Bonaventure

Articulus Unicus.

De diversis comparationibus proprietatis.

Quaestio I.

Utrum proprietas sit persona.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quantum ergo ad primum quaeritur de comparatione proprietatis ad personam. Et quaeritur, utrum proprietas sit persona. Et quod non, ostenditur hoc modo.

1. Ubicumque est vere determinans et determinatum secundum rem, ibi determinans differt a determinato — nam si non differt, non est determinans vere, sed totum est determinatum — sed persona in divinis est vere determinatum, et proprietas vere determinans, quia proprietas vere et non secundum modum dicendi solum distinguit personam: ergo proprietas differt a persona. Sed differentia non praedicatur de se in abstractione¹: ergo nec proprietas de persona, vel e converso.

2. Item, ubicumque est vere abstractum et concretum, ibi differt quod abstrahitur ab eo, a quo abstrahitur²; sed proprietas significatur in concretione ad personam, cum dicitur Pater, et in abstractione, cum dicitur paternitas, et non tantum est differentia in modo loquendi, quia aliquid dicitur de Patre, quod non de paternitate: ergo vere differt paternitas a persona. Sed quod vere differt ab alio non praedicatur de eo in abstractione: ergo etc.

3. Item, ubicumque est absolutum et respectivum, absolutum non est ipse respectus, quantumcumque se ipso referatur — unde quamvis materia se ipsa referatur ad formam, tamen non est ipse respectus ad formam — ergo cum in divinis persona vere sit substantia absoluta, relatio sit verus respectus, quantumcumque se ipsa referatur persona, non est verus respectus sive ipse respectus, nec e converso: ergo proprietas non est ipsa persona.

Ex his tribus suppositionibus arguebat Porretanus, quod persona non est proprietas nec e converso. Et quia omne quod est in persona, est persona propter summam simplicitatem, arguebat ulterius, quod proprietates non sunt in personis, sed assistunt.

4. Et quod ista positio sit conveniens, videtur auctoritate Boethii de Trinitate³. Dicit enim, quod «relatio non in eo quod est esse consistit, sed in comparatione».

5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione, quia omne quod advenit alicui et recedit sine sui mutatione, non praedicat aliquid, quod sit in illo, sed solum⁴ assistens; sed relatio est huiusmodi, ut patet in dextro et sinistro: ergo etc. Cum ergo proprietates sint relationes, non sunt personae nec in personis, sed assistunt.

Contra:

1. «Omne simplicissimum est id quod habet, excepto eo, ad quod relative dicitur». Haec est Augustini undecimo de Civitate Dei⁵ et per se nota est; sed divina persona est simplicissima, aliter non esset Deus, et non dicitur relative ad proprietatem: ergo est proprietas.

2. Item, omne perfectissimum est omne illud a quo perficitur et denominatur — haec per se nota est, quia aliter denominans et perficiens esset perfectius eo; et Augustinus istam proponit quinto de Trinitate⁶ dicens quod, quia ipse Deus est maximus, ideo est sua magnitudo — sed persona divina est perfectissimum quid et denominatur sua proprietate: ergo persona est sua proprietas, et Pater est paternitas.

3. Item, omne simpliciter primum est quidquid habet, excepto eo quod est ex illo⁷ — nam si habet aliquid quod non sit ab ipso, vel quod non sit ipsum illud, illud est aeque primum ut ipsum: ergo ipsum non erit simpliciter primum — sed Pater habet paternitatem, et paternitas non est ab ipso, et ipse est simpliciter primus: ergo Pater est paternitas, eadem ratione Filius est filiatio, et Spiritus sanctus processio.

Ex his concluditur, quod proprietates non sunt tantum personae, sed etiam in personis.

4. Et quod istud verum sit, videtur auctoritate Hieronymi in libro de Expositione fidei catholicae ad Damasum⁸: «Tres, inquit, personas expressas sub proprietatibus distinguimus».

