Dist. 1, Part 1, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1
Dubia circa litteram Magistri.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de ordine istius libri ad praecedentem. Cum enim nos cognoscamus Creatorem per creaturas, quia videmus per speculum1; et «scientia debeat inchoari a notioribus nobis»: ergo prius debuit agere de creaturis quam de Creatore: ergo liber iste primus, non secundus debet esse.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod supra, cum actum est de Creatore, actum est etiam de creaturis, prout sunt via ad perveniendum in cognitionem Creatoris2; nunc autem agitur de cognitione rerum, prout cognitio de Creatore adminiculatur ei, quia agitur de conditione et lapsu. Non potest autem cognosci conditio, nisi prius cognoscatur eius principium; principium autem huius conditionis solus Deus est: ideo oportet, doctrinam huius libri sequi doctrinam praecedentis; et patet obiectum.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc, quod dicit: In uno principio a Deo creatore mundum factum refert. Quaero, pro quo supponat ille terminus principio: aut pro creato, aut pro increato. Non pro increato, quia praepositiones sunt transitivae3. Non pro creato, quia nihil creatum erat, in quo fieret.
Item, ab aeterno fuerunt res in principio suo, scilicet Deo: si ergo productio respicit egressum a Deo, nullo modo potest stare pro principio increato; nec pro creato, quia nondum erat aliquid; ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praepositio4 cum suo casuali tripliciter potest accipi. Uno modo ut dicat pure ordinem, sicut idem est facere in principio quod facere ante alia, ita quod connotet privationem respectu alicuius temporalis prioris, et connotet positionem posterioris. Alio modo potest importare habitudinem mensurae; et tunc in principio idem est, quod in primo instanti temporis. Tertio modo potest importare habitudinem causae; et tunc sensus est, in principio, id est in Filio. In Filio enim dicitur creasse, secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo5: Omnia in sapientia fecisti, Domine, ut sic notetur non tantum causa efficiens, sed etiam exemplaris.
Omnes istae expositiones verae sunt et catholicae, et per eas eliduntur tres errores circa mundi productionem. Ex prima eliditur error quorundam modernorum philosophantium6, qui dixerunt, mundum ex tempore factum, sed mediante Intelligentia, ita quod Deus primo fecit Angelos et cum illis condidit mundum; contra quos est prima expositio. Si enim Deus in principio conditionis creavit mundum, non ergo post Angelos vel Intelligentias, ita quod per illos condiderit mundum; et hic error ortum habet ex illo verbo: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram7, quasi Deus loquatur Angelis. — Ex secunda expositione eliditur error Aristotelicorum8, qui dixerunt, mundum conditum ab aeterno. Si enim in principio temporis factus est ex nihilo, non ergo fuit sine principio; et hic error ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt videre, qualiter mundus inceperit, et quare tunc et non ante. — Ex tertia expositione eliditur error tertius Platonicorum9, qui dixerunt, principia mundi tria esse aeterna, scilicet Deum, materiam et exemplar. Si enim Deus in Filio sicut per exemplar aeternum condidit de nihilo mundum, non ergo requiritur secundum principium, quod est exemplar, nec tertium, quod sit materia; et hic ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt intelligere omnino, quomodo aliquid fiat ex nihilo. — Ex omnibus his eliditur error Manichaeorum, qui posuerunt principia mundi effectiva duo; et iste eliditur per subiectum dictae locutionis: Creavit Deus caelum et terram10, lucem et tenebras; et hic error est omnibus vilior.
Et habent se gradatim. Nam primus solum errat in eo a quo. Secundus errat in eo de quo et quando11, quia ex aliquo et ab aeterno. Tertius errat in eo de quo, quia dicit factum esse de materia, non ex nihilo; et in eo per quod, scilicet circa exemplar, quod posuit aliud a Deo, ut apparet; et in quando, quia posuit materiam ab aeterno imperfectam. Et iste error est multo vilior quam error Aristotelis, qui posuit, ab aeterno materiam fuisse perfectam sua forma. Quartus error Manichaeorum omnibus est abominabilior, quia deficit in primo principio, in quo philosophi communiter concordaverunt, ponens prima duo principia, ac per hoc auferens ordinem et decorem universi, et bonitatem et Dei potestatem. Et hunc errorem inter ceteros non humanam malitiam, sed diabolicam astutiam credo adinvenisse, ut se alterum Deum esse persuadeat12 mentibus peccatorum.
