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Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus
p. 157

Articulus II. De qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis.

Consequenter quaeritur de qualitate et nobilitate illius unionis, ex qua consurgit diversitas istarum trium opinionum, circa quam quaeruntur tria.

Primo quaeritur de illa beatissima unione quantum ad terminum.

Secundo vero quaeritur de ipsa quantum ad modum.

Tertio vero quaeritur de eadem quantum ad gradum.

Quaestio I. Utrum unio duarum naturarum sit terminata ad unitatem personae.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad terminum; et quaeritur, utrum terminata sit ad unitatem personae, an non. Et quod sic, videtur.

(Fundamenta.) 1. Ioannis octavo1: Ego principium, qui et loquor vobis; sed ego est pronomen demonstrativum, ergo certam demonstrat personam; et qui est nomen relativum, ergo et eandem refert personam: ergo una erat persona, quae erat principium, et quae loquebatur. Sed principium erat secundum divinam, et loquebatur secundum humanam naturam: ergo unio illa ad unitatem personalem videtur esse terminata.

2. Item, solus Filius Dei est unitus humanae naturae; sed Filius Dei non distinguitur a Patre nisi in persona: ergo necesse est, illam unionem habere pro termino unitatem personalem2.

3. Item, unio est via ad aliquam unitatem, ergo si non sit illa unio frustra, ad aliquam unitatem pervenit; sed non perduxit ad unitatem naturae, quia nec divina natura potest fieri humana, nec e converso, nec ex his potest fieri tertia: ergo necesse est, quod unio illa terminetur ad unitatem personae3.

4. Item, quando aliqua duo uniuntur, quorum unum praedominatur alteri, praedominans trahit ad se illud cui praedominatur; sed Dei Filius unitus est humanae naturae, cui per omnia praedominatur: ergo traxit eam ad propriam unitatem. Sed non traxit eam ad unitatem naturalem, sicut prius4 ostensum est: ergo traxit ad unitatem personalem.

(Ad oppositum.) Sed contra: 1. Aeternum non potest esse terminus rei temporalis; sed unitas personalis Filii Dei est aeterna, unio vero fuit temporalis: ergo illa unio non poterit terminari ad unitatem personalem.

2. Item, nihil unum et idem est medium et extremum et terminus in eadem actione5; sed personae unitas in illa unione habet rationem extremi: ergo non videtur, quod habeat rationem termini.

3. Item, aequalis simplicitatis et dignitatis est persona divina, sicut et natura; sed propter dignitatem et simplicitatem illius naturae unionem illam impossibile est terminari ad unitatem naturae6: ergo impossibile est terminari ad unitatem personae.

4. Item, sicut divinae naturae respondet persona increata, sic humanae naturae respondet persona creata: ergo cum terminus unionis aequaliter se habeat ad extrema, et unio illa non possit terminari ad unitatem personae creatae7, pari ratione videtur, quod non valeat terminari ad unitatem personae increatae: ergo simpliciter est verum, quod unio illa non terminatur ad unitatem personae.

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Conclusio.

Duarum naturarum in Christo unio terminatur ad unitatem personae divinae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam est unio, (Species 4 unionis.) in qua est unius unibilis in naturam alterius conversio; et hoc est, quia unius est ad alterum repugnantia et praedominantia, sicut si gutta aquae uniatur amphorae vini. — Quaedam vero est unio, in qua est utriusque unibilis alteratio et tertiae naturae productio; et hoc, quia est ibi repugnantia et non excellens praedominatio, sicut uniuntur elementa ad constituendum corpora mixta8. — Quaedam vero est unio, in qua non est unitorum transmutatio, sed tertiae naturae constitutio; et hoc est, quia unibilia non habent repugnantiam, habent tamen mutuam dependentiam, sicut uniuntur corpus et anima ad constitutionem hominis. — Quaedam vero est unio, in qua nec est transmutatio9 nec tertiae naturae constitutio, sed unum unibilium fundatur tantum in altero. Et hoc est, quia nec est ibi repugnantia nec essentialis dependentia10, est tamen excellens praedominatio; sicut quando arbor una inseritur stipiti alterius arboris, tunc utraque arbor servat naturam propriam, et tamen una arbor substantificatur in stipite alterius arboris, ita quod unus est stipes utriusque.