5. Item, hoc videtur ratione. Quia omne quod est, aut est ens per se et in se, aut in alio⁹. Proprietates igitur aut sunt per se entes, et ita substantiae; aut in alio. Si in alio, non nisi in personis, quia proprietas non est nisi in eo cuius est proprietas. Si per se, ergo proprietas est substantia: aut ergo creata, aut increata, aut media. Sed non creata, nec media — illud constat — restat ergo, quod increata: ergo sunt personae.

Conclusio.

Proprietas est persona et in persona, tamen proprietas et persona differunt secundum modum se habendi.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de comparatione proprietatis ad personam triplex fuit opinio.

Prima positio fuit, quod proprietates non sunt personae nec in personis, sed assistunt personis, sicut relationes. Et ratio, quae movit istos, fuit personarum pluralitas et divina simplicitas. Quia enim personae plures sunt, plures habent proprietates, quae vere differentes sunt¹⁰. Et quia differentes sunt, si essent in persona, auferrent ei simplicitatem. Quae cum non possit auferri a divinis, posuerunt, proprietates esse assistentes personis, non esse personas. Et huic videtur consonare natura relationis, quae non videtur esse in substantia¹¹ nec praedicare aliquid in subiecto¹², sed dicere respectum ad aliud. Et haec positio, etsi rationabilis aliquo modo fuit, tamen stare non potest, quia ponebat, relationes in divinis nec Deum esse nec creaturam. Unde etsi in principio sui modicum contineret errorem, ducebat tamen ad magnum¹³; et ideo retractata fuit in Concilio Rhemensi, et magister Gilbertus Porretanus ore proprio retractavit.

Ideo fuit secunda opinio¹⁴, multum differens ab ista, videlicet, quod proprietates omnino sunt personae nec differunt nisi solummodo in modo loquendi, et tantum sunt tres proprietates, sicut sunt tres personae. Et ista positio fundata est similiter super divinam simplicitatem. Quia enim personae sunt simplicissimae, se ipsis distinguuntur, et ipsae sunt suae proprietates nec habent alias differentes re, sed solo modo loquendi. Et ista positio fuit magistri Praepositivi, et magis est probabilis quam praecedens. Attamen ipsa improbata est supra, distinctione vigesima sexta¹⁵, quia una persona plures habet relationes, quae sunt verae relationes; et plures personae habent unam proprietatem et una persona alio et alio modo se habet ad Filium et ad Spiritum sanctum, etiam secundum rem. Ex quo necessario sequitur, quod realiter aliquo modo differt proprietas a persona, et non solum in modo loquendi, sicut dicebat magister Praepositivus.

Et propter hoc intelligendum, quod utraque praedictarum positionum aliquid veri dixit et in aliquo defecit. Nam prima, quae dicebat, quod proprietates aliquo modo differunt a personis, verum dixit; sed in hoc male, quod dixit simpliciter differre. Sequens, quae dixit, quod proprietates sunt personae, verum dixit; sed in hoc excessit, quod dixit, quod nullo modo differunt a personis.

Ideo ex his duabus positionibus conflatur¹⁶ una vera et communis positio, quam tenent modo magistri communiter, quod proprietates sunt personae et in personis, tamen aliquo modo differunt a personis. — Et quod ista positio sit conveniens, patet, si quis inspiciat naturam proprietatum. Dictum enim est supra¹⁷, cum quaerebatur, quid esset proprietas in divinis, quod erat relatio. Dictum est etiam, quod relatio ratione comparationis, quam habet ad subiectum, transit in substantiam in divinis; et ideo de subiecto suo omnino vere praedicatur, ut Pater est paternitas. Ratione vero comparationis, quam habet ad obiectum, manet verissime in divinis et habet quodam modo differentiam a persona; nec facit secundum hoc compositionem, sed distinctionem respectu cuius est. Compositio enim attenditur per comparationem proprietatis ad subiectum, distinctio respectu obiecti. Et ex hoc patet, quod proprietas est persona et in persona, quia idem est per essentiam¹⁸ sive modum essendi, differt tamen quantum ad modum se habendi. — Concedendae igitur sunt rationes, quod proprietates sunt personae et in personis.

