← Back to Distinction 5

Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 121

ARTICULUS I. De ipsa assumtione ex parte assumentis.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum assumere sit actus conveniens divinae naturae.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum assumere sit actus conveniens divinae naturae. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. (Fundamenta.) Auctoritate Augustini in libro de Fide ad Petrum1: « Illa natura, quae semper genita manet apud Patrem, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit » ; sed suscipere et assumere idem est: ergo natura Dei naturam nostram suscepit.

p. 122

2. Item, expressius in libro de Trinitate2: « Forma Dei accepit formam servi » ; sed forma Dei non est aliud quam natura Dei: ergo si forma formam accepit, natura naturam assumsit.

3. Item, ratione videtur. Haec est vera et propria: natura divina unita est humanae; aut ergo in illa unione3 se habet ut agens, aut ut patiens; constat, quod non ut patiens: ergo se habet ut agens. Sed in ipsa unione agere nihil aliud est quam ipsam naturam assumere: ergo videtur, quod assumere conveniat divinae naturae.

4. Item, natura divina et humana uniuntur in unitate4 personae; sed ex illa unione vere et proprie dicitur humana natura esse assumta: ergo pari ratione divina natura vel debet dici ex illa unione assumens, vel assumta. Sed non assumitur: ergo illius est assumere.

Sed contra 1. (Ad oppositum.) est auctoritas Concilii Toletani, quam Magister ponit in littera5: « Cum tota Trinitas operata sit formationem suscepti hominis, solus tamen Filius suscepit hominem in unitate personae, non in unitate naturae » : ergo si hoc soli Filio convenit, non videtur, quod conveniat divinae naturae.

2. Item, Anselmus6: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nullo modo differunt in natura: ergo quod convenit divinae naturae convenit Patri et Filio et Spiritui sancto; sed assumtio humanae naturae nullo modo convenit Patri, vel Spiritui sancto: ergo nullo modo videtur divinae naturae competere.

3. Item, divina natura est quoddam simplicissimum; sed simplicissimum, cum unitur, totaliter unitur: ergo si divina natura unitur humanae et eam assumit, videtur, quod hoc conveniat cuilibet personae.

4. Item, si aliquod unum, in quo plura uniuntur, unitur alicui, necesse est per consequens, et illa uniri, sicut patet. Nam si punctus, cui uniuntur multae lineae, alicui coniungitur, necesse est, et illas lineas7 uniri; si etiam anima, cui uniuntur potentiae, unitur alicui, necesse est, et eidem potentias uniri. Ergo si divinae personae magis uniuntur in natura, quam linea in puncto, vel potentiae in anima; si assumere convenit divinae naturae, necesse est, quod conveniat cuilibet personae; sed constat, quod non convenit cuilibet personae: ergo nec naturae.

5. Item, haec simpliciter est falsa et nullo modo conceditur: divina essentia generat vel natura, quoniam ille actus est actus proprius conveniens uni soli personae: ergo si assumere est actus conveniens uni soli personae, utpote personae Filii; videtur, quod haec sit neganda tanquam falsa: divina natura assumit humanam.

6. Item, regula est, et habita fuit in primo libro8, quod essentia non supponit personam nec e converso: ergo divina essentia vel natura non potest pro persona locutionem reddere veram, nec pro alio; hoc constat, quia soli Filio convenit assumere: ergo videtur simpliciter esse neganda praedicta locutio.

CONCLUSIO. Terminus assumere non convenire potest divinae naturae, nisi quatenus tantum dicit respectum ad relationem unionis, quae est in una persona, non autem in ipsa natura.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod tam per verbum uniendi quam per verbum assumendi importatur unio divinae naturae ad humanam, differenter tamen quantum ad modum significandi (Differunt dupliciter unire et assumere.): quia verbum uniendi dicitur ab unione, quae magis importat relationem quam actionem; verbum autem assumendi dicitur ab assumtione, quae principalius importat actionem. Unde quamvis concedatur, quod divina natura uniat sibi humanam, et eidem etiam uniatur; nullo modo tamen conceditur, quod divina natura assumatur (Notandum.). — Alia etiam est differentia: quia unire, quantum est de se, non dicit terminum relationis vel actionis determinate; potest enim aliquis aliquid unire sibi et alii. Assumere autem importat terminum intrinsecum tam actionis quam relationis; assumere enim hoc9 est ad se sumere.

