Dist. 1, Part 2, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 1
Dubia circa litteram Magistri.
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et quaeritur primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus et habetur in littera1: Quia bonus est Deus, sumus. Videtur enim falsum dicere. Nam si consequentia est bona: ergo, si non essemus, Deus non esset bonus. Si dicas, quod non est consequentia necessaria, et2 quia non dicit ibi consequentiam, sed causam; obiicitur contra hoc, quia bonitas Dei aut est causa sufficiens, aut non. Si sufficiens, ergo ponit effectum eo modo, quo inest; sed necessarium est, Deum esse bonum: ergo necessarium fuit, creaturas exire in esse, ergo non voluntarium; cuius oppositum monstratum est in libro primo in tractatu de voluntate3. — Item, videtur male appropriare. In vestigio enim est correspondentia causae ad effectum, ita quod essentia creaturae repraesentat essentiam Creatoris, potentia potentiam, veritas veritatem et bonitas bonitatem: ergo deberet dicere: quia Deus est, sumus. Propter hoc est quaestio: cum ad nostrum esse concurrat potentia, sapientia, bonitas, quare causalitas nostri esse potius attribuitur bonitati quam aliis?
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod causa in actu est ex concursu efficientis et finis, quia finis movet efficientem in his inferioribus. Et quoniam voluntas dicit illud quo efficiens iungitur fini in habentibus intellectum, hinc est, quod voluntas est causa immediata; et ita dictum est et ostensum in primo libro4. Quoniam ergo bonum dicit rationem duplicis causae, scilicet efficientis et finis, hinc est, quod bonum est ratio, quare voluntas est in actu, et ita potissima ratio productionis effectuum. Et ideo nostrum esse attribuitur bonitati, non per modum repraesentandi, vel appropriationis in repraesentando, sed rationis in causando. Unde prima consequentia includit hanc, scilicet: quia bonus est Deus, vult se diffundere; et quia vult se diffundere, vult creaturam producere; et quia Deus vult creaturam producere, vult creaturam esse; et ita, quia bonus est, sumus5.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hac propositione: In quantum sumus, boni sumus. Ergo videtur, quod nos boni simus per essentiam, quod est contra Boethium in libro de Hebdomadibus6, qui dicit, quod sumus boni participatione. — Item, si in quantum sumus, boni sumus: ergo non est intelligere esse, abstracta bonitate; quod falsum est, cum intelligatur veritas, bonitate abstracta.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod bonitas est duplex in creatura: una quae est ex forma dante esse, alia quae est ex forma dante bene esse. Prima est bonitas substantialis, quae non addit supra formam novam essentiam7, sed solum relationem ad finalem
causam, ex qua comparatione omne aliud a Deo habet esse bonum. Et quia illa comparatio ad causam essentialem sive finalem est essentialis, nec unquam esse relinquit nec potest relinquere; hinc est, quod Augustinus dicit: «In quantum sumus, boni sumus». — Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Boethio, dicendum, quod ipse vocat bonum per essentiam illud bonum, quod est absolute bonum, non ex dependentia ad aliud. Hoc autem modo nulla creatura bona est, immo ex comparatione, et ideo participatione. Nec sequitur, quod accidentaliter; quia participatio non est accidentalis respectu primae bonitatis, quae est ex forma dante esse, quamvis sit accidentalis, secundum quod est ex forma dante bene esse8.
Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non est intelligere esse etc.; dicendum, quod illud quod attribuitur alicui secundum quod ipsum, potest dupliciter attribui: aut enim consequitur, aut praecedit. Si praecedit, sic est ita essentiale, quod sine ipso nec est nec potest intelligi. Sed si aliquo modo consequitur, non tamen cadit in aliud genus, potest quidem intelligi intellectu apprehendente et intellectu semiplene resolvente; sed intellectu plene ad causas comparante non potest intelligi, non intellecto illo, maxime cum illud dicit habitudinem necessariam et relationem ad causam, sicut verum et bonum9.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de his causis, quas assignat Magister circa unionem animae rationalis. Dicit enim primo, quod causa est Dei voluntas; secundo, quod est causa instructio nostra. Et videtur, quod utraque sit inartificialis. Prima enim responsio potest ad omnia dari; in secunda videtur principium peti, quia, si non esset unita, limpide videret Deum nec indigeret exemplo10: ergo si exemplo indiguit, non fuit nisi propter minorationem suae cognitionis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister respondet sufficienter et bene. Sufficienter quidem, quia cum sit duplex via cognoscendi opera Dei, scilicet fide et intelligentia, ad soliditatem fidei sufficit scire, quod Deus voluit, quem credit nihil velle nisi rationabile; unde in prima responsione satisfacit fidei, et haec responsio in omnibus fideli11, ut fidelis est, plene sufficit. — Ad soliditatem intelligentiae redditur ratio; et cum non possit reddi ratio vel causa ex parte Dei, redditur ex parte creaturae. Et haec est manifestatio divinae bonitatis in suo opere, in quo debet se manifestare non solum propter nostram indigentiam, verum etiam ad suam gloriam12; et sic patent obiecta. Respondetur etiam hic causa efficiens et finalis, et sic sufficienter et plene.
