Dist. 11, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 11
Articulus II. De vocabulis, quae videntur importare inceptionem.
Consequenter quaeritur de his vocabulis, quae videntur importare inceptionem. Et circa hoc tria sunt dubitabilia perquirenda.
Primo quaeritur, utrum simpliciter concedendum sit, quod Christus sit creatura. — Secundo, utrum concedendum sit, quod ille homo coeperit esse. — Tertio quaeritur, utrum homo coeperit esse Deus.
Quaestio I. Utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est creatura.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Christus est creatura. Et quod sic, ostenditur multiplici auctoritate.
1. Augustinus ad Dardanum1: « Quod ad Verbum attinet, Creator est Christus; quod ad hominem attinet, creatus est Christus ». — Item, Leo
Papa2: « Nova et inaudita conventio: Deus, qui est et qui erat, fit creatura ». — Damascenus3 etiam expresse: « Non scandalizatur ad nomen creaturae qui se servum, aut vermem, aut granum natum de terra nominavit ». Idem etiam ipse: « Quid mirabilius, quam Creatorem creari et plasmatorem plasmari »? — Richardus de sancto Victore4 in quadam Sequentia: « Potestate, non natura, fit Creator creatura ». — Ex his omnibus auctoritatibus tanquam una efficaci ratione concluditur, quod Christus sit creatura.
2. Item, auctoritate efficaciori, ad Galatas quarto5: Misit Deus Filium suum factum ex muliere, et similiter ad Romanos; sed omne factum est creatura, Filius autem Dei est factus: ergo etc.
3. Item, ratione videtur. In Christo est veritas naturae creatae et naturae increatae, et Christus nominat hypostasim utriusque naturae; sed haec est vera ratione divinae naturae: Christus est Creator, et: ille homo est Creator: ergo pari ratione et haec: Christus est creatura.
4. Item, de quocumque praedicatur inferius, et superius, necessaria consequentia6; sed creatura est superius respectu hominis et animalis; sed haec est vera simpliciter: Christus est homo, et haec: Christus est animal: ergo et haec necessario est vera: Christus est creatura.
5. Item, si Christus est homo, aut creatus, aut increatus; non increatus, hoc constat, quia « oppositio est in adiecto7 »: ergo est homo creatus. Sed homo creatus est creatura: ergo etc.
6. Item, sicut caro Christi fuit concepta, sic anima Christi fuit creata: ergo sicut ratione carnis haec fuit vera: Christus est proles Virginis et conceptus de Virgine; ita haec erit vera: Christus est creatura Dei, vel creatus a Deo. Si dicas, quod non est simile propter repugnantiam intellectuum, quae est in hac: Christus est creatura; contra: maior est repugnantia, cum oppositum praedicatur de opposito, quam quando creatura de Christo; sed haec est vera: Christus est impassibilis, est immortalis, est mortuus8: ergo etc.
Sed contra: 1. Ad Romanos octavo9: Vanitati subiecta est omnis creatura; sed Christus, cum sit Deus, non est vanitati subiectus: ergo etc.
2. Item, intellectus huius nominis creatura est esse de nihilo10; sed hoc repugnat Christo, cum Christus fuerit ab aeterno: ergo non est concedendum, Christum esse creatum.
3. Item, omne creatum incipit esse; sed Christus fuit ab aeterno, quoniam ipse eduxit filios Israel de Aegypto11: ergo etc.
4. Item, si Christus est creatura, aut hoc est ratione naturae, aut ratione personae; ratione naturae non, quia natura non praedicatur de Christo12; ratione personae non, quia persona Christi non est creata, sed Patri coaeterna: ergo nullo modo verum est, quod Christus sit creatura.