Cum igitur vocabulum assumendi importet simul relationem et actionem, terminus ille, interius intellectus, potest referri ad utrumque, vel ad alterum tantum, videlicet ad relationem (Distinctio.). Si ad utrumque referatur; cum actio illa terminetur ad unitatem aliquam, tunc assumere dictum de aliquo significat non solum unionem, sed etiam illam unionem terminari ad unitatem assumentis. Et quoniam illa unio non terminatur ad unitatem naturae, sed potius ad unitatem personae; ideo secundum istum intellectum assumere non convenit divinae naturae (Conclusio 1.). Divina enim natura non assumsit humanam in unitatem naturae; et ideo isto modo non conceditur, quod eam assumserit divina natura, hoc est ad se sive ad propriam unitatem sumserit. — Si autem terminus ille habeat respectum ad relationem unionis1b; tunc conceditur, quod divina natura humanam assumserit, hoc est sibi unierit (Conclusio 2.). Univit enim sibi humanam naturam, quamvis non in se ipsa, sed in una persona. — Et isto modo procedunt rationes et auctoritates, quae ad hoc inducuntur; et ideo sunt concedendae.

p. 123

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod solus Filius suscepit humanam naturam; dicendum, quod solum2b non excludit ibi naturam, quae est in persona et praedicatur de persona, sed excludit alias duas personas, scilicet Patrem et Spiritum sanctum (Solutio oppositorum.). — Praeterea, auctoritas illa non dicit simpliciter, quod solus Filius susceperit, sed quod solus Filius suscepit in unitatem propriam3b (Aliter.); et tunc non est instantia de natura, quia, ut dictum est, natura divina non suscepit humanam in unitatem naturae, sed in unitatem personae4b.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nullo modo differunt in natura; dicendum, quod ista duplex est (Duplex sensus.). Uno modo potest intelligi sic: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nullo modo differunt in natura, id est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, habentes unam naturam, nullo modo differunt; et hoc est falsum, quia Pater et Filius personaliter differunt et habent proprietates distinctas. — Alio modo potest intelligi, ut sit sensus: Pater et Filius non differunt in natura, id est, non differunt diversitate naturae; nihilominus tamen differunt a se invicem re, et ab ipsa essentia vel natura differunt ratione vel attributione. Aliquid enim attribuitur personae, quod non naturae, et e converso5b. Et ideo, sicut non sequitur: divina natura est in tribus personis: ergo persona Patris est in tribus personis una; sic non sequitur: divina natura unit sibi vel assumit humanam: ergo persona Patris assumit; immo est ibi sophisma accidentis, vel locus sophisticus accidentis6b.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de divina natura, quod est quid simplicissimum; dicendum, quod quamvis sit simplicissimum in forma, habet tamen distinctionem in hypostasibus sive in personis7b. Cum ergo intelligimus, aliquid uniri alicui, hoc possumus intelligere aut quantum ad unionem secundum formam, aut quantum ad unionem secundum suppositum (Notanda distinctio.). Dico ergo, quod si divina natura uniretur alicui secundum formam, quod necessario tota uniretur, hoc est in qualibet persona, cum simplicissimum8b sit. Sed quia unio ista vel assumtio non est quantum ad unionem in forma, sed quantum ad unionem in persona et supposito; ideo non sequitur, quod quamvis sit simplicissima, quod tota sit unita, secundum quod totum distribuit pro personis. Unde non valet processus ille, quo proceditur a simplicitate naturae ad personarum pluralitatem.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura est illud, in quo personae uniuntur: ergo ipsa unita, tres personae uniuntur, et ipsa assumente, assumunt; dicendum, quod non sequitur. Quando enim dicitur, quod ad unionem eius, in quo alia uniuntur, sequitur unio illorum, hoc verum est, quando uniuntur secundum illud et in eo, in quo alia uniuntur in eo (Notandum.), sicut est in puncto, in quo lineae uniuntur tanquam in termino, et ipse punctus ut terminus potest alii uniri; similiter et in anima et in suis potentiis. Non sic autem est in proposito, quia illae personae uniuntur in natura quantum ad unitatem naturalem sive essentialem; sed divina natura non unitur humanae in unam essentiam, sed unitur in unitate hypostasis, in qua quidem hypostasis unitate aliae personae magis distinguuntur quam conveniant.

