Dist. 8, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 8
Articulus I. De nativitate temporali in comparatione ad divinam naturam.
Quaestio I. Utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: divina natura est de Virgine nata. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Primo auctoritate Hilarii, in libro de Trinitate quarto1: « Nihil nisi natum habet Filius » ; sed (Ad oppositum.) habet divinam naturam: ergo est nata. Sed quod natum est aeternaliter in Christo ex Patre, natum est temporaliter de Matre: si igitur divina natura est huiusmodi, patet etc.
p. 186 2. Item, expressius Damascenus, tertio libro, capitulo duodecimo2: « Theotocon, id est Dei genitricem, vere et principaliter sanctam Mariam Virginem praedicamus » ; sed « Deus est nomen naturae »: ergo Virgo Maria erit genitrix divinae naturae: ergo divina natura est nata de Virgine.
3. Item, expressissime Augustinus de Fide ad Petrum3: « Natura aeterna atque divina non posset temporaliter concipi et nasci nisi secundum susceptionem veritatis humanae »: ergo videtur, quod vere et proprie debeat dici concepta et nata de Virgine.
4. Item, incarnatio ordinatur ad nativitatem — unde et persona Verbi ideo nata est, quia incarnata — sed conceditur, quod divina natura sit incarnata, ut habitum est supra distinctione quinta4: ergo et concedi debet, quod sit de Virgine nata.
5. Item, assumere carnem nihil aliud est quam nasci in utero; sed haec conceditur, quod divina natura assumsit carnem de Virgine5: ergo concedi debet, quod nata fuerit in utero Virginis. Sed ad nativitatem in utero subsequitur nativitas ex utero: ergo si divina natura nata fuit in Virginis utero, sequitur, quod fuerit nata ex Virginis utero.
6. Item, magis consonat divinae naturae nasci de Virgine, quam pati conveniat virtuti, et infirmari conveniat fortitudini; sed Bernardus6 dicit, quod « in illa unione fuit fortitudo infirmata »: ergo multo fortius concedi debet, divinam naturam esse natam de Virgine.
(Fundamenta.) Sed contra: 1. Damascenus, libro quarto7: « Cognoscimus, quod nasci non est naturae, sed hypostasis »: ergo nasci de Virgine naturae non competit, sed solum personae.
2. Item, nobilior et prior est nativitas aeterna quam temporalis; sed divina natura non dicitur esse nata propter Filii nativitatem aeternam, ut in primo libro8 ostensum est: ergo multo minus non debet dici nata propter temporalem nativitatem.
3. Item, cuicumque competit nasci, competit esse ab alio9; sed divinae naturae non competit esse ab alio: ergo divina natura nec aeternaliter nec temporaliter debet dici nata.
4. Item, cuicumque competit nasci, competit ratio filiationis: ergo si divina natura dicitur esse nata de Virgine, divina natura dicitur10 filia Virginis.
5. Item, sicut se habent proprietates divinae naturae ad humanam, sic proprietates humanae ad divinam; sed haec est simpliciter falsa: humanitas in Christo est aeterna: ergo et ista: divina natura in Christo est de Virgine nata.
6. Item, quod nascitur ex aliquo est natura conformis cum eo, ex quo nascitur11: si ergo divina natura nata est de Virgine, videtur, quod divina natura et Virgo Maria sint eiusdem naturae; quod est falsum et impossibile.
Conclusio
(Conclusio.) Praedicta locutio ob duplicem causam non debet recipi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera12, haec non recipitur tanquam propria: divina natura est de Virgine nata. Et hoc propter duo, videlicet propter vitandam confusionem proprietatum personalium et proprietatum naturalium sive essentialium, quae duo praecipue sunt observanda circa sermonem catholicum et veritatis fidei expressivum. — (Ratio 1.) Non igitur recipitur, quod divina natura sit nata de Virgine, propter confusionem personalium; propter quod etiam non conceditur, quod sit nata de Patre. Et hoc est quod dicit Magister in littera13: « Quae res non est de Patre genita, non videtur de Matre nata; nec res aliqua filiationis nomen habet in humanitate, quae illud non teneat in divinitate ».
(Ratio 2.) Propter vitandam etiam confusionem proprietatum naturalium non recipitur. Sicut enim in beatissima Trinitate distinctae sunt personae ad invicem et earum proprietates; sic in Christo naturae sunt distinctae ad invicem et earum proprietates, quamvis conveniant in supposito; et ideo proprietas unius naturae non debet14 praedicari de altera natura in abstractione considerata, ne ex hoc intelligatur, quod divina natura et humana sint una essentia. Quod enim praedicatur de altero in abstrap. 187ctione non intelligitur convenire ei solum ratione suppositi, verum etiam ratione formae15. Et ideo praedicta locutio recipi non debet. Et concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.