### Conclusio Non recipitur propositio: Christus sive Filius Dei est creatura, nisi determinetur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedictus sermo doctoribus theologiae communiter non recipitur: Christus sive Filius Dei est creatura. Adhaerent enim verbis Magistri in littera13. — Ratio autem, quare non recipitur, est, quia talis sermo est propinquus errori. Errori autem appropinquat, et quia male aliquando intellectus est ab haereticis Arianis, et etiam quia de se male est intelligibilis. Arius namque dicebat, Filium Dei esse creaturam; et quoniam Christus nominat personam Filii Dei, qui dicit, Christum esse creaturam, non determinans, secundum quam naturam intelligat, videtur ipse dicere quod
Arius impie sensit. — Est etiam male intelligibilis de se propter repugnantiam intellectuum. Creatura enim, quantum est de ratione sui nominis, dicit respectum ad Creatorem; dicit aliquid, quod habet esse post non-esse; dicit etiam, quod habet esse aliunde per voluntatem procedens: ergo in tali locutione intellectus praedicati repugnare videtur intellectui ipsius subiecti secundum triplicem dissonantiam. Et propterea praedictus sermo est male intelligibilis et fuit male intellectus, et per hoc est errori propinquus. — Et quoniam « sermo theologicus debet esse catholicus et usitatus, ab intellectu non dissonus, et rei, de qua loquimur, consonus14 »; propterea praedictus sermo non recipitur, nisi determinetur. — Unde rationes concedendae sunt, quae ostendunt, praedictum sermonem non esse admittendum.
1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium de Sanctorum auctoritatibus, dicendum, quod Sancti aliquando multum expresse loquuntur, amplius quam admittat communis usus, ob aliquid exprimendum; et tales sermones non oportet extendi, sed magis15 sunt exponendi. Et sic est in praedicto sermone, cum dicunt, Christum esse creaturam; hoc autem dicunt secundum humanam naturam, et vere loquuntur; non tamen oportet, sermonem istum trahi ad communem usum.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de verbo Apostoli, quo dicitur: Factum de muliere; dicendum, quod ipsa determinatio de muliere, et alia determinatio, quae dicit ad Romanos16: Qui factus est ei ex semine David secundum carnem, trahunt hoc vocabulum factus ad standum sive ponendum rem suam circa naturam assumtam. Et ideo non sequitur propter hoc, quod tales locutiones sint sine determinatione concedendae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec conceditur sine determinatione: Christus est Creator; dicendum, quod non est simile; quoniam Christus nominat personam Verbi, quae est increata et increatae naturae17 per essentiam et naturam propriam. Ideo non ita convenienter attribuitur ei vocabulum creaturae, sicut Creatoris, quia non est talis intellectuum dissonantia. Praeterea, ille sermo non ita approximat veneno erroris, sicut sermo propositus; et ita patet, quod non est respuendus.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de quocumque praedicatur inferius, et superius; dicendum, quod verum est, quantum de virtute illationis. Unde si haec est vera: Petrus est homo, absque dubio verum est: Petrus est animal; sic etiam concedi potest, quod si vere est homo, quod vere est creatura. Non tamen oportet, quod si aliqua locutione utendum est cum inferiori, quod utendum sit ea cum superiori, propter diversos modos significandi, in quorum uno intellectus invenit consonantiam, in alio repugnantiam. Et quoniam praedictam locutionem magis respuunt doctores propter hoc, quod potest esse via in falsitatem vel errorem propter malum modum intelligendi, quam quod ipsa de se sit falsa vel erronea; ideo patet ratio.
