo modo, nec proprie, nec transumtive recipitur materiale principium. Et ratio huius est, quoniam materia dicit principium passivum et ita incompletum; et quoniam a divino esse15 omnis incompletio et omnis passio penitus removenda est, ideo nullo modo genus materialis principii in Deo esse ponitur.

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod persona est de substantia, et ipsa est distincta, et substantia non; dicendum, quod hic est defectus quantum ad utramque conditionem. Nam primo haec non recipitur, quod persona sit de substantia, sicut vult Augustinus16, quia «non dicimus tres personas ex eadem essentia»; licet haec communiter recipiatur, quod Filius est de substantia Patris, ubi non materia, sed originis consubstantialitas designatur, sicut supra ostensum est distinctione quinta17. Alia est conditio, quae deficit: nam materia est distincta18 et possibilis ad distinctionem per formam; sed substantia vel essentia nullo modo distinguitur nec per se nec per accidens; et ita patet, quod non convenit ei ratio materiae.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod efficiens refertur ad finem et forma ad materiam; dicendum, quod nullius causae habitudo cadit in Deo19 respectu sui, sed respectu creaturarum; et aliarum causarum habitudines in Deo recipiuntur, circumscripta dependentia, propter hoc, quod sonant in perfectionem20; sed materia sonat omnino in imperfectionem. Et quod obiicitur, quod forma dicitur ad materiam; dicendum, quod est forma constitutiva et exemplaris. Et forma constitutiva dicitur ad materiam; et haec non cadit in Deo, sed forma exemplaris sic21. Et si dicatur, quod Deus est forma in se, hoc est dictum, quia est actus purus non dependens a possibili. Nec tamen simile est de correspondentia formae et materiae, et efficientis et finis22. Efficiens enim et finis possunt incidere in idem numero; sed forma et materia nunquam. Forma vero23 constitutiva incidit cum efficiente et fine in idem specie, non numero; forma vero exemplaris in idem numero.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod materia est fundamentum existentiae; dicendum, quod modus illius fundamenti Deo non competit, quia24 est fundamentum esse quod recipit aliunde, scilicet a forma; Deus autem a nullo recipit: ideo non cadit in eo materia.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinitate, dicendum, quod est infinitas ex defectu perfectionis, et haec competit materiae, sed non Deo; et est infi-

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nitas ex termino limitationis, et haec Deo et formae liberrimae, non materiae competit: et ita patet illud.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quare materia et forma non ponantur per indifferentiam: dicendum, quod ista duo, quo est et quod est, de ratione sua nullam important imperfectionem, sed ratione eius quod differunt. Unde, sublata eorum differentia, manet completio, et tunc in divinis recipiuntur. Sed materia, non tantum quia differt a forma, dicit incompletionem, sed etiam quia materia est: et ideo nullo modo ponitur in Deo.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod circumscripta omni forma, materia non distinguitur: dicendum, quod ista propositio: omnis distinctio est a forma, non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur de distinctione perfecta — quod enim habet esse distinctum habet esse completum — de distinctione autem qualicumque falsum est. Materia enim differt a forma, et constat quod se ipsa differt ab ea. Sic potest dici et in proposito, quod materia differt a Deo se ipsa: tamen ex parte sua, quia non est perfecta, non cadit perfecta distinctio: sed ex parte Dei, quia perfectissimus est, perfecta cadit distinctio. Causa enim distinguitur a causato, ens actu ab ente in potentia; et istae sunt primae differentiae et summae.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec militat contra pantheismum seu potius materialismum, a Concilio Vaticano (const. I. de Deo creatore, can. 2.) his verbis notatum: Si quis praeter materiam nihil esse affirmare non erubuerit: a. s. In specie eadem confundit insaniam Davidis de Dinanto, cuius principale argumentum fuit illud quod ultimo inter ad oppos. legitur, scil. hoc; si Deus non esset aliud quod prima materia, oporteret differre ea aliquibus differentiis, et sic non essent simplicia. Nam in eo quod per differentiam ab alio differt, ipsa differentia compositionem facit. Ita S. Thom. (S. c. Gent. 1. c. 17.) hoc Davidis argumentum refert, et deinde ad mentem S. Bonav. sic solvit: «Hoc autem processit ex ignorantia, qua nescivit, quid inter differentiam et diversitatem intersit. Differens enim, ut in decimo Metaphysicorum (text. comm. 12.) determinatur, dicitur ad aliquid; nam omne differens, aliquo est differens. Diversum autem aliquid absolute dicitur ex hoc, quod non est idem. Differentia igitur in his quaerenda est, quae in aliquo conveniunt: oportet enim aliquid in his assignari, secundum quod differant, sicut duae species conveniunt in genere, unde oportet, quod differentiis distinguantur. In his autem, quae in nullo conveniunt, non est quaerendum, quo differant: sed se ipsis diversa sunt. Sic enim et oppositae differentiae ab invicem distinguuntur; non enim participant generis quasi partem suae essentiae; et ideo non est quaerendum, quibus differant; se ipsis enim diversa sunt. Sic etiam Deus et materia prima distinguuntur, quorum unum est actus purus, aliud potentia pura, in nullo convenientiam habentes». Idem argumentum Davidis B. Albert. simili modo solvit (S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 2. q. incid.) — In eadem solut. ad 6. a S. Bonav. duplex ponitur species distinctionis, scil. altera perfecta et specifica per formam, altera imperfecta per propriam entitatem materiae.

