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Dist. 6, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus
p. 159

Quaestio II. Utrum modus unionis duarum naturarum sit singularis, an reperiatur aliquis unionis modus ei consimilis.

Secundo quaeritur de illa unione quantum ad modum; et est quaestio, utrum modus illius unionis sit singularis, an reperiatur aliquis unionis modus ei consimilis. Et quod sit singularis, videtur:

1. (Fundamenta.) Auctoritate ipsius Algazelis in sua Metaphysica3, ubi ponit modos unius. Ibi enim dividit unum simpliciter et unum secundum quid. Unum simp. 160pliciter dividit in tres differentias: primo in unum, (Modi unius.) in quo non est multitudo nec actu nec potentia, ut punctus et unitas; secundo in unum, in quo non est multitudo actu, quamvis sit potentia, sicut est linea; tertio in unum, in quo est multitudo actu et potentia, ut lectus et membrum, in quibus sunt actu multa. Unum autem secundum quid in quinque differentias habet dividi, videlicet: in unum genere, ut est homo et bos; in unum specie, ut Socrates et Plato; in unum accidente, ut est nix et cerussa; in unum proportione, ut sunt auriga et nauta; in unum subiecto, sicut dulce et album in aliqua substantia una. Sed nullo istorum modorum, ut patet discurrenti per singula, est illa unio, quae est in Christo: ergo videtur, quod modus illius unionis excedat omnes unionis modos.

2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Aristotelis, qui dividit unum in Prima Philosophia1b (Modi unius sec. Aristot.) in unum per se et unum per accidens. Unum per accidens dicitur sicut duo accidentia in uno subiecto. Unum autem per se dicitur decem modis, scilicet continuatione, quorum terminus unus; unum specie vel forma, ut Socrates et Plato in homine; unum genere, ut homo et bos in animali; unum definitione, ut illa quae habent eandem definitionem, vel quorum unum est definitio alterius; unum indivisibilitate, ut punctus; unum numero, ut singulare; unum simplicitate vel essentia, ut universale2b; unum totalitate vel perfectione, ut circulus; unum proportione, ut auriga et nauta; unum materia, ut omnia corporalia. Sed nullo istorum modorum est unio in persona in Christo: ergo videtur, quod sit unio modo singulari et proprio.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate Bernardi ad Eugenium quinto3b, (Modi unius sec. Bernard.) ubi distinguit unum novem modis, scilicet ubi ait sic: « Est unitas collectiva, ut videlicet multi lapides faciunt unum acervum; est unitas constitutiva, ut cum multae partes unumquodque totum constituunt; est unitas coniugativa, qua fit, ut duo iam non duo, sed una caro sint4b; est unitas nativa, qua anima et carne unus homo nascitur; est unitas potestativa, qua homo virtutis non instabilis, non dissimilis, sed unus sibimet nititur inveniri; est unitas consentanea, cum per caritatem multorum hominum est cor unum et anima una5b; est unitas votiva, cum anima omnibus votis Deo adhaerens unus spiritus est; est unitas dignativa, qua limus noster a Dei Verbo in unam assumtus est personam ». Est et postrema unitas Trinitatis, de qua ipse Bernardus subdit6b: « Verum et quid sunt ad illud unum »? ergo si unitas ista, qua Dei Verbum unitum est carni speciali differentia, dicitur unitas dignativa; videtur ergo, quod unio praedicta singularem modum habeat.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur auctoritate prophetici verbi; dicitur enim Ieremiae trigesimo primo7b: Novum faciet Dominus super terram, hoc, inquam, dicitur de illa unione creata; sed non esset novum, si simile haberet: videtur ergo, quod inter omnes uniones sit unio una singularis.

Sed contra: 1. (Ad oppositum.) Ad Ephesios quinto8b: Erunt duo in carne una; Sacramentum hoc magnum est; ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia; Glossa: « Quia Christus, qui Deus erat apud Patrem, per quem et facti sumus, factus est per carnem particeps noster, ut illius capitis corpus essemus »: ergo videtur, quod unitas illa, quae est Verbi ad carnem, sit consimilis illi, quae est viri ad uxorem: non igitur est unitas singularis.

2. Item, illa unitas, qua Verbum est unitum carni, est unitas personalis, sicut supra9b ostensum est; sed unitas illa, qua anima unitur carni, quae est unitas nativa, est unitas personalis: ergo videtur, quod illa unitas communis sit cum aliis creaturis.