(Conclusio 1.) Hoc tamen quarto unionis genere habet uniri natura divina humanae. Quia enim nulla est repugnantia inter naturam divinam et humanam, ideo nulla est ibi transmutatio, nec conversio. Quia vero non est mutua dependentia, non est tertiae naturae constitutio. Sed quia est ibi alterius, scilicet divinae naturae, praedominatio, necesse est, quod divina natura humanam naturam trahat ad unitatem; sed ad unitatem naturae non potest trahere sine transmutatione et conversione: (Conclusio 2.) necesse est ergo, quod eam trahat ad unitatem personae, et una et eadem hypostasis sit divinae naturae et humanae, ut quasi humana natura fundetur et substantificetur in divino stipite. — (Corollarium.) Et ideo multum assimilatur ista unio ei unioni, quae est per insertionem. Propter quod etiam fortassis dicit beatus Iacobus primo5b: In mansuetudine suscipite insitum Verbum. — Concedendum est igitur, quod illa unio terminatur ad unitatem personae.

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas illius personae est aeterna; dicendum, quod persona nominat ipsum suppositum in comparatione ad naturam, cui subiicitur; sic et dignitas personae attendenda est respectu naturae6b. Potest igitur persona illa comparari ad naturam divinam, et sic eius dignitas est aeterna. Potest etiam comparari ad naturam divinam pariter et humanam; et sic connotat aliquid temporale, et ratione illius connotati dicitur esse terminus unionis. Illa enim unio non fecit, ut illa persona esset vel una esset, sed fecit, quod persona, quae erat una in natura simplici, esset una in natura duplici7b.

(Notandum.) 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unitas8b personalis est extremum, ergo non est terminus; dicendum, quod secundum unam comparationem, quam habet, videlicet ad divinam naturam, est extremum; secundum autem comparationem, quam habet ad humanam naturam, est unionis terminus, quia per illam unionem factum est, ut persona Verbi esset homo. Secundum autem comparationem, quam habet ad utramque naturam, tenet rationem medii. Nihil autem impedit, unum et idem diverso respectu habere comparationem medii et extremi et termini; et per hunc quidem modum in proposito intelligendum est.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod propter summam simplicitatem divinae naturae9b non potest uniri humanae naturae in unitatem naturae; dicendum, quod non est simile: quia plures naturas in unam naturam cedere repugnat simplici naturae, sed (Haec unio non repugnat simplicitati personae.) plures naturas uniri in unitatem personae non repugnat simplici personae duplici ex causa. Una quidem est, quia, sicut plures personae possunt esse in una natura, ita quod non impediunt naturae simplicitatem; sic plures naturae in una persona10b. Alia vero ratio est, quia persona divina potest fieri suppositum humanae naturae sola relatione humanae naturae ad

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ipsam, quae quidem relatio nihil ponit novum circa personam Verbi, sed solum in natura assumta; et ideo unio naturarum unitati personae non repugnat. Non sic autem est, quando unio terminatur ad unitatem naturae, ubi non solum notatur esse respectus, sed etiam notatur convenientia fieri in forma; et hoc non potest fieri sine compositione sive transmutatione aliqua.

(Notandum.) 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod unio illa non potest terminari ad unitatem personae creatae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia divina natura non potest substantificari in persona creata. Quod enim substantificatur in aliquo minus habet de stabilitate, quam illud in quo substantificatur; et ideo, quia veriori modo est ens et per se stans natura divina quam humana, ideo humana natura potest inniti1c divinae personae, quamvis divina natura non possit inniti naturae creatae. Et ideo potest fieri unio in unitatem personae increatae, quamvis non possit fieri unio in unitatem personae creatae. — (Alia ratio.) Est et alia ratio: quia persona semper habet denominari a digniori proprietate2c; et ideo divina natura et humana in unam concurrunt hypostasim. Et cum semper necesse sit, divinam naturam excellere dignitate, non potest fieri unio in unitatem personae creatae, licet possit fieri unio in unitatem personae increatae. Et ideo patet, quod non est simile quod assumit pro simili, sed valde dissimile.