II. Praeter citatos cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. q. 1. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 3. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 20. a. 1, ubi refert et solvit plura argumenta «Alexandri, cuiusdam Graeci, et David de Dinanto, Latini»; et S. p. I. tr. II. q. 47. m. 3. partic. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 3. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 28. q. 2. et a. 29. q. 2. — Ceteri doctores hanc quaest. tangunt tractando de simplicitate Dei, in specie de illo problemate, utrum Deus sit in aliquo genere determinato, de quo agit Magister d. 8. p. II.

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English Translation

QUESTION III.

Whether in the divine persons a material principle can be posited.

Thirdly it is asked, whether in the divine persons a material principle is to be posited. And that there is, is shown in this manner.

1. Whenever someone or something is of something, in such wise that it itself is distinct and that of which it is is undistinct, it is of that as of a material principle1; but the person of the Son is of the substance of the Father, and the person is distinct, [whereas] substance expresses something undistinct: therefore it is as a material principle.

2. Likewise, just as efficient [cause] and end are correlative causes, so [are] form and matter2 — for form is said with respect to matter — but in God a formal cause is to be posited, «for he himself is form», as Boethius says3: therefore in God matter is to be posited.

3. Likewise, it seems that material cause belongs to God more than any other genus of causes, because matter in these lower things gives existence and permanence on account of its incorruption, whence it is the foundation of created existence4: if therefore God or the divine being has existence or permanence through an incorruptible foundation, it seems that the account of a material principle most of all belongs to God, therefore etc.

4. Likewise, in created things finitude comes from form, but infinity from matter5; but everything that is in God is infinite: therefore since the affection consequent upon a material principle most of all befits God, [matter] itself also most of all belongs [to him].

5. Likewise, although in God there is the highest and altogether complete simplicity, nevertheless we posit in God that which is and that by which it is truly, but yet6 by way of indifference: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that in God matter and form can be posited, yet by way of indifference.

6. Likewise, every distinction is from form7, therefore, every created form being set aside, matter is not distinguished, therefore it is not other than God, therefore it is God, because everything that is and is not distinguished from God is God: it seems therefore that the material principle is God himself, and so [it seems] to belong to the divine persons8.

On the contrary: 1. Boethius in the book On the Trinity9: «Form without matter cannot be a subject», and he speaks of God: therefore in God there will not be the account of a material principle.

2. Likewise, matter among all beings is the most imperfect, whence also Augustine says in the book of Confessions10 that it is near to nothing; but God is altogether most perfect: therefore in him nothing of imperfection is found at all: therefore neither what belongs to matter.

3. Likewise, matter is the principle of being acted upon11, whence to be acted upon is from matter. Everything therefore in which matter is, is born to be acted upon and to receive; but nothing such is omnipotent; for in this, that it can be acted upon, it falls short of [full] capacity: therefore in the omnipotent there is in no way a material principle.

