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Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 124

QUAESTIO II. Utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum assumere conveniat divinae personae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. (Fundamenta.) Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum2: « Deus unigenitus, dum conciperetur, veritatem carnis accepit de Virgine » ; sed Deus unigenitus non est nisi persona: ergo etc.

2. Item, ratione videtur: quia assumtio nihil plus dicit nisi actionem respectu creaturae et relationem3; et utrumque natum est convenire divinae personae: ergo etc.

3. Item, assumtio est ad aliquam unionem4; sed unio illa non terminatur ad naturam, sed ad personam, quia divinitas et humanitas eiusdem naturae esse non possunt: ergo videtur, quod ipsa assumtio vere et proprie conveniat ipsi personae.

4. Item, assumtio est ad redemptionem et satisfactionem pro humano genere; sed eadem persona competit esse, quae debet satisfacere et debitum solvere, et quae potest5: ergo videtur, quod assumtio vere competat ipsi personae.

5. Item, cui competit missio et incarnatio, eidem competit assumtio; sed missio, vel incarnatio competit personae6: ergo et assumtio.

Sed contra: 1. (Ad oppositum.) Ubicumque est assumtio, ibi1 est unio ad alterum et communicatio; sed persona dicit quid distinctum et incommunicabile7: ergo intellectus personae repugnat unioni et assumtioni: ergo non potest ei vere attribui.

2. Item, « persona est individua substantia rationalis naturae8 » ; sed individuum dicitur non so-

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lum quod est indivisum in se, sed quod est divisum ab aliis: ergo si assumtio dicit unionem et coniunctionem, videtur, quod nullo modo personae conveniat.

3. Item, omnis unio naturalis ordinatur ad illud quod est ita unum in se, quod non est alteri unibile, alioquin non esset status; illud autem unum est individuum rationalis naturae, quod quidem est persona et habet summam completionem in genere creaturae: si ergo ad dignitatem personae spectat, quod nulli alii uniatur, et divina persona habet quidquid dignitatis est; videtur, quod nihil possit sibi copulari, et ita nullam naturam assumere.

4. Item, nihil temporale potest fieri aeternum; sed unitas creaturae debita est temporalis, unitas divinae personae est aeterna: ergo divina persona non potest creaturam aliquam ad unitatem personae suae accipere. Sed hoc est assumere: ergo assumtio divinae personae non potest convenire.

CONCLUSIO.

Assumtio in incarnatione competit personae divinae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut dictum est1b (Conclusio.), assumtio dicit actionem et relationem et terminum utriusque; et ratione horum omnium potest divinae personae convenire. — Nam divinae personae competit (Probatio.) esse principium activum et rationalis naturae suppositum; et utrumque spectat ad eius dignitatem et nobilitatem. Et ideo divina persona potest humanam naturam fabricare tanquam principium2b effectivum et stabilire tanquam proprium suppositum, ita quod eiusdem naturae erit causale principium et suppositum personale; et ita per hoc se habet in ratione (Solutio.) principii et in ratione medii et in ratione termini. Ratione primi vel principii competit ei actio; ratione medii relatio; ratione termini3b competit utriusque terminatio. Divina enim persona fecit, ut plures naturae unirentur in se. — Et ideo concedendum est, quod ipsa assumtio competit divinae personae. Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

Ad argumenta:

1. (Solutio oppositorum.) Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod ubi est assumtio, ibi est communicatio et unio; dicendum, quod (Communicabile dicitur tripliciter.) communicabile potest dici tripliciter: aut per unius constitutionem, aut per praedicationem, aut per proprietatum et idiomatum communicationem. Cum ergo dicitur: ubi est assumtio, ibi est communicatio; dicendum, quod verum est tertio modo, sed non primo modo, vel secundo. Cum vero dicitur, quod persona dicit quid (De persona.) incommunicabile et distinctum; dicendum, quod hoc dicitur per oppositionem ad primum, vel secundum; quia nec venit ad tertii constitutionem, nec habet universalitatis praedicationem4b. Et sic patet, quod persona cum assumtione non habet oppositionem.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod persona est individua substantia; idem respondendum est, quod illud dicitur per privationem compositionis et praedicationis communis, non per privationem unionis; nisi forte dicatur unio respectu dignioris, sicut inferius5b melius apparebit. Nullum autem horum est in proposito reperire.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis unio ordinatur ad unum, quod careat unibilitate; dicendum, quod verum est, loquendo de unione in eodem genere, videlicet de unione, quae est per compositionem. Sic autem non est in proposito; et ideo in nullo cogunt rationes illae.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod temporale non potest fieri aeternale; dicendum, quod verum est (Notandum.) per identitatem essentiae; nihil tamen impedit hoc esse virtute unionis gratuitae. Sicut enim temporale potest a principio aeterno causari temporaliter, sic etiam inniti6b potest supposito aeterno, ut, sicut Deus est principium cuiuslibet creaturae, sic Dei Filius sit suppositum rationalis naturae. Et pro tanto dicitur illa unitas ad unitatem personae terminari, non quia personae Filii Dei adveniat nova unitas, sed quia ex assumtione humanae fit, ut duarum naturarum sit una hypostasis atque persona7b.