(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud verbum Hilarii dicendum, quod aliquid habet improprietatis et debet sic exponi: nihil habet Filius nisi natum, id est, nihil habet, quod non nascendo accepit. Et hoc melius in primo libro16 explanatum fuit.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de auctoritate Damasceni, quod Virgo Maria est Dei genitrix; dicendum, quod concedendum est, quod Deus natus est de Virgine; ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod divina natura sit de Virgine nata, pro eo quod hoc nomen Deus, quia significat in concretione, supponit personam; non sic divina natura, quae significat in abstractione. Unde et haec conceditur: Deus generat: quamvis haec non concedatur: divina natura vel essentia generat. Unde in omnibus talibus processibus est sophisma secundum accidens. Aliter enim et aliter significatur divina natura per hoc nomen Deus, et aliter per hoc nomen natura; ideo in nullo cogit auctoritas illa.
3. (Nota.) Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod divina natura dicitur concipi et nasci; dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Magister in littera17, Augustinus ibi extendit nomen naturae, ut stet loco personae; et hoc quidem multoties facit. Sed communis usus talem modum loquendi non admittit; ideo ex tali auctoritate non debet argui, immo potius debet exponi.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod incarnatio est via ad nativitatem; dicendum, quod verum est: ad nativitatem personae, quae est suppositum naturae assumtae; sed non oportet, quod sit via ad nativitatem naturae. Incarnatio enim non facit communicationem idiomatum ratione convenientiae in natura, sed potius ratione convenientiae in persona.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod assumere carnem est nasci in utero; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod assumere idem est quod in unitatem sui accipere, et hoc modo proprium est personae. Secundum autem quod assumere dicitur de divina natura, accipitur largius; et hoc modo assumere non est idem quod in utero nasci, sed potius carni uniri.
6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod fortitudo est infirmata, et sic de aliis; dicendum, quod verba illa non sunt trahenda ad consequentiam. Conceditur enim18 aliquid dicere ei qui vult excitare devotionem et elevare in admirationem, quod tamen reprehenderetur in eo qui sermonis catholici proprietatem et veritatem inquirit. — (Alia solutio.) Posset etiam et aliter responderi, quod non est simile. Quamvis enim hoc nomen essentia vel natura non supponat pro persona; nomina tamen appropriata, ut virtus et sapientia, pro persona supponunt et locutionem veram reddunt. Unde sensus est: fortitudo est infirmata, id est persona, cui appropriatur fortitudo, Christus videlicet, qui est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia19, Verbum scilicet Patris, cui competit esse Dei virtutem et Dei sapientiam. Et ideo, quamvis talia praedicata conveniant et attribuantur nominibus appropriatis, non tamen sequitur, quod attribui possint essentiae vel naturae proprie et vere.
I. Pro conclusione, quae est doctrina communis, plures a diversis rationes afferuntur, praesertim haec, quod divina natura per temporalem nativitatem nec producitur nec accipitur. — Illud principium in solutionibus tactum, quod nativitas proprie et primo tribuitur personae, naturae autem tantum ex consequenti, negat Scot. (hic q. unica n. 10. seqq.); cfr. infra a. 2. q. 2, ubi agitur de filiatione. — De hac 1. quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 10. m. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3; S. III. q. 35. a. 1. ad 1. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. q. hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.
II. Quoad sequentem (2.) quaestionem patet, quod si nasci proprie dicitur de supposito, non refertur ad naturam nisi minus proprie et ex consequenti. Conclusio tamen ab antiquis conceditur cum quadam determinatione limitante. De hac quaestione: S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1.
III. Quaestio 3. a plerisque tangitur in quaestionibus 5. distinctionis, praesertim in quaestione (a. 1. q. 5.), utrum divina natura sit incarnata, vel in altera, utrum divinae naturae conveniat assumere. Specialiter de eadem tractant Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3, qui eodem loquendi modo cum S. Bonav. utitur, et Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 3, qui tamen negative ad quaestionem respondet. Sed haec differentia non est nisi de modo loquendi.
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Article I. On the temporal nativity in comparison to the divine nature.
Question I. Whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is born of the Virgin.
Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the divine nature is born of the Virgin. And that it is so, seems [provable]:
1. First, by the authority of Hilary, in the fourth book On the Trinity1: « The Son has nothing except what is born » ; but (On the contrary.) he has the divine nature: therefore it is born. But what is born eternally in Christ from the Father, is born temporally of the Mother: if therefore the divine nature is of this sort, it is evident, and so on.
2. Likewise, more expressly Damascene, in the third book, chapter twelve2: « We proclaim the Theotokos, that is, the God-bearer, to be truly and principally holy Mary the Virgin » ; but « God is a name of the nature »: therefore the Virgin Mary will be the bearer of the divine nature: therefore the divine nature is born of the Virgin.
3. Likewise, most expressly Augustine, On the Faith, to Peter3: « The eternal and divine nature could not be temporally conceived and born except by the taking up of human truth [reality] »: therefore it seems that it ought truly and properly to be said to be conceived and born of the Virgin.
4. Likewise, the incarnation is ordered to the nativity — whence the person of the Word too was born because incarnate — but it is conceded that the divine nature is incarnate, as was held above in the fifth distinction4: therefore it must also be conceded that it is born of the Virgin.
5. Likewise, to assume flesh is nothing other than to be born in the womb; but this is conceded, that the divine nature assumed flesh from the Virgin5: therefore it must be conceded that it was born in the womb of the Virgin. But upon nativity in the womb there follows nativity from the womb: therefore if the divine nature was born in the Virgin's womb, it follows that it was born from the Virgin's womb.
6. Likewise, it is more fitting to the divine nature to be born of the Virgin than it is fitting for power to suffer, and for fortitude to be weakened; but Bernard6 says that « in that union fortitude was weakened »: therefore much more strongly must it be conceded that the divine nature is born of the Virgin.
(Fundamenta.) On the contrary: 1. Damascene, in the fourth book7: « We acknowledge that to be born does not belong to the nature, but to the hypostasis »: therefore to be born of the Virgin does not belong to the nature, but only to the person.
2. Likewise, the eternal nativity is nobler and prior than the temporal; but the divine nature is not said to be born on account of the Son's eternal nativity, as was shown in the first book8: therefore much less ought it to be said to be born on account of the temporal nativity.
3. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be born, to it belongs to be from another9; but it does not belong to the divine nature to be from another: therefore the divine nature ought to be said to be born neither eternally nor temporally.
4. Likewise, to whatever it belongs to be born, to it belongs the formal character of sonship: therefore if the divine nature is said to be born of the Virgin, the divine nature is said10 to be the daughter of the Virgin.
5. Likewise, as the properties of the divine nature stand to the human, so the human properties [stand] to the divine; but this is simply false: the humanity in Christ is eternal: therefore this also [is false]: the divine nature in Christ is born of the Virgin.
6. Likewise, what is born from something is a nature conformable with that from which it is born11: if therefore the divine nature is born of the Virgin, it seems that the divine nature and the Virgin Mary are of the same nature; which is false and impossible.
Conclusion
(Conclusion.) The aforesaid locution, for a twofold cause, ought not to be received.
I respond: It must be said that, as the Master says in the text12, this is not received as proper: the divine nature is born of the Virgin. And this on account of two things, namely on account of avoiding a confusion of the personal properties and of the natural or essential properties, which two things are especially to be observed regarding catholic speech and what expresses the truth of the faith. — (Reason 1.) Therefore it is not received that the divine nature is born of the Virgin, on account of the confusion of personal properties; for which reason it is also not conceded that it is born of the Father. And this is what the Master says in the text13: « What is not begotten of the Father does not seem to be born of the Mother; nor does any reality have the name of sonship in the humanity which it does not hold in the divinity ».
(Reason 2.) Also on account of avoiding a confusion of the natural properties it is not received. For just as in the most blessed Trinity the persons and their properties are distinct from one another; so in Christ the natures are distinct from one another and their properties, although they coincide in the supposit; and therefore the property of one nature ought not14 to be predicated of the other nature considered in abstraction, lest from this it be understood that the divine and human nature are one essence. For what is predicated of another in abstracp. 187tion is not understood to belong to it only by reason of the supposit, but also by reason of the form15. And therefore the aforesaid locution ought not to be received. And the reasons demonstrating this are to be conceded.
(Solution of the contrary arguments.) 1. To that word of Hilary it must be said that it has something of impropriety and ought to be expounded thus: the Son has nothing except what is born, that is, he has nothing which he did not receive by being born. And this was better explained in the first book16.