Scholion

I. In hac quaestione, quae multa continet notatu digna, plura magis explicantur, quae iam tacta sunt supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2, ubi probatur, nullatenus in Christo fuisse assumtam personam humanam. Hic vero positive docetur, terminum huius unionis esse personam divinam. — In descriptione quatuor specierum unionis recensetur secundo loco unio, quae fit in mixtionibus sive combinationibus chimicis; ubi auctor talibus utitur terminis, qui differentiam opinionis, quae est inter Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram respectu unitatis formarum substantialium, satis manifestant, si conferuntur cum verbis S. Thomae de eadem specie unionis prolatis, quae sic sonant: « Tertia natura componitur ex duabus naturis non manentibus, sicut ex quatuor elementis componitur mixtum » (III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. in corp.). De hac differentia opinionum cfr. II. Sent. d. 13. a. 2. q. 2. in scholio.

II. Ad explicandam quartam speciem unionis, quae est in Christo, et praecipue, quod ita fit ista unio, ut unum sit alterius eique proprium, quin unum mutetur in alterum; hic adhibetur similitudo quaedam sumta ex arbore, quae inserta est in stipite alterius arboris. Haec similitudo magis explicatur ab Alexandro Hal. (S. p. III. q. 7. m. 1. a. 1.) sic: « Surculus piri unitur arbori, cui inseritur, sicut pomo vel alii; servatur enim natura utriusque, scilicet piri et pomi, nec unquam fiet pirum pomum, nec e converso; nec ex illis efficitur tertium, scilicet arbor aliqua, quae nec sit pirum nec pomum; sed unum fit de altero, sive est de altero, sicut pirus de pomo, quia in insertione dominans trahit alterum ad sui unitatem, ita quod est de illo, sed non est illud » etc. « Secundum hunc modum dicendum, sicut possumus dicere — nam non sumus digni corrigiam calceamenti solvere [Luc. 3, 16; Ioan. 1, 27.], hoc est sacramentum unionis exponere — quod unio humanitatis ad Deitatem est illa, in qua unum fit, vel est de altero; et non, in qua unum, scilicet tertium, sit ex illis » [scilicet ut sit compositio rigorosa per mutationem utriusque extremi]. — Ipsa verba Alexandri iam insinuant, quod haec similitudo, licet sit apta ad quasdam proprietates huius unionis illustrandas, tamen claudicet in multis aliis, quae melius explicantur quibusdam aliis similitudinibus. Prae ceteris servit similitudo unionis animae et corporis, iam in Symbolo Athanasiano adhibita, de qua S. Thom. (Quaest. disput. de unione Verbi etc. a. 1.) dicit: « Huius unionis exemplum in rebus creatis nullum est propinquius quam unio animae rationalis ad corpus ». Tamen etiam haec analogia non parum deficit.

III. Praeter laudatum Alexandrum: Scot., in utroque Scripto III. Sent. d. 1. q. 1. 5; Quodl. q. 19. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. 3.; S. III. q. 2. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. — Petr. a Tar., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., III. Sent. d. 5. a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 2. 3. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 2. — Biel, III. Sent. d. 5. q. unica.

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English Translation

Article II. On the quality and nobility of that union.

Next there is inquiry concerning the quality and nobility of that union, from which arises the diversity of those three opinions; and concerning it three things are asked.

First, there is inquiry concerning that most blessed union with respect to its terminus.

Second, there is inquiry concerning it with respect to its mode.

Third, there is inquiry concerning the same with respect to its degree.

Question I. Whether the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the person.

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and there is inquiry concerning that union with respect to its terminus; and it is asked whether it is terminated at the unity of the person, or not. And that it is so, it seems.

(Arguments.) 1. John 81: I am the beginning, who also speak to you; but I is a demonstrative pronoun, therefore it points out a determinate person; and who is a relative noun, therefore it refers to the same person: therefore there was one person, who was the beginning, and who was speaking. But he was the beginning according to the divine nature, and was speaking according to the human nature: therefore that union seems to be terminated at the personal unity.

2. Likewise, the Son of God alone is united to the human nature; but the Son of God is not distinguished from the Father except in person: therefore it is necessary that that union have for its terminus the personal unity2.

3. Likewise, a union is a way toward some unity, therefore, if that union is not in vain, it arrives at some unity; but it did not lead to a unity of nature, since neither can the divine nature become human, nor the reverse, nor can a third be made from these: therefore it is necessary that that union be terminated at the unity of the person3.

4. Likewise, when any two things are united, one of which predominates over the other, the predominating one draws to itself that over which it predominates; but the Son of God was united to the human nature, over which he predominates in all things: therefore he drew it to his own unity. But he did not draw it to a natural unity, as was shown before4: therefore he drew it to the personal unity.

