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Dist. 1, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
p. 49

QUAESTIO II. Quae sit differentia, per quam Angelus et anima differunt.

Secundo circa hoc quaeritur, quae sit illa differentia, per quam Angelus et anima differunt. Quod autem differant essentialiter per hoc quod est unibile, videtur primo sic.

1. Sicut se habet corpus humanum ad corpus non unibile, sic se habet spiritus humanus ad spiritum non unibilem; sed corpus humanum differt specie, immo etiam genere, ut videtur, a corpore non unibili, utpote a lapide, per hoc quod est unibile animae vivificanti: ergo etc.

2. Item, esse unibile convenit animae rationali: aut ergo essentialiter, aut accidentaliter; sed non accidentaliter, constat; quia tunc ex corpore1 et anima non fieret unum per essentiam: ergo essentialiter hoc convenit animae. Sed quaecumque differunt in aliquo essentiali, differunt specie: ergo anima et Angelus etc.

3. Item, pars suum esse completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in toto: ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, suum esse completum non habet, nisi secundum quod est in suo toto, scilicet in homine, ut pars2. Sed non est pars hominis, nisi secundum quod est unibilis: ergo in unibilitate ad corpus consistit complementum animae. Sed per illud habet unumquodque essentialiter differre sive distingui ab aliquo, in quo consistit eius complementum: ergo etc.

4. Item, vivificare est actus animae rationalis, quem habet in corpus: aut ergo actus accidentalis, aut essentialis. Si accidentalis, ergo vita accidit homini; quod manifeste falsum est, quia tunc accideret ei esse animal. Si est actus substantialis sive essentialis, ergo inest animae ratione sui quo est, sive formalis et completivi. Ergo si penes illud accipitur differentia formalis et completiva uniuscuiusque, quod est formale et completivum, penes illud, quo anima nata est vivificare corpus, sumitur illa differentia; sed eo ipso nata est anima uniri corpori, quo nata est corpus vivificare: ergo penes unibilitatem sumitur animae ad Angelum differentia essentialis specifica.

Contra:

1. Omnis differentia prior est per naturam, quam illud cuius est differentia; sed unio sive unibilitas ad corpus consequitur animam, quia dicit relationem ad alterum, sine quo potest anima esse et intelligi3: ergo unibilitas sive unibile non est illud, per quod differunt Angelus et anima.

2. Item, differentia completiva debet esse propria eius cuius est differentia; sed esse unibile non solum rationali animae convenit, sed etiam vegetabili et sensibili: ergo non est animae rationalis completiva differentia.

3. Item, differentia specifica debet accipi penes id quod in re est optimum, quia unumquodque debet definiri per id quod est optimum in ipso4; sed esse unibile convenit animae penes suum infimum: ergo penes illud differentia completiva non potest accipi.

4. Item, differentia completiva ita essentialiter adhaeret, quod eius oppositum5 non potest inesse, vel si inest actu, non tamen naturaliter; sed anima rationalis sic est unibilis, quod separabilis; et praeterea, separabile esse convenit animae per naturam, et per hoc differt a vegetabili et sensibili: ergo esse unibile corpori nullo modo potest esse specifica differentia, per quam differunt Angelus et anima.

Conclusio. Differentia specifica inter Angelum et animam humanam recte sumitur ab eo, quod anima est naturaliter unibilis corpori, Angelus vero non.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi.

Quidam enim conati sunt assignare differentiam specificam Angeli et animae per comparationem ad Deum. Et ratio, quae movit eos, haec fuit, quia