3. Item, unitas illa, qua Deus unitur carni, est ex summa potestate Dei — unde in quadam Sequentia1c: « Potestate, non natura, fit Creator creatura »:p. 161 — ergo videtur, quod illa sit unitas potestativa; sed ille modus competit et reperitur in creatura: ergo etc.

4. Item, aut illa unio, qua divinitas unitur humanitati, est naturalis, aut gratuita; si naturalis: ergo continetur sub unitatibus illis, quae a Philosopho2c assignantur; si gratuita: ergo cum unitas gratuita sit unitas votiva, sicut dicit Bernardus, videtur, quod iste modus unitatis divinae non faciat specialem unitatis differentiam.

Conclusio.

Unio duarum naturarum in personae unitate quoad omnes condiciones simul collectas superexcedit omnem naturam et gratiam communem et philosophicam rationem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut nulla creatura perfecte Deo assimilatur, sed quodam modo est similis, quodam modo dissimilis; et ubi una creatura habet similitudinem, frequenter alia3c habet dissimilitudinem: per hunc modum intelligendum est circa hanc sacratissimam unionem. (Conclusio 1.) Si enim loquamur de ipsa quantum ad speciales eius conditiones singillatim acceptas, sic potest habere convenientiam cum modis unitatum in creaturis repertis; si autem loquamur quantum ad collectionem suarum proprietatum, sic dicit modum unitatis singularis.

Et hoc patet sic. In hac enim unione est4c (Quatuor consideranda.) considerare distantiam unibilium, unionis principium, unionis terminum et unitorum vinculum. Quantum ad distantiam unibilium, qua unitur Creator creaturae, convenit cum unitate5c votiva. Quantum ad unionis principium convenit cum unitate potestativa; quia talis unitas est ex divina virtute et mera gratia. Quantum autem ad unionis terminum convenit cum unitate nativa, quae quidem terminatur ad unitatem personae. Quantum autem ad unionis vinculum convenit cum unitate coniugativa, in qua est vinculum perpetuum et individua copula. (Conclusio 2.) Quantum autem ad omnes condiciones simul collectas nullum modum habet unitatis sibi consimilem, quia superexcedit omnem naturam et omnem aliam gratiam communem, videlicet quod divina natura et humana uniantur in unam personam indissolubiliter per Dei potentiam.

Et ideo concedendum est, quod talis unio superexcellit6c (Conclusio 3.) omnem considerationem philosophicam; nec mirum, quia ad ipsam vix pertingit ratio per fidem elevata. Et ideo Bernardus secundum istam unionem assignavit specialem unitatis differentiam, vocans eam unitatem dignativam. — Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quae sunt ad istam partem.

Ad oppositum: (Solutio oppositorum.) Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod similis est unioni coniugativae; iam patet responsio: quia, etsi sit similitudo quantum ad vinculum, non tamen est similitudo quantum ad terminum, vel distantiam unibilium.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similis est unitati nativae, pro eo quod est unio in persona; dicendum, quod etsi sit similitudo quantum ad terminum, non tamen quantum ad vinculum, vel distantiam unibilium.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similis unitati potestativae; dicendum, quod etsi sit similitudo quantum ad principium, quia utraque est ex virtute divina, dissimilitudo tamen est quantum ad vinculum et quantum ad terminum.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est similis unitati votivae, cum sit per gratiam; dicendum, quod est alia gratiae differentia, qua anima unitur Deo per caritatem perfectam, et qua natura humana unitur Verbo in unitatem personae; nec tantum quantum ad hoc est differentia, sed etiam quantum ad vinculum et quantum ad terminum; et ideo ista unio facit singularem modum7c.