Et huius exemplum haberi potest in aeternis rationibus, secundum quas Deus producit (Exemplum 1.), quae quidem omnes unum sunt in essentia Dei et substantia; non tamen sequitur, quod si Deus facit aliquid secundum rationem unam, quod secundum illam et eandem faciat omnia alia9b. Unde idem sunt idea hominis et idea asini in divina substantia; cum tamen divina substantia facit asinum, non facit illum secundum ideam hominis, sed secundum ideam asini. — Aliud etiam exemplum ponit Anselmus10b in fonte, rivo et lacu (Exemplum 2.), qui sunt unius naturae, et unus fluit ab alio. Unde Nilus dicitur fons et dicitur rivus et dicitur lacus; et unus est Nilus, et una est aqua, et unius naturae, quamvis non sit unus fons et unus rivus et unus lacus. Et contingit, Nilum infistulari, ut rivus est, non ut fons neque ut lacus; et hoc est, quia, quamvis eadem aqua primo sit in

p. 124

fonte, postea in rivo, postea in lacu, diversum tamen habet modum essendi. In ideis autem est multitudo respectu connotatorum. Et haec duo in divinis personis ponuntur, videlicet pluralitas respectuum, et distinctio modorum essendi ab alio et non ab alio. — Et sic patet, quod non sequitur: divina natura assumsit, ergo quaelibet persona assumsit, propter relationem intrinsecam.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nullo modo conceditur: essentia generat, quia illud est proprium personae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia generare importat distinctionem, quae nullatenus convenit naturae; assumere vero dicit actionem et relationem, quae convenit divinae naturae secundum unum intellectum, ut prius visum est.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura non supponit pro persona; dicendum, quod verum est; et quod dicitur: natura divina assumsit humanam, iste terminus natura non reddit locutionem veram pro persona, sed magis stat ibi natura pro se ipsa. Ipsi enim naturae convenit assumtionem facere, et convenit uniri humanae naturae; et haec duo importat verbum assumendi secundum unam sui acceptionem.

SCHOLION

I. Petrus Lombardus in principio huius dist. quatuor ponit quaestiones, quarum tres priores supposita fide catholica, solvi facile possunt; de quarto autem articulo scrupulosam dicit esse etiam inter doctos quaestionem. Hinc S. Bonav. de ista quarta quaestione disputat diffuse, et quidem in quatuor primis quaestionibus huius articuli. Solutio autem propositae difficultatis sponte fluit ex determinatione differentiae, quae est inter assumere et unire. S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 1. quaest. 3.) quinque differentias inter assumtionem et unionem enumerat, quarum principales etiam a S. Bonaventura in 1. quaestione recensentur, vel in seqq. tanguntur. Insuper notandum, quod vocabulum assumtio, ut verbis Richardi a Med. (hic a. 1. q. 1.) utamur, « tripliciter potest dici, scilicet communiter et proprie et magis proprie. Primo modo accipitur pro sumere; et sic concedendum, quod tota Trinitas humanam naturam assumsit ipsi Filio, quia fecit unionem humanae naturae cum persona ipsius Filii. Secundo modo assumere accipitur pro ad se sumere; et sic concedendum, quod divina natura naturam humanam assumsit in persona Filii, in quantum per eam factum est, ut natura humana simul esset cum divina in eadem persona. Tertio modo assumere accipitur pro ad se sumere et in se sumere ut in supposito; et sic dicendum, quod divina natura non assumsit humanam naturam, nec aliqua persona nisi persona ipsius Filii ».

II. Hanc et duas seqq. quaestiones posteriores Scholastici vel una, vel duabus quaestionibus absolvunt. De his igitur tribus qq. agunt: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 4. m. 1. 2. 3. — Scot., hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2; S. III. q. 3. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 3. 4. 6. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Ægid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. 2. — Biel, de his et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

---

English Translation

ARTICLE I. On the assuming itself, on the part of the one assuming.