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differentia ultimo completiva penes id quod nobilius est in re, debet accipi; et ideo voluerunt dicere, quod anima et Angelus differunt, quia Angelus habet intellectum deiformem, ut vult Dionysius6; unde habet sibi species innatas et videt aspectu simplici. Sed anima habet intellectum potentialem sive collativum et inquisitivum, et hoc per naturam, quidquid sit de gloria. — Sed iste modus assignandi differentiam non videtur esse omnino conveniens. Primo, quia differentiae rerum accipiuntur secundum comparationem, quam habent ad se7, non in relatione ad Deum, respectu cuius potius conveniunt. Amplius, deiformitas intellectus respicit potentiam intellectivam; nos autem quaerimus de differentia essentiarum, non de differentia potentiarum. Postremo, quod obtinetur per gratiam8 non est contra naturam institutam; sed deiformitatem acquirit intellectus per gloriam: ergo haec intellectui humano non est aliena; ergo per hanc non differt Angelus ab anima. Et quod plus est, anima separata modum intelligendi habet, quem habet Angelus9; et anima Adae habuit species innatas, ut etiam Angelus; et hoc totum quid accidentale videtur dicere: ergo penes hoc essentialis differentia non debet sumi.

Alii vero fuerunt, qui conati sunt differentiam invenire secundum comparationem rerum10 ad invicem; et quia non potuerunt invenire actus differentes formaliter, per quos venirent in cognitionem diversarum differentiarum, sed invenerunt actus differentes gradu et dignitate; dixerunt, quod anima et Angelus differunt specie propter maiorem excessum in simplicitate et bonitate naturae. Et iste excessus in essentialibus variat speciem, quando excessus ille exit limitem speciei debitum, sicut calidum in quarto gradu est alterius speciei, quam calidum in primo; sic dicunt esse in proposito. — Sed hoc valde dubium est, quod Angelus tantum excedat animam, quod ex ipso excessu differentia specierum11 fiat, cum optima anima, scilicet Christi, nobilissima sit creatura nec exeat speciem humanam. Et praeterea, esto quod esset ibi excessus, penes ipsum non debet sumi differentia specifica, quia potius videtur consequi differentiam specificam quam e converso. Potius enim res diversarum bonitatum12 gradus habent in nobilitate propter naturas diversas specierum, quae sunt natae capere plus et minus, quam e converso. Et iterum, haec differentia valde generalis et transcendens esse videtur, quia, si ita potest accipi hic, pari ratione ubique.

Et ideo tertius est hic modus dicendi, quem probabiliorem aestimo, qui sumitur per comparationem animae rationalis ad corpus humanum, ex qua parte innotescit nobis anima non solum secundum accidentia, sed etiam secundum substantiam et naturam, et non solum secundum id quod indignitatis est, sed etiam secundum id quod nobilitatis. Hoc enim, quod est animam uniri corpori humano sive vivificare corpus humanum, non dicit actum accidentalem nec dicit actum ignobilem: non accidentalem, quia ratione illius est anima forma substantialis13; non ignobilem, quia ratione illius est anima nobilissima formarum omnium, et in anima stat appetitus totius naturae. Corpus enim humanum nobilissima complexione et organizatione, quae sit in natura, est organizatum et complexionatum; ideo non completur nec natum est compleri nisi nobilissima forma sive natura14. Illud ergo, quo anima est unibilis corpori, tale dicit quid essentiale respiciens, quod est nobilissimum in anima; et ita penes illud recte sumitur specifica differentia, secundum quam differt anima a natura angelica. — Unde rationes ad hoc inductae concedendae sunt. Ad illa quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, ex praedictis patet responsio.

1. Quod enim dicit primo, quod differentia debet esse prior; dicendum, quod verum est; et differentia illa, quae est esse unibile, non dicit puram relationem, sed naturalem aptitudinem, quae inest animae secundum principia intrinseca, quae priora sunt anima per naturam, sicut rationale respectu hominis.

2. 3. Quod obiicitur, quod differentia completiva debet esse propria; dicendum, quod uniri corpori non est proprium animae rationalis; sed tamen15 uniri corpori humano, sicut dicit illud quod est animae essentiale et nobile, sic etiam importat, quod est proprium. — Et per hoc patet aliud. Nam illud quo mediante anima perficit corpus humanum, est illud quo anima est anima rationalis, et quod etiam est principium aliarum nobilium operationum16; sed

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perficit se ipsa; se ipsa enim anima perficit corpus, sicut forma se ipsa unitur materiae.