5. Et per hoc patet responsio ad sequentem obiectionem. Quamvis enim ista admittatur et concedatur: Christus est homo creatus; non tamen simpliciter concedendum, quod sit creatus, ne intelligatur, ei tale praedicatum simpliciter attribui et totaliter, hoc est ratione utriusque naturae.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est conceptus ratione carnis, et ita similiter creatus ratione animae; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, etsi conceptio dicat exitum rei in esse, non tamen ita repugnat personae Christi intellectus illius vocabuli, sicut intellectus verbi creandi. — Et ratio huius est, quia conceptio aliquid praesupponit; et naturam determinatam concernit; nec dicitur respectu Dei, sed respectu mulieris sive matris; dicit etiam18 exitum naturalem; sed non sic creatio vel creatura. Nam creatio dicit actum, qui potest in totam rei substantiam, unde quod creatur simpliciter incipit esse; nullam etiam determinatam naturam concernit; dicitur etiam respectu ipsius creantis, et exitum voluntarium importat: hinc est, quod multo magis repugnat personae Christi vocabulum creandi quam concipiendi. — Quodsi obiicias, quod non magis repugnat, quam si dicatur: immortalis est mortalis; dicendum, quod etsi non magis repugnet quantum ad exterius rationem19; tamen magis repugnat repugnantia ducente in errorem. Cum enim dicitur:
immortalis est mortalis, quia mortalis praesupponit creaturam viventem et ratione illius praedicatur; ideo non ita repugnat. Et praeterea, iste sermo prolatus ostendit, se non debere intelligi nisi per unionem20. Sed cum dicitur: Christus est creatura, nec praesupponit, nec sermo videtur intelligi per unionem; immo videtur praedicatum dicere totum esse subiecti, et propter naturam talis actus21, qui consuevit esse in totum. Et sic patet, quod non est simile, et quod valde rationabiliter Magister22 dicit, praedictum sermonem non esse trahendum ad usum, quamvis non possit convinci faciliter, ipsum esse simpliciter et absolute falsum. Difficiliores enim et efficaciores sunt rationes ad oppositum.
I. Quamvis aliquid creatum sit in Christo, videlicet humana eius natura, tamen haec propositio: Christus est creatura, sine determinatione secundum quod homo, communissime non recipitur. Durand. autem (hic q. 1.) hunc modum loquendi, saltem indirecte, nititur defendere, dum solvere vult argg. ab aliis contra eandem prolata. — Insuper non omnes idem sentiunt quoad admittendam proprietatem huius propositionis, si addatur: secundum quod homo. De hac enim formula iudicat S. Thom. (S. III. q. 16. a. 10.), quod sit magis concedenda quam neganda; idem fere sentit Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.). Sed in Comment. (hic a. 3.) S. Thom. dicit: « Tunc etiam tropica est et figurativa, ut dicit Magister, sicut et haec: Aethiops est albus secundum dentem ». Scot. autem (hic q. 2.) vult, quod in propositione ista, etiam addita illa determinatione, remaneat ratio falsitatis, et quod in uno sensu sit omnino falsa, in altero possit concedi, sed tantum ut impropria. Loquendo autem de propositione a nostro auctore sine determinatione prolata, ipse et S. Thom. in Sum. theolog. praecipue urgent rationem sumtam ex periculo erroris vitando. Alii autem cum Scoto (hic q. 1, tamen cum quadam restrictione) et Richardo contendunt, propositionem istam secundum proprietatem sermonis in se esse falsam; pro qua sententia nonnulli etiam Ss. Thomam et Bonaventuram allegant. Quod eadem saltem sit impropria, satis innuit S. Bonav., quia praeter periculum erroris et in corp. et in solutionibus ad oppos. contra eam arguit ex « repugnantia intellectuum ». Ita eundem etiam Scot. (hic q. 1. n. 3.) intellexit, simulque ibi arguit contra S. Bonaventurae doctrinam, quod communicatio idiomatum non admittatur in his, in quibus est repugnantia proprietatis unius naturae ad aliam. — Sed in hac disputatione agitur tantum de modo loquendi, et fere est lis de nomine.
II. Praeter locos citatos: S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. III. q. 16. a. 8; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 47. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. 2. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, hic q. unica.
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Article II. On the words that seem to imply a beginning.
Next there is inquiry about those words which seem to imply a beginning. And concerning this three points are to be examined.
