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Dist. 6, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 6

Textus Latinus

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry begins with La. for the Latin gloss as printed in the Quaracchi apparatus and En. for our English rendering.

DUB. I.

In parte ista circa litteram dubitatur de ratione Augustini ad Orosium, quod nec voluntate nec necessitate, quia necessitas in Deo non est etc. Videtur enim sufficiens1 divisio. Omne enim quod Deus facit, aut facit naturaliter, et sic necessario, aut voluntarie: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod ipse respondet ad intellectum haeretici, et haereticus intelligit de voluntate antecedente et necessitate inevitabilitatis: obiicitur, quod oratio nihilominus in se est multiplex. Sed qui respondet orationi multiplici simpliciter affirmando vel negando, male respondet, secundum quod dicit Philosophus2: ergo, etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus respondet secundum intellectum haeretici. Quamvis autem oratio in se sit multiplex, quia tamen haereticus in uno sensu eam accipit, iam multiplicitas illa non faceret3 ad solvendum, quia non procedit secundum illam. Sed distinctio propositionis multiplicis, quando secundum illam multiplicitatem non cadit deceptio, magis est ad ostentationem quam ad veram responsionem.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Dicamus, Verbum Dei esse Filium Dei natura, non voluntate. Videtur enim benedicere, quia Pater alio est Deus, alio est Pater, quia deitate est Deus, et paternitate est Pater, ut dicit Augustinus4. Sed Filius est Deus natura deitatis: ergo hac non dicetur Filius, sed ipsa filiatione5.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ille ablativus potest construi formaliter; et sic falsa est, quia formaliter alio est Deus, scilicet natura, et alio Filius. Potest iterum construi originaliter et in ratione principii; et sic vera est, et est sensus, quod Filius ortum habet a Patre naturaliter.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Acute sane quidam respondit, quia Augustinus commendat istam solutionem, quae non est commendanda, quia multiplicare inconveniens non est solvere6.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est solutio ad hominem et est solutio ad orationem7; et aliquando melius et utilius est solvere ad hominem quam ad orationem, ut puta, quando respondens est discolus et non vult intelligere veritatem, et quando assistentes sunt simplices et non possunt capere veritatem et subtilitatem. Ideo quia haereticus veritatem respuebat et adversabatur, idcirco adversanti erat adversandum, et tali modo, quo magis privaretur gloria et assistentes fallacia. Ideo commendat istam responsionem Augustinus, quia8 manifeste opponentem sua quaestione ligavit. Hunc modum respondendi docuit Dominus Matthaei vigesimo primo9, ubi dixit: Baptismus Ioannis de caelo erat, an ex hominibus etc.

Item quaeritur, cum non sit responsum ad orationem, quomodo respondendum sit. Videtur enim10, quod divisio haeretici sit per immediata, quia velle et nolle opponuntur contradictorie, inter quae non cadit medium. Et dicendum ad hoc, quod haereticus quaerit hoc de voluntate accedente sive de antecedente; et tunc neutra pars est vera, nec sunt membra opposita contradictorie, sed contrarie. Nolle enim et velle dicunt actus voluntatis contrarios, inter quos cadit medium. Aliquid enim est, respectu cuius voluntas nec11 habet rationem causae nec repugnantiae; et ita patet illud.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de solutione Magistri. Videtur enim falsum dicere, cum dicit: Scientia Dei et praescientia de bonis et malis est. Dicit enim Glossa super illud Psalmi12: Quae ignorabam; interrogabant me etc.: «Ars nescit vitium»; sed in Deo est ars artium, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod nescit per modum practicum, sed scit per modum speculationis13; contra: solum illud scit hoc modo, quod in eo relucet; sed in Deo non relucent mala: ergo etc.

Item, non videtur Magister solvere ad argumentum; multiplicare enim inconveniens non est solvere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut infra dicetur14, Deus cognoscit mala per se ipsum, sicut rectum iudicat de obliquo et lux de tenebra; nec oportet, quod in Deo luceat malum, sed sufficit, quod luceat in eo mali oppositum.