4. Quod obiicitur ultimo, quod differentia essentialiter adhaeret; dicendum, quod esse unibile adhaeret inseparabiliter, quia aptitudo semper inest, quamvis non semper insit actus, sicut patet in rationabilitate et gressibilitate. Et sicut gressibilis truncatur, et rationalis anima stulta efficitur non natura, sed propter defectum naturae; ita quod anima separatur17, hoc est in poenam peccati. Et ideo esse separabile non sic assignatur differentia animae, sicut esse unibile. — Amplius, anima rationalis eo ipso, quod nata est perficere corpus sic perfectum et ordinatum per naturam ad immortalitatem, est immortalis; et eo ipso nata est separari ab hoc corpore iam mortuo propter peccatum; et ita nunc18 non dicit aliam differentiam, quam hoc quod est esse unibile, sed consequitur illam, quia, sicut non est separatio nisi prioris uniti, sic non est separabilitas in aliquo, nisi prius fuerit unibilitas per naturam. Et ideo, si aliquid potest esse differentia animae, videtur, quod hoc maxime sit, id est illud quod per hoc nomen19 significatur. Intellectus enim noster rarissime pervenit ad cognitionem formae substantialis nisi a posteriori; et quia sicut cognoscit, sic nominat, ideo differentias per naturam priores ut plurimum nominat a posteriori. Et sic patent quaesita20.

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English Translation

QUESTION II. What the difference is by which the Angel and the soul differ.

Secondly, concerning this it is asked, what that difference is by which the Angel and the soul differ. And that they differ essentially by that which is unitable [to a body], it seems, first, thus:

1. As the human body is to a body not unitable, so is the human spirit to a spirit not unitable; but the human body differs in species — indeed even in genus, as it seems — from a body not unitable, such as a stone, by this, that it is unitable to a life-giving soul: therefore etc.

2. Again, to be unitable belongs to the rational soul: either therefore essentially or accidentally; but not accidentally, that is settled; because then from body1 and soul there would not come to be one [thing] by essence: therefore this belongs to the soul essentially. But whatever things differ in something essential, differ in species: therefore the soul and the Angel etc.

3. Again, a part does not have its complete being except according as it is in the whole: therefore, since the rational soul is a part of man, it does not have its complete being except according as it is in its whole, namely in man, as a part2. But it is not a part of man except according as it is unitable: therefore the complement of the soul consists in unitability to the body. But by that in which its complement consists, each thing essentially differs or is distinguished from something else: therefore etc.

4. Again, to give life is an act of the rational soul, which it has upon the body: either therefore an accidental act, or an essential one. If accidental, then life is accidental to man; which is manifestly false, because then to be an animal would be accidental to him. If it is a substantial or essential act, then it is in the soul by reason of that by which it is, that is, of the formal and completing [principle]. Therefore, if the formal and completing difference of each thing is taken from that which is formal and completing, then from that by which the soul is born to give life to the body that difference is taken; but by the very fact that the soul is born to be united to a body, it is born to give life to the body: therefore from unitability is taken the essential, specific difference of the soul to the Angel.

To the contrary:

1. Every difference is prior by nature to that of which it is the difference; but the union or unitability to the body is consequent upon the soul, because it states a relation to another, without which the soul can be and be understood3: therefore unitability or the unitable is not that by which the Angel and the soul differ.

2. Again, the completing difference must be proper to that of which it is the difference; but to be unitable belongs not only to the rational soul but also to the vegetable and the sensible: therefore it is not the completing difference of the rational soul.

3. Again, the specific difference must be taken from that which is best in the thing, because each thing must be defined by that which is best in it4; but to be unitable belongs to the soul on the side of its lowest [element]: therefore the completing difference cannot be taken from it.

4. Again, the completing difference so essentially adheres that its opposite5 cannot be present, or, if it is present in act, yet not naturally; but the rational soul is so unitable that [it is also] separable; and moreover, to be separable belongs to the soul by nature, and by this it differs from the vegetable and the sensible: therefore to be unitable to a body can in no way be the specific difference by which the Angel and the soul differ.

