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Dist. 31, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 31

Textus Latinus
p. 543

Quaestio III.

Quare aeternitas approprietur Patri, species Imagini, et usus Muneri.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Tertio quaeritur, quare aeternitas approprietur Patri, species Imagini et usus Muneri. Videtur, quod non sit bona appropriatio Hilarii1:

1. Quia omnes divinae personae simul aeternae et coaequales sunt, et aeternitas abstrahit ab actu personae: ergo non est appropriabilis.

2. Item, quaeritur, quare species appropriatur imagini? Aut enim sumitur ibi species, ut species dicitur forma, aut pulcritudo: si forma; sed sicut natura nulli2 est appropriabilis, sic nec species. Si autem pulcritudo; sed pulcritudo imaginis refertur ad prototypum: ergo ad Patrem; ergo illi debet appropriari.

3. Item, Dionysius3 dicit, quod «bonum et pulcrum idem est»: ergo cum bonitas sit appropriabilis Spiritui sancto, ergo et pulcritudo.

4. Item, Hilarius4 dicit, quod «oportet imaginem habere essentiam et naturam et speciem auctoris». Quare ergo magis definit imaginem per speciem quam aliquod aliorum?

5. Item, non est utendum Deo, sed solum creatura5: ergo usus nulli personae est appropriabilis; ergo nec Spiritui sancto.

Conclusio.

Congrue appropriatur aeternitas Patri propter carentiam principii; usus, ut dicit generaliter actum voluntatis, Spiritui sancto propter modum emanationis, id est secundum voluntatem; Filio autem species, quia species dicit similitudinem, rationem cognoscendi, et pulcritudinem: quae omnia illi congruunt, quia emanat per modum naturae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista appropriatio Hilarii fuit ad explicandam personarum originem sive emanationem. Quoniam igitur persona Patris emanatione et origine caret, ideo illud debuit ei appropriari, quod importat privationem principii. Tale autem est hoc nomen aeternitas. Aeternum enim est quod principio caret6. Et licet de suo nomine non dicat nisi privationem initii durationis, per appropriationem tamen dicit privationem omnis principii.

1. Et sic patet prima obiectio.

Spiritus vero sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis et amoris; et ita debuit ei appropriari nomen, quod actum exprimit voluntatis; hoc autem est hoc nomen usus. «Nam uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis»7, sive ad utendum sive ad fruendum. Quoniam ergo assumtio ad fruendum est per amorem, similiter ad utendum, quia amor est pondus et ordo8: ideo usus recte appropriatur Spiritui sancto.

5. Et sic patet ultimo quaesitum, scilicet quod usus accipitur hic, non prout dividitur contra fruitionem, sed prout dicit amoris complexum et9 actum liberum.

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Filius vero emanat per modum naturae; et quia emanat per modum naturae10, ideo emanat per modum perfectae et expressae similitudinis. Nam natura producit sibi simile et aequale. Et quia habet rationem expressae similitudinis, ideo et cognitionis, quia expressa similitudo est ratio cognoscendi11. Et quia per modum perfectae similitudinis et rationis habet in se rationem et exemplar omnium, inde est, quod habet rationem perfectae pulcritudinis. Quia enim est perfecta et expressa similitudo, ideo pulcher est in comparatione ad eum quem exprimit. Quia vero rationem cognoscendi habet, et non unius tantum, sed totius universitatis; ideo «pulcrum pulcherrimus ipse mundum mente gerens»12, pulcritudinem habet in comparatione ad omnem pulcritudinem exemplatam. Ex his duobus relinquitur perfectissima pulcritudo. Sicut enim dicit Augustinus13: «Pulcritudo non est aliud quam aequalitas numerosa». Quoniam igitur in comparatione ad Patrem habet pulcritudinem aequalitatis, quia perfecte exprimit, sicut pulcra imago; in comparatione vero ad res habet omnes rationes, secundum quod dicit Augustinus14, quod «est ars plena omnium rationum viventium»: ideo patet, quod in Filio recte reperitur ratio omnis pulcritudinis. — Eo igitur quo Filius per modum naturae emanat, habet rationem perfectae et expressae similitudinis; eo quod habet rationem perfectae similitudinis, habet rationem cognitionis; et ratione utriusque habet rationem pulcritudinis. Quoniam igitur nomen speciei importat similitudinem et importat cognoscendi rationem, importat etiam pulcritudinem — ut «species quidem Priami digna est imperio»15 — ideo elegantissime appropriatur Filio.