Ex dictis igitur patet, pro quo supponat hoc nomen principium. Potest enim supponere pro Filio, et Deus pro Patre; et ex modo13 construendi fit talis appropriatio. Potest etiam supponere pro creatura, utpote pro principio temporis; sed non dicit tunc ordinem, sed concomitantiam mensurae ad mensuratum, scilicet quod caelum et terra cum principio temporis esse coeperunt. Et sic patet illud.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Aristoteles tria posuit esse principia, duo etc., quare distinguit illa duo a tertio? Et iterum, videtur illud non esse verum perscrutanti libros Philosophi, quia ipse non ponit nisi ista tria, materiam, formam et privationem, in principio novae Metaphysicae14 et in libro primo Physicorum: non ergo ista quae ponit Magister.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ideo duo distinguit a tertio, quia duo sunt intrinseca tanquam elementa, et unum est extrinsecum. Ubi autem Philosophus ista tria ponit, si quaeratur, expresse invenitur in secundo de Generatione circa finem15.
Sed tunc est quaestio, quia videtur non sufficienter principia in Physicis16 assignasse; immo si ibi assignavit tria praeter operatorium, tunc ergo sunt quatuor. — Et dicendum ad hoc, quod privatio non differt a forma17 vel a materia. Sive enim privatio nominet appetitum formae cum eius carentia, sive nominet ipsam formae essentiam, prout est in materia in potentia, non differt ab his duobus, scilicet materia et specie18. Nam appetitus ad materiam reducitur nec est aliud; et essentia formae ad speciem secundum rem. Et haec duo principia determinat in primo19. Postmodum adiungit tertium, operatorium, dum omnia reducit ad motorem primum, in octavo. Et sic patet, quod Magister vere et proprie loquitur.
Dub. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: In principio temporum mundum creasse. Si enim tempus coepit cum primo mobili, et illud coepit in secundo die20: non ergo in principio temporis, sed ante.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tempus dicitur tripliciter: communissime, communiter et proprie. Communissime dicitur mensura exitus de non-esse in esse. Communiter dicitur tempus mensura cuiuslibet mutationis, maxime illius quae fuit ante primum mobile. Tertio modo dicitur proprie mensura motus primi mobilis, ut communiter consuevit distingui. Et quia primo modo dictum est primum omnium, et in illo conditum est saeculum: ideo dicit: in principio temporum.
Dub. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnipotentissimi est nocere non posse.
Contra: Omnis poena affligit et laedit, et si laedit, nocet: ergo si Deus non potest nocere, non potest punire.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut duplex est malum, scilicet culpae et poenae, sic etiam duplex est nocumentum. Cum ergo dicitur, quod non potest nocere, non intelligitur quantum ad nocumentum, quod facit malum poenae, sed quod facit malum culpae21.
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Doubts on the text of the Master.
Dub. I.
In this part are doubts on the littera, and the question is asked first about the order of this book in relation to the preceding. For since we know the Creator through creatures — for we see through a mirror1 — and «knowledge ought to begin from what is more known to us»: therefore [the Master] ought to have treated of creatures before the Creator: therefore this book should be the first, not the second.
I respond: It must be said that above, when the Creator was treated, the creatures too were treated, insofar as they are a way of arriving at the knowledge of the Creator2; but now things are treated according to that aspect under which knowledge of the Creator aids it, because the topic is the foundation and the fall. But the foundation cannot be known unless its principle is first known; and the principle of this foundation is God alone: therefore the teaching of this book must follow the teaching of the preceding one; and the objection is plain.
Dub. II.
Likewise the question is asked about what he says: He relates that the world was made by God the Creator in one principle. I ask what the term principle stands for: either for something created, or for something uncreated. Not for something uncreated, because prepositions are transitive3. Not for something created, because nothing created existed in which it could come to be.
Likewise, from eternity things were in their principle, namely God: therefore if production regards a going-out from God, in no way can in principle stand for an uncreated principle; nor for a created one, because nothing yet was; therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that a preposition4 together with its case-noun can be taken in three ways. In one way, so as to say purely order — as to do in the beginning is the same as to do before other things, in such a way that it connotes a privation with respect to some prior temporal thing, and connotes the position of what is posterior. In another way, it can import the relation of measure; and then in the beginning is the same as in the first instant of time. In a third way, it can import the relation of cause; and then the sense is in the beginning, that is, in the Son. For God is said to have created in the Son, according to what is said in the Psalm5: Thou hast made all things in wisdom, O Lord, so as to indicate not only the efficient cause but also the exemplar.