Si autem quaeratur sufficientia unitatum modorum assignatorum; (Quaestio incidens.) dicendum, quod ista quaestio alibi8c habet suum locum, et singula suis locis tractanda sunt. (Solvitur ex parte.) Illorum tamen novem modorum unitatum, quos Bernardus assignat, potest sic sumi sufficientia. Est enim unitas naturalis et gratuita, et unitas super utramque constituta. (Unitas naturalis.) Unitas autem naturalis est in quadruplici differentia. Quaedam enim est per aggregationem rerum differentium distinctarum, sicut unitas collectiva. Quaedam9c est per colligationem rerum formaliter differentium, sive partium heterogenearum; et sic est unitas constitutiva. Quaedam per coniunctionem differentium sexu, operatione convenientium; et sic est unitas coniugativa. Quaedam per unionem differentium naturarum in unionem concurrentium; et sic est unitas nativa. (Unitas gratuita.) — Unitas autem gratuita similiter quatuor habet differentias: aut enim est unitas eiusdem animae ad se secundum statuum diversitatem, et sic estp. 162 unitas potestativa; aut multorum hominum ad invicem secundum caritatem, et sic est unitas consentanea; aut animae ad Deum per voluntatis conformitatem, et sic est unitas votiva; aut humanae naturae ad divinam secundum personae unitatem, et sic est unitas dignativa. (Unitas super utramque constituta.) — Unitas autem super utramque constituta, videlicet super naturalem et gratuitam, est una sola, videlicet unitas Trinitatis, quam quidem unam esse decet solam, ut in ea sit status omnium unitatum.

Scholion

I. Conclusio non est dubia. Observatione digna sunt quae ex philosophis et S. Bernardo afferuntur de variis unitatum speciebus. — De ipsa quaestione alii commentatores non instituunt explicite disquisitionem, sed eandem plerumque tangunt in solutione seq. (3.) quaestionis.

II. Distinctiones et conclusiones S. Bonaventurae in seq. (3.) quaestione satis sunt manifestae. S. Thom. hic non utitur nisi una distinctione, scilicet ex parte eorum quae coniunguntur, et ex parte eius in quo coniunguntur, quod est divina persona, quae excellit maxima et simplicissima unitate. Doctrina autem S. Bonaventurae, quod simplicitas et eminens unitas divinae personae sit radix et prima causa excellentissimae huius unionis, videtur esse mens etiam aliorum doctorum. Quae ratio magis explicatur notabili applicatione, quam inde eruit Aegid. R. (III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. 2.). Nam secundum ipsum ex simplicitate assumentis personae sequitur, quod sit « intimior creaturae quam ipsa sibi, iuxta illud Augustini, III. Confessionum: « Deus est intimior nobis intimo nostro » [cfr. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 37. p. I.]... « Ex ista ergo tanta intimitate dicemus, istam unionem superare omnes alias uniones post illam unionem supremam sanctae et individuae Trinitatis ». Etiam S. Bonav. ad idem principium recurrit supra d. I. a. I. q. I. fundam. 4.

III. De hac 3. quaestione (vel de utraque): Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 2. 3. — Scoti loci collecti apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. IV. q. 2. a. 9. — S. Thom., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 9. — B. Albert., III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. 12. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 3. — Aegid. R., loc. cit. — Durand., III. Sent. d. 5. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 7.

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English Translation
p. 159

Question II. Whether the mode of the union of the two natures is singular, or whether some mode of union like it is to be found.

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning that union with respect to its mode; and the question is whether the mode of that union is singular, or whether some mode of union like it is to be found. And that it is singular seems to be the case:

1. (Fundamenta.) By the authority of Algazel himself in his Metaphysics3, where he sets out the modes of the one. For there he divides the one absolutely and the one in a qualified sense. The one absolutely he dividesp. 160 into three differences: first into a one (The modes of the one.) in which there is no multitude either in act or in potency, as a point and a unit; secondly into a one in which there is no multitude in act, although there is in potency, as is a line; thirdly into a one in which there is a multitude both in act and in potency, as a bed and a limb, in which there are many things in act. But the one in a qualified sense is to be divided into five differences, namely: into a one in genus, as a man and an ox; into a one in species, as Socrates and Plato; into a one in accident, as snow and white-lead; into a one in proportion, as a charioteer and a sailor; into a one in subject, as the sweet and the white in some one substance. But by none of these modes, as is plain to one running through them singly, is that union which is in Christ: therefore it seems that the mode of that union exceeds all the modes of union.

2. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of Aristotle, who in the First Philosophy1b divides the one (The modes of the one according to Aristotle.) into one per se and one per accidens. One per accidens is said as two accidents in one subject. But one per se is said in ten modes, namely: by continuation, of which the terminus is one; one in species or form, as Socrates and Plato in man; one in genus, as a man and an ox in animal; one in definition, as those things which have the same definition, or of which one is the definition of the other; one in indivisibility, as a point; one in number, as a singular; one in simplicity or essence, as a universal2b; one in totality or perfection, as a circle; one in proportion, as a charioteer and a sailor; one in matter, as all corporeal things. But by none of these modes is the union in the person in Christ: therefore it seems that it is a union in a singular and proper mode.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of Bernard, to Eugene, book five3b, (The modes of the one according to Bernard.) where he distinguishes the one in nine modes, namely where he speaks thus: « There is a collective unity, as namely many stones make one heap; there is a constitutive unity, as when many parts constitute each whole; there is a conjugal unity, by which it comes about that two are now not two, but one flesh4b; there is a native unity, by which from soul and flesh one man is born; there is a potestative unity, by which the man of virtue, not unstable, not dissimilar, but one, strives to be found at one with himself; there is a consentaneous unity, when through charity of many men there is one heart and one soul5b; there is a votive unity, when the soul, cleaving to God with all its desires, is one spirit; there is a dignative unity, by which our clay has been assumed by the Word of God into one person ». And there is a last unity, that of the Trinity, concerning which Bernard himself adds6b: « But what are they compared to that one »? Therefore if that unity, by which the Word of God is united to the flesh by a special difference, is called the dignative unity; it therefore seems that the aforesaid union has a singular mode.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to hold by the authority of the prophetic word; for it is said in Jeremiah, chapter thirty-one7b: The Lord will make a new thing upon the earth, this, I say, is said of that created union; but it would not be new, if it had something like it: it therefore seems that among all unions there is one singular union.

On the contrary: 1. (To the opposite.) Ephesians five8b: They shall be two in one flesh; this is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church; the Gloss: « Because Christ, who was God with the Father, through whom also we were made, was made through the flesh a partaker of us, that we might be the body of that head »: therefore it seems that the unity which is of the Word to the flesh is like that which is of husband to wife: therefore it is not a singular unity.

2. Likewise, that unity by which the Word is united to the flesh is a personal unity, as was shown above9b; but that unity by which the soul is united to the flesh, which is the native unity, is a personal unity: therefore it seems that that unity is common with other creatures.

3. Likewise, that unity by which God is united to the flesh is from the highest power of God — whence in a certain Sequence1c: « By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature »:p. 161 — therefore it seems that it is a potestative unity; but that mode is found and met with in a creature: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, either that union, by which the divinity is united to the humanity, is natural or gratuitous; if natural: then it is contained under those unities which are assigned by the Philosopher2c; if gratuitous: then, since the gratuitous unity is the votive unity, as Bernard says, it seems that this mode of the divine unity does not make a special difference of unity.

Conclusion.

The union of the two natures in the unity of the person, with respect to all its conditions taken together, superexceeds every nature and every common grace and philosophical reason.

I respond: It must be said that, just as no creature is perfectly assimilated to God, but in some way is like, in some way unlike; and where one creature has a likeness, frequently another3c has an unlikeness: in this manner is it to be understood concerning this most sacred union. (Conclusion 1.) For if we speak of it with respect to its special conditions taken singly, thus it can have an agreement with the modes of unities found in creatures; but if we speak with respect to the collection of its properties, thus it bespeaks a singular mode of unity.

And this is plain thus. For in this union there is4c (Four things to be considered.) to be considered the distance of the unitables, the principle of the union, the terminus of the union, and the bond of the things united. As to the distance of the unitables, by which the Creator is united to the creature, it agrees with the votive5c unity. As to the principle of the union, it agrees with the potestative unity; because such a unity is from the divine power and from sheer grace. But as to the terminus of the union, it agrees with the native unity, which indeed is terminated at the unity of the person. But as to the bond of the union, it agrees with the conjugal unity, in which there is a perpetual bond and an individual coupling. (Conclusion 2.) But as to all its conditions taken together, it has no mode of unity like itself, because it superexceeds every nature and every other common grace, namely that the divine nature and the human are united into one person indissolubly by the power of God.

And therefore it must be conceded that such a union superexcels6c (Conclusion 3.) every philosophical consideration; nor is this a wonder, since reason, even elevated by faith, scarcely attains to it. And therefore Bernard, according to this union, assigned a special difference of unity, calling it the dignative unity. — The reasons therefore which are on that side are to be conceded.

To the opposite: (Solution of the opposing arguments.) To 1. To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that it is like the conjugal union; the response is already plain: because, even though there is a likeness as to the bond, there is nevertheless not a likeness as to the terminus, or the distance of the unitables.

