← Back to Distinction 19

Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 4

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
p. 362

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum in divinis differentia secundum numerum possit poni.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum in divinis sit ponere differentiam secundum numerum. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus in tertio libro1: «Numero, non natura differunt hypostases»; et loquitur de divinis hypostasibus.

2. Item, omnia quae contingit vere numerari, necesse est differre numero; sed hypostases vere contingit numerari, ut dicantur duae et tres: ergo vere cadit in eis differentia secundum numerum.

3. Item, omnia quae differunt re, aut differunt genere, aut specie, aut numero, aut nullo modo differunt2. Sed impium est dicere, quod hypostases nullo modo differant: ergo saltem numero differunt.

4. Item, unitas secundum3 numerum non respicit unitatem formae, sed suppositi — quod patet: hoc enim album et hic sedens, demonstrato Petro, est unum numero — ergo ab oppositis diversitas secundum numerum non respicit diversitatem naturae, sed suppositorum; sed in Deo est pluralitas suppositorum, quamvis non sit diversitas naturarum: ergo etc.

p. 363

5. Item, idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens4: ergo omne quod est ad alterum comparatum, aut est idem specie, aut diversum; aut idem numero, aut diversum. Ergo Pater, comparatus Filio5, aut est idem numero, aut diversus. Si idem; sed quandocumque aliqua duo sunt eadem numero, unum vere praedicatur de altero: ergo possum dicere: Pater est Filius, quod est6 contra fidem. Si diversus numero: ergo in divinis cadit diversitas secundum numerum.

Sed contra: 1. Ambrosius super secundam Epistolam ad Corinthios, et Magister recitat in littera7: «Ibi vere unitas, ubi nulla diversitas»: ergo non est ibi diversitas secundum numerum, cum sit aliqua diversitas, scilicet diversitas secundum numerum.

2. Item, Boethius in libro de Trinitate capitulo secundo: «Nulla est in Deo diversitas8, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo»: ergo nec differentia secundum numerum.

3. Item, diversitas secundum numerum solum venit ex parte materiae; unde dicit Philosophus9, quod «omnino materia numerabiliter est»; sed in divinis non cadit materia aliqua: ergo nec diversitas secundum numerum.

4. Item, quaecumque differunt numero, numerant10 omnia quae sunt in se ipsis, saltem omnia quae sunt ibi ex parte formalis principii. Hoc patet, quia enim Petrus et Paulus sunt duo, ideo duo homines, duo animalia, duo alba, et sic de singulis: ergo si Pater et Filius11 sunt numero differentes, ergo habent duas naturas, et duas essentias: ergo sunt duo dii, quod est contra catholicam fidem.

5. Item, quaecumque differunt numero, sunt separabilia imaginatione vel intellectu12; sed Pater et Filius nullo modo sunt separabiles, nec re nec intellectu, in divinis, quia una persona est in alia et e converso: ergo nec differunt numero.

6. Item, quod non est multiplicabile nec multiplicatum est unum numero; sed divina natura non est multiplicabilis nec multiplicata: ergo est unum numero13; sed quaecumque sunt unum numero, non possunt differre numero: ergo si essentia vel natura divina ceteras complectitur personas, impossibile est, quod personae numero differant.

CONCLUSIO.

In divinis non est ponenda differentia secundum numerum, licet personae numerentur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in divinis non est ponere differentiam secundum numerum. Et huius ratio sumi potest et a posteriori et a priori.

A posteriori: quoniam omnia quae differunt numero, consequitur ista passio, quae est numerus; numerus autem est aggregatio multitudinis, in qua plus est in toto quam in singulis partium14. Haec autem aggregatio est ex his solum, quae habent unitatem limitatam, quae plus est cum alio quam per se ipsam. Limitatio autem venit per additionem. Additio autem perducit ad compositionem cum materia, quae facit esse hic et nunc, et tantum et non plus; et ita non est diversitas secundum numerum nisi in his, in quibus est distinctio per additionem et compositionem et materiam. Et15 haec distinctio non cadit in Deo, ideo nec diversitas secundum numerum.