First it is asked whether it is to be conceded without qualification that Christ is a creature. — Second, whether it is to be conceded that that man began to be. — Third it is asked whether the man began to be God.
Question I. Whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a creature.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus and asks whether this is to be conceded: Christ is a creature. And that it is so is shown by manifold authority.
1. Augustine to Dardanus1: "As regards the Word, Christ is Creator; as regards the man, Christ is created." — Likewise, Leo
the Pope2: "A new and unheard-of agreement: God, who is and who was, becomes a creature." — Damascene3 also expressly: "He is not scandalized at the name of creature who called himself a servant, or a worm, or a grain born of the earth." The same one likewise: "What is more wonderful than that the Creator be created and the fashioner fashioned?" — Richard of Saint Victor4 in a certain Sequence: "By power, not by nature, the Creator becomes a creature." — From all these authorities, as by one efficacious argument, it is concluded that Christ is a creature.
2. Likewise, by a more efficacious authority, in Galatians, chapter four5: God sent his Son, made of a woman, and similarly to the Romans; but everything made is a creature, and the Son of God is made: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, it appears by reason. In Christ there is the truth of a created nature and of an uncreated nature, and Christ names the hypostasis of each nature; but this is true by reason of the divine nature: Christ is Creator, and: that man is Creator: therefore by parity of reason this also: Christ is a creature.
4. Likewise, of whatever the inferior [term] is predicated, the superior [term] is also predicated, by necessary consequence6; but creature is superior in respect of man and animal; but this is true without qualification: Christ is man, and this: Christ is an animal: therefore this also is necessarily true: Christ is a creature.
5. Likewise, if Christ is man, [he is] either created or uncreated; he is not uncreated, this is settled, because "there is opposition in the adjunct7": therefore he is a created man. But a created man is a creature: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, just as the flesh of Christ was conceived, so the soul of Christ was created: therefore, just as by reason of the flesh this was true: Christ is the offspring of the Virgin and conceived of the Virgin; so this will be true: Christ is a creature of God, or created by God. If you say that it is not similar on account of the repugnance of the [two] understandings, which is in this [proposition]: Christ is a creature; on the contrary: the repugnance is greater when an opposite is predicated of its opposite than when "creature" [is predicated] of Christ; but this is true: Christ is impassible, is immortal, is dead8: therefore etc.
On the contrary: 1. To the Romans, chapter eight9: Every creature is made subject to vanity; but Christ, since he is God, is not subject to vanity: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the meaning of this name creature is to be from nothing10; but this is repugnant to Christ, since Christ was from eternity: therefore it is not to be conceded that Christ is created.
3. Likewise, everything created begins to be; but Christ was from eternity, since he himself led the sons of Israel out of Egypt11: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if Christ is a creature, either this is by reason of nature or by reason of person; it is not by reason of nature, because nature is not predicated of Christ12; it is not by reason of person, because the person of Christ is not created, but co-eternal with the Father: therefore it is in no way true that Christ is a creature.
### Conclusion The proposition "Christ, or the Son of God, is a creature" is not accepted unless it is qualified.
I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid statement is commonly not accepted by the doctors of theology: Christ, or the Son of God, is a creature. For they adhere to the words of the Master in the text13. — But the reason why it is not accepted is that such a statement is near to error. And it approaches error both because it was at times wrongly understood by the Arian heretics, and also because of itself it is ill-intelligible. For Arius was saying that the Son of God was a creature; and since Christ names the person of the Son of God, he who says that Christ is a creature, without determining according to which nature he understands it, seems himself to say what
Arius impiously held. — It is also of itself ill-intelligible on account of the repugnance of the [two] understandings. For "creature," so far as belongs to the account of its own name, expresses a relation to the Creator; it expresses something that has being after non-being; it expresses also something that has being from elsewhere, proceeding through will: therefore in such a locution the understanding of the predicate seems to be repugnant to the understanding of the subject itself according to a threefold dissonance. And therefore the aforesaid statement is ill-intelligible and was ill understood, and through this it is near to error. — And because "theological speech ought to be catholic and customary, not dissonant from the understanding, and consonant with the thing of which we speak14"; therefore the aforesaid statement is not accepted unless it is qualified. — Hence the arguments are to be conceded which show that the aforesaid statement is not to be admitted.