4. Likewise, if matter is in God, either with respect to

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itself12, or with respect to other things. If with respect to other things: since therefore matter is a being in potency to others nor is distinguished from other things, but is perfected through them, then God would receive completion from a creature, nor would he be distinguished from it, which is absurd. But if matter is13 in God with respect to itself, either it is purely matter, or something else. If purely matter: therefore it is not a being14. And besides, nothing is matter of itself: therefore it is necessary that there be there something with the matter: and if so, then the divine being is composed and mixed: therefore neither does God have simple being, and consequently not first being either, and so he is not God.

CONCLUSION.

In God in no way, neither properly nor by transumption, can a material principle be posited.

I respond: It must be said that in God in no way, neither properly nor by transumption, is a material principle received. And the reason for this is that matter expresses a passive principle and so an incomplete one; and because from the divine being15 every incompletion and every passion must be utterly removed, therefore in no way is the genus of material principle posited to be in God.

To 1. To that, then, which is objected — that the person is of the substance, and itself is distinct, while the substance is not [distinct]; it must be said that here there is a defect with respect to either condition. For first this is not received, that the person be of the substance, as Augustine wishes16, because «we do not say three persons out of the same essence»; although this is commonly received, that the Son is of the substance of the Father, where not matter, but the consubstantiality of origin is designated, as was shown above in the fifth distinction17. The other condition that fails: for matter is distinct18 and capable of distinction through form; but substance or essence is in no way distinguished, neither per se nor per accidens; and so it is plain that the account of matter does not belong to it.

To 2. To that which is objected, that efficient is referred to end and form to matter; it must be said that the relation of no [created] cause occurs in God19 with respect to himself, but with respect to creatures; and the relations of the other causes are received in God, with dependence set aside, on account of this, that they sound toward perfection20; but matter sounds altogether toward imperfection. And as to what is objected, that form is said in relation to matter; it must be said that there is constitutive form and exemplar form. And constitutive form is said in relation to matter; and this does not occur in God, but exemplar form does21. And if it be said that God is form in himself, this is said because he is pure act not depending on the possible. Nor however is the case similar concerning the correspondence of form and matter, and of efficient and end22. For efficient and end can coincide in the same in number; but form and matter never. Constitutive form indeed23 coincides with efficient and end in the same in species, not in number; but exemplar form [coincides with them] in the same in number.

To 3. To that which is objected, that matter is the foundation of existence; it must be said that the mode of that foundation does not belong to God, because24 it is a foundation receiving being from elsewhere, namely from form; but God receives from no one: therefore matter does not occur in him.

To 4. To that which is objected concerning infinity, it must be said that there is infinity from defect of perfection, and this belongs to matter, but not to God; and there is infi-

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nity from the term of limitation, and this belongs to God and to most-free form, not to matter: and so that [argument] is plain.

To 5. To that which is objected, why matter and form are not posited by way of indifference: it must be said that those two, that by which it is and that which is, of their own account import no imperfection, but [import imperfection] by reason of that wherein they differ. Hence, with their difference removed, completion remains, and then they are received in divine matters. But matter, not only because it differs from form expresses incompletion, but also because it is matter: and therefore in no way is it posited in God.

To 6. To that which is objected last, that, every form being set aside, matter is not distinguished: it must be said that this proposition: every distinction is from form, does not have truth, unless it is understood of perfect distinction — for what has distinct being has complete being — but of distinction of any sort whatsoever it is false. For matter differs from form, and it is plain that it differs from it by itself. So it can also be said in the present case, that matter differs from God by itself: yet on its own side, because it is not perfect, no perfect distinction occurs: but on the side of God, because he is most perfect, perfect distinction occurs. For cause is distinguished from caused, being in act from being in potency; and these are the first and highest differences.