Alia ratio est a priori: quia in quolibet, quod intelligimus ut completum, intelligimus sub ista duplici conditione, scilicet per modum quo est et quod est; et unitas quidem sive identitas secundum speciem vel genus venit16 a parte eius quod est quo, secundum diversos status sive completionem maiorem et minorem. Unitas vero, vel diversitas secundum numerum venit a parte ipsius quod est secundum esse, sive prout est in supposito17 individuo. Sic autem ista duo coniuncta sunt in omnibus, quod numerato ipso quod est, necesse est, numerari ipsum quo est. Cum ergo in omnibus, quae differunt numero, numeretur ipsum quod est, necesse est, quod multiplicetur in illis ipsum quo est.

Et18 quia ad diversitatem secundum numerum concurrit diversitas ipsius quo est et quod est et qui

p. 364

est, id est naturae et suppositi sive hypostasis, sed principaliter ipsius quod est; cum in divinis ipsum quod est sive essentia propter summam simplicitatem nullo modo sit multiplicabilis: ideo necesse est, quod ipsum quod est similiter remaneat indistinctum: et ideo impossibile est, quod cadat ibi diversitas secundum numerum. Nec tamen unum est numero: quia ipsum quod est unum numero19 in creaturis non est dicibile de pluribus: sed in divinis ipsum quod est, quamvis sit unum, tamen de pluribus est dicibile. Et ratio huius est, quia idem est ibi quo est et quod est, quantum20 ex parte rei. Et ideo, sicut quo est est communicabile pluribus, quamvis non multiplicabile, ita ipsum quod est. Unde possumus dicere, quod pluralitas personarum medium tenet inter idem numero et diversum. Quamvis enim ipsum quod est non numeretur, numeratur tamen ipse qui est; unde sunt ibi plures qui.

Ad 1. Et hoc vult dicere Damascenus, cum dicit: «Numero, non natura differunt hypostases». Per hanc enim additionem: non natura, ipse contraxit differentiam secundum numerum sive distraxit a propria ratione21. Unde ipse dicit primo libro capitulo octavo: «Oportet scire, quod aliud est differre re, aliud ratione. In omnibus creaturis hypostasum divisio re consideratur, communitas vero ratione; in summa vero et supersubstantiali Trinitate est e converso». Unde cum diversitas secundum numerum faciat sive notet diversitatem in re et natura, proprie loquendo, nisi nomen diversitatis secundum numerum distrahatur ad distinctionem suppositorum, non est concedendum, quod sit ibi diversitas secundum numerum, sed secundum numerum22 personarum sive hypostasum. Et hoc vult dicere Damascenus, quando dicit, quod hypostases differunt numero, non, inquam, numero, qui dicat23 diversitatem in re et natura, sed qui dicat differentiam in proprietatibus et relationibus, natura semper manente unica et indivisa. Ex hoc patet illud Damasceni.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur, quod numero differunt ea quae numerantur; dicendum, quod verum est, quod24 eo modo differunt, quo numerantur; sed non numerantur nisi quantum ad personas; et ita non differunt nisi numero hypostasum et proprietate.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quae differunt re etc.; distinguendum est in hoc nomine re25, quia potest dicere naturam sive essentiam, et potest dicere personam. Si dicat essentiam et naturam, verum est; si personam, falsum est, et non habet locum illa divisio.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas numero respicit identitatem suppositi; dicendum, quod si suppositum dicatur ipsum quod est, tunc habet veritatem. Si autem dicatur ipse qui est sive persona, non habet veritatem nisi in his, in quibus differt quo est et quod est. Unde proprie loquendo, diversitas secundum numerum sequitur ipsum quod est; et ideo26 in divinis non habet locum.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur27, quod idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens, ergo idem numero, vel diversum; dicendum, quod illud verum est in ente, quod natum est numerari, sicut ens creatum; sed in ente increato hoc deficit. Unde Hilarius de Trinitate28: «Deum ex Deo natum nec eundem nativitas nec aliud esse permittit»: et ita, sicut praedictum est, tenet medium inter idem numero et diversum.

