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Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
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ARTICULUS III. De modo distinguendi spiritum angelicum ab anima rationali.

Consequenter tertio loco quaeritur de modo distinguendi spiritum angelicum ab anima rationali. Et quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum differant specie, an tantum numero. Secundo, quae sit illa differentia, per quam differunt.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum Angelus et anima differant specie.

Quod autem differant specie, videtur.

1. Quae differunt specie habent diversas perfectiones secundum speciem1; sed homo et Angelus differunt specie, constat, et anima dat speciem homini et actum specificum: ergo et anima et Angelus.

2. Item, quae sunt similia specie, vel simul producuntur, vel unum facit ad productionem alterius, ubi producuntur2 per propagationem; sed animae non simul cum Angelis sunt productae, nec Angeli faciunt ad animarum productionem: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod similiter potest argui de animabus; hoc falsum est, quia pater facit ad generationem prolis.

3. Item, plus convenit sensibile et vegetabile cum sensibili et vegetabili, quam sensibile et vegetabile cum non-sensibili et non-vegetabili; sed anima humana per essentiam est sensibilis et vegetabilis, alioquin non faceret animal: ergo cum differat specie ab anima sensibili tantum et vegetabili, multo plus differt a spiritu angelico, qui nec est sensibilis nec vegetabilis.

Contra:

1. Quorum perfectio et complementum ultimum est unum specie, ipsa sunt unum3; sed ad eandem beatitudinem ordinatur homo et Angelus, quae est visio et fruitio Dei: ergo homo et Angelus, sive anima et Angelus sunt specie unum.

2. Item, quorum differentia ultimo completiva est specie una, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed differentia ultimo completiva animae rationalis et Angeli est hoc quod est rationale sive intellectuale, et in hoc communicant, sicut dicit Gregorius4, quod homo communicat «esse cum lapidibus, intelligere cum Angelis»: ergo etc.

3. Item, quorum optimum naturale est unum, ipsa sunt specie unum; sed optimum naturale hominis et Angeli est unum, sicut dicit Bernardus ad Eugenium5: «Optimum, inquit, tui et Angeli ratio est»: ergo cum species accipiatur ab optimo, patet etc.

Conclusio. Anima rationalis ab Angelo specie differt, et quidem in genere substantiae.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc fuit triplex opinio.

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Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod quaestio ista nulla est. Cum enim quaeritur, utrum aliqua differant specie, supponitur, quod utrumque sit in genere ut species; et quoniam anima non est species, sed speciei pars, nec est in genere secundum rectam lineam ut species vel individuum, sed a latere, vel magis per reductionem sicut principium6: ideo dicunt, quod quaestio ista nulla est, cum anima non sit species. — Sed haec responsio potius est evasio ad hominem quam solutio ad orationem. Nam adhuc restat quaestio: cum anima sit substantia et forma substantialis, vel habens formam substantialem, in qua omnes animae conveniunt, utrum in eadem conveniant anima et Angelus, an sit ibi solum differentia accidentalis. Praeterea, anima separata spiritus est et substantia, prout est res per se existens, et per se substans accidentibus, et secundum sui mutationem susceptibilis contrariorum7: ergo proprie est substantia et recte in genere substantiae sicut substantia prima, et Angelus similiter; constat. Si ergo de omnibus primis substantiis rationabiliter contingit quaerere, utrum specie conveniant vel differant: patet, quod quaestio est bona et recta, et responsio est fuga.

Secunda vero positio est, quod8 si consideratur anima ut spiritus, est eadem specie cum Angelo, sed differt in hoc, quod animarum ad animas est aliqua validior similitudo, sicut aqua eadem aquae dicitur esse. Et ratio, quae movet eos, est propter convenientiam in optimo et nobilissimo suo, sicut ostensum est in obiiciendo. — Sed haec positio communiter non tenetur, quia planum est, hominem et Angelum non solum specie, sed etiam genere differre: ergo et perfectio sive forma dans speciem homini ab Angelo differt; haec autem est anima: ergo differt specie ab Angelo. Et hoc melius patebit infra9.

Tertia positio est, quod Angelus et anima specie differunt; quae sit autem illa differentia, quaeretur iam10. Nunc autem iuxta communem positionem tenendum est, quod essentialiter differant et in genere substantiae. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes probantes, Angelum et animam esse specie differentes, eo modo, quo licet dicere animam rationalem esse speciem. Nam, proprie loquendo, potius est forma speciei sive pars formalis, quam species; extenso tamen nomine potest species appellari.