p. 132

Ad illud quod obiicitur de solutione Magistri, dicendum, quod solutionem non ponit, sed innuit contra arguendo, quasi dicat: ex illo unum15 non potest inferri ex altero, quia quamvis sint idem in essentia, tamen diversa sunt connotata.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit16 in notula: quod sancta Ecclesia anathematizat eos qui dicunt, Deum non generasse consilio. Videtur enim contradicere Damasceno17 dicenti, quod in Deo non est consilium, quia consilium est ignorantis naturae.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod consilium18 dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur consulere accipere consilium: et sic dicit ignorantiam et similiter consilium, dictum ab hoc19; alio modo consulere dicitur dare consilium, et hoc modo dicit scientiam, et hoc potest transferri ad divina. Deus enim nullo modo accipit consilium aliunde. Unde notandum, quod in consilio duo sunt: est ibi cognitio rei occultae, et est ibi dispositio firma. Quoniam ergo in Deo est verissima cognitio occultorum et invariabilitas, ideo recte dicitur, in ipso esse consilium. Unde Gregorius20: «Deus mutat sententiam, sed non consilium».

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English Translation

Doubts concerning the Master's text.

Doubt I.

In this part, concerning the text, a doubt is raised about Augustine's argument to Orosius, namely that [the Son was generated] neither by will nor by necessity, because necessity is not in God, etc. For the division seems to be sufficient1: indeed, whatever God does, he either does naturally, and so necessarily, or voluntarily; therefore, etc. If you say that he himself is responding according to the heretic's understanding, and the heretic understands [the question] of an antecedent will and a necessity of unavoidableness — it is objected that the proposition is nonetheless in itself ambiguous. But one who responds to an ambiguous proposition by simply affirming or denying responds badly, according to what the Philosopher says2: therefore, etc.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine responds according to the heretic's understanding. For although the proposition is in itself ambiguous, since nevertheless the heretic takes it in one sense, that ambiguity would not bear3 upon the solution, because [the heretic] does not proceed according to it. But the distinguishing of an ambiguous proposition, when no deception arises through that ambiguity, belongs more to ostentation than to a true response.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: Let us say that the Word of God is the Son of God by nature, not by will. For it seems to speak well, since the Father is God by one [thing], and Father by another, because by deity he is God, and by paternity he is Father, as Augustine says4. But the Son is God by the nature of deity: therefore he will not be called Son by this [nature], but by filiation itself5.

I respond: It must be said that that ablative can be construed formally; and so it is false, because formally he is God by one [thing], namely by nature, and Son by another. It can again be construed originally and in the manner of a principle; and so it is true, and the sense is that the Son has his origin from the Father naturally.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what is said: Acutely indeed has someone responded — for Augustine commends that solution, which is not to be commended, because to multiply an inconvenience is not to solve it6.

I respond: It must be said that there is a solution ad hominem and a solution ad orationem [to the proposition]7; and sometimes it is better and more useful to solve ad hominem than ad orationem — for instance, when the respondent is contentious and unwilling to understand the truth, and when the bystanders are simple and cannot grasp the truth and its subtlety. Therefore, because the heretic was rejecting and opposing the truth, for that reason the opponent had to be opposed, and in such a way that he might be the more deprived of glory and the bystanders of deception. So Augustine commends that response, because8 he manifestly bound the opponent by his own question. The Lord taught this manner of responding in Matthew chapter twenty-one9, where he said: The baptism of John was from heaven, or from men, etc.

Again it is asked: since there has been no response to the proposition itself, how it ought to be responded to. For it seems10 that the heretic's division is by immediates, since to will and not to will are opposed contradictorily, and between contradictories there is no middle. And it must be said to this that the heretic asks this concerning an accompanying or antecedent will; and then neither part is true, nor are the members opposed contradictorily, but contrarily. For not to will and to will signify contrary acts of the will, between which a middle does fall. For there is something in respect of which the will has neither the character of cause nor11 of repugnance; and so that is plain.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the Master's solution. For he seems to say something false when he says: The knowledge and foreknowledge of God is of good things and of evil things. For the Gloss says, on that text of the Psalm12: Things which I knew not; they questioned me, etc.: «Art does not know vice»; but in God there is the art of arts: therefore, etc. If you say that [God] does not know [evil] in a practical mode, but knows [it] in the mode of speculation13; on the contrary: he knows in this mode only that which shines in him; but evils do not shine in God: therefore, etc.

Likewise, the Master does not seem to solve the argument; for to multiply an inconvenience is not to solve it.