2. 4. Patet ergo, quare illud nomen magis appropriat Hilarius Filio quam aliud, quare etiam magis definit imaginem per illud nomen quam per aliquod aliud.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod pulcritudo imaginis refertur ad prototypum; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen aliter refertur honor, aliter pulcritudo: quia honor imaginis sive picturae ita refertur ad prototypum, quod in ipsa non est secundum se honor, sicut patet, si honoretur iconia beati Nicolai16; sed pulcritudo ita refertur ad prototypum, quod nihilominus est in imagine pulcritudo, non solum in eo cuius est imago. Et potest ibi reperiri duplex ratio pulcritudinis, quamvis in eo cuius est, non nisi una inveniatur. Quod patet, quia imago dicitur pulcra, quando bene protracta est, dicitur etiam pulcra, quando bene repraesentat illum, ad quem est. Et quod ista sit alia ratio pulcritudinis, patet, quia contingit unam esse sine alia: quemadmodum dicitur imago diaboli pulcra, quando

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bene repraesentat foeditatem diaboli, et tunc foeda est. Et ideo Hilarius, approprians speciem sive pulcritudinem Filio, magis appropriat sub nomine imaginis quam sub nomine filii.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est bonum et pulcrum: dicendum, quod Dionysius non vult dicere, quod sint unum ratione, sed quod sint unum re. Sed quoniam ratione differunt, ideo potest alicui appropriari unum, quod non appropriatur alterum.

Scholion

I. De ipsa ratione appropriationis et de duplici eius radice cfr. infra d. 34. q. 3, ubi etiam sermo est de appropriatione qua Patri tribuitur potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui S. bonitas; tertiam appropriationem vide hic a. 2. q. 3. (cfr. Breviloq. p. 1. c. 6.). In hac quaestione egregie exponitur appropriatio ex S. Hilario sumta.

Notandum est, quod in Filio sit ratio summae pulcritudinis ex duplice capite: ex parte Patris, quem perfectissima similitudine exprimit, et ex parte exemplatorum. Plura de ratione pulcritudinis vide II. Sent. d. 9. q. 8; IV. Sent. d. 49. p. II. a. 2. q. [?] in fundam.; Itiner. mentis in Deum c. 2; Hexaem. Serm. 6. 20. — Mentione digna est etiam doctrina in solut. ad. 2.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 67. m. 1. — Scot., I. Report. d. 34. q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2 [?]; S. I. q. 39. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. 6. 7; S. p. I. tr. 12. q. 48. m. 2. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic [?]. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., [?] 71. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. [?]. — Biel, hic q. [?].

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English Translation
p. 543

Question III. Why eternity is appropriated to the Father, species to the Image, and use to the Gift.

Thirdly, it is asked why eternity is appropriated to the Father, species (beauty) to the Image, and use to the Gift. It seems that Hilary's appropriation1 is not a good one:

1. Because all the divine persons are equally eternal and coequal, and eternity abstracts from the act of a person: therefore it is not appropriable.

2. Likewise, it is asked: why is species appropriated to the Image? For there species is taken either as species is called form, or as beauty: if as form — but just as nature is appropriable to none2, so neither is species. If as beauty — but the beauty of the image is referred to the prototype: therefore to the Father; therefore it ought to be appropriated to him.

3. Likewise, Dionysius3 says that "the good and the beautiful are the same": therefore, since goodness is appropriable to the Holy Spirit, so also is beauty.

4. Likewise, Hilary4 says that "an image must have the essence and nature and species of the author." Why then does he define an image more by species than by any of the others?

5. Likewise, God is not to be used, but only the creature5: therefore use is appropriable to no person; therefore not even to the Holy Spirit.