To 2. To that which is objected, that it is like the native unity, for the reason that it is a union in a person; it must be said that, even though there is a likeness as to the terminus, there is nevertheless not as to the bond, or the distance of the unitables.

To 3. To that which is objected, that it is like the potestative unity; it must be said that, even though there is a likeness as to the principle, because each is from the divine power, there is nevertheless an unlikeness as to the bond and as to the terminus.

To 4. To that which is objected, that it is like the votive unity, since it is through grace; it must be said that there is another difference of grace, by which the soul is united to God through perfect charity, and by which the human nature is united to the Word into the unity of the person; nor is there only a difference as to this, but also as to the bond and as to the terminus; and therefore this union makes a singular mode7c.

But if it be asked concerning the sufficiency of the modes of unity assigned; (An incidental question.) it must be said that this question has its place elsewhere8c, and the singulars are to be treated in their own places. (Resolved in part.) Nevertheless, of those nine modes of unities which Bernard assigns, the sufficiency can be gathered thus. For there is a natural and a gratuitous unity, and a unity constituted over both. (Natural unity.) But the natural unity is in a fourfold difference. For one is by an aggregation of distinct differing things, as the collective unity. One9c is by a binding-together of things formally differing, or of heterogeneous parts; and thus it is the constitutive unity. One is by a conjunction of things differing in sex, agreeing in operation; and thus it is the conjugal unity. One is by a union of differing natures concurring into one union; and thus it is the native unity. (Gratuitous unity.) — But the gratuitous unity likewise has four differences: for either it is a unity of the same soul to itself according to the diversity of states, and thus it isp. 162 the potestative unity; or of many men to one another according to charity, and thus it is the consentaneous unity; or of the soul to God through conformity of will, and thus it is the votive unity; or of the human nature to the divine according to the unity of the person, and thus it is the dignative unity. (Unity constituted over both.) — But the unity constituted over both, namely over the natural and the gratuitous, is one alone, namely the unity of the Trinity, which alone indeed it befits to be one, that in it may be the rest of all unities.

Scholion

I. The conclusion is not in doubt. Worthy of observation are the things which are brought forward from the philosophers and from St. Bernard concerning the various species of unities. — Concerning the question itself, other commentators do not institute an explicit disquisition, but for the most part touch it in the solution of the following (3rd) question.

II. The distinctions and conclusions of St. Bonaventure in the following (3rd) question are sufficiently manifest. St. Thomas here uses only one distinction, namely on the part of the things which are conjoined, and on the part of that in which they are conjoined, which is the divine person, which excels by a greatest and most simple unity. But the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, that the simplicity and eminent unity of the divine person is the root and first cause of this most excellent union, seems to be the mind also of the other doctors. This account is more fully explained by the notable application which Aegidius Romanus draws from it (III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. dub. lat. 2.). For according to him, from the simplicity of the assuming person it follows that it is « more inward to the creature than it is to itself, according to that saying of Augustine, III. Confessions: « God is more inward to us than our inmost » [cf. Bonav., I. Sent. d. 37. p. I.]... « From this so great inwardness, therefore, we shall say that this union surpasses all other unions after that supreme union of the holy and undivided Trinity ». St. Bonaventure too recurs to the same principle above, d. I. a. I. q. I. fundam. 4.