QUESTION I. Whether to assume is an act befitting the divine nature.

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus and asks whether to assume is an act befitting the divine nature. And that it is, it seems:

1. (Foundations.) On the authority of Augustine in the book On the Faith, to Peter1: "That nature, which always remains begotten with the Father, took up our nature without sin"; but to take up and to assume are the same: therefore the nature of God took up our nature.

2. Likewise, more expressly in the book On the Trinity2: "The form of God received the form of a servant"; but the form of God is nothing other than the nature of God: therefore if the form received a form, the nature assumed a nature.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason. This is true and proper: the divine nature is united to the human; therefore in that union3 it stands either as agent or as patient; it is established that it is not as patient: therefore it stands as agent. But in that very union to act is nothing other than to assume the nature itself: therefore it seems that to assume befits the divine nature.

4. Likewise, the divine and human natures are united in the unity4 of a person; but from that union the human nature is truly and properly said to be assumed: therefore by parity of reasoning the divine nature too ought to be called, from that union, either the one assuming or the one assumed. But it is not assumed: therefore to assume is its own.

On the contrary 1. (To the opposite.) there is the authority of the Council of Toledo, which the Master sets down in the text5: "Although the whole Trinity wrought the formation of the man taken up, yet the Son alone took up the man into the unity of person, not into the unity of nature": therefore if this befits the Son alone, it does not seem that it befits the divine nature.

2. Likewise, Anselm6: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in no way in nature: therefore what befits the divine nature befits the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but the assumption of the human nature in no way befits the Father, or the Holy Spirit: therefore in no way does it seem to belong to the divine nature.

3. Likewise, the divine nature is something most simple; but what is most simple, when it is united, is united wholly: therefore if the divine nature is united to the human and assumes it, it seems that this befits any person whatsoever.

4. Likewise, if some one thing, in which several things are united, is united to something, it is necessary as a consequence that those too be united, as is evident. For if a point, to which many lines are united, is joined to something, it is necessary that those lines7 too be united; if also a soul, to which the powers are united, is united to something, it is necessary that the powers be united to the same. Therefore if the divine persons are united in nature more than a line in a point, or the powers in the soul; if to assume befits the divine nature, it is necessary that it befit any person whatsoever; but it is established that it does not befit any person whatsoever: therefore neither the nature.

5. Likewise, this is simply false and in no way conceded: the divine essence, or nature, generates, since that act is a proper act befitting one person alone: therefore if to assume is an act befitting one person alone, namely the person of the Son; it seems that this is to be denied as false: the divine nature assumes the human.

6. Likewise, there is a rule, and it was held in the first book8, that the essence does not supposit for the person, nor conversely: therefore the divine essence or nature cannot render a statement true with respect to a person, nor with respect to anything else; this is established, because to assume befits the Son alone: therefore it seems that the aforesaid statement is simply to be denied.

CONCLUSION. The term to assume cannot befit the divine nature except insofar as it expresses only a relation toward the relation of union, which is in one person, but not in the nature itself.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that both by the word to unite and by the word to assume the union of the divine nature with the human is signified, yet differently as to the mode of signifying (To unite and to assume differ in two ways.): for the word to unite is named from union, which imports relation more than action; but the word to assume is named from assumption, which more principally imports action. Hence although it be conceded that the divine nature unites the human to itself, and is even united to it; yet in no way is it conceded that the divine nature is assumed (To be noted.). — There is also another difference: for to unite, of itself, does not express the term of a relation or of an action determinately; for someone can unite something to himself and to another. But to assume imports an intrinsic term both of the action and of the relation; for to assume9 is to take to oneself.

Since therefore the word to assume imports at once relation and action, that term, inwardly understood, can be referred to both, or to one only, namely to the relation (Distinction.). If it is referred to both; since that action is terminated at some unity, then to assume said of something signifies not only the union, but also that the union is terminated at the unity of the one assuming. And since that union is not terminated at the unity of nature, but rather at the unity of person; therefore according to that understanding to assume does not befit the divine nature (Conclusion 1.). For the divine nature did not assume the human into the unity of nature; and therefore in this way it is not conceded that the divine nature assumed it, that is, took it to itself or to its own unity. — But if that term has reference to the relation of union1b; then it is conceded that the divine nature assumed the human, that is, united it to itself (Conclusion 2.). For it united the human nature to itself, though not in itself, but in one person. — And in this way the reasons and authorities adduced for this proceed; and therefore they are to be conceded.