All these expositions are true and catholic, and by them three errors concerning the production of the world are knocked down. By the first is knocked down the error of certain modern philosophizers6, who said that the world was made in time, but by the mediation of an Intelligence, so that God first made the Angels and with them founded the world; against whom the first exposition stands. For if God in the beginning of the foundation created the world, then [he did] not [create it] after the Angels or Intelligences, such that he founded the world through them; and this error has its rise from the word Let us make man in our image and likeness7, as if God were speaking to the Angels. — By the second exposition the error of the Aristotelians8 is knocked down, who said that the world was founded from eternity. For if it was made in the first instant of time from nothing, then it was not without a beginning; and this error has its rise from the fact that they could not see how the world began, and why then and not before. — By the third exposition the third error of the Platonists9 is knocked down, who said that there are three eternal principles of the world: namely God, matter, and the exemplar. For if God in the Son, as through an eternal exemplar, founded the world from nothing, then no second principle (which is the exemplar) is required, nor a third (which would be matter); and this error has its rise from the fact that they could not understand at all how anything can come-to-be from nothing. — From all of these the error of the Manichaeans is knocked down, who posited two effective principles of the world; and this is knocked down by the subject of the said utterance: God created heaven and earth10, light and darkness; and this error is the basest of all.
And they stand in a gradient. For the first errs only in the by whom. The second errs in the from what and when11, because [it says] from something and from eternity. The third errs in the from what, because it says [the world] was made from matter, not from nothing; and in the through which — namely about the exemplar, which it posited as other than God, as appears; and in the when, because it posited matter as imperfect from eternity. And this error is much baser than the error of Aristotle, who posited that from eternity matter was perfect in its form. The fourth error, that of the Manichaeans, is the most abominable of all, because it fails in the first principle, on which the philosophers commonly agreed, positing two first principles, and through this taking away the order and beauty of the universe, and the goodness and power of God. And this error among the rest, I believe, was invented not by human malice but by diabolical cunning, that [the devil] might persuade12 the minds of sinners that he is a second God.
From what has been said, then, it is plain what this name principle stands for. For it can stand for the Son, and God for the Father; and from the mode13 of construction such an appropriation comes about. It can also stand for a creature, namely for the beginning of time; but then it does not say order, but a concomitance of measure with the measured — namely that heaven and earth began to be along with the beginning of time. And so that is plain.
Dub. III.
Likewise the question is asked about what he says: Aristotle posited three principles, two etc., why does he distinguish those two from the third? And again, this does not seem true to one searching the books of the Philosopher, because he does not posit anything but these three — matter, form, and privation — at the beginning of the new Metaphysics14 and in the first book of the Physics: therefore not those which the Master posits.
I respond: It must be said that he distinguishes the two from the third for this reason: that two are intrinsic, like elements, and one is extrinsic. Where the Philosopher posits these three, if it be asked, is expressly found in the second book On Generation, near the end15.
But then there is a question, because he seems not to have sufficiently assigned principles in the Physics16; indeed, if there he assigned three besides the operatory [principle], then there are four. — And it must be said to this that privation does not differ from form17 or from matter. For whether privation names the appetite of form along with the lack of it, or names the very essence of form insofar as it is in matter in potency, it does not differ from these two — namely matter and species18. For appetite is reduced to matter and is nothing else; and the essence of form to species, according to reality. And these two principles he determines in the first [book]19. Afterward he adjoins a third, the operatory, when he reduces all things to a first mover, in the eighth. And so it is plain that the Master speaks truly and properly.
Dub. IV.
Likewise the question is asked about what he says: He created the world in the beginning of times. For if time began with the first movable, and that began on the second day20, then [it was created] not in the beginning of time but before.
I respond: It must be said that time is said in three ways: most commonly, commonly, and properly. Most commonly it is said to be the measure of the going-out from non-being into being. Commonly time is said to be the measure of any mutation whatever — especially of that which was before the first movable. In the third way it is said properly to be the measure of the motion of the first movable, as it is commonly distinguished. And because in the first sense it was called the first of all, and in it the age was founded: therefore he says in the beginning of times.
Dub. V.
Likewise the question is asked about what he says: It belongs to the most omnipotent not to be able to do harm.