Conclusion.

Eternity is fittingly appropriated to the Father on account of his lack of a principle; use, as it generally signifies the act of will, [is appropriated] to the Holy Spirit on account of the mode of emanation, that is, according to will; but species [is appropriated] to the Son, since species expresses likeness, the ground of knowing, and beauty: all of which fit him, since he emanates by way of nature.

I respond: It must be said that this appropriation of Hilary was made for the sake of explaining the origin or emanation of the persons. Since therefore the person of the Father lacks emanation and origin, that ought to be appropriated to him which imports the privation of a principle. And such is this name eternity. For the eternal is what lacks a principle6. And although by its own meaning it expresses only the privation of a beginning of duration, by appropriation it nonetheless expresses the privation of every principle.

1. And thus the first objection is answered.

Now the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will and love; and so there had to be appropriated to him a name which expresses the act of will; and this is the name use. For "to use is to take something up into the resource of the will"7, whether for using or for enjoying. Since therefore the assumption [of something] for enjoying is through love, likewise [assumption] for using, since love is weight and order8: therefore use is rightly appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

5. And thus the last [point] inquired about is plain, namely that use is taken here, not as it is divided over against enjoyment, but as it expresses the embrace of love and9 the free act.

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But the Son emanates by way of nature; and since he emanates by way of nature10, therefore he emanates by way of perfect and expressed likeness. For nature produces what is like and equal to itself. And since he has the account of an expressed likeness, therefore [he has] also [the account] of cognition, since an expressed likeness is the ground of knowing11. And since by way of perfect likeness and ground he has in himself the account and exemplar of all things, hence it is that he has the account of perfect beauty. For since he is a perfect and expressed likeness, therefore he is beautiful in comparison to him whom he expresses. Since indeed he has the ground of knowing, and not only of one [thing] but of the whole universe, therefore "the most beautiful, bearing the world beautifully in his mind"12, he has beauty in comparison to all exemplified beauty. From these two there results most perfect beauty. For as Augustine says13: "Beauty is nothing other than numerical equality." Since therefore in comparison to the Father he has the beauty of equality, since he expresses [him] perfectly, as a beautiful image; but in comparison to things he has all the accounts [or "reasons"], according as Augustine says14 that "he is the art full of all the living reasons": therefore it is plain that in the Son the account of every beauty is rightly found. — Therefore by the same fact that the Son emanates by way of nature, he has the account of perfect and expressed likeness; by the fact that he has the account of perfect likeness, he has the account of cognition; and by reason of both he has the account of beauty. Since therefore the name species imports likeness, and imports the ground of knowing, it imports also beauty — as in "the species (beauty) of Priam, indeed, is worthy of empire"15 — therefore [species] is most elegantly appropriated to the Son.

2. 4. It is plain therefore why Hilary appropriates that name to the Son rather than another, and why too he defines an image by that name rather than by any other.

To that, then, which is objected, that the beauty of an image is referred to the prototype, it must be said that this is true, but yet honor is referred [to the prototype] in one way, and beauty in another: for the honor of an image or picture is so referred to the prototype that in the [image] itself there is not honor in itself, as is plain if the icon of blessed Nicholas is honored16; but beauty is so referred to the prototype that nonetheless beauty is in the image [as well], not only in him whose image it is. And there can be found there a twofold account of beauty, although in him whose [image] it is, only one is found. Which is plain, since an image is called beautiful when it is well drawn, and is also called beautiful when it well represents him toward whom it is. And that this is another account of beauty is plain, since it happens that the one is without the other: just as an image of the devil is said to be beautiful when

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it well represents the foulness of the devil, and is then itself foul. And therefore Hilary, when appropriating species or beauty to the Son, appropriates it more under the name of image than under the name of son.

3. To that which is objected, that the good and the beautiful are the same: it must be said that Dionysius does not mean that they are one in account, but that they are one in reality. But since they differ in account, therefore the one can be appropriated to someone, while the other is not appropriated.