Ad argumenta:

1. Et patet ex dictis responsio ad primum argumentum. Quia enim aliquantulam habent differentiam proprietates a persona penes modum se habendi, ideo proprietas vere determinat et distinguit; hoc tamen non tollit praedicationem¹⁹, quia modus ille non addit aliam essentiam.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo de abstractione, dicendum, quod non est abstractio secundum rem, sed solum secundum modum intelligendi et loquendi: quia abstractio respicit subiectum in quo, et secundum illum respectum transit²⁰; quia tamen manet in comparatione ad terminum, hinc est, quod relatio non tantummodo loquendi differt, nec tamen oportet, quod sit ibi vera abstractio.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio, quod absolutum non dicitur de respectivo; dicendum, quod verum est in creatura, quia respectus ipse verus aut est alius per essentiam, aut in comparatione ad aliud²¹: per essentiam, ut materia et forma, quorum neutrum est in divinis: unde respectus in creaturis ponit dependentiam, et ideo privat summam simplicitatem, et ideo non praedicatur in creaturis. Omne enim simplicissimum est independens omnino²². In divinis autem relationes dicunt respectum sine dependentia; et ideo non privant summam simplicitatem, et ideo dicuntur de hypostasibus.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur postmodum, quod omnes relationes sunt assistentes; dicendum, quod esse in comparatione dicuntur a Boethio, non quia non sint in re, sed quia, cum sint in re, non sunt in ea absolute, sed in comparatione ad alterum; quo quidem mutato et corrupto, contingit relationem pariter corrumpi et desinere propter hoc, quod non est in subiecto absolute, sed ad alterum; nihilominus tamen est in subiecto.

5. Ex hoc patet responsio ad illud quod obiicitur. Nam illud non habet veritatem nisi in ente absoluto, non respectivo. Et illud²³ trahitur ex ratione et verbis Boethii: ex ratione, quia quando dico, hoc esse ordinatum ad aliquid, non nihil dico de illo, de quo dicitur, et quando de aliquo, quod non habet ordinem, fit habens ordinem, quia non erat illud ad quod ordinaretur — et ideo ordo erat in potentia in hoc, non ratione sui, sed ratione eius ad quod est — quantum est ex parte sui, erat in actu; et ideo, nulla mutatione facta in ipso, sed in obiecto, introducitur in esse et desinit. Et hoc patet ex verbis Boethii, quia Boethius non negat simpliciter, quod relatio non in eo quod est esse consistit, sed non totaliter consistit. Unde dicit²⁴: «Non potest praedicatio relativa quidquam rei, de qua dicitur, per se addere, vel minuere, vel mutare, quae non tota in eo quod est esse consistit». Ex hoc innuit, quod aliquo modo consistit; et ideo nec in creaturis nec in Deo est verum dicere, quod relatio non sit in aliquo; sed verum est dicere, quod non tota est in aliquo absolute.

Article Unique.

On the various comparisons of property.

Question I.

Whether property is a person.

So as to the first, it is asked concerning the comparison of property to person. And it is asked, whether property is a person. And that it is not, is shown in this way.

1. Wherever there is truly a determining and a determined according to the thing, there the determining differs from the determined — for if it does not differ, it is not truly determining, but the whole is determined — but the person in the divine is truly the determined, and the property truly the determining, since the property truly, and not according to a mode of speaking only, distinguishes the person: therefore the property differs from the person. But a difference is not predicated of itself in the abstract¹: therefore neither is the property [predicated] of the person, or vice versa.