2. To that which is objected from the authority of Damascene, that the Virgin Mary is the God-bearer; it must be said that it must be conceded that God was born of the Virgin; yet from this it does not follow that the divine nature is born of the Virgin, for the reason that this name God, because it signifies in concretion, supposits for the person; not so the divine nature, which signifies in abstraction. Whence this too is conceded: God begets; although this is not conceded: the divine nature or essence begets. Whence in all such processes there is a fallacy of accident. For the divine nature is signified in one way by this name God, and in another by this name nature; therefore that authority compels nothing.
3. (Note.) To that which is objected, that the divine nature is said to be conceived and born; it must be said that, as the Master says in the text17, Augustine there extends the name nature so that it stands in place of person; and this indeed he does many times. But common usage does not admit such a manner of speaking; therefore from such an authority one ought not to argue, but rather it ought to be expounded.
4. To that which is objected, that the incarnation is the way to the nativity; it must be said that it is true: to the nativity of the person, which is the supposit of the assumed nature; but it is not necessary that it be the way to the nativity of the nature. For the incarnation does not effect a communication of idioms by reason of a coinciding in nature, but rather by reason of a coinciding in person.
5. To that which is objected, that to assume flesh is to be born in the womb; it must be said that it is true, insofar as to assume is the same as to receive into the unity of oneself, and in this way it is proper to the person. But insofar as to assume is said of the divine nature, it is taken more broadly; and in this way to assume is not the same as to be born in the womb, but rather to be united to flesh.
6. To that which is objected, that fortitude was weakened, and so of the others; it must be said that those words are not to be drawn into a consequence. For it is conceded18 that something is said by one who wishes to excite devotion and to lift up into admiration, which nevertheless would be censured in one who inquires into the propriety and truth of catholic speech. — (Another solution.) It could also be answered otherwise, that it is not similar. For although this name essence or nature does not supposit for the person; nevertheless appropriated names, such as power and wisdom, supposit for the person and render the locution true. Whence the sense is: fortitude was weakened, that is, the person to whom fortitude is appropriated, namely Christ, who is the power of God and the wisdom of God19, namely the Word of the Father, to whom it belongs to be the power of God and the wisdom of God. And therefore, although such predicates befit and are attributed to appropriated names, it nevertheless does not follow that they can be attributed to the essence or nature properly and truly.
I. For the conclusion, which is the common doctrine, several reasons are brought forward by various [authors], especially this, that the divine nature is neither produced nor received through the temporal nativity. — The principle touched upon in the solutions, that nativity is properly and primarily attributed to the person, but to the nature only consequently, Scotus denies (here, the single question, n. 10 ff.); cf. below, a. 2, q. 2, where filiation is treated. — On this first question: Alexander of Hales, Part III, q. 10, m. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3; Summa III, q. 35, a. 1, ad 1. — Bl. Albert, on this and the following q. here, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 2. — Durandus, on this and the following q. here, q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, on this and the following q. here, q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following qq. here, the single question.
II. As regards the following (second) question, it is evident that if to be born is properly said of the supposit, it is not referred to the nature except less properly and consequently. The conclusion is nevertheless conceded by the ancients with a certain limiting determination. On this question: St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 1.
III. The third question is touched by most [authors] in the questions of the fifth distinction, especially in the question (a. 1, q. 5) whether the divine nature is incarnate, or in the other [question] whether to assume befits the divine nature. Richard of Mediavilla treats specially of the same, here a. 1, q. 3, who uses the same manner of speaking as St. Bonaventure, and Giles of Rome, here q. 2, a. 3, who nevertheless answers the question negatively. But this difference is only as to the manner of speaking.
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- Num. 10. — Minor subsumta, in qua pro Sed quod edd. exhibent Sed quidquid, sententialiter convenit cum dicto Fulgentii, de Fide ad Petrum, c. 2. n. 14: Illa enim natura, quae semper genita manet ex Patre, naturam nostram sine peccato suscepit, ut nasceretur ex Virgine. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1.No. 10. — The minor premise subsumed, in which for Sed quod ("But what") the editions present Sed quidquid ("But whatever"), agrees in meaning with the statement of Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter, c. 2, n. 14: For that nature, which always remains begotten of the Father, took up our nature without sin, that it might be born of the Virgin. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 1.
- De Fide orthod. — Verba Deus est nomen naturae sunt secundum Ambros. (l. de Fide ad Gratian. c. 1. n. 7.), ut in lit. Magistri, l. Sent. d. II. c. 4. refertur.On the Orthodox Faith. — The words God is a name of the nature are according to Ambrose (On the Faith, to Gratian, bk. 1, c. 1, n. 7), as is reported in the text of the Master, Sentences bk. I, d. II, c. 4.