1. Quod obiicitur, quod perfectio Angeli et hominis eadem sunt specie; dicendum, quod est perfectio in esse primo, et in esse secundo; quorum perfectio in esse secundo est eadem, ipsa propter hoc non sunt eadem — nam cygnus et nix sunt alba eadem albedine secundum speciem11 — sed illud habet veritatem in perfectione quantum ad primum esse; hoc autem modo non est gloria vel gratia perfectio.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur: quorum differentia ultimo completiva est eadem etc.; dicendum, quod rationale, secundum quod est differentia animae et Angeli, differt. Nam rationale Angeli est intellectuale12; sed rationale animae proprie est rationale. Nam Angelus natus est intelligere secundum intellectum simplicem et deiformem, anima secundum intellectum inquisitivum et possibilem. — Et per hoc patet solutio ad sequens. Nam quamvis ratio sit optimum mei et Angeli, tamen ratio mea et ratio Angeli est alia et alia, non tantum secundum accidens, sed etiam secundum speciem et essentiam, ut patet.

Scholion

Duas huius articuli quaestiones alii Commentatores una sola quaestione absolvunt. Et cum expositio S. Doctoris facile intelligatur, pauca hic notata sufficiant etiam pro quaest. seq. — Communiter tenetur, animam humanam et genere et specie differre a substantia angelica; sed disputatur, in quo praecise haec differentia ponenda sit, quod discutitur in quaest. seq. S. Thom. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. a. 6.) quinque opiniones de hac differentia recenset, et quoad rem cum S. Bonaventura consentit (cfr. S. I. q. 75. a. 7; S. c. Gent. II. c. 92.), sicut etiam B. Albert., Petr. a Tar. aliique. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 20. m. 5. plures differentias recenset, et in fine concludit: «Si quis in esse theologico potuit convenientiorem differentiam invenire, acquiescendum est, cum res huiusmodi sint altissimae speculationis». Scotus autem (hic q. 5.) plura opponit, et resolvit, animam et Angelum essentialiter distingui per suas entitates absolutas, et non per respectus unionis vel potentiae. Dionys. Carth. argumenta Scoti solvere nititur, sed, ni fallimur, dissensus magis in modo loquendi consistit quam in re.

In seq. quaest. notanda est solut. ad 3, qua S. Doctor errori Petri Ioan. Olivi, quod anima rationalis non per se et

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immediate, sed per partem sensitivam sit forma substantialis corporis, praevenit docens, quod anima se ipsa, et quatenus rationalis est, perficit corpus ut forma substantialis. Quae doctrina decreto Concilii Vienn. sancita est. Cfr. d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. Schol.

Praeter citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 13. 14. — Petr. a Tar., II. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. a. 3; cfr. etiam hic q. 3. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic p. II. q. 2. a. 3. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 10. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 10. — Biel, hic q. 6.

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English Translation

ARTICLE III. On the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul.

Consequently, in the third place, inquiry is made concerning the manner of distinguishing the angelic spirit from the rational soul. And two things are asked. First it is asked whether they differ in species, or only in number. Secondly, what that difference is by which they differ.

QUESTION I. Whether the Angel and the soul differ in species.

That they do differ in species, it seems:

1. Things that differ in species have diverse perfections according to species1; but man and the Angel differ in species, that is settled, and the soul gives species to man and [his] specific act: therefore [so do] both the soul and the Angel.

2. Again, things that are alike in species are either produced together, or the one contributes to the production of the other, where they are produced2 by propagation; but souls are not produced together with Angels, nor do Angels contribute to the production of souls: therefore etc. If you say that the like could be argued about souls [too]; this is false, because the father contributes to the generation of the offspring.

3. Again, the sensible and the vegetable agree more with the sensible and the vegetable than the sensible and vegetable [agrees] with the non-sensible and non-vegetable; but the human soul is by its essence sensible and vegetable, otherwise it would not make an animal: therefore, since it differs in species from a soul [that is] merely sensible and vegetable, much more does it differ from the angelic spirit, which is neither sensible nor vegetable.

To the contrary:

1. Things whose perfection and ultimate completion is one in species are one3; but man and the Angel are ordered to the same beatitude, which is the vision and enjoyment of God: therefore man and the Angel, that is, the soul and the Angel, are one in species.

2. Again, things whose ultimately-completing difference is one in species are one in species; but the ultimately-completing difference of the rational soul and of the Angel is that which is rational or intellectual, and in this they share, as Gregory says4, that man shares «being with stones, understanding with Angels»: therefore etc.

3. Again, things whose natural best is one are one in species; but the natural best of man and of the Angel is one, as Bernard says to Eugene5: «Your best, he says, and the Angel's, is reason»: therefore, since species is taken from the best, it is clear, etc.

Conclusion. The rational soul differs in species from the Angel, and indeed in the genus of substance.