Scholion

I. This question militates against pantheism or rather materialism, marked by the Vatican Council (const. I, On God the Creator, can. 2) with these words: If anyone shall not have blushed to affirm that nothing exists besides matter: let him be anathema. In particular it confounds the same madness of David of Dinant, whose principal argument was that which is read last among the [arguments] ad oppositum, namely this: if God were nothing other than prime matter, [the two] would have to differ by some differences, and so they would not be simple. For in that whereby a thing differs from another by a difference, the difference itself makes composition. Thus St. Thomas (Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 17) reports this argument of David, and then in line with the mind of St. Bonaventure resolves it thus: «But this proceeded from the ignorance with which he did not know what stands between difference and diversity. For different, as is determined in the tenth book of the Metaphysics (text. comm. 12), is said with reference to something; for everything different is different by something. But something is called diverse absolutely from this, that it is not the same. Difference therefore must be sought in those things which agree in something: for it is necessary to assign in them something, according to which they differ, just as two species agree in a genus, whence it is necessary that they be distinguished by differences. But in those things which agree in nothing, it is not to be sought, by what they differ: but they are diverse by themselves. For thus also opposite differences are distinguished from one another; for they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence; and therefore it is not to be sought by what they differ; for they are diverse by themselves. So also God and prime matter are distinguished, of which the one is pure act, the other pure potency, having no commonality in anything». Bl. Albert resolves the same argument of David in a similar manner (Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 20, m. 2, q. incid.) — In the same solution to [argument] 6, by St. Bonaventure a twofold species of distinction is posited, namely one perfect and specific through form, the other imperfect through the proper entity of matter.

