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Dist. 5, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 5

Textus Latinus
p. 125

QUAESTIO III. Utrum assumere conveniat personae ratione naturae, an e converso.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum assumere personae conveniat ratione naturae, an e converso. Et quod conveniat ratione naturae, videtur.

(Argg. pro 1. parte.) 1. Ratione eius competit personae opus recreationis, cui competit opus creationis8b; sed opus creationis competit personae ratione naturae: ergo et

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opus recreationis; sed assumtio est opus recreationis: ergo etc.

2. Item, assumtio est operatio virtuosa; sed omnis operatio virtuosa competit supposito ratione naturae sive naturalis potentiae1: ergo etc.

3. Item, quod sic competit uni personae, quod competit alteri personae, hoc competit ratione naturae, non ratione personae: ergo cum assumtio sic competat personae Filii, quod possit competere alii personae, sicut supra2 dictum fuit; videtur, quod si conveniat Filio, conveniat ratione naturae.

4. Item, assumtio in extremis ponit diversitatem; sed in assumtione carnis a Deo est diversitas naturarum, non personarum: ergo videtur, quod assumtio primo conveniat naturae et per naturam personae.

Sed contra: (Argg. pro 2. parte.) 1. Assumtio dicit relationem3; sed relatio non competit personae ratione naturae, sed magis ratione sui: ergo et assumere.

2. Item, assumtio dicit ordinationem ad unitatem aliquam; sed constat, quod non ad unitatem naturae, sed personae: ergo etc.

3. Item, si convenit personae ratione naturae; et omne tale dicitur de tribus: ergo et assumere conveniret4 tribus personis. Sed hoc est falsum: ergo et primum.

4. Item, si assumere convenit personae ratione naturae, ergo convenit naturae per se; et quod convenit per se convenit universaliter5, ergo pro quolibet suo supposito: sequeretur ergo idem quod prius, scilicet quod cuilibet personae conveniret assumtio.

(Conclusio.) Assumere, quatenus dicit actionem, competit personae divinae ratione naturae; quatenus dicit terminationem, competit naturae ratione personae; quatenus dicit relationem, communiter competit utrique.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad hanc quaestionem satis patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. Cum enim tria sint de intellectu huius vocabuli, quod est assumere (Tria in assumtione.), videlicet actio et relatio et terminatio; primum competit personae ratione naturae, ultimum competit naturae ratione personae, medium vero communiter convenit utrique (Conclusio.). — Ipsa namque assumtionis actio6 personae convenit ratione naturae, quia persona agit virtute naturae, unde illa virtus et operatio competit cuilibet personae (Explicatur.). Terminus vero assumtionis respicit ipsam proprie et per se; unde ad unitatem personalem et unius solius personae terminatur ipsa assumtionis actio et unionis relatio. Sed medium, videlicet relatio, communiter convenit utrique: et divina natura et divina persona unitur humanae7, et humana natura unita est divinae naturae et divinae personae, quia ad utramque habet ordinem et distinctionem formalem et gratuitam coniunctionem, quae implicantur in illa relatione.

Et secundum hoc patet responsio ad utramque partem (Ad argg.). Rationes enim verum concludunt secundum diversas vias nec habent in se aliquam repugnantiam. Et hoc melius patet pertractanti singulas8.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether assuming befits the person by reason of the nature, or conversely.

Thirdly it is asked whether assuming befits the person by reason of the nature, or conversely. And that it befits [the person] by reason of the nature is seen [as follows].

(Arguments for the first part.) 1. By reason of it [the nature] the work of re-creation befits the person, to which [person] the work of creation befits8b; but the work of creation befits the person by reason of the nature: therefore also

the work of re-creation; but assumption is a work of re-creation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, assumption is a virtuous operation; but every virtuous operation befits the supposit by reason of the nature, or of the natural power1: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that which befits one person in such a way that it befits another person, this befits [it] by reason of the nature, not by reason of the person: therefore, since assumption befits the person of the Son in such a way that it could befit another person, as was said above2, it is seen that, if it befits the Son, it befits [him] by reason of the nature.

4. Likewise, assumption posits a diversity in the extremes; but in the assumption of the flesh by God there is a diversity of natures, not of persons: therefore it is seen that assumption first befits the nature, and through the nature the person.

On the contrary: (Arguments for the second part.) 1. Assumption signifies a relation3; but a relation does not befit the person by reason of the nature, but rather by reason of itself: therefore also assuming [does not].

2. Likewise, assumption signifies an ordering to some unity; but it is established that [this is] not to the unity of the nature, but of the person: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if it befits the person by reason of the nature; and everything of this kind is said of the three: therefore assuming too would befit4 the three persons. But this is false: therefore also the first [is false].