1. To that which is objected, that the Son alone took up the human nature; it must be said that alone2b does not there exclude the nature, which is in the person and is predicated of the person, but excludes the other two persons, namely the Father and the Holy Spirit (Solution of the opposing arguments.). — Moreover, that authority does not say simply that the Son alone took up, but that the Son alone took up into the proper unity3b (Otherwise.); and then there is no counter-instance from the nature, since, as has been said, the divine nature did not take up the human into the unity of nature, but into the unity of person4b.

2. To that which is objected, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in no way in nature; it must be said that this is twofold (Twofold sense.). In one way it can be understood thus: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in no way in nature, that is, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, having one nature, differ in no way; and this is false, because the Father and the Son differ personally and have distinct properties. — In another way it can be understood, so that the sense is: the Father and the Son do not differ in nature, that is, they do not differ by a diversity of nature; nevertheless they differ from one another in reality, and from the essence or nature itself they differ by reason or by attribution. For something is attributed to the person which is not attributed to the nature, and conversely5b. And therefore, just as it does not follow: the divine nature is in three persons: therefore the person of the Father is one in three persons; so it does not follow: the divine nature unites or assumes the human to itself: therefore the person of the Father assumes; nay, there is here the sophism of accident, or the sophistical topic of accident6b.

3. To that which is objected concerning the divine nature, that it is something most simple; it must be said that although it is most simple in form, yet it has distinction in the hypostases or in the persons7b. When therefore we understand that something is united to something, we can understand this either as to a union according to form, or as to a union according to suppositum (A distinction to be noted.). I say therefore that if the divine nature were united to something according to form, it would necessarily be wholly united, that is, in any person whatsoever, since it is most simple8b. But because this union or assumption is not as to a union in form, but as to a union in person and suppositum; therefore it does not follow that, although it be most simple, it is wholly united, in the sense in which whole is distributed over the persons. Hence that process is invalid, by which one proceeds from the simplicity of the nature to the plurality of persons.

4. To that which is objected, that the nature is that in which the persons are united: therefore it being united, the three persons are united, and it being the assumer, they assume; it must be said that it does not follow. For when it is said that to the union of that in which others are united there follows the union of those, this is true when they are united according to that and in it, in which the others are united in it (To be noted.), as is the case in a point, in which lines are united as in a terminus, and the point itself as terminus can be united to another; likewise also in the soul and in its powers. But it is not so in the matter at hand, because those persons are united in nature as to a natural or essential unity; but the divine nature is not united to the human in one essence, but is united in the unity of a hypostasis, in which unity of a hypostasis indeed the other persons are more distinguished than they agree.

And an example of this can be had in the eternal reasons, according to which God produces (Example 1.), which are all one in the essence and substance of God; yet it does not follow that if God makes something according to one reason, He makes all other things according to that same one9b. Hence the idea of man and the idea of an ass are the same in the divine substance; yet when the divine substance makes an ass, it does not make it according to the idea of man, but according to the idea of an ass. — Anselm10b also gives another example, in a spring, a stream, and a lake (Example 2.), which are of one nature, and one flows from the other. Hence the Nile is called a spring and is called a stream and is called a lake; and the Nile is one, and the water is one, and of one nature, although the spring and the stream and the lake are not one. And it happens that the Nile is channeled as it is a stream, not as a spring nor as a lake; and this is because, although the same water is first in

the spring, afterward in the stream, afterward in the lake, yet it has a different mode of being. But in the ideas there is a multitude with respect to the connotates. And these two are posited in the divine persons, namely a plurality of respects, and a distinction of the modes of being from another and not from another. — And so it is evident that it does not follow: the divine nature assumed, therefore any person whatsoever assumed, on account of the intrinsic relation.

5. To that which is objected, that in no way is it conceded: the essence generates, because that is proper to a person; it must be said that it is not similar: for to generate imports a distinction, which in no way befits the nature; but to assume expresses an action and a relation, which befits the divine nature according to one understanding, as was seen before.