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Doubts on the text of the Master.
Dub. I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and it is asked, first, about that which Augustine says and which is contained in the littera1: Because God is good, we are. For it seems false to say [this]. For if the consequence is valid: then, if we were not, God would not be good. If you say that it is not a necessary consequence, and2 that it does not there state a consequence but a cause; it is objected against this, that the goodness of God either is a sufficient cause, or not. If sufficient, then it posits the effect in the manner in which it is present [in the cause]; but it is necessary that God be good: therefore it was necessary that creatures go forth into being, therefore not voluntary; the opposite of which was demonstrated in the first book, in the treatise on the will3. — Likewise, it seems to appropriate badly. For in a vestige there is a correspondence of the cause to the effect, so that the essence of the creature represents the essence of the Creator, power [represents] power, truth truth, and goodness goodness: therefore he ought to say: because God is, we are. On account of this there is a question: since to our being there concur power, wisdom, [and] goodness, why is the causality of our being attributed rather to goodness than to the others?
I respond: It must be said that the cause in act is from the concurrence of the efficient [cause] and the end, because the end moves the efficient [cause] in these lower things. And since will states that by which the efficient [cause] is joined to the end in [beings] having intellect, hence it is that the will is the immediate cause; and so it has been said and shown in the first book4. Since therefore the good states the account of a twofold cause, namely of the efficient and of the end, hence it is that the good is the reason why the will is in act, and so the most powerful reason of the production of effects. And therefore our being is attributed to goodness, not by way of representing, or of appropriation in representing, but of [its] account in causing. Whence the first consequence includes this, namely: because God is good, he wills to diffuse himself; and because he wills to diffuse himself, he wills to produce a creature; and because God wills to produce a creature, he wills the creature to be; and so, because he is good, we are5.
Dub. II.
Likewise it is asked concerning this proposition: Inasmuch as we are, we are good. Therefore it seems that we are good by essence, which is against Boethius in the book On the Hebdomads6, who says that we are good by participation. — Likewise, if inasmuch as we are, we are good: then it is not [possible] to understand being with goodness abstracted [from it]; which is false, since truth is understood with goodness abstracted.
I respond: It must be said that goodness is twofold in a creature: one which is from the form giving being, another which is from the form giving well-being. The first is substantial goodness, which does not add a new essence over the form7, but only a relation to the final
cause, by which comparison everything other than God has being good. And because that comparison to the essential or final cause is essential, and never relinquishes being nor can relinquish [it]; hence it is that Augustine says: «Inasmuch as we are, we are good». — To that, then, which is objected concerning Boethius, it must be said that he calls good by essence that good which is absolutely good, not from dependence on another. But in this way no creature is good — rather [it is good] from comparison, and therefore by participation. Nor does it follow that [it is good] accidentally; because participation is not accidental in respect of the first goodness, which is from the form giving being, although it is accidental according as it is from the form giving well-being8.
To that which is objected, that it is not [possible] to understand being etc.; it must be said that what is attributed to something according to itself can be attributed in two ways: for it either follows or precedes. If it precedes, then it is so essential that without it [the thing] neither is nor can be understood. But if in some way it follows, yet does not fall into another genus, it can indeed be understood by an apprehending intellect and by an intellect resolving half-fully; but by an intellect fully comparing [things] to their causes it cannot be understood, that [other] not being understood — especially since it states a necessary relation and a reference to the cause, like the true and the good9.
Dub. III.
Likewise it is asked concerning those causes which the Master assigns regarding the union of the rational soul. For he says, first, that the cause is the will of God; secondly, that the cause is our instruction. And it seems that each is unskillful [as an answer]. For the first response can be given to everything; in the second the question seems to be begged, because, if [the soul] were not united, it would see God clearly and would not need an exemplar10: therefore, if it needed an exemplar, it was only on account of the diminishing of its knowledge.