- Cap. 2. n. 14. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine testimonii allati codd. K Z voci humanae praemittunt naturae.Ch. 2, n. 14. See here the text of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the cited testimony codices K Z prefix naturae to the word humanae.
- Art. 1. q. 5.Art. 1, q. 5.
- Cfr. supra d. 5. a. 1. q. 1. De distinctione nativitatis in utero et ex utero vide supra d. 3. p. 1. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — Edd. omittunt de Virgine.Cf. above, d. 5, a. 1, q. 1. On the distinction of the nativity in the womb and from the womb see above, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 and following. — The editions omit of the Virgin.
- Homil. 2. super Missus est, n. 9: Videas, si attendas, potentiam regi, sapientiam instrui... fortitudinem infirmari. — Pro Bernardus codd. W X Gregorius. Post fortitudo edd. subiiciunt divina.Homily 2 on Missus est, n. 9: You may see, if you attend, power ruled, wisdom instructed... fortitude weakened. — For Bernardus codices W X read Gregorius. After fortitudo the editions add divina.
- De Fide orthod. c. 7.On the Orthodox Faith, c. 7.
- Dist. 5. a. 2. q. 1. — In maiori Vat. melior pro nobilior.Dist. 5, a. 2, q. 1. — In the major premise the Vatican edition reads melior ("better") for nobilior ("nobler").
- Nam, ut Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 47. (c. 4.) dicit, « generat autem nihil ipsum se ipsum ». — In fine arg. pro debet cod. A substituit oportet.For, as Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 47 (c. 4), says, « nothing whatever begets its very self ». — At the end of the argument, for debet codex A substitutes oportet.
- Cod. U subiicit esse. — Cfr. de hoc arg. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Codex U adds esse. — Cf. on this argument the text of the Master here, c. 1.
- Generare enim, ut Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 34. (c. 4.) docet, « est facere aliud quale ipsum ». Cfr. supra d. 4. a. 1. q. 1. seq. et dub. 2.For to beget, as Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 34 (c. 4), teaches, « is to make another such as itself ». Cf. above, d. 4, a. 1, q. 1 and following, and dub. 2.
- Hic c. 1. — Mox pro tanquam propria Vat. cum non paucis codd. erronee tanquam impropria.Here, c. 1. — Shortly after, for tanquam propria ("as proper") the Vatican edition with not a few codices erroneously [reads] tanquam impropria ("as improper").
- Hic c. 1, ubi textus origin. et Vat. pro nec res... habet exhibent ne res... habeat. Subinde pro teneat cod. G tenet. — Paulo superius post de Virgine ex solo cod. bb, contextu exigente, supplevimus propter confusionem personalium (proprietatum vitandam).Here, c. 1, where the original text and the Vatican edition, for nec res... habet, present ne res... habeat. Thereafter, for teneat codex G [reads] tenet. — A little above, after de Virgine, from codex bb alone, the context requiring it, we supplied propter confusionem personalium (to avoid the confusion of properties).
- Cod. K et ideo proprietates... non debent.Codex K [reads] and therefore the properties... ought not.
- Cfr. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 1. ad 5. et 6, nec non d. 7. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.Cf. above, d. 6, a. 1, q. 1, ad 5 and 6, as also d. 7, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.
- Dist. V. lit. Magistri, c. 1. et Comment. a. 2. q. 1. ac dub. 5.Dist. V, the text of the Master, c. 1, and the Commentary, a. 2, q. 1, and dub. 5.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 4. q. 1. et 4. atque d. 3. a. 1. q. 1. De sophismate secundum accidens cfr. supra pag. 179, nota 1. — In fine solut. pro in nullo cod. G nullo modo.Cf. Sentences bk. I, d. 4, q. 1 and 4, and d. 3, a. 1, q. 1. On the fallacy of accident cf. above, p. 179, note 1. — At the end of the solution, for in nullo codex G [reads] nullo modo.
- Hic c. 1. Cfr. supra lit. Magistri, d. V. c. 1, ubi similis sententia ex eodem libro de Fide ad Petrum affertur, et l. Sent. d. V. c. 1.Here, c. 1. Cf. above, the text of the Master, d. V, c. 1, where a similar opinion is adduced from the same book On the Faith, to Peter, and Sentences bk. I, d. V, c. 1.
- Respicitur I. Cor. 1, 24. — Cfr. I. Sent. d. 32. a. 2. q. 2. in fine et d. 34. q. 3.1 Cor. 1:24 is referred to. — Cf. Sentences bk. I, d. 32, a. 2, q. 2, at the end, and d. 34, q. 3. ---