To the contrary: Every penalty afflicts and injures, and if it injures, it harms: therefore if God cannot harm, he cannot punish.
I respond: It must be said that as evil is twofold, namely of fault and of penalty, so likewise harm is twofold. When therefore it is said that he cannot harm, it is not understood with regard to the harm which makes the evil of penalty, but to that which makes the evil of fault21.
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- Epist. I. Cor. 13, 12: Videmus nunc per speculum. Cfr. de his I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 2. — Seq. propositio est Aristotelis, I. Phys. text. 2: Innata autem est ex notioribus nobis via ac manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora; non enim sunt eadem et nobis nota et simpliciter. Quapropter necesse est ad hunc modum procedere ex immanifestioribus quidem naturae, nobis autem manifestioribus ad manifestiora naturae et notiora.1 Corinthians 13:12: Now we see through a mirror. Cf. on these I Sent. d. 3, p. I, q. 2. — The following proposition is from Aristotle, Physics I, text 2: The way is innate from what is more known to us and more manifest, to what is more manifest in nature and more known; for the same things are not known both to us and absolutely. Wherefore it is necessary to proceed in this way from what is less manifest in nature, but more manifest to us, to what is more manifest in nature and more known.
- Ex cod. Y (cod. Q in marg.) supplevimus Creatoris, pro quo cod. V ponit Dei. Paulo inferius plures codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt prius.From codex Y (codex Q in the margin) we supplied Creatoris ("of the Creator"), for which codex V puts Dei ("of God"). A little below, several codices with ed. 1 omit prius.
- Cfr. tom. I. pag. 116, Scholion I.Cf. tom. I, p. 116, Scholion I.
- Cod. V quod haec praepositio in cum.Codex V reads quod haec praepositio in cum ("that this preposition in with").
- Psalm. 103, 24. — Paulo superius fide plurium codd. ut H K M N T W aa adiecimus In Filio enim; particulam enim exhibent tantum codd. W aa, quorum posterior insuper post dicitur bene supplet Deus.Psalm 103:24. — A little above, on the faith of several codices (H, K, M, N, T, W, aa) we added In Filio enim ("For in the Son"); the particle enim is exhibited only by codices W and aa, the latter of which moreover after dicitur rightly supplies Deus.
- Vide supra a. 2. q. 2. — Aliquanto inferius codd. K U prius Angelos, cod. Q per Angelos, cod. bb cum Vat. primo Angelos pro post Angelos.See above a. 2, q. 2. — A little below codices K, U read prius Angelos ("the Angels first"); codex Q per Angelos ("through the Angels"); codex bb with the Vatican ms. primo Angelos ("first the Angels") for post Angelos ("after the Angels").
- Gen. 1, 26.Genesis 1:26.
- Plures codd. aliquorum; cod. A antiquorum; non pauci cum ed. 1 aliorum, forte propter abbreviationem seducti. — Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1 et 2.Several codices read aliquorum ("of some"); codex A antiquorum ("of the ancients"); not a few with ed. 1 aliorum ("of others"), perhaps misled by an abbreviation. — Cf. above a. 1, q. 1 and 2.
- Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1.Cf. above a. 1, q. 1.
- Gen. 1, 1. — De errore Manichaeorum vide supra a. 2. q. 1.Genesis 1:1. — On the error of the Manichaeans see above a. 2, q. 1.
- Supple cum cod. M error.Supply with codex M the word error.
- Codd. A X persuaderet.Codices A, X read persuaderet (subjunctive imperfect).
- Cod. cc et ed. 1 et ex hoc modo. Aliquanto inferius cod. F post concomitantiam addit sive convenientiam. — Idem dubium resolvit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 1; B. Albert., hic a. 1 et S. p. II. tract. 12. q. 41; S. Thom., hic a. 6; Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 4. a. 3.Codex cc and ed. 1 read et ex hoc modo. A little below codex F after concomitantiam adds sive convenientiam ("or agreement"). — The same doubt is resolved by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 43, m. 1; Bl. Albert, here a. 1 and Summa p. II, tract. 12, q. 41; St Thomas, here a. 6; Peter of Tarantasia and Richard of Mediavilla, here circa litteram; Giles of Rome, here q. 4, a. 3.