I respond: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that concerning this there was a threefold opinion.

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For some have wished to say that this question is null. For when it is asked whether some things differ in species, it is supposed that each is in a genus as a species; and since the soul is not a species, but a part of a species, nor is it in a genus along the straight line as a species or an individual, but at the side, or rather by reduction as a principle6: therefore they say that this question is null, since the soul is not a species. — But this response is rather an evasion ad hominem than a solution to the question. For the question still remains: since the soul is a substance and a substantial form, or [something] having a substantial form, in which all souls agree, whether the soul and the Angel agree in the same [substance], or whether there is there only an accidental difference. Moreover, the separated soul is a spirit and a substance, inasmuch as it is a thing existing through itself, and standing of itself under accidents, and according to its own change capable of contraries7: therefore it is properly a substance and rightly in the genus of substance like a first substance, and the Angel likewise; this is settled. If therefore concerning all first substances it is reasonable to ask whether they agree or differ in species: it is clear that the question is good and right, and the response is a flight.

But the second position is that8, if the soul is considered as a spirit, it is the same in species as the Angel, but differs in this, that there is among souls, in relation to souls, a stronger likeness, as water is said to be the same as water. And the reason that moves them is on account of the agreement in their best and noblest [element], as was shown in the objecting. — But this position is not commonly held, because it is plain that man and the Angel differ not only in species but even in genus: therefore also the perfection or form giving species to man differs from the Angel; but this is the soul: therefore it differs in species from the Angel. And this will be made clearer below9.

The third position is that the Angel and the soul differ in species; but what that difference is, will now be asked10. But for now, according to the common position, it must be held that they differ essentially and in the genus of substance. — Whence the reasons proving that the Angel and the soul are differing in species are to be granted, in that way in which it is permitted to call the rational soul a species. For, properly speaking, it is rather the form of the species or a formal part, than a species; yet by an extended name it can be called a species.

1. To what is objected, that the perfection of the Angel and of man are the same in species; it must be said that there is a perfection in first being, and in second being; of which, [though] the perfection in second being is the same, they are not on that account the same — for the swan and snow are white by the same whiteness according to species11 — but that [objection] holds true of perfection as regards first being; in this way, however, glory or grace is not a perfection.

2. 3. To what is objected: things whose ultimately-completing difference is the same, etc.; it must be said that the rational, insofar as it is the difference of the soul and of the Angel, differs. For the rational of the Angel is intellectual12; but the rational of the soul is properly rational. For the Angel is born to understand by a simple and God-formed intellect, the soul by an inquiring and possible intellect. — And by this is clear the solution to the following [objection]. For although reason is the best [element] of me and of the Angel, yet my reason and the Angel's reason are diverse, not only according to accident, but even according to species and essence, as is clear.

Scholion

The other Commentators settle the two questions of this article in a single question. And since the exposition of the holy Doctor is easily understood, let the few things noted here suffice also for the following question. — It is commonly held that the human soul differs from the angelic substance both in genus and in species; but it is disputed in what precisely this difference is to be placed, which is discussed in the following question. St. Thomas (II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 6) reviews five opinions on this difference, and as to substance agrees with St. Bonaventure (cf. Summa I, q. 75, a. 7; Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 92), as do also Bl. Albert, Peter of Tarentaise and others. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 20, m. 5, reviews several differences, and at the end concludes: «If anyone has been able, in theological being, to find a more fitting difference, one must acquiesce, since matters of this kind are of the highest speculation». Scotus, however (here, q. 5), raises many objections, and resolves that the soul and the Angel are essentially distinguished by their absolute entities, and not by relations of union or of potency. Dionysius the Carthusian endeavors to solve Scotus's arguments, but, unless we are mistaken, the dissent consists rather in the manner of speaking than in the matter.

In the following question is to be noted the solution ad 3, by which the holy Doctor anticipates the error of Peter John Olivi — that the rational soul is not, of itself and

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immediately, but through the sensitive part, the substantial form of the body — teaching that the soul, by itself, and inasmuch as it is rational, perfects the body as a substantial form. This doctrine was sanctioned by the decree of the Council of Vienne. Cf. d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, Schol.