1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary concerning the authorities of the Saints, it must be said that the Saints at times speak very expressly, more than common usage admits, in order to express something; and such statements ought not to be extended, but rather15 to be expounded. And so it is in the aforesaid statement, when they say that Christ is a creature; but they say this according to his human nature, and they speak truly; nevertheless the statement ought not to be drawn into common usage.
2. To that which is objected from the word of the Apostle, by which it is said: Made of a woman; it must be said that the determination itself of a woman, and the other determination, which says, to the Romans16: Who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh, draw this word made to standing for or positing its thing about the assumed nature. And therefore it does not follow on this account that such locutions are to be conceded without qualification.
3. To that which is objected, that this is conceded without qualification: Christ is Creator; it must be said that it is not similar; since Christ names the person of the Word, which is uncreated and of an uncreated nature17 by its own essence and proper nature. Therefore the word creature is not so fittingly attributed to him as Creator, because there is not such a dissonance of understandings. Moreover, that statement does not so approach the poison of error as does the statement proposed; and so it is clear that it is not to be rejected.
4. To that which is objected, that of whatever the inferior is predicated, the superior is also; it must be said that it is true, so far as concerns the force of inference. Hence if this is true: Peter is man, without doubt it is true: Peter is animal; so too it can be conceded that if he is truly man, he is truly creature. Nevertheless it is not necessary that, if some locution is to be used with the inferior, it must be used with the superior, on account of the diverse modes of signifying, in one of which the understanding finds consonance, in the other repugnance. And because the doctors reject the aforesaid locution rather on this account, that it can be a way into falsity or error through a wrong mode of understanding, than because it is of itself false or erroneous; therefore the reason is clear.
5. And through this is clear the response to the following objection. For although this be admitted and conceded: Christ is a created man; nevertheless it is not to be conceded without qualification that he is created, lest it be understood that such a predicate is attributed to him simply and totally, that is, by reason of both natures.
6. To that which is objected, that he is conceived by reason of the flesh, and so likewise created by reason of the soul; it must be said that it is not similar, because, although conception expresses the going-forth of a thing into being, nevertheless the understanding of that word is not so repugnant to the person of Christ as the understanding of the verb to create. — And the reason for this is that conception presupposes something; and it concerns a determinate nature; nor is it said in respect of God, but in respect of the woman or mother; it expresses also18 a natural going-forth; but not so creation or creature. For creation expresses an act which extends to the whole substance of the thing, whence what is created simply begins to be; it also concerns no determinate nature; it is said also in respect of the one creating, and it imports a voluntary going-forth: hence it is that the word to create is far more repugnant to the person of Christ than to conceive. — But if you object that it is no more repugnant than if it be said: an immortal is mortal; it must be said that, although it be no more repugnant as to the outer account19; nevertheless it is more repugnant by a repugnance leading into error. For when it is said:
an immortal is mortal, because mortal presupposes a living creature and is predicated by reason of it; therefore it is not so repugnant. And moreover, that statement, when uttered, shows that it ought not to be understood except through the union20. But when it is said: Christ is a creature, it neither presupposes [a union], nor does the statement seem to be understood through the union; rather the predicate seems to express the whole being of the subject, and on account of the nature of such an act21, which is wont to be [extended] to the whole. And so it is clear that it is not similar, and that the Master22 very reasonably says that the aforesaid statement is not to be drawn into [common] usage, although it cannot easily be convinced that it is simply and absolutely false. For the arguments to the contrary are more difficult and more efficacious.