II. Besides those cited cf. above d. 8, p. II, q. 1. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 3, aa. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 20, a. 1, where he reports and resolves several arguments of «Alexander, a certain Greek, and David of Dinant, a Latin»; and Summa p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 3, partic. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, aa. 3, 4. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 28, q. 2 and a. 29, q. 2. — The other doctors touch on this question in treating of the simplicity of God, especially of that problem, whether God is in any determinate genus, on which the Master treats in d. 8, p. II.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Haec propositio fundatur in Aristotelis sententia de materia et forma, quae se habent ad invicem ut potentia (indistinctum) et actus (distinctum), et secundum quam forma substantialis rerum genitarum (excepta anima rationali) educitur e potentia materiae.
    This proposition is founded on Aristotle's teaching concerning matter and form, which are related to one another as potency (the undistinct) and act (the distinct), and according to which the substantial form of generated things (excepting the rational soul) is educed from the potency of matter.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28-31. (c. 3.) et V. Metaph. text. 2. et 3. (IV. c. 2.), ubi hoc colligi potest tum ex definitione causarum, tum ex eo, quod efficiens et finis etc. ponuntur esse sibi invicem causa. Vide S. Thomae et Scoti commentaria in hos locos. — Ex plurimis mss. substituimus correlativae loco corollariae, pro quo ed. 1 corrolate.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text. 28–31 (c. 3) and Metaphysics V, text. 2 and 3 (IV, c. 2), where this can be gathered both from the definition of causes, and from the fact that efficient and end etc. are posited to be each other's cause. See the commentaries of St. Thomas and Scotus on these passages. — From most of the manuscripts we have substituted correlativae in place of corollariae, for which edition 1 [reads] corrolate.
  3. Libr. de Trin. c. 2.
    Book On the Trinity, c. 2.
  4. Videsis Aristot., I. Phys. text. 82. (c. 9.), ubi incorruptibilitas materiae monstratur, et VII. Metaph. text. 8. (VI. c. 3), ubi materia tanquam ultimum sive fundamentum substantiae exhibetur. — Ope plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus creatae loco creaturae. Mox Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice ponit cum loco si et Deum pro divinum ac habeat loco habet.
    See Aristotle, Physics I, text. 82 (c. 9), where the incorruptibility of matter is shown, and Metaphysics VII, text. 8 (VI, c. 3), where matter is exhibited as the ultimate or foundation of substance. — By the help of most of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted creatae in place of creaturae. Next the Vatican edition, with only one or two codices, puts cum in place of si, and Deum in place of divinum, and habeat in place of habet.
  5. Cfr. Aristot., III. Phys. text. 59-72. (c. 6. et 7.) et Averroes, in Comment. super praedictos textus. — Paulo infra post passio fide fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 expunximus repetitum passio quod codd. cc hoc loco ponunt, ipso tamen omisso post Deo. Dein cod. Z post competit addit ei.
    Cf. Aristotle, Physics III, text. 59–72 (cc. 6 and 7) and Averroes in his Commentary on the foregoing texts. — A little below, after passio, on the testimony of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out a repeated passio which codices cc put in this place, with the same omitted however after Deo. Then codex Z after competit adds ei.
  6. Vat., refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, tantum. Mox plures codd. cum Vat. posset loco possit.
    The Vatican edition, against the resistance of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] tantum. Next several codices with the Vatican edition [read] posset in place of possit.
  7. Aristot., VII. Metaphys. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.): Actus namque separat (ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ χωρίζει). — De indistinctione materiae vide q. praec. in corp.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text. 49 (VI, c. 13): For act separates (ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ χωρίζει). — On the indistinction of matter see the preceding question in the body.
  8. In Vat. desiderantur verba et ita competere divinis personis, quae tamen exstant in omnibus mss. et sex primis edd.
    In the Vatican edition the words et ita competere divinis personis ("and so [it seems] to belong to the divine persons") are wanting, which nevertheless are extant in all the manuscripts and the first six editions.
  9. Cap. 2: Forma vero, quae est sine materia, non poterit esse subiectum.
    Chapter 2: But the form which is without matter will not be able to be a subject.
  10. Libr. XII. c. 7. n. 7: Tu eras et aliud nihil, unde fecisti caelum et terram, duo quaedam; unum prope te, alterum prope nihil. — Ex multis mss. ut A F G K T Y Z etc. et sex primis edd. post unde supplevimus et, ac paulo infra fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus perfectissimus loco perfectissimum. In fine argumenti cod. A materia pro materiae.
    Book XII, c. 7, n. 7: Thou wert and nothing else, whence thou madest heaven and earth, two certain things; the one near to thee, the other near to nothing. — From many manuscripts such as A F G K T Y Z etc. and the first six editions, after unde we have supplied et, and a little below, on the testimony of most of the codices and edition 1, we have substituted perfectissimus in place of perfectissimum. At the end of the argument codex A [reads] materia in place of materiae.
  11. Aristot., I. de Gener. et Corrupt. text. 33. (c. 7.): Materia, ut materia, passiva est. Et ibid. II. text. 53. (c. 9.): Materiae enim est pati. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, Unde omne loco Omne igitur.
    Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption I, text. 33 (c. 7): Matter, as matter, is passive. And the same II, text. 53 (c. 9): For it belongs to matter to suffer. — Next the Vatican edition with codex cc, with the other codices and edition 1 nevertheless resisting, [reads] Unde omne in place of Omne igitur.
  12. Aliqui codd. ut YZ cum ed. 1 repetunt hic respectu.
    Some codices such as YZ with edition 1 here repeat respectu.