- Aetate media duae versiones librorum Metaphysicorum Aristotelis vulgo in usu erant, nempe Graeco-latina et Arabico-latina, quae inter se non parum discrepant, etiam in librorum huius operis divisione et ordine et numero. Sic v. g. in versione Arabico-latina deest prima pars primi libri (quam Arabes non Aristoteli, sed Theophrasto adiudicabant) et liber undecimus; liber vero duodecimus in mss. invenitur primo loco positus. Versio Graeco-latina in multis mss. intitulatur translatio nova sive nova Metaphysica, in aliis autem mss. hoc nomine insignitur versio Arabico-latina, versio autem Graeco-latina vocatur Metaphysica vetus. Cfr. Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, par Charles Jourdain, Paris 1843, pag. 177 et 370, qui etiam ostendit, quod Vincentius Bellovacensis († 1264) in suo libro Speculum doctrinale nomine Metaphysica nova intellexerit versionem Arabico-latinam. Huic assertioni suffragantur S. Bonaventurae verba hic posita in principio novae Metaphysicae. Nam in principio libri duodecimi, relatis opinionibus antiquorum philosophorum de substantiis, Aristoteles ait, text. 12 (XI. c. 2.): «Tres itaque causae et tria principia; duo quidem ipsa contrarietas, cuius hoc quidem ratio et forma, hoc vero privatio; tertium vero materia». — Vat. cum ceteris edd. legit in principio noni Metaphysicorum, quae lectio quidem non est falsa, quia etiam ibi Aristoteles haec tria principia nominat, cum loquatur de potentia activa et passiva nec non de potentia et actu, sed haec lectio est contra codd. antiquiores. — De I. Phys. cfr. text. 73. seqq. (c. 8. seq.).In the Middle Ages two versions of the books of Aristotle's Metaphysics were commonly in use — namely the Greek-Latin and the Arabic-Latin — which differ from each other in no small measure, even in the division, order, and number of the books of this work. Thus, e.g., in the Arabic-Latin version the first part of the first book is missing (which the Arabs assigned not to Aristotle but to Theophrastus), and also the eleventh book; the twelfth book, however, is found in the manuscripts placed in the first position. The Greek-Latin version is in many manuscripts entitled translatio nova or nova Metaphysica; in other manuscripts, however, the Arabic-Latin version is marked with this name, and the Greek-Latin is called Metaphysica vetus. Cf. Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote, by Charles Jourdain, Paris 1843, pp. 177 and 370, who also shows that Vincent of Beauvais († 1264), in his book Speculum doctrinale, understood by Metaphysica nova the Arabic-Latin version. To this assertion the words of St Bonaventure here placed, in the beginning of the new Metaphysics, lend support. For at the beginning of the twelfth book, after relating the opinions of the ancient philosophers on substances, Aristotle says, text 12 (XI, c. 2): «Therefore three are the causes and three the principles; two indeed are contrariety itself — one of which is the account and form, the other privation; the third is matter.» — The Vatican ms. with the other editions reads in the beginning of the ninth book of the Metaphysics, which reading is not false, for there too Aristotle names these three principles when he speaks of active and passive potency and likewise of potency and act; but this reading is against the older codices. — On Physics I cf. text 73ff. (c. 8f.).
- Text. 51. seqq. (c. 9.), ubi de causis et principiis generationis et corruptionis inquirens ait: «Illud enim ut materia est, hoc autem ut forma; oportet autem et tertium adhuc adesse», scil. principium efficiens, ut deinceps probatur.Text 51ff. (c. 9), where, inquiring concerning the causes and principles of generation and corruption, he says: «For this is as matter, that as form; but it is necessary that a third still be present», namely the efficient principle, as is proved in what follows.