Scholion

I. Cum fides applicet numeros unum et tres ad divina, et numerus videatur non convenire cum aequalitate, S. Doctor apte agit hic de numero praecise sub hoc respectu, sive quomodo numerus admitti possit in divinis, quin derogetur summae divinae aequalitati. Plura de ratione numeri in divinis dicentur infra d. 24. a. 2. Cum Magister in hac re opinionem sustinuerit communiter reprobatam, multum illa aetate de ratione numeri in divinis est disputatum. Unde Alex. Hal. integram de hac materia scripsit quaestionem, septem membra complectentem, in qua diffuse exponit quae S. Bonav. hic brevi compendio exhibet.

II. Duplici conclusione quaestio resolvitur. Primo respondetur cum Magistro, quod in divinis non est differentia secundum numerum. Haec solutio intelligitur de numero proprie et stricte sumto. Hanc assertionem omnibus doctoribus communem Seraphicus duplici ratione probat. Prima sumta est a posteriori i. e. ex consideratione earum rerum, quae proprie habent differentiam numeralem. Haec sic procedit: numerus supponit aggregationem multitudinis, haec vero unitatem limitatam, limitatio additionem, quia genus additione differentiae specificae, species additione principiorum individuantium, materia additione formae limitantur; additio autem implicat compositionem, quae minime est in Deo et consequenter nec differentia numeralis. Secunda ratio sumitur a priori sive ex intrinsecis conditionibus entium et praecipue entis infiniti. Haec procedit ex distinctione in omnibus entibus completis facienda inter quo est et quod est. Quo est significat naturam specificam vel genericam, quod est vero individuum seu suppositum: ex illo oritur unitas specifica vel generica, ex hoc vero identitas vel diversitas secundum numerum. In Deo autem quo est et quod est minime multiplicantur et distinguuntur; tamen qui est (hypostasis) habet distinctionem et numerum personalem. — His suppositis facile intelligitur secunda conclusio, quae incipit a verbis: «Nec tamen est unum numero» etc. Licet enim in Deo quo est et quod est sint unum, tamen numeratur pluralitas personarum. Unde in divinis non est simpliciter numerus, sed cum additione determinante, nempe pluralitas «secundum numerum personarum» (hic ad 1. et dub. 2.). Ideo S. Doctor non consentit Magistro, qui numerum omnino removet a divinis, sed dicit infra (d. 24. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.): «Numerus importat distinctionem et super hoc compositionem aggregationis; et quamvis in divinis non sit aggregatio, nihilominus est distinctio, ideo numerus non simpliciter removendus est a divinis, sed numerus talis. Et Magister omnino removet, ideo in positione sua defecit. Et in illo articulo communiter non tenetur a magistris Parisiensibus».

III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 45. m. 1. 2. 3. 4. — Scot., in utroque scripto I. Sent. d. 24. q. unic. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 24. q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 30. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 17; S. p. 1. tr. 9. q. 42. m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., I. Sent. d. 24, prima princ. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 43. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., I. Sent. d. 14. n. 2.

---

English Translation

QUESTION IV.

Whether in divine things difference according to number can be posited.

Fourthly and lastly it is asked, whether in divine things a difference according to number is to be posited. And that there is, seems [to be the case].

1. The Damascene in the third book1: «In number, not in nature, the hypostases differ»; and he speaks of the divine hypostases.

2. Likewise, all things which can truly be numbered must necessarily differ in number; but the hypostases can truly be numbered, so that they are called two and three: therefore difference according to number truly applies in them.

3. Likewise, all things which differ in reality differ either in genus, or species, or number, or do not differ in any way2. But it is impious to say that the hypostases do not differ in any way: therefore at least they differ in number.

4. Likewise, unity according to3 number does not regard the unity of form, but of the supposit — which is plain: for this white thing and this seated one, with Peter pointed out, are one in number — therefore by [the rule of] opposites, diversity according to number does not regard diversity of nature, but of supposits; but in God there is a plurality of supposits, although there is no diversity of natures: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the same and the diverse sufficiently divide being4: therefore everything which is compared to another either is the same in species, or diverse; or the same in number, or diverse. Therefore the Father, compared with the Son5, is either the same in number, or diverse. If the same; but whenever any two things are the same in number, the one is truly predicated of the other: therefore I can say: the Father is the Son, which6 is contrary to the faith. If diverse in number: therefore in divine things diversity according to number applies.