I. Although something created be in Christ, namely his human nature, nevertheless this proposition, "Christ is a creature," without the determination insofar as he is man, is most commonly not accepted. Durandus, however (here q. 1), strives, at least indirectly, to defend this manner of speaking, in seeking to resolve the arguments brought by others against it. — Moreover, not all hold the same view as to admitting the propriety of this proposition if it be added: insofar as he is man. For of this formula St. Thomas judges (Summa III, q. 16, a. 10) that it is more to be conceded than denied; almost the same view is held by Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1). But in the Commentary (here a. 3) St. Thomas says: "Then too it is tropical and figurative, as the Master says, just as this also: An Ethiopian is white as to his teeth." Scotus, however (here q. 2), holds that in that proposition, even with that determination added, there remains an account of falsity, and that in one sense it is altogether false, in another it can be conceded, but only as improper. But speaking of the proposition uttered by our author without determination, he and St. Thomas in the Summa theologica chiefly press the argument drawn from the danger of error to be avoided. Others, however, with Scotus (here q. 1, yet with a certain restriction) and Richard, contend that this proposition, according to the propriety of speech, is in itself false; for which opinion some adduce even Sts. Thomas and Bonaventure. That it is at least improper, St. Bonaventure sufficiently intimates, because, besides the danger of error, both in the body [of the article] and in the solutions to the contrary [arguments], he argues against it from the "repugnance of the [two] understandings." Thus Scotus too (here q. 1, n. 3) understood him, and at the same time argues there against St. Bonaventure's doctrine, that the communication of idioms is not admitted in those things in which there is a repugnance of the propriety of one nature to the other. — But in this disputation there is treatment only of the manner of speaking, and it is almost a dispute about a word.
II. Besides the places cited: St. Thomas, here a. 2; Summa III, q. 16, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 47. — Blessed Albert, here a. 1, 2, 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Biel, here the single question.
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- Sive Epist. 187. (alias 57.) c. 3. n. 8.Or Letter 187 (otherwise 57), c. 3, n. 8.
- Sententialiter in Serm. 77. (alias 75. 3. de Pentecost.) c. 2: « Si enim homo ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus in suae honore naturae mansisset... Creator mundi creatura non fieret ». Sed ad verbum in Serm. 128. (alias 13. de Tempore) sive Serm. 12. in Natali (qui a Maurinis in Appendice Serm. Augustini repositus est) c. 2. n. 2: « O nova et inaudita commixtio! Deus, qui est et qui erat, fit! Creator creatura »! Gregor. Nazian. Orat. 38. n. 20: O novam mixtionem, o admirandam temperationem! Qui est, fit; qui creatus non est, creatur.In substance in Sermon 77 (otherwise 75, the third on Pentecost), c. 2: "For if man, made to the image and likeness of God, had remained in the honor of his nature... the Creator of the world would not become a creature." But word-for-word in Sermon 128 (otherwise 13, on the Season) or Sermon 12 on the Nativity (which by the Maurists is placed in the Appendix of Augustine's Sermons), c. 2, n. 2: "O new and unheard-of commingling! God, who is and who was, becomes! The Creator [becomes] a creature!" Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 38, n. 20: O new mingling, O wondrous tempering! He who is, comes to be; he who is not created, is created.