Scholion

I. Concerning the very nature of appropriation and its twofold root, cf. below d. 34, q. 3, where there is also discussion of the appropriation by which power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit; for the third appropriation see here a. 2, q. 3 (cf. Breviloquium p. 1, c. 6). In this question the appropriation drawn from St. Hilary is excellently expounded.

It must be noted that in the Son the account of supreme beauty is found from a twofold source: from the side of the Father, whom he expresses with the most perfect likeness, and from the side of the things exemplified. For more on the account of beauty see II Sent. d. 9, q. 8; IV Sent. d. 49, p. II, a. 2, q. [?] in fundam.; Itinerarium mentis in Deum c. 2; Hexaemeron Sermo 6, n. 20. — Worthy of mention also is the doctrine in the solution to [obj.] 2.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 67, m. 1. — Scotus, I Report. d. 34, q. 3. — St. Thom., here q. 2 [?]; S. I, q. 39, a. 8. — B. Albert, here a. 8, 6, 7; S. p. I, tr. 12, q. 48, m. 2. — Ægid. R., here 2. princ. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here [?]. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2, q. 1. — Henr. Gand., [?] 71, q. 4. — Durand., here q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., here q. [?]. — Biel, here q. [?].

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Verba Hilarii invenies pag. 541, nota 1. — Paulo superius post Videtur codd. XZ inserunt enim. Post hoc argumentum in cod. K sequens invenitur interpositum: Item, appropriatio est ad excludendum errorem: ergo cum magis possunt homines errare circa aeternitatem Filii quam Patris, magis Filio debet appropriari.
    The words of Hilary are to be found on p. 541, note 1. — A little above, after Videtur, codices XZ insert enim. After this argument, in codex K, the following is found inserted: "Likewise, appropriation is for excluding error: therefore since men can err more concerning the eternity of the Son than of the Father, [eternity] ought rather to be appropriated to the Son."
  2. Pro nulli, quod auctoritate codd. QY et ed. 1 posuimus, Vat. nulla. Paulo superius post ut species dicitur forma codd. aa bb addunt vel essentia.
    In place of nulli, which we have set down on the authority of codices QY and edition 1, the Vatican [edition] reads nulla. A little above, after ut species dicitur forma, codices aa bb add vel essentia.
  3. De Div. Nom. c. 4. § 7: ταὐτόν ἐστι τἀγαθὸν τῷ καλόν. — Post idem codd. aa bb adiungunt est conseguuntur vel se. — Hoc argumentum, hoc Vat. loco positum, auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 ultimo loco posuimus.
    On the Divine Names, c. 4, § 7: "The Good is the same as the Beautiful." — After idem codices aa bb add est consequuntur or se. — This argument, placed by the Vatican [edition] in this position, on the authority of the codices and of edition 1 we have placed in the last position.
  4. Libr. de Synod. n. 13: Ut rei imago sit, speciem necesse est et naturam et essentiam, secundum quod imago est, in se habeat auctoris.
    Book On the Synods, n. 13: "That something be the image of a thing, it is necessary that, according as it is image, it have in itself the species and nature and essence of its author."
  5. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 3. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum aliquibus mss. perperam Spiritus sanctus.
    Cf. above d. 1, a. 1, q. 3. — At the end of the argument the Vatican [edition], with some manuscripts, wrongly reads Spiritus sanctus.
  6. Richardus de S. Victore, II. de Trin. c. 4: Sempiternum namque esse videtur, quod caret initio et fine; aeternum, quod caret utroque et omni mutabilitate.
    Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity II, c. 4: "For sempiternal seems to be that which lacks beginning and end; eternal, that which lacks both and [lacks] all mutability."
  7. August., X. de Trin. c. 11. n. 17. Vide supra d. 1. c. 3, et explicationem S. Doctoris ibi a. 1. q. 1.
    Augustine, On the Trinity X, c. 11, n. 17. See above d. 1, c. 3, and the explanation of the Holy Doctor there at a. 1, q. 1.
  8. August., XIII. Confess. c. 9. n. 10: Pondus meum amor meus, eo feror quocumque feror. Cfr. etiam XI. de Civ. Dei c. 28, et XV. c. 22, ubi et docetur, in amore requiri ordinem.