  13. Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus est pro sit. Paulo ante plures codd. ut AGHISWZ cum ed. 1 absurdissimum loco absurdum.
    From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted est in place of sit. A little earlier several codices such as AGHISWZ with edition 1 [read] absurdissimum in place of absurdum.
  14. Vide a nobis ex Aristotele allatam definitionem materiae q. praec. pag. 358 nota 11. — Mox Vat. cum cod. cc omittit divinum esse, quod exhibetur ab aliis mss., licet plures eorum cum ed. 1 incongrue Deum loco divinum ponant.
    See the definition of matter brought forward by us from Aristotle in the preceding question, p. 358, note 11. — Next the Vatican edition with codex cc omits divinum esse, which is exhibited by the other manuscripts, although several of them with edition 1 incongruously put Deum in place of divinum.
  15. Pauci codd. ut SW a divinis loco a divino esse. Mox ed. 1 remota pro removenda.
    A few codices such as SW [read] a divinis in place of a divino esse. Next edition 1 [reads] remota in place of removenda.
  16. Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11: Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias, unam essentiam et unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant... tamen tres personas eiusdem essentiae vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus; tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona. — Paulo infra post licet plures codd. ut A T X Y cum ed. 1 omittunt haec.
    Book VII On the Trinity, c. 6, n. 11: Nor therefore do we so call the Trinity three persons or substances, one essence and one God, as though three certain things should subsist out of one matter... yet we say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as though there were there one thing which is essence, another which is person. — A little below, after licet, several codices such as A T X Y with edition 1 omit haec.
  17. Art. 1. q. 2.
    Article 1, question 2.
  18. Exhibemus lectionem plurimorum mss., quae cum subnexis magis convenit, dum Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus codd. habet indistincta, cui cod. I adiungit de se.
    We exhibit the reading of most of the manuscripts, which agrees better with what follows, while the Vatican edition with edition 1 and some codices has indistincta, to which codex I adds de se.
  19. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 Deum.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] Deum.
  20. Mendum Vat. et ed. 1 nec non aliquorum mss. sonant imperfectionem ex aliis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 correximus; cod. Y sanat imperfectionem scil. dependentia, non false, sed minus ad rem. Mox multi codd. cum Vat. et ed. 1 post omnino omittunt in, quod tamen in aliis mss. et edd. 2, 3, 6 invenitur.
    The blunder of the Vatican edition and edition 1, and also of some manuscripts, sonant imperfectionem ("they sound imperfection"), we have corrected from the other manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; codex Y heals it [as] imperfectionem scil. dependentia ("imperfection, namely, dependence"), not falsely, but less to the point. Next many codices with the Vatican edition and edition 1, after omnino, omit in, which nevertheless is found in the other manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 6.
  21. Ita multi codd. ut ANORTVWXY etc. cum ed. 1; Vat. cum aliquibus mss., interpunctione variata, incongrue exemplaris, sicut si; codd. AZ omittunt sic. Mox, postulantibus mss. et sex primis edd., substituimus dictum pro dictu. Immediate post legunt plures codd. ut FGHKLOY ee quod loco quia.
    Thus many codices such as ANORTVWXY etc. with edition 1; the Vatican edition with some manuscripts, with the punctuation varied, incongruously [reads] exemplaris, sicut si; codices AZ omit sic. Next, at the request of the manuscripts and the first six editions, we have substituted dictum in place of dictu. Immediately after, several codices such as FGHKLOY ee read quod in place of quia.
  22. Aliqui codd. ut SWX hic et paulo post finalis.
    Some codices such as SWX [read] here and a little after finalis ("final").
  23. Fide plurimorum mss. et ed. 1 delevimus hic additum tantum. — Aristot., II. Phys. text. 70. (c. 7.) ait: Veniunt autem tres (causae) in unam plerumque; ipsum enim quid est (causa formalis) et id cuius gratia (causa finalis) una est; ipsum vero unde motus primum (causa efficiens) specie eadem est his; homo enim hominem generat.
    On the testimony of most of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted an added tantum here. — Aristotle, Physics II, text. 70 (c. 7), says: But for the most part the three (causes) come into one; for the very what-it-is (formal cause) and that for the sake of which (final cause) is one; while the very whence-the-motion-first (efficient cause) is the same in species with these; for man generates man.
  24. Supple: materia. In proxime sequentibus praestamus fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 lectionem, quae et cum sententia S. Doctoris de essentiali dependentia materiae a forma congruit (cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 1. q. 1). Cod. F, transpositis verbis, quia est fundamentum, quod recipit esse aliunde etc.; Vat. vero cum edd. 4, 5, 6 quia esse fundamentum est esse quod recipit aliud, et aliunde perficitur, scilicet a forma; unde cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3 quoad primam propositionis partem cum Vat., quoad secundam partem, omissis scil. aliud et ac perficitur, cum aliis mss. consentit. — Paulo ante cod. Y in Deo non reperitur pro Deo non competit.
    Supply: matter. In what immediately follows we present the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, which also agrees with the teaching of the Holy Doctor concerning the essential dependence of matter on form (cf. II Sent. d. 12, a. 1, q. 1). Codex F, with the words transposed, [reads] quia est fundamentum, quod recipit esse aliunde etc.; while the Vatican edition with editions 4, 5, 6 [reads] quia esse fundamentum est esse quod recipit aliud, et aliunde perficitur, scilicet a forma; whence codex cc with editions 2, 3, with respect to the first part of the proposition agrees with the Vatican edition, with respect to the second part — namely with aliud and ac perficitur omitted — agrees with the other manuscripts. — A little before, codex Y [reads] in Deo non reperitur in place of Deo non competit.
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