On the contrary: 1. Ambrose on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, and the Master recites it in the littera7: «There is true unity, where there is no diversity»: therefore there is no diversity there according to number, since [if there were] there would be some diversity, namely diversity according to number.

2. Likewise, Boethius in the book On the Trinity, chapter two: «There is no diversity8 in God, no plurality from diversity, no multitude from accidents»: therefore neither difference according to number.

3. Likewise, diversity according to number comes solely from the side of matter; whence the Philosopher says9 that «altogether matter is what is numerable»; but in divine things no matter applies: therefore neither diversity according to number.

4. Likewise, whatever things differ in number, number10 all the things which are in themselves, at least all the things which are there from the side of the formal principle. This is plain, for because Peter and Paul are two, therefore [they are] two men, two animals, two white things, and so for each: therefore if Father and Son11 are different in number, therefore they have two natures and two essences: therefore they are two gods, which is contrary to the catholic faith.

5. Likewise, whatever things differ in number are separable in imagination or in intellect12; but the Father and the Son are in no way separable, neither in reality nor in intellect, in divine things, because one person is in the other and conversely: therefore neither do they differ in number.

6. Likewise, what is not multipliable nor multiplied is one in number; but the divine nature is not multipliable nor multiplied: therefore it is one in number13; but whatever things are one in number cannot differ in number: therefore if the divine essence or nature embraces the other persons, it is impossible that the persons differ in number.

CONCLUSION.

In divine things difference according to number is not to be posited, although the persons are numbered.

I respond: It must be said that in divine things a difference according to number is not to be posited. And the reason for this can be taken both a posteriori and a priori.

A posteriori: because all things which differ in number are followed by that affection which is number; but number is the aggregation of a multitude, in which there is more in the whole than in any of the parts singly14. But this aggregation comes from those alone which have a limited unity, which is more with another than through itself. But limitation comes through addition. But addition leads to composition with matter, which makes [a thing] to be here and now, and so much and not more; and so there is no diversity according to number except in those things in which there is distinction through addition and composition and matter. And15 this distinction does not apply in God, therefore neither diversity according to number.

The other reason is a priori: because in anything which we understand as complete, we understand it under this twofold condition, namely through the mode by which it is and that which is; and unity indeed or identity according to species or genus comes16 from the side of that which is the quo, according to the diverse states or greater and lesser completion. But unity, or diversity according to number, comes from the side of that which is itself according to being, or as it is in an individual supposit17. But these two are joined in all things in such wise that, that which is being numbered, it is necessary that that by which it is be also numbered. Since therefore in all things which differ in number, that which is is numbered, it is necessary that that by which it is be also multiplied in them.

And18 because for diversity according to number there concur the diversity of that by which it is and that which is and who

p. 364

is, that is, of nature and of supposit or hypostasis, but principally of that which is itself; since in divine things that which is itself, that is, the essence, on account of the highest simplicity is in no way multipliable: therefore it is necessary that that which is itself likewise remain undistinguished: and therefore it is impossible that diversity according to number apply there. Nor however is it one in number: because that which is itself one in number19 in creatures cannot be predicated of many: but in divine things that which is itself, although it be one, is nevertheless predicable of many. And the reason for this is that that by which it is and that which is are the same there, in respect20 of the thing. And therefore, just as that by which it is is communicable to many, although not multipliable, so [also] that which is itself. Whence we can say that the plurality of persons holds the middle between the same in number and the diverse. For although that which is itself is not numbered, he who is is nevertheless numbered; whence there are there many whos.

To 1. And this is what the Damascene wishes to say, when he says: «In number, not in nature, the hypostases differ». For by this addition: not in nature, he himself contracted difference according to number, or rather drew it away from its proper account21. Whence he himself says in the first book, chapter eight: «It must be known, that one thing is to differ in reality, another in reason. In all creatures the division of the hypostases is considered in reality, but the community in reason; in the highest and supersubstantial Trinity, however, it is the converse». Whence since diversity according to number makes or notes diversity in reality and in nature, properly speaking, unless the name of diversity according to number is drawn over to the distinction of supposits, it is not to be conceded that there is there diversity according to number, but [only] according to number22 of persons or hypostases. And this is what the Damascene wishes to say, when he says that the hypostases differ in number, not, I say, in a number which expresses23 diversity in reality and in nature, but [in one] which expresses difference in properties and relations, the nature always remaining one and undivided. From this that [saying] of the Damascene is plain.