I respond: It must be said that, as will be said below14, God knows evils through himself, just as the straight judges of the crooked, and light of darkness; nor is it necessary that evil shine in God, but it suffices that the opposite of evil shine in him.

p. 132

To that which is objected concerning the Master's solution, it must be said that he does not posit a solution, but [rather] suggests one by counter-arguing, as if to say: from this, the one15 cannot be inferred from the other, because although they are the same in essence, nevertheless their connotations are different.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says16 in the marginal note: that the holy Church anathematizes those who say that God did not beget by counsel. For it seems to contradict Damascene17, who says that in God there is no counsel, because counsel belongs to a nature that is ignorant.

I respond: It must be said that counsel18 is said in two ways. In one way, to take counsel means to receive counsel; and so it implies ignorance, and likewise counsel, said from this19; in another way, to counsel means to give counsel, and in this mode it implies knowledge, and this can be transferred to divine things. For God in no way receives counsel from elsewhere. Hence it is to be noted that in counsel there are two things: there is the cognition of a hidden matter, and there is firm disposition. Since therefore in God there is the truest cognition of hidden things and invariability, for that reason it is rightly said that in him there is counsel. Hence Gregory20: «God changes his sentence, but not his counsel».

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Multi codd. ut DFRSTVW etc. cum sex primis edd. insufficiens, cuius lectionis sensus potest esse: videtur, quod divisio in responsione Augustini (ad bimembrem quaestionem Orosii: Voluntate genuit vel necessitate) contenta, in qua scilicet tertium membrum additur neu necessitate nec voluntate, sit insufficiens, i. e. non bona, quia divisio Orosii est sufficiens i. e. adaequata.
    Many codices, such as DFRSTVW etc., together with the first six editions, read insufficiens ("insufficient"); the sense of that reading can be: it seems that the division contained in Augustine's response (to the two-membered question of Orosius: Did he beget by will or by necessity?) — in which division a third member is added, neither by necessity nor by will — is insufficient, i. e. not good, because the division of Orosius is sufficient, i. e. adequate.
  2. II. Elenchi. c. 2. (c. 17.) iuxta translationem Boethii: quoniam nulli eorum quae aequivoca sunt, convenit respondere simpliciter.
    Sophistical Refutations II, c. 2 (c. 17), according to the translation of Boethius: because to none of those things which are equivocal is it fitting to respond simply.
  3. Nonnulli codd. ut ARTU fuerat.
    Some codices, such as ARTU, read fuerat ("had been").
  4. Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 1. et c. 6. n. 11. et Serm. 1. in Psalm. 68. n. 5, ubi sententialiter habetur. Cfr. infra Magister, d. XXXIII. in fine. — Substituimus fide mss. et ed. 1 bis deitate loco divinitatis, quod et magis correspondet verbis Augustini in loc. cit. et modo loquendi Seraphici, de quo vide infra d. 15. p. II. dub. 6.
    Book VII On the Trinity, c. 4, n. 1, and c. 6, n. 11, and Sermon 1 on Psalm 68, n. 5, where the substance is found. Cf. below the Master, d. XXXIII at the end. — On the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have twice substituted deitate ("by deity") for divinitatis ("of divinity"), which both better corresponds to Augustine's words in the cited place and to the Seraphic Doctor's manner of speaking, on which see below d. 15, p. II, dub. 6.
  5. Cod. X addit scilicet filiatione, quae verba a cod. I non hic, sed paulo infra post sensus adiiciuntur. Mox ex multis mss. ut AGHKSTYZ etc. et ed. 1 posuimus quod loco quia. — Plura de hoc dubio vide supra q. 2. et infra d. 33. q. 2. et dub. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard., hic q. 3.
    Codex X adds scilicet filiatione ("namely, by filiation"); these words are added by codex I not here, but a little below, after sensus. Then, from many manuscripts such as AGHKSTYZ etc. and ed. 1, we have placed quod in the place of quia. — For more on this doubt see above q. 2 and below d. 33, q. 2 and dub. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard, here q. 3.
  6. Cfr. Aristot., VIII. Topic. c. 4. in princ. (c. 8.) — Paulo ante plures codd. SVWXY dd cum ed. 1 viditur loco est.
    Cf. Aristotle, Topics VIII, c. 4 at the beginning (c. 8). — A little before, several codices SVWXY, dd, with ed. 1, read viditur in the place of est.
  7. Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et sex primarum edd. hic et paulo infra ter rationem pro orationem. Cfr. Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.), ubi secundum translationem Boethii, qui pro λόγος semper ponit oratio, sic habetur: Hi omnes non ad orationem, sed ad hominem solvunt.