(On the contrary.) But against this: 1. The eternal cannot be the terminus of a temporal thing; but the personal unity of the Son of God is eternal, while the union was temporal: therefore that union cannot be terminated at the personal unity.

2. Likewise, no one and the same thing is the middle and the extreme and the terminus in the same action5; but the unity of the person in that union has the character of an extreme: therefore it does not seem that it has the character of a terminus.

3. Likewise, the divine person is of equal simplicity and dignity as the nature; but on account of the dignity and simplicity of that nature it is impossible for that union to be terminated at the unity of nature6: therefore it is impossible for it to be terminated at the unity of the person.

4. Likewise, just as to the divine nature there corresponds an uncreated person, so to the human nature there corresponds a created person: therefore, since the terminus of a union is related equally to the extremes, and that union cannot be terminated at the unity of a created person7, by parity of reasoning it seems that it cannot be terminated at the unity of an uncreated person: therefore it is simply true that that union is not terminated at the unity of the person.

Conclusion.

In Christ the union of the two natures is terminated at the unity of the divine person.

I respond: It must be said that there is a certain union (The four species of union.) in which there is a conversion of one of the unitable things into the nature of the other; and this is because there is in the one a repugnance to, and predominance over, the other, as if a drop of water were united to a flagon of wine. — But there is a certain union in which there is an alteration of both unitable things and the production of a third nature; and this is because there is repugnance there and not an excelling predominance, as the elements are united to constitute mixed bodies8. — But there is a certain union in which there is no transmutation of the things united, but the constitution of a third nature; and this is because the unitable things have no repugnance, yet have a mutual dependence, as body and soul are united for the constitution of man. — But there is a certain union in which there is neither transmutation9 nor the constitution of a third nature, but one of the unitable things is founded only in the other. And this is because there is there neither repugnance nor essential dependence10, yet there is an excelling predominance; as when one tree is grafted onto the stock of another tree, then each tree preserves its own nature, and yet the one tree is substantiated in the stock of the other tree, so that there is one stock of both.

(First conclusion.) Yet it is by this fourth kind of union that the divine nature has to be united to the human. For since there is no repugnance between the divine nature and the human, therefore there is there no transmutation, nor conversion. And since there is no mutual dependence, there is no constitution of a third nature. But because there is there the predominance of the other, namely of the divine nature, it is necessary that the divine nature draw the human nature to unity; but it cannot draw it to a unity of nature without transmutation and conversion: (Second conclusion.) it is necessary, therefore, that it draw it to a unity of person, and that there be one and the same hypostasis of the divine nature and the human, so that the human nature may be, as it were, founded and substantiated in the divine stock. — (Corollary.) And therefore this union is much assimilated to that union which is by grafting. On account of which also, perhaps, blessed James says, in chapter 15b: With meekness receive the ingrafted Word. — It must be conceded, therefore, that that union is terminated at the unity of the person.

(Solution of the opposing arguments.) 1. To that which is objected, that the unity of that person is eternal; it must be said that person names the supposit itself in comparison to the nature to which it is subjected; and so the dignity of the person must be regarded with respect to the nature6b. The person, therefore, can be compared to the divine nature, and thus its dignity is eternal. It can also be compared to the divine nature and the human alike; and thus it connotes something temporal, and by reason of that thing connoted it is said to be the terminus of the union. For that union did not bring it about that the person should be, or should be one, but it brought it about that the person, which was one in a simple nature, should be one in a twofold nature7b.

(Note.) 2. To that which is objected, that the personal unity8b is an extreme, therefore it is not a terminus; it must be said that according to one comparison which it has, namely to the divine nature, it is an extreme; but according to the comparison which it has to the human nature, it is the terminus of the union, because by that union it came about that the person of the Word was a man. But according to the comparison which it has to both natures, it holds the character of a middle. And nothing prevents one and the same thing from having, in a different respect, the comparison of middle and of extreme and of terminus; and it is in this way indeed that it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that on account of the supreme simplicity of the divine nature9b it cannot be united to the human nature in a unity of nature; it must be said that it is not similar: because for several natures to coalesce into one nature is repugnant to a simple nature, but (This union is not repugnant to the simplicity of the person.) for several natures to be united in the unity of a person is not repugnant to a simple person, for a twofold cause. The one indeed is, because, just as several persons can be in one nature, in such a way that they do not impede the simplicity of the nature; so several natures can be in one person10b. But the other reason is, because the divine person can become the supposit of the human nature by the relation alone of the human nature to

it, which relation indeed posits nothing new about the person of the Word, but only in the assumed nature; and therefore the union of the natures is not repugnant to the unity of the person. But it is not so when a union is terminated at a unity of nature, where there is noted not only a relation, but there is noted also that a fitting-together comes to be in the form; and this cannot come to be without some composition or transmutation.