    Augustine, Confessions XIII, c. 9, n. 10: "My weight is my love; by it I am borne wherever I am borne." Cf. also On the City of God XI, c. 28, and XV, c. 22, where it is also taught that in love an order is required.
  9. Codd. K V X subiiciunt ita.
    Codices K V X add ita.
  10. Verba et quia emanat per modum naturae, quae in plurimis codd. et ed. 1 exstant, in Vat. et aliquibus codd. desiderantur. — De ratione mox addita vide supra pag. 134, nota 10.
    The words et quia emanat per modum naturae, which are found in very many codices and in edition 1, are wanting in the Vatican [edition] and in some codices. — On the reason added shortly afterward, see above p. 134, note 10.
  11. Cfr. supra d. 6. q. 3. ad 4, et infra d. 33. q. 1. in corp., et Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. (c. 8.), ac libr. de Memoria et Reminisc. c. 2. (c. 1.). — Paulo inferius post rationem Vat. repetit cognoscendi, neque codd. neque edd. 1, 2, 3 suffragantibus.
    Cf. above d. 6, q. 3, ad 4, and below d. 33, q. 1, in the body, and Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 38 (c. 8), and the book On Memory and Reminiscence, c. 2 (c. 1). — A little below, after rationem, the Vatican [edition] repeats cognoscendi, with neither the codices nor editions 1, 2, 3 supporting [the repetition].
  12. Boeth., III. de Consol. metr. 9. — Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 addit ut ait Boethius, et mox pro exemplatam substituit extraneam, paucis tantum suffulta codd. Cod. R exemplati pro exemplatam.
    Boethius, On Consolation III, metrum 9. — The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and of edition 1, adds ut ait Boethius, and shortly afterward in place of exemplatam substitutes extraneam, supported by only a few codices. Codex R reads exemplati in place of exemplatam.
  13. Libr. VI. de Musica c. 13. n. 38: An aliud quam aequalitatem numerosam esse arbitraris (pulcritudinem)? Cfr. et XXII. de Civ. Dei c. 19. n. 2. et 3.
    Book VI On Music, c. 13, n. 38: "Or do you judge beauty to be anything other than numerical equality?" Cf. also XXII On the City of God, c. 19, nn. 2 and 3.
  14. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 11.
    Book VI On the Trinity, c. 10, n. 11.
  15. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie, iuxta mendosam translationem antiquam, qua usi sunt Scholastici (etiam Averroes sic legit). Verba species Priami B. Albertus, qui nomen Priami librariorum errore ortum esse non suspicabatur, sic explicare tentat in suo Commentario super Porphyrium: «Secundum quod dicimus, quod species Priami, Troiani regis (qui forma elegantissima fuit), digna est imperio; quia ex elegantia formae demonstratur dispositio ad virtutes» etc. At Boëthius (ed. Migne), Porphyrii textum Graecum recte Latine reddens, pro Priami legit primum (alii interpretes prima), quae vox et in Euripide habetur, ex quo verba illa citata sumta sunt. Euripidis verba in Latinum translata sunt: Corpus habere, quod res pulcra mereatur.
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. On Species, according to the faulty old translation which the Scholastics used (even Averroes reads it thus). The words species Priami (Priam's species), B. Albert, who did not suspect that the name Priami arose from a copyists' error, attempts to explain thus in his Commentary on Porphyry: "According as we say that the species [beauty] of Priam, the Trojan king (who was of most elegant form), is worthy of empire; because from the elegance of the form is shown the disposition toward the virtues" etc. But Boethius (ed. Migne), rightly rendering Porphyry's Greek text into Latin, in place of Priami reads primum (other translators prima), which word is also found in Euripides, from whom those cited words were taken. Euripides' words translated into Latin are: To have a body which a beautiful thing would deserve.
  16. Sola Vat. hic addit iconia beati Nicolai pulcra, quia decorem illius repraesentat, et inde placida est, et.
    The Vatican [edition] alone here adds the icon of blessed Nicholas is beautiful, because it represents his comeliness, and on that account is pleasing, and.
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