Conclusion. The specific difference between the Angel and the human soul is rightly taken from this, that the soul is naturally unitable to a body, but the Angel not.

I respond: It must be said that concerning this there is a threefold manner of speaking.

For some have endeavored to assign the specific difference of the Angel and the soul by comparison to God. And the reason that moved them was this, that

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the ultimately-completing difference must be taken from that which is nobler in the thing; and therefore they wished to say that the soul and the Angel differ because the Angel has a God-formed intellect, as Dionysius holds6; whence it has species innate to it and sees by a simple gaze. But the soul has a potential or comparative and inquiring intellect, and this by nature, whatever be the case as to glory. — But this manner of assigning the difference does not seem to be altogether fitting. First, because the differences of things are taken according to the comparison which they have to themselves7, not in relation to God, in respect of whom they rather agree. Further, the God-formedness of the intellect regards the intellective power; but we are inquiring about a difference of essences, not about a difference of powers. Lastly, what is obtained through grace8 is not against nature as instituted; but the intellect acquires God-formedness through glory: therefore this is not alien to the human intellect; therefore by this the Angel does not differ from the soul. And what is more, the separated soul has the manner of understanding which the Angel has9; and the soul of Adam had innate species, as also the Angel; and all this seems to state something accidental: therefore the essential difference must not be taken from this.

But there were others who endeavored to find the difference according to the comparison of things10 to one another; and because they could not find acts differing formally, through which they might come to a knowledge of diverse differences, but found acts differing in degree and dignity; they said that the soul and the Angel differ in species on account of the greater excess in simplicity and goodness of nature. And this excess in essentials varies the species, when that excess goes beyond the limit due to the species, just as the hot in the fourth degree is of another species than the hot in the first; so they say it is in the matter at hand. — But it is very doubtful that the Angel so far exceeds the soul that from the excess itself a difference of species11 arises, since the best soul, namely Christ's, is the noblest creature and yet does not go beyond the human species. And moreover, granted that there were an excess there, the specific difference must not be taken from it, because it rather seems to follow upon the specific difference than the reverse. For rather, things of diverse goodnesses12 have degrees in nobility on account of the diverse natures of species, which are born to receive more and less, than the reverse. And again, this difference seems very general and transcendent, because, if it can be taken thus here, by parity of reasoning [it could be] everywhere.

And therefore the third is this manner of speaking, which I judge the more probable, which is taken by the comparison of the rational soul to the human body, on which side the soul becomes known to us not only according to accidents, but also according to substance and nature, and not only according to that which is of indignity, but also according to that which is of nobility. For this, that the soul is united to the human body or gives life to the human body, does not state an accidental act nor an ignoble act: not accidental, because by reason of it the soul is a substantial form13; not ignoble, because by reason of it the soul is the noblest of all forms, and in the soul stands the appetite of the whole of nature. For the human body is organized and tempered with the noblest temperament and organization that is in nature; therefore it is not completed, nor is it born to be completed, except by the noblest form or nature14. That, therefore, by which the soul is unitable to a body, states such an essential something — regarding what is noblest in the soul; and so from it is rightly taken the specific difference according to which the soul differs from the angelic nature. — Whence the reasons adduced for this are to be granted. To those things which are objected to the contrary, from the foregoing the response is clear.

1. As to what it says first, that the difference must be prior; it must be said that it is true; and that difference which is to-be-unitable does not state a pure relation, but a natural aptitude, which is in the soul according to intrinsic principles, which are prior to the soul by nature, just as the rational [is prior] in respect of man.

2. 3. To what is objected, that the completing difference must be proper; it must be said that to be united to a body is not proper to the rational soul; but nevertheless15 to be united to a human body, inasmuch as it states that which is essential and noble to the soul, so also imports that which is proper. — And by this is clear the other [point]. For that by mediation of which the soul perfects the human body is that by which the soul is a rational soul, and which is also the principle of the other noble operations16; but

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it perfects [it] by itself; for the soul by itself perfects the body, just as a form by itself is united to matter.