4. Likewise, if assuming befits the person by reason of the nature, then it befits the nature in itself; and what befits [a thing] in itself befits [it] universally5, therefore for any of its supposits: there would follow therefore the same thing as before, namely that assumption would befit any person whatever.

(Conclusion.) Assuming, insofar as it signifies an action, befits the divine person by reason of the nature; insofar as it signifies a termination, befits the nature by reason of the person; insofar as it signifies a relation, befits both in common.

I respond: It must be said that to this question the response is sufficiently clear from the things that have been said. For since there are three [elements] belonging to the understanding of this word, which is "to assume" (The three [elements] in assumption.), namely action and relation and termination; the first befits the person by reason of the nature, the last befits the nature by reason of the person, but the middle one belongs in common to both (Conclusion.). — For the very action of assuming6 befits the person by reason of the nature, because the person acts by the power of the nature, whence that power and operation befits any person whatever (It is explained.). But the term of the assumption regards [the person] itself properly and in itself; whence to the personal unity, and of one sole person, is the very action of assuming and the relation of union terminated. But the middle [element], namely the relation, belongs in common to both: both the divine nature and the divine person is united to the human7, and the human nature is united to the divine nature and to the divine person, because to both it has an order and a formal distinction and a gracious conjunction, which are implied in that relation.

And according to this the response to both parts is clear (To the arguments.). For the reasons conclude truly according to diverse ways, nor have they in themselves any contradiction. And this is better clear to one who treats them singly8.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. supra pag. 28, nota 2. — De minori cfr. I. Sent. d. 36. a. 1. q. 2. — Pro cui competit codd. K bb accuratius ratione cuius. Edd., duabus prioribus huius propos. vocibus, scil. Ratione eius, interpunctione a se seiunctis, et voce ratione cum praeced. videtur coniuncta, hanc alteram propos. sic inchoant: Ei [pro eius] personae competit etc. Paulo superius pro an e converso cod. F an ratione sui.
    Cf. above, p. 28, note 2. — On the minor [premise] cf. I Sent., d. 36, a. 1, q. 2. — For cui competit ("to which it befits") codices K bb [read] more accurately ratione cuius ("by reason of which"). The editions, with the first two words of this proposition, namely Ratione eius ("by reason of it"), separated off by punctuation, and the word ratione joined with the preceding videtur, begin this other proposition thus: Ei [for eius] personae competit etc. ("to the person it befits"). A little above, for an e converso ("or conversely") codex F [reads] an ratione sui ("or by reason of itself").
  2. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 64. (c. 4.), ubi Philosophus vult, quod melius est «non dicere animam cogitare, sed hominem anima» (i. e. per animam).
    Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 64 (c. 4), where the Philosopher holds that it is better "not to say that the soul thinks, but [that] the man [thinks] by the soul" (i.e. by means of the soul).
  3. Dist. 1. a. 1. q. 4. — Pro quod possit competere cod. Z quod non possit competere.
    Distinction 1, article 1, question 4. — For quod possit competere ("that it could befit") codex Z [reads] quod non possit competere ("that it could not befit").
  4. Cfr. supra q. 1, ubi etiam videsis de maiori arg. seq., in qua Vat. pro ordinationem exhibet deordinationem.
    Cf. above, question 1, where you may also see concerning the major [premise] of the following argument, in which the Vatican [edition], for ordinationem ("ordering"), presents deordinationem ("disordering").
  5. Codd. L T U diceretur, cod. X communicaretur.
    Codices L T U [read] diceretur ("it would be said"), codex X communicaretur ("it would be communicated").
  6. Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. — Paulo inferius codd. et edd. 1, 2 omittunt scilicet.
    Cf. Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 4. — A little below, the codices and editions 1, 2 omit scilicet ("namely").
  7. Codd. L (N a prima manu) S T U V aa cc ratio. Mox post unde codd. K Z subiungunt et.
    Codices L (N by the first hand) S T U V aa cc [read] ratio ("reason"). Shortly after, following unde ("whence"), codices K Z append et ("and").
  8. Scil. naturae. — Paulo ante pro et divina natura Vat. Nam divina natura. Paulo inferius pro ordinem codd. G aa ordinationem.
    Namely, of the nature. — A little before, for et divina natura ("and the divine nature") the Vatican [edition reads] Nam divina natura ("For the divine nature"). A little below, for ordinem ("order") codices G aa [read] ordinationem ("ordering").
  9. Vide scholion ad 1. huius art. quaest.
    See the scholion to the first question of this article. ---
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