- Sententialiter (nam verba ipsa in Damasc. operibus non invenimus) in IV. de Fide orthod. c. 18: « Deus Verbum... creatura dicitur et novissime appellatur » (Isai. 53, 3.); et in Orat. I. de Imagin. n. 4: Ipsi Creatori [servio], qui instar mei creatus factus est [χτισθέντα τὸ κατ᾽ ἐμέ]. Verba sub Damasc. nomine allegata potius Hieronymi esse videntur, qui I. Comment. in Epist. ad Eph. 2, 10. ait: « Nos libere proclamamus, non esse periculum eum [Christum] dicere creaturam, quem vermem et hominem et crucifixum et maledictionem tota spei nostrae fiducia profitemur ». Alterum sub Damasc. nomine allegatum testimonium sententialiter habetur in III. de Fide orthod. c. 1: « Quid enim maius, quam Deum hominem fieri »?In substance (for the words themselves we did not find in the works of Damascene) in IV On the Orthodox Faith, c. 18: "God the Word... is called a creature and is at last so named" (Isaiah 53, 3); and in Oration I On the Image, n. 4: To the Creator himself [I am a servant], who like me was made created. The testimonies adduced under the name of Damascene seem rather to be Jerome's, who in his first book of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians 2, 10 says: "We freely proclaim that there is no danger in calling him [Christ] a creature, whom we profess with all the confidence of our hope to be a worm and a man and crucified and a curse." The other testimony adduced under the name of Damascene is found in substance in III On the Orthodox Faith, c. 1: "For what is greater than that God become man?"
- In operibus dicti auctoris non reperitur. B. Albert., hic a. 3, laudatam Sequentiam magistro Rodolpho de sancto Victore adscribit. Cfr. supra pag. 161, nota 1. — Paulo inferius pro ratione multi codd. ratiocinatione.It is not found in the works of the said author. Blessed Albert, here a. 3, ascribes the Sequence cited to master Rudolf of Saint Victor. Cf. above, page 161, note 1. — A little below, for by reason many codices [read] by reasoning.
- Vers. 4. — Locus ex Epist. ad Rom. allegatus est 1, 3: factus est ei ex semine David etc.Verse 4. — The passage adduced from the Epistle to the Romans is 1, 3: who was made to him of the seed of David etc.
- Secundum Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 3. (c. 2.), ex prima regula praedicamentali. Cfr. IV. Topic. c. 1. — Ante necessaria codd. cc et edd. interiiciunt est.According to Aristotle, Categories c. 3 (c. 2), from the first predicamental rule. Cf. Topics IV, c. 1. — Before necessary, codices cc and the editions insert is.
- Aristot., II. Periherm. c. 2. (c. 11.).Aristotle, On Interpretation II, c. 2 (c. 11).
- Codd. A bb Christus impassibilis est passibilis, immortalis mortuus; cod. K a secunda manu Christus impassibilis est passus. Paulo superius pro de opposito cod. K de suo opposito.Codices A, bb [read] Christ impassible is passible, immortal dead; codex K, by a second hand, Christ impassible is one who suffered. A little above, for of an opposite, codex K [reads] of its own opposite.
- Vers. 20. — Hoc idem arg. adducit Hilar., XII. de Trin.; nec non Ambros., I. de Fide, c. 14. n. 87. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Verse 20. — Hilary adduces this same argument, On the Trinity XII; as also Ambrose, On the Faith I, c. 14, n. 87. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1.
- Cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. et 3.Cf. II Sent. d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and 3.
- Ut legitur in Missali, improper. 1. fer. VI. in Parasceve: popule meus, quid feci tibi?... Quia eduxi te de terra Aegypti, parasti crucem Salvatori tuo ». Et apud Ioan. 8, 58. dicit Iesus: amen, amen dico vobis, antequam Abraham fieret, ego sum.As is read in the Missal, in the first Reproach, on Friday in the Pasch [Good Friday]: my people, what have I done to thee?... Because I led thee out of the land of Egypt, thou hast prepared a cross for thy Savior. And in John 8, 58 Jesus says: amen, amen I say to you, before Abraham was made, I am.
- Cfr. supra pag. 149, nota 5.Cf. above, page 149, note 5.
- Hic c. 1. seq. — Subinde pro Errori autem cod. bb errori enim, et post pauca pro intellectus est cod. A fuit intellectus, codd. L aa et edd. 1, 2 intelligitur.Here c. 1 ff. — Thereupon, for but to error, codex bb [reads] for to error, and a little after, for it was understood, codex A [reads] it was understood, codices L, aa and editions 1, 2 it is understood.