To 2. To that which is objected secondly, that those things differ in number which are numbered; it must be said that it is true that24 they differ in that mode in which they are numbered; but they are not numbered except with respect to the persons; and so they do not differ except in number of hypostases and in property.

To 3. To that which is objected, that those things which differ in reality etc.; a distinction must be made in this name re [in reality]25, because it can express the nature or essence, and it can express the person. If it expresses the essence and the nature, it is true; if the person, it is false, and that division has no place.

To 4. To that which is objected, that unity in number regards the identity of the supposit; it must be said that if by supposit be meant that which is, then it has truth. But if there be meant he who is or the person, it does not have truth except in those things in which that by which it is and that which is differ. Whence properly speaking, diversity according to number follows that which is; and therefore26 in divine things it has no place.

To 5. To that which is objected27, that the same and the diverse sufficiently divide being, therefore [each thing is either] the same in number, or diverse; it must be said that this is true in a being which is born to be numbered, such as a created being; but in uncreated being this fails. Whence Hilary On the Trinity28: «That God born from God, neither does birth permit to be the same nor [permit] to be other»: and so, as has been said before, [it] holds the middle between the same in number and the diverse.

Scholion

I. Since faith applies the numbers one and three to divine things, and number does not seem to be in agreement with equality, the Holy Doctor here aptly treats of number precisely under this respect, that is, in what manner number can be admitted in divine things without derogating from the highest divine equality. More on the account of number in divine things will be said below in d. 24, a. 2. Since the Master in this matter held an opinion commonly disapproved, much was disputed in that age concerning the account of number in divine things. Whence Alexander of Hales wrote a whole question on this matter, embracing seven members, in which he sets out at length what St. Bonaventure here exhibits in a brief compendium.

II. The question is resolved by a twofold conclusion. First it is answered with the Master, that in divine things there is no difference according to number. This solution is to be understood of number properly and strictly taken. The Seraphic Doctor proves this assertion, common to all the doctors, by a twofold reason. The first is taken a posteriori, that is, from the consideration of those things which properly have numerical difference. It proceeds thus: number supposes an aggregation of a multitude, this in turn a limited unity, limitation an addition, because genus is limited by the addition of the specific difference, species by the addition of individuating principles, matter by the addition of form; but addition implies composition, which is by no means in God, and consequently neither numerical difference. The second reason is taken a priori, that is, from the intrinsic conditions of beings and especially of infinite being. It proceeds from the distinction to be made in all complete beings between quo est and quod est. Quo est signifies the specific or generic nature, but quod est the individual or supposit: from the former arises specific or generic unity, from the latter identity or diversity according to number. But in God quo est and quod est are by no means multiplied and distinguished; nevertheless qui est (the hypostasis) has distinction and personal number. — These things being supposed, the second conclusion is easily understood, which begins with the words: «Nor however is it one in number» etc. For although in God quo est and quod est are one, nevertheless the plurality of persons is numbered. Whence in divine things there is not number simply, but with a determining addition, namely plurality «according to number of persons» (here in [reply] to 1 and dub. 2). Therefore the Holy Doctor does not agree with the Master, who removes number altogether from divine things, but says below (d. 24, a. 2, q. 1, in the body): «Number imports distinction and over and above this composition of aggregation; and although in divine things there is no aggregation, nevertheless there is distinction, therefore number is not simply to be removed from divine things, but [only] number of such [a kind]. And the Master removes [it] altogether, therefore in his position he failed. And in that article he is not commonly held by the masters of Paris».

III. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 45, m. 1, 2, 3, 4. — Scotus, in either writing on I Sent. d. 24, q. unic. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 24, q. 1, a. 2; Summa I, q. 30, a. 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 17; Summa p. 1, tr. 9, q. 42, m. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, I Sent. d. 24, prima princ. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 43, q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, I Sent. d. 14, n. 2.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. De Fide orthod. c. 6: Personae siquidem non natura, sed numero inter se distingui dicuntur.
    On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6: For the persons are said to be distinguished from one another not in nature, but in number.
  2. Cfr. Aristot., I. Topic. c. 6. (c. 5.); V. Metaph. text. 16. (IV. c. 9.); et Boeth., de Trin. c. 1.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics I, c. 6 (c. 5); Metaphysics V, text. 16 (IV, c. 9); and Boethius, On the Trinity, c. 1.
  3. In Vat. et cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1 adiungitur materiam sive, et paulo infra contra plurimos codd. ponitur et hoc patet loco quod patet, pro quo cod. Z hoc enim patet.
    In the Vatican edition and codex cc, against the testimony of the other manuscripts and edition 1, materiam sive ("matter or") is added, and a little below, against most codices, et hoc patet ("and this is plain") is put in place of quod patet ("which is plain"), for which codex Z [reads] hoc enim patet ("for this is plain").
  4. Vide supra pag. 104 nota 5.
    See above p. 104, note 5.
  5. Praeferimus lectionem maioris partis codd. ut AFGIHSTUWYZ etc. et ed. 1 lectioni aliquorum codd. et Vat. Si ergo Pater comparatur Filio. Mox post Si idem ex plurimis mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus male omissum sed.
    We prefer the reading of the greater part of the codices, such as AFGIHSTUWYZ etc. and edition 1, to the reading of some codices and the Vatican edition, Si ergo Pater comparatur Filio ("If therefore the Father is compared with the Son"). Next, after Si idem, from most of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have supplied the wrongly omitted sed.
  6. Cod. H addit falsum est.
    Codex H adds falsum est ("is false").
  7. Hic, c. 1, circa finem. — Paulo infra lectionem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 restituimus addendo cum sit aliqua diversitas, scil. diversitas secundum numerum.
    Here, c. 1, near the end. — A little below we have restored the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 by adding cum sit aliqua diversitas, scil. diversitas secundum numerum ("since [if there were] there would be some diversity, namely diversity according to number").
  8. Cod. V diversitas.
    Codex V [reads] diversitas.
  9. Libr. I. Phys. text. 66. (c. 7.).
    Book I Physics, text. 66 (c. 7).
  10. Plurimi mss. et ed. 1 numerantur; sed propter difficultatem grammaticalem hanc lectionem non recepimus.
    Most manuscripts and edition 1 [read] numerantur ("are numbered"); but on account of the grammatical difficulty we have not accepted this reading.
  11. In cod. Y additur duo.
    In codex Y duo ("two") is added.
  12. In aliquibus mss. et Vat. hic additur nec modo, sed minus ad rem et contradicente maiore parte mss. et ed. 1. In fine argumenti plures codd. cum ed. 1 ergo non loco ergo nec.
    In some manuscripts and the Vatican edition there is here added nec modo ("nor in mode"), but less to the point and against the major part of the manuscripts and edition 1. At the end of the argument several codices with edition 1 [read] ergo non in place of ergo nec.
  13. Vat. cum uno alterove codice perperam omittit numero, quod tamen exhibetur in ceteris codd. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with one or two codices wrongly omits numero ("in number"), which however is exhibited in the other codices and edition 1.
  14. Communis definitio numeri, sumta ex Aristotele, IV. Phys. text. 133. (c. ult.); V. Metaph. text. 11. et 20., ac X. Metaph. text. 21. (IV. c. 6. et 13. ac IX. c. 6.), haec est: Numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum. Vel ex Boethio, I. de Arithmetica, c. 3: Numerus est unitatum collectio, vel quantitatis acervus ex unitatibus profusus (cfr. etiam de Trin. c. 3.). — Plures codd. ut AIPQTV cc singula pro singulis. Paulo ante cod. 1 ratio loco passio. Mox codd. PQ in his pro ex his.
    The common definition of number, taken from Aristotle, IV Physics, text. 133 (last chapter); V Metaphysics, text. 11 and 20, and X Metaphysics, text. 21 (IV, cc. 6 and 13, and IX, c. 6), is this: Number is a multitude measured by one. Or from Boethius, I On Arithmetic, c. 3: Number is a collection of unities, or a heap of quantity poured forth from unities (cf. also On the Trinity, c. 3). — Several codices such as AIPQTV cc [read] singula in place of singulis. A little earlier codex 1 [reads] ratio in place of passio. Next codices PQ [read] in his in place of ex his.