6. To that which is objected, that the nature does not supposit for the person; it must be said that it is true; and as for what is said: the divine nature assumed the human, this term nature does not render the statement true with respect to the person, but rather there the nature stands for itself. For to the nature itself it belongs to perform the assumption, and it belongs to be united to the human nature; and these two the word to assume imports according to one of its acceptations.

SCHOLION

I. Peter Lombard, at the beginning of this distinction, sets down four questions, of which the three former, granting the catholic faith, can be solved easily; but concerning the fourth article he says there is a scrupulous question even among the learned. Hence St. Bonaventure disputes this fourth question at length, and indeed in the first four questions of this article. The solution of the proposed difficulty flows of itself from the determination of the difference which exists between to assume and to unite. St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 1, quaest. 3) enumerates five differences between the assumption and the union, of which the principal ones are also reviewed by St. Bonaventure in the first question, or are touched on in the following ones. Moreover it is to be noted that the word assumption, to use the words of Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 1, q. 1), "can be said in three ways, namely commonly and properly and more properly. In the first way it is taken for to take; and so it must be conceded that the whole Trinity assumed the human nature for the Son himself, because it made the union of the human nature with the person of the Son himself. In the second way to assume is taken for to take to oneself; and so it must be conceded that the divine nature assumed the human nature in the person of the Son, inasmuch as through it it was brought about that the human nature was together with the divine in the same person. In the third way to assume is taken for to take to oneself and to take into oneself as into a suppositum; and so it must be said that the divine nature did not assume the human nature, nor did any person except the person of the Son himself."