(Note.) 4. To that which is objected, that that union cannot be terminated at the unity of a created person; it must be said that it is not similar, because the divine nature cannot be substantiated in a created person. For what is substantiated in something has less of stability than that in which it is substantiated; and therefore, since the divine nature is being and self-subsistent in a truer mode than the human, therefore the human nature can rest upon1c the divine person, although the divine nature cannot rest upon a created nature. And therefore a union into the unity of an uncreated person can come to be, although a union into the unity of a created person cannot come to be. — (Another reason.) There is also another reason: because a person always has to be denominated from the worthier property2c; and therefore the divine nature and the human concur into one hypostasis. And since it is always necessary that the divine nature excel in dignity, a union into the unity of a created person cannot come to be, although a union into the unity of an uncreated person can come to be. And therefore it is clear that what he takes for something similar is not similar, but very dissimilar.

Scholion

I. In this question, which contains many things worthy of note, several matters are more fully explained which have already been touched upon above in d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, where it is proved that in no way was a human person assumed in Christ. Here, however, it is positively taught that the terminus of this union is the divine person. — In the description of the four species of union there is reckoned in the second place the union which comes about in mixtures or chemical combinations; where the author uses such terms as sufficiently manifest the difference of opinion which exists between Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure regarding the unity of substantial forms, if they are compared with the words of St. Thomas uttered concerning the same species of union, which run thus: "A third nature is composed of two natures not remaining, as a mixture is composed of four elements" (III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, in the body). Concerning this difference of opinions cf. II. Sent. d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, in the scholion.

II. To explain the fourth species of union, which is in Christ, and especially that this union comes about in such a way that one is the other's and proper to it, without one being changed into the other; here there is employed a certain likeness taken from a tree which is grafted onto the stock of another tree. This likeness is more fully explained by Alexander of Hales (S. p. III. q. 7, m. 1, a. 1) thus: "A shoot of a pear is united to the tree onto which it is grafted, as to an apple or another; for the nature of each is preserved, namely of the pear and of the apple, nor will the pear ever become an apple, nor the reverse; nor is a third made from them, namely some tree which is neither pear nor apple; but one becomes of the other, or is of the other, as the pear is of the apple, because in grafting the dominant draws the other to its own unity, so that it is of it, but is not it" etc. "According to this mode it must be said, as we can say — for we are not worthy to loose the latchet of the sandal [Luke 3:16; John 1:27], that is, to expound the sacrament of the union — that the union of humanity to Deity is that in which one becomes, or is, of the other; and not that in which one, namely a third, is from them" [namely, so that there should be a rigorous composition through a change of both extremes]. — The very words of Alexander already intimate that this likeness, although it is apt for illustrating certain properties of this union, nevertheless limps in many other respects, which are better explained by certain other likenesses. Before the rest the likeness of the union of soul and body serves, already employed in the Athanasian Creed, concerning which St. Thomas (Disputed Questions on the Union of the Word, a. 1) says: "No example of this union in created things is nearer than the union of the rational soul to the body." Yet even this analogy falls not a little short.