Besides those cited: Bl. Albert, here, a. 13–14. — Peter of Tarentaise, II Sent. d. 3, q. 2, a. 3; cf. also here, q. 3, a. 3. — Giles of Rome, here, p. II, q. 2, a. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 12, q. 10. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here, q. 10. — Biel, here, q. 6.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Observamus, quod argumenta ista fundantur in hoc, quod ea, quae in essentia et cum ipsa necessario connexis conveniunt vel differunt, etiam in specie conveniant vel differant necesse est. Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Specie et seqq.
    We observe that these arguments are founded on this, that things which agree or differ in essence and in what is necessarily connected with it must also agree or differ in species. Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Species and following.
  2. Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 nisi producantur, perperam, ut constat ex seqq.
    Not a few codices with editions 1, 2, 3 [read] nisi producantur ("unless they be produced"), wrongly, as is clear from what follows.
  3. Aliis verbis: Quorum est finis unus, ipsa sunt specie unum, quia cuilibet rei proprius finis respondet. — Codd. aa bb cc et ed. 1 unum specie.
    In other words: Things whose end is one are one in species, because to each thing its proper end corresponds. — Codices aa, bb, cc and ed. 1 [read] unum specie.
  4. Homil. 29. in Evang. n. 2, et VI. Moral. c. 16. n. 20, in quo textu cod. F in esse pro esse. — Nonnulli codd. ut F H in minori post et Angeli est adiungunt eadem, Vat. una et eadem scilicet.
    Homily 29 on the Gospels, n. 2, and Morals VI, c. 16, n. 20, in which text codex F [reads] in esse for esse. — Some codices such as F, H, in the minor [premise], after et Angeli est add eadem; the Vatican ms. [reads] una et eadem scilicet.
  5. Libr. V. de Consid. c. 3. n. 5: Unum siquidem tui et Angeli optimum ratio est.
    Book V On Consideration, c. 3, n. 5: For the one best [element] of you and of the Angel is reason.
  6. Secundum doctrinam Scholasticorum aliquid ponitur in praedicamento i. e. ordinatione supremorum generum, tripliciter, scil. directe i. e. quando aliquid est in linea recta praedicamentali, cuiusmodi sunt genera, species et individua; indirecte i. e. quando aliquid tanquam divisivum generis et constitutivum speciei ponitur a latere, cuiusmodi sunt differentiae; reductive i. e. quando aliquid est vel proprietas vel pars essentialis (principium), vel pars integralis etc. eorum, quae directe ponuntur in praedicamento, sic v. g. anima, utpote pars essentialis hominis, est in eodem praedicamento, in quo homo est. — Paulo inferius Vat. solutio ad rem pro solutio ad orationem, sed contra codd. et modum loquendi Aristotelicum, de quo cfr. tom. I. pag. 131, nota 6.
    According to the doctrine of the Scholastics something is placed in a predicament (i.e. in the ordering of the highest genera) in three ways, namely directly, i.e. when something is in the straight predicamental line, of which kind are genera, species and individuals; indirectly, i.e. when something, as dividing the genus and constituting the species, is placed at the side, of which kind are differences; reductively, i.e. when something is either a property, or an essential part (a principle), or an integral part, etc., of those things which are placed directly in the predicament — thus, e.g., the soul, as an essential part of man, is in the same predicament in which man is. — A little below the Vatican ms. [reads] solutio ad rem for solutio ad orationem, but against the codices and the Aristotelian manner of speaking, on which cf. vol. I, p. 131, note 6.
  7. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia.
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Substance.
  8. Codd. et primae edd. hic addunt anima et Angelus, incongrue. Paulo post cod. P est in eadem specie pro est eadem specie. Dein cod. N sicut aqua similior aquae, cod. cc et ed. 1 sicut aqua eadem omni aquae pro sicut aqua eadem aquae.
    The codices and the first editions here add anima et Angelus, incongruously. A little after, codex P [reads] est in eadem specie for est eadem specie. Then codex N [reads] sicut aqua similior aquae, codex cc and ed. 1 sicut aqua eadem omni aquae for sicut aqua eadem aquae.
  9. Quaest. seq.
    The following question.
  10. Cod. bb infra, nempe in quaest. seq. — Aliquanto inferius Vat. cum sola ed. 4 in genere et specie pro in genere substantiae.
    Codex bb [reads] infra ("below"), namely in the following question. — Somewhat below, the Vatican ms. with ed. 4 alone [reads] in genere et specie for in genere substantiae.
  11. In cod. I bene additur et non sunt eadem specie. In fine solutionis Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus mss. perperam gratiae perfectio pro gratia perfectio.
    In codex I there is rightly added et non sunt eadem specie ("and they are not the same in species"). At the end of the solution the Vatican ms. with ed. 1 and some mss. wrongly [reads] gratiae perfectio for gratia perfectio.
  12. Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 7. § 2. — Plures codd. intelligibile, Vat. intelligere. Paulo superius non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2 differunt pro differt.
    According to Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 7, § 2. — Several codices [read] intelligibile, the Vatican ms. intelligere. A little above, not a few codices with editions 1, 2 [read] differunt for differt.
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