4. To what is objected lastly, that the difference essentially adheres; it must be said that to-be-unitable adheres inseparably, because the aptitude is always present, although the act is not always present, as is clear in rationality and the power to walk. And just as the able-to-walk is maimed, and the rational soul is rendered foolish — not by nature, but on account of a defect of nature; so [too] that the soul is separated17, this is in punishment of sin. And therefore to-be-separable is not assigned as the difference of the soul in the way that to-be-unitable [is]. — Further, the rational soul, by the very fact that it is born to perfect a body so perfect and ordered by nature to immortality, is immortal; and by the very fact it is born to be separated from this body now dead on account of sin; and so it does not now18 state another difference than this, which is to-be-unitable, but follows upon it, because, just as there is no separation except of [something] previously united, so there is no separability in anything unless there has first been unitability by nature. And therefore, if anything can be the difference of the soul, it seems that it is this most of all, that is, that which is signified by this name19. For our intellect very rarely arrives at the knowledge of a substantial form except a posteriori; and because as it knows, so it names, therefore it for the most part names the differences that are prior by nature a posteriori. And so the things sought are clear20.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Fide codd. U aa cc et ed. I substituimus corpore pro homine.
    On the faith of codices U, aa, cc and ed. 1 we have substituted corpore ("from body") for homine ("from man").
  2. Posuimus lectionem cod. N, quae et in se planior est, et qua aliae lectiones, quae hic in codd. occurrunt, explicantur; sic plures codd. legunt cum ergo anima rationalis sit pars, esse suum completum consistit, ut est pars hominis; cod. I similiter cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, non habet suum esse completum; plures codd. ut H T U W ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis. Sed non est etc. — De ultima propositione huius arg. cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Differentia, ubi et plura alia huc spectantia tanguntur.
    We have placed the reading of codex N, which is both plainer in itself and by which the other readings that occur here in the codices are explained; thus several codices read cum ergo anima rationalis sit pars, esse suum completum consistit, ut est pars hominis; codex I similiter cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis, non habet suum esse completum; several codices such as H, T, U, W ergo cum anima rationalis sit pars hominis. Sed non est etc. — On the last proposition of this argument cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, the chapter On Difference, where several other things pertinent here are also touched.
  3. Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6: Quod vero per se est et substantia prius eo natura est, quod est ad aliquid; esse enim hoc appendix quaedam videtur atque accidens eius quod est. — In principio argumenti pro prior multi codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue primo.
    Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6: But that which is through itself and substance is prior by nature to that which is in relation to something; for this [latter] being seems to be a certain appendage and accident of that which is. — At the beginning of the argument, for prior many codices with ed. 1 incongruously [read] primo.
  4. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 43. (VI. c. 12.), ubi ostendit, quod differentia ultima et finalis sit primum sive substantia rei. Cfr. etiam X. Ethic. c. 5. (c. 7.), ubi ostendit, optimum et praestantissimum omnium, quae in homine sunt, esse intellectum. Vide quaest. praeced. arg. 3. ad opposit.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 43 (VI, c. 12), where he shows that the ultimate and final difference is the first thing, or the substance of the thing. Cf. also Ethics X, c. 5 (c. 7), where he shows that the best and most excellent of all things that are in man is the intellect. See the preceding question, argument 3 ad oppositum.
  5. Plures codd. ut C F K O R S T opposita.
    Several codices such as C, F, K, O, R, S, T [read] opposita.