III. Besides the cited Alexander: Scotus, in both Scripta on III. Sent. d. 1, q. 1, 5; Quodl. q. 19. — St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, 3; S. III. q. 2, a. 1, 2. — B. Albert, here a. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Middleton, III. Sent. d. 5, a. 4, q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, 3. — Durandus, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, III. Sent. d. 5, q. 2. — Biel, III. Sent. d. 5, q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 25. Cfr. August., in Ioan. Evang. tr. 38. n. 11.
    Verse 25. Cf. Augustine, On the Gospel of John, tract 38, n. 11.
  2. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 2. et d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. — In maiori edd. omittunt solus.
    Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 2, and d. 5, a. 1, q. 1. — In the major premise the editions omit solus.
  3. De hoc arg. cfr. Boeth., de Una Persona et duabus naturis, c. 6. seq.
    On this argument cf. Boethius, On the One Person and the Two Natures, c. 6 and following.
  4. Dist. 5. a. 1. q. 1. et q. 2. ad 4. — De maiori cfr. Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 7. seqq. (c. 2.), ubi docetur, corpus compositum moveri secundum elementum praedominans.
    Distinction 5, a. 1, q. 1, and q. 2, ad 4. — On the major premise cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens and the Earth, I, text 7 and following (c. 2), where it is taught that a composite body is moved according to the predominating element.
  5. Codd. G U unione. Cfr. d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. in corp.
    Codices G and U read unione ("union"). Cf. d. 5, a. 1, q. 1, in the body.
  6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 1. et p. II. q. 2.
    Cf. I. Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 1, and p. II, q. 2.
  7. Vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.
    See above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.
  8. Hanc duplicem unionem Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 88. seqq. (c. 10.) describit sic: Activorum autem et passivorum quaecumque sunt facile divisibilia, multa quidem paucis et magna parvis composita, non faciunt mixtionem, sed augmentationem dominantis; mutatur enim alterum in dominans. Ideo gutta vini decem millibus congiis aquae non miscetur; solvitur enim forma et mutatur in universam aquam. Quando autem potentiis adaequantur quodammodo, tunc mutatur quidem utrumque in dominans ex sui ipsius natura, non generatur autem alterum, sed medium et commune... Mixtio autem est miscibilium alteratorum unio. — Paulo superius post est ibi repugnantia codd. F G X adiungunt et praedominantia, edd. 4, 2 et praedominatio, quae edd. et subinde pro et non excellens substituunt sed non excellens.
    Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, I, text 88 and following (c. 10), describes this twofold union thus: "But of active and passive things, whatever are easily divisible, when many are composed with few and great with small, do not make a mixture, but an increase of the dominant; for the one is changed into the dominant. Therefore a drop of wine is not mixed with ten thousand congii of water; for its form is dissolved and changed into the water as a whole. But when they are made equal in their powers in some way, then each is indeed changed into the dominant from its own nature, but the one is not generated, rather a middle and common thing... A mixture, however, is the union of mixable things that have been altered." — A little above, after est ibi repugnantia, codices F G X add et praedominantia, editions 4 and 2 et praedominatio; and these editions thereupon, in place of et non excellens, substitute sed non excellens.
  9. Cod. U addit unitorum.
    Codex U adds unitorum ("of the things united").
  10. Ex iis quae praecedunt, supple cum Vat. mutua. De his modis unionis vide supra pag. 8, nota 3, et Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul., regul. 100.
    From what precedes, supply with the Vatican edition mutua ("mutual"). On these modes of union see above, p. 8, note 3, and Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 100.
  11. Vers. 21. — Paulo superius pro et una codd. Z bb ut una.
    Verse 21. — A little above, in place of et una, codices Z and bb read ut una.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. — Paulo superius post dicendum, quod edd. cum paucis codd. inserunt sicut; et subinde post et sic eius dignitas Vat. cum cod. cc supplet et unitas, de qua revera agit obiectio.
    Cf. above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. — A little above, after dicendum, quod, the editions with a few codices insert sicut; and thereupon, after et sic eius dignitas, the Vatican edition with codex cc supplies et unitas ("and the unity"), which the objection really treats of.
  13. Vide supra a. 1. q. 2.
    See above, a. 1, q. 2.
  14. Codd. I L aa cc unio.
    Codices I, L, aa, cc read unio ("union").
  15. Hic vel supple cum Vat. ipsa, vel lege cum edd. 4, 2 divina natura pro divinae naturae. Mox edd. bis simplicitati pro simplici.
    Here either supply with the Vatican edition ipsa ("itself"), or read with editions 4 and 2 divina natura for divinae naturae. Presently the editions twice read simplicitati for simplici.
  16. De quo vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 1; de propos. seq. cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
    On which see I. Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 1; on the following proposition cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
  17. Edd. nec non aliqui codd. hic et paulo post verbum inniti infeliciter transformarunt in uniri.
    The editions, as also some codices, here and a little after unhappily transformed the word inniti ("rest upon") into uniri ("be united").
  18. Quod probatum est supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.
    Which was proved above, d. 5, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1.
← Dist. 6, Art. 1, Q. 3Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 2→