  15. Ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 loco Sed substituimus Et, quod aliqui codd. ut SY omittunt.
    From most of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted Et in place of Sed, which some codices such as SY omit.
  16. Vat. cum paucis codd. est veniens.
    The Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] est veniens ("is coming").
  17. In cod. Y adiungitur vel. Mox aliqui codd. ut ATXZ cum ed. 1 iuncta pro coniuncta, quod aliqui ut SW omittunt.
    In codex Y vel ("or") is added. Next some codices such as ATXZ with edition 1 [read] iuncta in place of coniuncta, which some such as SW omit.
  18. Vat. cum cod. cc, omissa particula Et, proxime sequentem propositionem cum praecedente coniungit novamque paulo infra incipit, addito ergo, a verbis Cum ergo in divinis, quae lectio et in se incongrua est et contra antiquiores codd. nec non ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc, omitting the particle Et, joins the next proposition with the preceding and begins a new one a little below, with ergo added, from the words Cum ergo in divinis ("Since therefore in divine things"), a reading which is in itself incongruous and against the older codices as well as edition 1.
  19. Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. adiecimus unum numero. Immediate post in pluribus codd. ut ADILORSTU etc. desideratur in creaturis.
    On the testimony of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have added unum numero ("one in number"). Immediately after, in several codices such as ADILORSTU etc. in creaturis ("in creatures") is missing.
  20. In paucis mss. ut YZ additur est, et a cod. Z paulo infra post ita adiungitur et.
    In a few manuscripts such as YZ est is added, and by codex Z a little below after ita et is added.
  21. Vat. quae ponit ad differentiam loco a propria castigatur ex mss. et sex primis edd. — Plurimi codd. cum primis edd. (excepta ed. 1.) distinxit pro distraxit. Mox Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, ut loco Unde.
    The Vatican edition, which puts ad differentiam in place of a propria, is corrected from the manuscripts and the first six editions. — Most codices with the first editions (except edition 1) [read] distinxit in place of distraxit. Next the Vatican edition, against the resistance of most manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] ut in place of Unde.
  22. Lectio Vat. mutila, in qua male omittitur sed secundum numerum, resarcitur ope fere omnium mss. et ed. 1.
    The mutilated reading of the Vatican edition, in which sed secundum numerum is wrongly omitted, is repaired by the help of nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1.
  23. Fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus hic et paulo infra dicat pro dicit et mox ope plurium mss. ut FHIT bb mutavimus relatione in relationibus. Dein pauci codd. ut USU unitate indivisa loco unica et indivisa.
    On the testimony of most codices and edition 1 we have here and a little below substituted dicat in place of dicit, and next by the help of several manuscripts such as FHIT bb we have changed relatione into relationibus. Then a few codices such as USU [read] unitate indivisa in place of unica et indivisa.
  24. Vat. cum cod. cc quia, sed contradicentibus aliis codd. et ed. 1. Paulo ante pro differunt aliqui codd. ut IKTV cc differant.
    The Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] quia, but with the other codices and edition 1 contradicting. A little earlier in place of differunt some codices such as IKTV cc [read] differant.
  25. Pauci codd. ut A D T rei, et paulo infra dicit loco dicat.
    A few codices such as A D T [read] rei, and a little below dicit in place of dicat.
  26. Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 6 supplevimus ideo.
    From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 6 we have supplied ideo.
  27. In Vat. et cod. cc deest quod obiicitur. Ed. addit est.
    In the Vatican edition and codex cc quod obiicitur ("which is objected") is missing. The edition adds est.
  28. Libr. I. n. 17: Quia Deo ex Deo nato neque eundem nativitas permittit esse, neque aliud. — In quo textu, fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 refragantibus, Vat. nec aliam esse natura permittit. Mox ex codd. cum ed. 1 praedictum loco dictum posuimus.
    Book I, n. 17: Because birth does not permit God born from God to be the same, nor [permit Him to be] other. — In which text, with nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1 resisting, the Vatican edition [reads] nec aliam esse natura permittit ("nor does nature permit [Him] to be other"). Next from the codices with edition 1 we have put praedictum in place of dictum.
← Dist. 19, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 19, Part 1, Dubia→