- Sic Alan. ab Insul., Theolog. Regul. regul. 34, in qua textus origin. post catholicus addit generalis. Alanus hanc regulam explicans sic prosequitur: Catholicus, inquam, esse debet, quia contrarius fidei catholicae admitti non debet, ut si tres essentiae, vel tres dii esse dicantur; usitatus etiam, quia profanas verborum novitates Ecclesia devitat (I. Tim. 6, 20.); generalis, ut ab hominibus intelligentibus recipiatur, ut Christum esse aliquid, secundum quod homo. Ut etiam intellectu sit perceptibilis; debet enim verborum involucra cavere catholicus. Ut etiam rei, de qua loquimur, sit consonus; debet enim theologus habere sermones cognatos rebus, de quibus loquitur.Thus Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 34, in which the original text after catholic adds general. Alan, explaining this rule, continues thus: It ought, I say, to be catholic, because what is contrary to the catholic faith ought not to be admitted, as if three essences or three gods be said to be; also customary, because the Church avoids the profane novelties of words (1 Tim. 6, 20); general, that it may be received by intelligent men, as that Christ is something insofar as he is man. Also that it be perceptible to the understanding; for the catholic ought to beware the wrappings of words. Also that it be consonant with the thing of which we speak; for the theologian ought to have his speech akin to the things of which he speaks.
- Edd. cum pluribus codd. potius magis. Paulo superius pro ob aliquid cod. K ad aliquid.The editions, with several codices, [read] rather, more. A little above, for for the sake of something, codex K [reads] to something.
- Cap. 1, 3. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Pro quae dicit edd. qua dicit.Chapter 1, 3. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 2. — For which says, the editions [read] by which it says.
- Pro et increatae naturae codd. M O et est creator vere, cod. A et ideo creator naturae, cod. bb (K a secunda manu) et est creator naturae, codd. T U V perperam et est creatae naturae. Paulo inferius pro dissonantia cod. bb disconvenientia. Circa finem solut. cod. E post et ita patet addit per hoc, et dein post quod non codd. A bb interserunt similiter.For and of an uncreated nature, codices M, O [read] and is truly creator, codex A and therefore creator of nature, codex bb (K by a second hand) and is creator of nature, codices T, U, V wrongly and is of a created nature. A little below, for dissonance, codex bb [reads] disagreement. Toward the end of the solution, codex E after and so it is clear adds through this, and then after that not codices A, bb insert likewise.
- Pro etiam edd. et nonnulli codd. enim; perperam, siquidem in seqq. huic membro expresse opponitur alterum, quod est: et exitum voluntarium importat. Mox pro incipit esse codd. N X potest esse.For also, the editions and some codices [read] for; wrongly, since in what follows another member is expressly opposed to this one, which is: and it imports a voluntary going-forth. Soon, for begins to be, codices N, X [read] can be.
- Est modus loquendi Aristot. familiaris et occurrit e. gr. I. Poster. c. 8. (c. 10.): πρὸς τὸν ἔξω λόγον, quod Boethius vertit: ad exterius orationem. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 155, nota 10. — Edd. ad exteriorem rationem.It is a manner of speaking familiar to Aristotle and occurs, e.g., Posterior Analytics I, c. 8 (c. 10): toward the outer discourse, which Boethius renders: "to the outer speech." Cf. tome I, page 155, note 10. — The editions [read] to the more outward account.
- Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 3. — Paulo inferius pro nec praesupponit codd. G bb nihil praesupponit.Cf. above, page 14, note 3. — A little below, for neither presupposes, codices G, bb [read] presupposes nothing.
- Scil. actus creandi.Namely, the act of creating.
- Hic c. 1. in initio et c. 2. in fine.Here c. 1, at the beginning, and c. 2, at the end. ---