  6. De Div. Nom. c. 7. § 2, ubi exponit, quod Angeli non ratiocinando neque per sensus, sed per propriam deiformis animi virtutem et naturam cognoscant. Cfr. ibid. c. 4. § 22. et c. 5. § 8.
    On the Divine Names, c. 7, § 2, where he explains that the Angels know not by reasoning nor through the senses, but through the proper power and nature of a God-formed mind. Cf. ibid. c. 4, § 22, and c. 5, § 8.
  7. Ita plures codd. ut X Y Z aa bb; plures alii codd. a se, Vat. inter se.
    So several codices such as X, Y, Z, aa, bb; several other codices [read] a se, the Vatican ms. inter se ("among themselves").
  8. Cod. bb gloriam; econtra codd. N aa paulo inferius per gratiam pro per gloriam. Vat. dein post ergo haec non bene adiicit differentia.
    Codex bb [reads] gloriam; on the contrary codices N, aa a little below [read] per gratiam for per gloriam. The Vatican ms. then, after ergo haec, not well adds differentia.
  9. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1. seq. — De cognitione, quae data est animae Adae, vide infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.
    Cf. IV Sent. d. 50, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 seq. — On the knowledge that was given to the soul of Adam, see below, d. 23, a. 2, q. 1.
  10. Cod. K eorum, scil. Angeli et animae.
    Codex K [reads] eorum ("of them"), namely of the Angel and the soul.
  11. Codd. F K specifica.
    Codices F, K [read] specifica.
  12. Cod. F dignitatum. Cod. I paulo inferius post in nobilitate adiungit et bonitate, et dein cod. F ponit diversarum pro diversas.
    Codex F [reads] dignitatum. Codex I a little below, after in nobilitate, adds et bonitate, and then codex F puts diversarum for diversas.
  13. Cod. I addit: Accidentalem actum non dicit, quia anima naturalem appetitum habet ad corpus, quod (ita quod?) ab ea separari non possit, sicut dicit Augustinus super Gen. ad litteram. — Ibi (VII. c. 27. n. 38.) dicitur: Sed melius creditur hoc [ut in corpus mittatur] naturaliter velle i. e. in ea natura creari ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est velle vivere.
    Codex I adds: It does not state an accidental act, because the soul has a natural appetite for the body, [so] that (so that?) it cannot be separated from it, as Augustine says on Genesis to the Letter. — There (VII, c. 27, n. 38) it is said: But it is better believed that [the soul] naturally wills this [to be sent into a body], i.e. to be created in that nature so as to will [it], just as it is natural to us to will to live.
  14. Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 2.
    Cf. above, a. 2, q. 2.
  15. Vat. incongrue tantum; melior est lectio ed. 1, in qua, retento tantum, post corpori humano additur et. Cod. aa optime: sed uniri corpori humano; sicut enim uniri corpori humano dicit illud, quod est etc.
    The Vatican ms. incongruously [reads] tantum; better is the reading of ed. 1, in which, tantum being retained, after corpori humano is added et. Codex aa best: sed uniri corpori humano; sicut enim uniri corpori humano dicit illud, quod est etc.
  16. Nonnulli codd. ut V aa cum Vat. hic subiungunt perficit... et autem (Vat. nam perficit) non mediante potentia. Cod. T (in marg.) post sed perficit se ipsa addit non mediante potentia. Plurimi codd. sed (cod. N et hoc) respicit se ipso pro sed perficit se ipsa.
    Some codices such as V, aa with the Vatican ms. here subjoin perficit... et autem (Vat. nam perficit) non mediante potentia. Codex T (in the margin), after sed perficit se ipsa, adds non mediante potentia. Very many codices [read] sed (cod. N et hoc) respicit se ipso for sed perficit se ipsa.
  17. Cod. N ita quoque anima separatur, et hoc est etc.
    Codex N [reads] ita quoque anima separatur, et hoc est etc.
  18. Subaudi: esse separabile. — Cod. aa et ideo pro et ita nunc. Mox non pauci codd. sed non consequitur illam pro sed consequitur illam; falso. Aliquanto superius codd. F P Q sicut perfectum pro sic perfectum; dein cod. N omittit immortalis.
    Supply: to-be-separable. — Codex aa [reads] et ideo for et ita nunc. Soon, not a few codices [read] sed non consequitur illam for sed consequitur illam; falsely. Somewhat above, codices F, P, Q [read] sicut perfectum for sic perfectum; then codex N omits immortalis.
  19. Subaudi cum cod. N unibilitas. Codd. F H cum ed. 3 omittunt id est.
    Supply, with codex N, unibilitas ("unitability"). Codices F, H with ed. 3 omit id est.
  20. Vide Scholion ad q. 1.
    See the Scholion to q. 1.
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