    The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and the first six editions, reads here and three times a little below rationem in place of orationem. Cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations II, c. 3 (c. 22), where, according to Boethius's translation — who always renders λόγος by oratio — it reads thus: All these solve not ad orationem, but ad hominem.
  8. Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 quod pro quia, et paulo infra post Hunc male addit ergo.
    The Vatican edition, against most codices and ed. 1, reads quod in place of quia, and a little below, after Hunc, badly adds ergo.
  9. Vers. 23. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. cum pro ubi.
    Verse 23. — The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the manuscripts, reads cum in place of ubi.
  10. Supplevimus ex mss. et edd. 1, 6 enim, et paulo infra post quaerit addidimus hoc.
    We have supplied enim on the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1 and 6, and a little below, after quaerit, we have added hoc.
  11. Vat. cum uno alterove cod. non.
    The Vatican edition, with one or another codex, reads non.
  12. 34, 11. Glossa interlin. ex Augustino apud Lyranum: Sicut ars vitium, quod per artem cognitum devitatur. — Vide August. in hunc Psalm. Serm. 2. n. 2. — Paulo infra post artium cod. G addit et scientia scientiarum.
    [Psalm] 34, 11. Interlinear Gloss, from Augustine, in Lyranus: Just as art [knows] vice, which, being known through art, is avoided. — See Augustine on this Psalm, Sermon 2, n. 2. — A little below, after artium, codex G adds et scientia scientiarum ("and the knowledge of knowledges").
  13. Corrupta lectio Vat. et codd. sed speculationis resarcitur ex cod. X, qui post sed addit scit per modum.
    The reading of the Vatican edition and the codices is corrupt, but speculationis is restored from codex X, which after sed adds scit per modum.
  14. Dist. 39. a. 1. q. 1. et 2. — Vat. hic dicitur loco dicetur, et paulo infra post cognoscit addit bona in se ipso et, non quidem falso, sed contra mss. et minus ad rem, quia tota obiectio est solum de cognitione malorum. — De propositione immediate sequente Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 83. (c. ult.): «Recto enim et ipsum et obliquum cognoscimus. Iudex enim utrorumque canon est recto». Ultima verba in translatione arabico-latina sic sonant: Regula enim iudicat utrumque per suam rectitudinem (ed. Venet. 1489).
    Distinction 39, a. 1, q. 1 and 2. — The Vatican edition reads here dicitur in place of dicetur, and a little below, after cognoscit, adds bona in se ipso et — not, indeed, falsely, but against the manuscripts and less to the point, since the whole objection is only about the cognition of evils. — On the proposition immediately following, [see] Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 83 (last chapter): «For by the straight we know both the straight itself and the crooked. For the canon of both is the straight, as a judge». The last words in the Arabic-Latin translation run thus: For the rule judges each thing by its own straightness (ed. Venet. 1489).
  15. Lectio confusa Vat. quasi dicat ex eo quod est ex illo, idem restauratur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
    A confused reading of the Vatican edition: quasi dicat ex eo quod est ex illo; the same is restored with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.
  16. Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit hic Vat. Hilarius et post notula adiungit circa istum §. Praedicta tamen, insuper in ipso textu ponit generare loco generasse.
    Against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, the Vatican edition adds here Hilarius, and after notula adjoins circa istum §. Praedicta tamen; moreover, in the text itself it places generare in place of generasse.
  17. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22. circa medium: Deus quippe non deliberat, quia ignorantis est consilium inire. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 quia loco quod. Aliqui codd. ut aa bb ff cum ed. 1 consiliari pro consilium.
    Book II On the Orthodox Faith c. 22, near the middle: For God does not deliberate, because to enter into counsel belongs to one who is ignorant. — The Vatican edition, against the older codices and ed. 1, reads quia in place of quod. Some codices such as aa, bb, ff, with ed. 1, read consiliari for consilium.
  18. Cod. dd addit aut consulere. Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut CISV aa cc cum quinque primis edd. ad hoc pro ab hoc.
    Codex dd adds aut consulere ("or to take counsel"). A little below, some codices such as CISV, aa, cc, with the first five editions, read ad hoc in place of ab hoc.
  19. In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur hoc.
    In the Vatican edition and codex cc, hoc is missing.
  20. Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 10: Deus etsi plerumque mutat sententiam, consilium nunquam.
    Book XVI Morals c. 10: God, although he often changes his sentence, [changes] his counsel never.
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