- Intellige secundum obiectionem, libro primo Physicorum, quod etiam Vat. ponit. Paulo inferius et circa finem solutionis plurimi codd. cum primis edd. operationem pro operatorum, sed contra textum Ambrosii a Magistro, hic c. 3, relatum. — Pro intelligentia eorum, quae sequuntur, observandum, quod secundum Aristotelem res naturales, si considerantur in statu constitutionis seu in facto esse, duo habent principia intrinseca, nempe materiam et formam; si vero considerantur in statu generationis seu in fieri, tria, scil. materiam, formam et privationem. Privatio, cum generatim sit carentia formae in subiecto apto ad formam, sumi potest tum respectu materiae, tum respectu formae. Si sumitur respectu materiae, tunc privatio erit ipsa materia, quatenus forma caret, apta tamen est (inclinatur, appetitum habet) ad illam, sive, ut S. Bonav. ait: «Appetitus formae (i. e. appetitus materiae ad formam) cum carentia eius». Si sumitur respectu formae, cum ipsa secundum Aristotelem ex materia sive ex potentia materiae sit educenda, privatio erit forma ex materia educenda.Understand [it] according to the objection, in the first book of the Physics, which the Vatican ms. also places [there]. A little below and near the end of the solution very many codices, with the first editions, read operationem for operatorum, but against the text of Ambrose as reported by the Master here, c. 3. — For the understanding of what follows, it is to be observed that, according to Aristotle, natural things, if they are considered in the state of constitution, that is, in being-made (in facto esse), have two intrinsic principles, namely matter and form; but if they are considered in the state of generation, that is, in becoming (in fieri), three — namely matter, form, and privation. Privation, since generally it is the lack of form in a subject apt for form, can be taken either with respect to matter or with respect to form. If it is taken with respect to matter, then privation will be the matter itself, insofar as it lacks form yet is apt for it (is inclined toward it, has an appetite for it) — or, as St Bonaventure says: «the appetite of form (i.e. the appetite of matter for form) together with the lack of it». If it is taken with respect to form, since according to Aristotle form is to be drawn out of matter or out of the potency of matter, privation will be the form to be drawn out of matter.
- Text. 4-5. seqq. (c. 6.). — Notandum, quod in determinatione, quae sit vera de hac re sententia Aristotelis, nec recentiores nec antiqui eiusdem interpretes conveniunt. S. Bonav. hic approbat sententiam Magistri, sed B. Albertus, II. Sent. d. 1. a. 11, asserit: Aristoteles in veritate non dicit hoc, quod tria vel duo sint principia mundi; sed ipse probat, duo non incepisse per motum, scilicet materiam primam et motorem primum; et ideo imponitur ei, quod duo dixerit esse ab aeterno. Et quando dicuntur duo, tunc tanguntur principia naturae essentialiter constituentia naturam, ut materia et forma, quia privatio non constituit, sed abiicitur per motum ad formam. Quando autem dicitur tertium, tunc dicitur seu tangitur primum movens. Cfr. idem, S. p. II. tr. I. q. 4. m. 2. a. 3. et 4; et S. Thomas, II. Sent. d. 1, qui B. Alberto consentit. Cfr. etiam Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med. et Aeg. R., hic in exposit. textus. Idem dissensus est circa sententiam Platonis, de qua re diffuse disputat Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.Text 4–5ff. (c. 6). — It is to be noted that, as to what is the true opinion of Aristotle in this matter, neither the more recent nor the ancient interpreters of him agree. St Bonaventure here approves the opinion of the Master, but Bl. Albert, II Sent. d. 1, a. 11, asserts: Aristotle in truth does not say this, that there are three or two principles of the world; rather he proves that two did not begin through motion, namely first matter and the first mover; and therefore it is imputed to him that he said two [principles] are from eternity. And when two are spoken of, then the principles essentially constituting nature are touched on, as matter and form, because privation does not constitute [nature] but is cast off by motion toward form. But when a third is spoken of, then the first mover is meant or touched on. Cf. the same author, Summa p. II, tr. I, q. 4, m. 2, a. 3 and 4; and St Thomas, II Sent. d. 1, who agrees with Bl. Albert. Cf. also Peter of Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, and Giles of Rome, here in the exposition of the text. The same disagreement is found concerning the opinion of Plato, on which matter Denis the Carthusian disputes at length, here q. 3.
- Graece μορφή, quod latine vertitur modo forma, modo species. — Cod. L addit aliter: quod privatio non est principium secundum rem, sed tantum secundum rationem. Dein cod. cc et ed. 1 post appetitus supplent materiae.In Greek μορφή, which in Latin is rendered now forma, now species. — Codex L adds otherwise: that privation is not a principle according to reality, but only according to reason. Then codex cc and ed. 1 after appetitus supply materiae.
- Subaudi: libro Physicorum, de quo in ipsa obiectione.Supply: in the book of the Physics, concerning which [book] [is spoken] in the objection itself.
- Gen. 1, 6-8: Dixit quoque Deus: Fiat firmamentum... et factum est vespere et mane, dies secundus.Genesis 1:6–8: And God also said: Let there be a firmament... and there was evening and morning, the second day.
- Cfr. infra d. 2. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.Cf. below d. 2, p. I, a. 2, q. 1. ---