2. Likewise, wherever there is truly an abstract and a concrete, there what is abstracted differs from that from which it is abstracted²; but property is signified in concretion to the person, when "Father" is said, and in abstraction, when "paternity" is said, and there is not only a difference in the mode of speaking, since something is said of the Father which is not said of paternity: therefore paternity truly differs from the person. But what truly differs from another is not predicated of it in the abstract: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, wherever there is an absolute and a relative, the absolute is not the very respect, however much it be referred by itself — whence although matter is referred by itself to form, nevertheless it is not the very respect to form — therefore since in the divine the person is truly absolute substance, the relation is true respect, however much the person be referred by itself, [the person] is not true respect or the very respect, nor the converse: therefore the property is not the person itself.

From these three suppositions Porretanus argued that the person is not the property nor vice versa. And since whatever is in the person is the person on account of supreme simplicity, he argued further, that the properties are not in the persons, but stand alongside.

4. And that this position is fitting, appears from the authority of Boethius, On the Trinity³. For he says that "relation does not consist in that which is to be, but in comparison."

5. Likewise, this same point is shown by reason, since whatever comes to something and recedes without its own change does not predicate something which is in it, but only⁴ something standing alongside; but relation is of this kind, as is clear in right and left: therefore etc. Therefore since the properties are relations, they are not persons nor in the persons, but stand alongside.

On the contrary:

1. "Everything most simple is that which it has, except for that to which it is said relatively." This is from Augustine, On the City of God XI⁵, and it is per se known; but the divine person is most simple, otherwise it would not be God, and it is not said relatively to the property: therefore it is the property.

2. Likewise, every most perfect [thing] is everything by which it is perfected and denominated — this is per se known, since otherwise the denominator and perfecter would be more perfect than it; and Augustine sets this forth in [book] five of the Trinity⁶, saying that, since God himself is the greatest, therefore he is his own greatness — but the divine person is something most perfect and is denominated by his own property: therefore the person is his own property, and the Father is paternity.

3. Likewise, every simply first [thing] is whatever it has, except for that which is from it⁷ — for if it has anything which is not from itself, or which is not it itself, that thing is equally first as it [is]: therefore it itself will not be simply first — but the Father has paternity, and paternity is not from him, and he is simply first: therefore the Father is paternity, by the same reason the Son is filiation, and the Holy Spirit procession.

From these it is concluded that the properties are not only persons, but also in the persons.

4. And that this is true, appears from the authority of Jerome in the book On the Exposition of the Catholic Faith to Damasus⁸: "We distinguish three persons," he says, "expressed under properties."

5. Likewise, this appears by reason. Since whatever is, either is a being per se and in itself, or in another⁹. The properties therefore either are per se beings, and so substances; or [are] in another. If in another, only in the persons, since a property is only in that of which it is the property. If per se, then property is substance: either then created, or uncreated, or middle. But not created, nor middle — that is established — therefore there remains, that [it is] uncreated: therefore they are persons.

Conclusion.

Property is a person and in a person; nevertheless property and person differ according to the mode of having themselves.

I respond: It must be said, that concerning the comparison of property to person there has been a threefold opinion.

The first position was, that the properties are not persons nor in the persons, but stand alongside the persons, like relations. And the reason which moved them was the plurality of persons and the divine simplicity. For since the persons are several, they have several properties, which are truly different¹⁰. And since they are different, if they were in the person, they would take from it simplicity. Since this cannot be taken from the divine [persons], they posited that the properties are standing-alongside [assistant] to the persons, are not persons. And to this the nature of relation seems to consort, which does not seem to be in substance¹¹ nor to predicate something in a subject¹², but to express a respect to another. And this position, although it was reasonable in some way, nevertheless cannot stand, because it posited that relations in the divine are neither God nor creature. Whence even though in its beginning it contained little error, nevertheless it led to a great one¹³; and therefore it was retracted at the Council of Reims, and master Gilbert Porretanus retracted it with his own mouth.