English Translation
p. 124

QUESTION II. Whether to assume befits the divine person.

Secondly it is asked, whether to assume befits the divine person. And that it does, it seems.

1. (Fundamenta.) Augustine, On the Faith, to Peter2: « God the Only-begotten, while He was conceived, received the truth of flesh from the Virgin » ; but God the Only-begotten is nothing other than a person: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, by reason it seems: for assumption says nothing more than an action with respect to a creature and a relation3; and each of these is naturally suited to befit the divine person: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, assumption is for some union4; but that union does not terminate at a nature, but at a person, since divinity and humanity cannot be of the same nature: therefore it seems that assumption itself truly and properly befits the person itself.

4. Likewise, assumption is for the redemption and satisfaction on behalf of the human race; but it befits the same person to be the one who ought to make satisfaction and pay the debt, and who is able to5: therefore it seems that assumption truly befits the person itself.

5. Likewise, to whom mission and incarnation befit, to that same one assumption befits; but mission, or incarnation, befits the person6: therefore assumption also.

On the contrary: 1. (Ad oppositum.) Wherever there is assumption, there1 is a union to another and a communication; but a person says something distinct and incommunicable7: therefore the notion of a person is repugnant to union and assumption: therefore it cannot truly be attributed to it.

2. Likewise, « a person is an individual substance of a rational nature8 » ; but "individual" is said not only of what is undivided in itself, but of what is divided

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from others: therefore if assumption says union and conjunction, it seems that it in no way befits a person.

3. Likewise, every natural union is ordered to that which is so one in itself that it is not unitable to another, otherwise there would be no stopping-point; but that one thing is the individual of a rational nature, which indeed is a person and has the highest completion in the genus of creature: if then it pertains to the dignity of a person that it be united to no other, and the divine person has whatever of dignity there is; it seems that nothing can be coupled to it, and so that it assumes no nature.

4. Likewise, nothing temporal can become eternal; but the unity owed to a creature is temporal, the unity of the divine person is eternal: therefore the divine person cannot take any creature to the unity of its person. But this is to assume: therefore assumption cannot befit the divine person.

CONCLUSION.

Assumption in the incarnation befits the divine person.

I respond: It must be said that, as has been said1b (Conclusio.), assumption says an action and a relation and the term of each; and by reason of all these it can befit the divine person. — For it befits the divine person (Probatio.) to be an active principle and the supposit of a rational nature; and each of these pertains to its dignity and nobility. And therefore the divine person can fashion the human nature as an effective principle2b and establish it as its own supposit, in such a way that it will be the causal principle and the personal supposit of the same nature; and so through this it stands in the account of (Solutio.) a principle and in the account of a medium and in the account of a term. By reason of the first, or principle, action befits it; by reason of the medium, relation; by reason of the term3b the termination of each befits it. For the divine person brought it about that several natures should be united in itself. — And therefore it must be conceded that assumption itself befits the divine person. Hence the reasons adduced for this are to be conceded.

To the arguments:

1. (Solutio oppositorum.) To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that where there is assumption, there is communication and union; it must be said that (Communicabile dicitur tripliciter.) "communicable" can be said in three ways: either by the constitution of one thing, or by predication, or by the communication of properties and idioms. When therefore it is said: where there is assumption, there is communication; it must be said that it is true in the third way, but not in the first way, or the second. But when it is said that a person says something (De persona.) incommunicable and distinct; it must be said that this is said by opposition to the first, or the second; for it neither comes to the constitution of a third thing, nor has the predication of universality4b. And so it is clear that a person has no opposition to assumption.

2. To that which is objected, that a person is an individual substance; the same response must be made, that it is said by privation of composition and of common predication, not by privation of union; unless perhaps a union with respect to something worthier be spoken of, as will appear better below5b. But none of these is to be found in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is objected, that every union is ordered to one thing which lacks unitability; it must be said that it is true, speaking of a union in the same genus, namely of the union which is by composition. But it is not so in the matter at hand; and therefore those reasons compel in nothing.

4. To that which is objected, that the temporal cannot become eternal; it must be said that it is true (Notandum.) by identity of essence; yet nothing prevents this from being by virtue of a gratuitous union. For just as the temporal can be caused temporally by an eternal principle, so also it can rest6b upon an eternal supposit, so that, just as God is the principle of every creature, so the Son of God is the supposit of a rational nature. And to this extent that unity is said to be terminated at the unity of the person, not because a new unity accrues to the person of the Son of God, but because from the assumption of the human [nature] it comes about that of the two natures there is one hypostasis and person7b.