III. Concerning this 3rd question (or concerning both): Alexander of Hales, S. p. III. q. 7. m. 2. a. 2. 3. — Scotus's passages collected in Hieronymus de Montefortino, t. IV. q. 2. a. 9. — St. Thomas, III. Sent. d. 5. q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2; S. III. q. 2. a. 9. — B. Albert, III. Sent. d. 2. a. 1. 12. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 4. a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 3. q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, loc. cit. — Durandus, III. Sent. d. 5. q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 7.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. c. 8. Qui liber est secunda pars operis philosophici ab Algazele compositi et Venetiis an. 1536 sub nomine Logica et philosophia Algazelis Arabis in lucem editi. In hoc secunda parte, quae inscribitur liber philosophiae, a cap. 1–7 tractatur de divisionibus entis, scil. in causam et causatum, in universale et particulare; cap. 8. agit de tertia divisione entis, in unum scil. et multa, et exponitur ibi, quod unum « dicitur vere et proprie, aliud improprie, unum vero proprie dicitur quodlibet singulare signatum, et hoc quidem tribus modis. Primo dicitur unum verissime id unum singulare, in quo non est multitudo in potentia nec effectu, ut punctus et essentia Creatoris, quoniam Deus nec dividitur nec est receptibilis divisionis... Secundo dicitur unum continuatione, in quo non est multitudo in effectu, sed in potentia, quoniam receptibile est multitudinis, ut cum dicitur: haec linea est una et duae, et: hoc corpus est unum et duo corpora; si enim fuerit in eis incisio, dicetur in eis dualitas... Tertio dicitur unum secundum ligationem, in quo est multitudo in effectu, sicut lectus unus et quodlibet singulare compositum ex diversis partibus, sicut compositio membrorum hominis ex osse et carnibus et venis... Unum autem improprie dicitur, cum nomen unius dicitur de multis, quae sunt sub uno universali; et haec sunt quinque. Primum est unum genere... secundo unum in specie... tertio unum in communi accidente... quarto dicitur unum proportione... quinto dicitur unum in subiecto » etc. — Mox pro unius edd. perperam unionis, et subinde post dividit unum Vat. addit in unum. Aliquanto inferius pro in unum accidente codd. AFHILT aa unum in accidente, edd. 1, 2 in unum in accidente.
    Book I, c. 8. This book is the second part of the philosophical work composed by Algazel and published at Venice in the year 1536 under the title Logic and philosophy of Algazel the Arab. In this second part, which is entitled the book of philosophy, from chapters 1–7 the divisions of being are treated, namely into cause and caused, into universal and particular; chapter 8 treats of the third division of being, namely into one and many, and it is there expounded that the one « is said truly and properly, and otherwise improperly; the one properly is said of any signate singular, and this indeed in three modes. First, that one singular is most truly called one in which there is no multitude in potency or in effect, as a point and the essence of the Creator, since God is neither divided nor is receptive of division... Secondly, one is said by continuation, in which there is no multitude in effect but in potency, since it is receptive of multitude, as when it is said: this line is one and two, and: this body is one and two bodies; for if there be a cutting in them, a duality will be said to be in them... Thirdly, one is said according to binding, in which there is a multitude in effect, as one bed and any singular thing composed of diverse parts, as the composition of a man's members from bone and flesh and veins... But one is said improperly, when the name of "one" is said of many things which are under one universal; and these are five. The first is one in genus... secondly one in species... thirdly one in a common accident... fourthly one is said by proportion... fifthly one is said in subject » etc. — Shortly after, for unius the editions wrongly read unionis, and just after, following dividit unum, the Vatican edition adds in unum. Somewhat below, for in unum accidente codd. AFHILT aa read unum in accidente, edd. 1, 2 in unum in accidente.
  2. Libr. V. text. 7. seqq. et X. text. 1. (IV. c. 6. et IX. c. 1.). — Paulo inferius sola Vat. verbis sicut duo accidentia in uno subiecto praemittit sicut accidens in suo subiecto, vel. Aeque iuste illis verbis addere potuit: sicut unum accidens in duobus subiectis, v. gr. albedo, quae accidit Socrati et Platoni, et in qua conveniunt sive unum sunt. — Mox pro decem modis cod. bb etiam habet novem modis, quam lectionem contextus exigit, alii codd. et edd. novem modis.