I respond: It must be said that the Master responds sufficiently and well. Sufficiently indeed, because, since there is a twofold way of knowing the works of God, namely by faith and by understanding, for the firmness of faith it suffices to know that God willed [it], whom [the faithful one] believes to will nothing except what is reasonable; whence in the first response he satisfies faith, and this response, for everyone faithful11, inasmuch as he is faithful, fully suffices. — For the firmness of understanding a reason is rendered; and since a reason or cause cannot be rendered on the part of God, it is rendered on the part of the creature. And this is the manifestation of the divine goodness in its work, in which [God] ought to manifest himself not only on account of our need, but also for his own glory12; and so the objections are clear. There is also answered here the efficient and final cause, and so [it is answered] sufficiently and fully.
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- Hic c. 4.Here, c. 4 [of the Master's littera].
- Sequimur cod. bb addendo et, quod contextus requirit. Cod. I quia haec conditio i. e. particula conditionalis quia.We follow codex bb in adding et, which the context requires. Codex I [reads] quia haec conditio, i.e. the conditional particle quia.
- Dist. 43.[Book I,] distinction 43.
- Dist. 43. a. 2. q. 1. et 2.[Book I,] distinction 43, a. 2, q. 1 and 2.
- De hoc dubio vide I. Sent. d. 1. dub. 13. seq.; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 17. m. 9, et p. II. q. 4. m. 2. et q. 5. m. 2; B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 6. q. 26. m. 2. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. et 2; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit. dub. 4; Aegid. R., hic circa lit. dub. 4. seqq.On this doubt see I Sent. d. 1, dub. 13 seq.; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 17, m. 9, and p. II, q. 4, m. 2, and q. 5, m. 2; Bl. Albert, Summa p. I, tract. 6, q. 26, m. 2, a. 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 3, q. 1 and 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here, on the text, dub. 4; Giles of Rome, here, on the text, dub. 4 seqq.
- Sive: «Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bona sint, cum non sint substantialia bona».Or [titled]: «How substances are good in that they are, although they are not substantial goods» [the alternative title of Boethius's De Hebdomadibus].
- Vat. cum uno alteroque cod. novum esse.The Vatican ms. with one or two codices [reads] novum esse ("a new being").
- In hac responsione continetur summa Boethiani opusculi, cuius finis est: bonum esse essentiam, iustum vero esse actum respicit... Amplius, bonum quidem generale est, iustum vero speciale, nec species descendit in omnia; idcirco alia quidem iusta, alia aliud, omnia vero bona.In this response is contained the sum of the Boethian opusculum, whose end is: it regards the good to be essence, but the just to be act... Further, the good indeed is general, but the just is special, nor does the species descend into all things; therefore some things are just, others [are] something else, but all things are good.
- Cfr. de hoc I. Sent. d. 28. dub. 1; Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 17. m. 4; B. Albert., S. p. I. tract. 6. q. 26. m. 1. a. partic. 1; Aegid. R., hic circa lit. dub. 7.Cf. on this I Sent. d. 28, dub. 1; Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 17, m. 4; Bl. Albert, Summa p. I, tract. 6, q. 26, m. 1, a. partic. 1; Giles of Rome, here, on the text, dub. 7.
- Alluditur ad verba Magistri, hic c. 6: Pro exemplo erit futurae societatis, quae inter Deum et spiritum rationalem glorificatione eiusdem perficienda; animam corporeis indumentis et terrenis mansionibus copulavit etc.Allusion is made to the words of the Master, here c. 6: It will serve as an exemplar of the future fellowship which, between God and the rational spirit, is to be perfected by the glorification of the same; he coupled the soul to bodily garments and earthly dwellings etc.
- Plures codd. ut H K P Q cc et ed. 1 in omni fideli, nonnulli ut F M in omnibus fidelibus. Paulo inferius fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 3 respondetur pro redditur, et dein plurimi codd. cum ed. 3 responderi pro reddi.Several codices such as H, K, P, Q, cc and ed. 1 [read] in omni fideli, some such as F, M in omnibus fidelibus. A little below, almost all codices with editions 1, 3 [read] respondetur for redditur, and then very many codices with ed. 3 responderi for reddi.
- Cfr. supra a. 2. q. 1. — Idem dubium solvit B. Albert., hic a. 14.Cf. above, a. 2, q. 1. — Bl. Albert solves the same doubt, here, a. 14.