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cod. Y pro aliqua persona. Subinde pro ibi edd. in. (p.124, footer note 1)
    Codex Y reads aliqua persona ("some person"). Thereafter, for ibi ("there") the editions read in. (printed page 124, footer note 1)
  2. Cap. 2. n. 17. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. (p.124, note 2)
    Ch. 2, n. 17. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. (printed page 124, note 2)
  3. Ut habetur in corp. quaest. praeced. — Deinde pro et utrumque codd. K Z bb sed utrumque. (p.124, note 3)
    As is held in the body of the preceding question. — Then, for et utrumque ("and each") codices K Z bb read sed utrumque ("but each"). (printed page 124, note 3)
  4. Cfr. quaest. praeced. — Minor exponitur infra d. 6. a. 2. q. 1. (p.124, note 4)
    Cf. the preceding question. — The minor premise is set forth below, d. 6, a. 2, q. 1. (printed page 124, note 4)
  5. Vel clarius verbis S. Thomae (hic q. I. a. 3. arg. ult.): « Ad hoc, quod fiat redemptio humani generis, oportet, quod sit agens satisfactionem unus, Deus, qui potest, et homo, qui debet » , scil. persona divina in natura humana. Cfr. infra d. 20. q. 2. seq. — Pro sed eadem persona competit esse, Vat. sed eandem personam competit esse unitam. Mox cod. U voci assumtio adiicit naturae. (p.124, note 5)
    Or more clearly in the words of St. Thomas (here q. I, a. 3, last argument): « For the redemption of the human race to be effected, it is necessary that there be one agent making satisfaction, God, who is able, and man, who owes » , namely the divine person in the human nature. Cf. below, d. 20, q. 2 f. — For sed eadem persona competit esse ("but it befits the same person to be"), the Vatican edition reads sed eandem personam competit esse unitam ("but it befits the same person to be united"). Shortly after, codex U adds naturae ("of nature") to the word assumtio. (printed page 124, note 5)
  6. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 15. p. 1. a. I. seqq. — Post personae Vat. subiungit Filii. (p.124, note 6)
    Cf. I Sent., d. 15, p. 1, a. I, ff. — After personae ("of the person") the Vatican edition subjoins Filii ("of the Son"). (printed page 124, note 6)
  7. De definitione deque proprietatibus personae in hoc et seqq. argg. occurrentibus vide plurimos auctoris locos infra a. 2. q. 2. in scholio. — In maiori post assumtio codd. K Z addunt et incarnatio. In fine arg. pro vere cod. X recte. (p.124, note 7)
    On the definition and the properties of a person occurring in this and the following arguments, see the many passages of the author below, a. 2, q. 2, in the scholion. — In the major premise, after assumtio codices K Z add et incarnatio ("and incarnation"). At the end of the argument, for vere ("truly") codex X reads recte ("rightly"). (printed page 124, note 7)
  8. Boeth., de Una Persona et duabus naturis Christi, c. 3. (p.124, note 8)
    Boethius, On the One Person and the Two Natures of Christ, c. 3. (printed page 124, note 8)
  9. Vide quaest. praeced. (p.125, note 1)
    See the preceding question. (printed page 125, note 1)
  10. Cod. K voci principium praemittit eius. (p.125, note 2)
    Codex K prefixes eius ("its") to the word principium. (printed page 125, note 2)
  11. Pro termini codd. A E G L N T V X aa et edd. 1, 2 tertii. Paulo ante edd. omittunt primi vel; cod. Z omittit vel. (p.125, note 3)
    For termini ("of the term") codices A E G L N T V X aa and editions 1, 2 read tertii ("of the third"). A little before, the editions omit primi vel ("of the first, or"); codex Z omits vel ("or"). (printed page 125, note 3)
  12. Ut humanitas, quae praedicatur e. gr. de Petro simul et de Paulo. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 25. a. 2. q. 1. — Subinde voci persona edd. praefigunt illa. (p.125, note 4)
    As humanity, which is predicated for example of Peter and at the same time of Paul. Cf. I Sent., d. 25, a. 2, q. 1. — Thereafter the editions prefix illa ("that") to the word persona. (printed page 125, note 4)
  13. Art. 2. q. 2. ad 1. et q. 3. — Paulo superius post compositionis cod. K adiungit constitutionis. (p.125, note 5)
    Article 2, q. 2, ad 1, and q. 3. — A little above, after compositionis ("of composition") codex K adds constitutionis ("of constitution"). (printed page 125, note 5)
  14. Pro inniti codd. A H (K a secunda manu) M O Z bb uniri; edd. recurrunt infra q. 5. ad 2. Pro causari codd. K Z bb creari. (p.125, note 6)
    For inniti ("to rest upon") codices A H (K by a second hand) M O Z bb read uniri ("to be united"); the editions recur below, q. 5, ad 2. For causari ("to be caused") codices K Z bb read creari ("to be created"). (printed page 125, note 6)
  15. Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest. (p.125, note 7)
    See the scholion to the preceding question. (printed page 125, note 7)
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