    Book V, text 7 ff. and X, text 1 (IV, c. 6 and IX, c. 1). — A little below the Vatican edition alone prefixes to the words as two accidents in one subject the words as an accident in its subject, or. With equal right it could have added to those words: as one accident in two subjects, e.g. whiteness, which befalls both Socrates and Plato, and in which they agree or are one. — Shortly after, for ten modes cod. bb also has nine modes, which reading the context requires; other codd. and edd. read nine modes.
  3. Edd. ut essentia vel universale. Paulo inferius pro in Christo codd. K Z bb Christi.
    The editions read as essence or universal. A little below, for in Christ codd. K Z bb read of Christ.
  4. De Consider. c. 8. n. 18. Cfr. Serm. 80. de Diversis (alias 44. ex Parvis).
    On Consideration, c. 8, n. 18. Cf. Sermon 80 on Various Subjects (otherwise 44 of the Short Ones).
  5. Gen. 2, 24; Matth. 19, 5. — Paulo ante pro unumquodque codd. GUIKLTUZ aa cc quodque, codd. NX quodcumque, edd. unum.
    Gen. 2:24; Matt. 19:5. — A little before, for each codd. GUIKLTUZ aa cc read which, codd. NX whatsoever, edd. one.
  6. Act. 4, 32. — In propos. seq., quae respicit I. Cor. 6, 17, codd. MO post votiva adiiciunt vel voluntaria, et dein post spiritus est Vat. subdit cum eo. Mox pro a Dei Verbo Vat. a Deo Verbo et plurimi codd. Dei Verbo. Edd. 1, 2 ultimam propositionem allegatae sententiae sic exhibent: Est unitas dignativa, qua Filius Dei dignatus est assumere nostram naturam.
    Acts 4:32. — In the following clause, which regards I Cor. 6:17, codd. MO add after votive the words or voluntary, and then after is spirit the Vatican edition adds with him. Shortly after, for by the Word of God (a Dei Verbo) the Vatican edition reads a Deo Verbo and very many codd. Dei Verbo. Edd. 1, 2 give the last clause of the cited sentence thus: There is a dignative unity, by which the Son of God deigned to assume our nature.
  7. Loc. cit. n. 19, ubi textus origin., cui etiam cod. II assentitur, sic: Verum haec omnia quid ad illud summum atque, ut ita dicam, unice Unum?
    Loc. cit., n. 19, where the original text, with which cod. II also agrees, runs thus: But what are all these compared to that highest and, so to speak, uniquely One?
  8. Vers. 22. — In fine arg. pro unio una codd. K P Q Z bb unio illa, Vat. unio ista.
    Verse 22. — At the end of the argument, for one union codd. K P Q Z bb read that union (illa), the Vatican edition that union (ista).
  9. Vers. 31. seq. — Glossa hic allegata, quae invenitur apud Rabanum in hunc locum, sumta est ex August., XII. contra Faustum, c. 8.
    Verse 31 f. — The Gloss here cited, which is found in Rabanus on this passage, is taken from Augustine, Against Faustus XII, c. 8.
  10. Quaest. praeced. — In fine arg. pro communis sit Vat. communicet.
    The preceding question. — At the end of the argument, for be common (communis sit) the Vatican edition reads communicate (communicet).
  11. In fest. Nativ. Domini. Cfr. Franc. Ios. Mone, Hymni latini medii aevi, tom. 2. n. 389: Potestate, non natura, / Fit Creator creatura, / Reportetur ut factura / Factoris in gloria.
    In the feast of the Lord's Nativity. Cf. F. J. Mone, Latin Hymns of the Middle Ages, vol. 2, n. 389: By power, not by nature, / The Creator becomes a creature, / That the making may be brought back / Into the glory of the Maker.
  12. Hic in fundam. 2. Verba Bernardi videsis in fundam. 3. — Voci unitatibus Vat. praemittit naturalibus.
    Here in fundamentum 2. The words of Bernard you may see in fundamentum 3. — To the word unities the Vatican edition prefixes natural.
  13. Codd. I L aa cc aliam, Vat. in alio, quae et paulo ante in uno substituit pro una.
    Codd. I L aa cc read another (acc. aliam), the Vatican edition in another, which also a little before substitutes in one for one.
  14. Codd. A G H I K L N T U Z aa et est.
    Codd. A G H I K L N T U Z aa read and is (et est).
  15. Plurimi codd. convenit unitas votiva; in qua lectione supple cum ipsa. Paulo inferius pro mera gratia codd. K Z magna gratia.
    Very many codd. read the votive unity agrees; in which reading supply with it. A little below, for sheer grace codd. K Z read great grace.
  16. Codd. G H I K L N T U X Z aa superexcessit, cod. A superexcrescit. Paulo inferius pro istam unionem edd. 1, 2 exhibent istam opinionem et dein pro unitatem dignativam posuerunt animam unitatis dignativam (!).
    Codd. G H I K L N T U X Z aa read superexceeded, cod. A over-grows. A little below, for this union edd. 1, 2 give this opinion and then for the dignative unity they put the soul of dignative unity (!).
  17. Cfr. supra d. 2. a. 3. q. 2.
    Cf. above, d. 2, a. 3, q. 2.
  18. Scilicet in metaphysica.
    Namely, in metaphysics.
  19. Plurimi codd. hic inepte repetunt enim.
    Very many codd. here ineptly repeat enim ("for").
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