II. This and the two following questions the later Scholastics dispatch in one, or in two, questions. Concerning these three questions, then, the following treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 4, m. 1. 2. 3. — Scotus, here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 1. 2; Summa III, q. 3, a. 1. 2. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1. 3. 4. 6. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1. 2. — Durandus, here q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 1. 2. — Biel, on these and the following questions, here in one question.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 2, n. 14. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. In textu origin. (p.121, footer note 5)
    On the Faith, to Peter, ch. 2, n. 14. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. In the original text. (printed page 121, footer note 5)
  2. Libr. I. c. 7. n. 14. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. (p.122, n. 1)
    Book I, c. 7, n. 14. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. (printed page 122, note 1)
  3. Ita cod. bb et edd., alii codd. aut ergo illa unio; edd. deinde post se habet addunt natura divina. — De maiori vide verba Damasceni, hic in lit. Magistri, c. 1. allata, quae et pro seq. arg. animadvertenda sunt. (p.122, n. 2)
    Thus codex bb and the editions; other codices read aut ergo illa unio ("or therefore that union"); the editions then, after se habet, add natura divina. — On the major premise see the words of the Damascene cited here in the text of the Master, c. 1, which are also to be noted for the following argument. (printed page 122, note 2)
  4. Codd. E F H L T U Z aa bb in unitatem. In seqq. codd. non sibi constant, modo ponentes in unitate, modo in unitatem. (p.122, n. 3)
    Codices E F H L T U Z aa bb read in unitatem ("into the unity"). In what follows the codices are not consistent with themselves, now putting in unitate ("in the unity"), now in unitatem. (printed page 122, note 3)
  5. Hic c. 1. (p.122, n. 4)
    Here, c. 1. (printed page 122, note 4)
  6. Libr. de Fide Trin. c. 3. seq. ubi S. Doctor falsissimum illud arg. Roscellini: si una eademque res Deus est, et ipsa eadem est Pater et Filius: ergo si Filius incarnatur, incarnatur et Pater, refellit obiiciendo, quod Filius sit alia persona. Cfr. Monolog. c. 43. et 58. seq., et de Processione Spir. S. c. 2. et 17. (p.122, n. 5)
    On the Faith of the Trinity, c. 3 f., where the holy Doctor refutes that most false argument of Roscelin — if God is one and the same thing, that same thing is the Father and the Son: therefore if the Son is incarnate, the Father too is incarnate — by objecting that the Son is another person. Cf. Monologion c. 43 and 58 f., and On the Procession of the Holy Spirit c. 2 and 17. (printed page 122, note 5)
  7. Nonnulli codd. cum edd. subiiciunt illi. Circa finem arg. codd. K bb omittunt constat, quod, codd. E G H L N T U V X aa et edd. 1, 2 totam minorem sed constat... personae. (p.122, n. 6)
    Several codices, with the editions, subjoin illi ("to it"). Toward the end of the argument codices K bb omit constat, quod ("it is established that"); codices E G H L N T U V X aa and editions 1, 2 omit the whole minor premise sed constat... personae ("but it is established... person"). (printed page 122, note 6)
  8. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. (p.122, n. 7)
    Cf. I Sent., d. 5, a. 1, q. 1. (printed page 122, note 7)
  9. Dist. 4. q. 1. (ubi et in scholio expositum est, quid sibi velint verba locutionem reddere veram) et q. 4; d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. nec non d. 28. dub. 4, et ibid. pag. 576, nota 1. — Mox pro hoc constat Vat. cui hoc conveniat. (p.122, n. 8)
    Distinction 4, q. 1 (where also in the scholion it is set forth what the words to render the statement true mean) and q. 4; d. 5, a. 1, q. 1; and also d. 28, dub. 4, and there p. 576, note 1. — Shortly after, for hoc constat the Vatican edition reads cui hoc conveniat ("to which this befits"). (printed page 122, note 8)
  10. In Vat. deest hoc, pro quo edd. 1, 2 hic. (p.122, n. 9)
    In the Vatican edition hoc is lacking, for which editions 1, 2 read hic ("here"). (printed page 122, note 9)
  11. Vat. adiicit tantum. (p.123, n. 1)
    The Vatican edition adds tantum ("only"). (printed page 123, note 1)
  12. Codd. Z bb solus. (p.123, n. 2)
    Codices Z bb read solus ("alone"). (printed page 123, note 2)
  13. Sive, ut utamur ipsis verbis Concilii, in singularitate personae. (p.123, n. 3)
    Or, to use the very words of the Council, into the singularity of the person. (printed page 123, note 3)
  14. Easdem duas solutiones etiam a Magistro afferuntur hic in lit. c. 1. circa finem. (p.123, n. 4)
    The same two solutions are also brought forward by the Master here in the text, c. 1, toward the end. (printed page 123, note 4)
  15. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 33. q. 1. seq. et d. 34. q. 1. seq. — Mox post tribus personis codd. F K U Y subiiciunt una. Codd. L K S aa cc in fine solut. omittunt verba vel locus sophisticus accidentis. De sophismate accidentis vide Aristot., l. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.) et tom. II. pag. 870, nota 8. (p.123, n. 5)
    Cf. I Sent., d. 33, q. 1 f. and d. 34, q. 1 f. — Shortly after tribus personis codices F K U Y subjoin una ("one"). Codices L K S aa cc at the end of the solution omit the words vel locus sophisticus accidentis ("or the sophistical topic of accident"). On the sophism of accident see Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations c. 4 (c. 5), and tome II, p. 870, note 8. (printed page 123, note 5)
  16. Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1. (p.123, n. 6)
    See I Sent., d. 8, p. II, q. 1. (printed page 123, note 6)
  17. Vat. cum paucis codd. simplicissima, et deinde in fine solut. cum edd. 1, 2 ita proceditur pro quo proceditur. (p.123, n. 7)
    The Vatican edition, with a few codices, reads simplicissima, and then at the end of the solution, with editions 1, 2, ita proceditur ("thus one proceeds"), for which proceditur ("one proceeds"). (printed page 123, note 7)
  18. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. seqq. (p.123, n. 8)
    Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 2 ff. (printed page 123, note 8)
  19. In libr. de Fide Trin. c. 8. Cfr. de Process. Spir. S. c. 17. (p.123, n. 9) — Mox (p.123, n. 10): Qua similitudine Incarnatio significatur, ut loc. cit. ipse Anselm. explicat.
    In the book On the Faith of the Trinity, c. 8. Cf. On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, c. 17. (printed page 123, note 9) — And shortly after (printed page 123, note 10): By which likeness the Incarnation is signified, as in the cited place Anselm himself explains. (printed page 123, note 10)
← Dist. 5, Divisio TextusDist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2→