Therefore there was a second opinion¹⁴, much differing from this, namely, that the properties are altogether persons and do not differ except only in the mode of speaking, and there are only three properties, just as there are three persons. And this position is founded likewise upon the divine simplicity. For since the persons are most simple, they are distinguished by themselves, and they are themselves their own properties and do not have others differing in reality, but only in the mode of speaking. And this position was that of master Praepositivus, and is more probable than the preceding. Nevertheless it itself was disproved above, in the twenty-sixth distinction¹⁵, because one person has several relations, which are true relations; and several persons have one property, and one person has himself in one and another way to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, even according to the thing. From which it necessarily follows that really in some way property differs from person, and not only in the mode of speaking, as master Praepositivus said.

And on this account it must be understood that each of the foregoing positions said something true and failed in something. For the first, which said that the properties differ in some way from the persons, said truly; but in this badly, that it said they differed simply. The next, which said that the properties are persons, said truly; but in this it went too far, that it said that they differ in no way from the persons.

Therefore from these two positions there is welded together¹⁶ one true and common position, which the masters now hold commonly, that the properties are persons and in the persons, yet differ in some way from the persons. — And that this position is fitting is clear, if one inspects the nature of the properties. For it was said above¹⁷, when it was asked, what property in the divine was, that it was relation. It was also said, that relation, by reason of the comparison which it has to the subject, passes over into substance in the divine; and therefore it is most truly predicated of its subject, as the Father is paternity. But by reason of the comparison which it has to the object, it remains most truly in the divine and has in some way a difference from the person; nor on this account does it make a composition, but a distinction with respect to that of which it is. For composition is taken according to the comparison of the property to the subject, distinction with respect to the object. And from this it is clear, that property is person and in person, since it is the same by essence¹⁸ or by mode of being, but differs as to the mode of having-itself. — The reasons therefore must be conceded, that the properties are persons and in the persons.

To the arguments:

1. And from what has been said the response to the first argument is clear. For since the properties have some little difference from the person according to the mode of having-themselves, therefore the property truly determines and distinguishes; this however does not take away the predication¹⁹, since that mode does not add another essence.

2. To that which is objected secondly, concerning abstraction, it must be said that there is not abstraction according to the thing, but only according to the mode of understanding and of speaking: since abstraction regards the subject in which, and according to that respect [the relation] passes over²⁰; since however it remains in comparison to the term, hence it is, that relation does not differ only in speaking, and yet it is not necessary that there be there a true abstraction.

3. To that which is objected thirdly, that the absolute is not said of the relative; it must be said, that this is true in the creature, since the very true respect either is another by essence, or in comparison to another²¹: by essence, as matter and form, of which neither is in the divine: whence respect in creatures posits dependence, and therefore takes away supreme simplicity, and therefore is not predicated in creatures. For everything most simple is altogether independent²². But in the divine relations express a respect without dependence; and therefore they do not take away supreme simplicity, and therefore they are said of the hypostases.

4. To that which is objected afterward, that all relations are standing-alongside; it must be said, that they are said by Boethius to be in comparison, not because they are not in the thing, but because, since they are in the thing, they are not in it absolutely, but in comparison to another; with this changed and corrupted, the relation likewise comes to be corrupted and to cease, on account of this, that it is not in the subject absolutely, but to another; nonetheless it is in the subject.

5. From this is clear the response to that which is objected. For that does not have truth except in absolute being, not relative. And that²³ is drawn from the reasoning and the words of Boethius: from the reasoning, since when I say, this is to be ordered to something, I do not say nothing of that of which it is said, and when, of something which does not have an order, [the case] becomes one having an order, since that to which it would be ordered did not yet exist — and therefore the order was in potency in this, not by reason of itself, but by reason of that to which it is — as far as it [depended] on its own side, it was in act; and therefore, with no change made in itself, but in the object, it is brought into being and ceases. And this is clear from the words of Boethius, since Boethius does not deny simply that relation does not consist in that which is to be, but [says it does] not wholly consist [therein]. Whence he says²⁴: "A relative predication cannot of itself add anything to the thing of which it is said, or diminish, or change, [a thing] which does not wholly consist in that which is to be." From this he hints that it does in some way consist [there]; and therefore neither in creatures nor in God is it true to say that the relation is not in something; but it is true to say that it is not wholly in something absolutely.