Dist. 33, Art. 1, Q. 4
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 33
Quaestio IV.
Utrum eadem proprietas de se ipsa denominative praedicari possit.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Quarto quaeritur de comparatione eiusdem proprietatis ad se ipsam. Quaeritur igitur, utrum eadem proprietas sive notio praedicetur de se denominative1. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Per simile, quia adiectiva essentialia denominant abstracta, ut magnitudo est magna, et bonitas est bona: ergo pari ratione generatio generat et spiratio spirat.
2. Item, quia in primis2 est status, ideo se ipsis denominantur — unde unitas se ipsa est una — ergo cum proprietates personales non habeant priores, immo ipsae primae sint, tunc se ipsas denominant.
3. Item, indefinita affirmativa aequipollet particulari3, ergo simpliciter convertitur; sed haec conceditur: generans est paternitas sive generatio: ergo generatio est generans.
4. Item, si haec non conceditur: paternitas est4 generans, aut hoc est propter repugnantiam a parte rei, aut a parte modi: non a parte rei, quia eadem res est; non a parte modi, quia eadem proprietas et relatio importatur: ergo nullo modo est ibi repugnantia: ergo locutio simpliciter est vera.
Contra:
1. Sicut proprium proprietatis est distinguere, sic proprium est personae aliam producere; sed haec est falsa: persona distinguit, quia non distinguit, immo distinguitur: ergo et haec est falsa: proprietas generat.
2. Item, «omne quod refertur, est aliquid, excepto eo, quod relative dicitur»5; sed proprietas non est nisi relatio: ergo proprietas non refertur. Sed generare est referri: ergo proprietas non generat.
3. Item, proprietas importat originem et relationem: ergo si supra se reflectitur et se ipsam denominat, tunc ergo originis erit origo et relationis relatio; quod habet Philosophus6 et omnis ratio pro inconvenienti.
4. Item, cum dicitur: generatio generat, aut verbum construitur ratione suppositi, aut ratione formae: non formae, quia respectus non agit7; nec ratione suppositi, quia supposita notione non supponitur persona — aliquid enim convenit personae, quod non notioni, ut supra ostensum est8 — ergo locutio simpliciter est falsa.
Conclusio.
Proprietas nulla se ipsam denominare potest.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedictae locutiones sunt falsae; nulla enim notio denominat se ipsam.
Et ratio huius est, quia denominatio notionis importat emanationem ut actum, importat etiam relationem9. Et quoniam productio proprie est suppositi, non formae, similiter relatio est alicuius ut suppositi; ideo omnis talis denominatio concernit suppositum. Non sic est de proprietatibus essentialibus — vel ut est de primis10, ut de uno et vero — immo respiciunt formam; ideo denominant se ipsas. Quod quia non est in huiusmodi adiectivis notionibus, non possunt locutiones esse verae ratione formae. Ratione vero suppositi non possunt esse verae, quia notio non supponit personam, quia plures notiones sunt in eadem persona. Essentia tamen supponit substantiam, quia una est essentia et una substantia, et ideo haec est vera: deitas creat, quia deitas supponit Deum; haec autem falsa: paternitas generat, quia non supponit Patrem.
Ad argumenta:
Ad 1. 2. Quod obiicitur de conditionibus essentialibus, et de primis, patet, quod non est simile ratione11 iam dicta. — Potest tamen nihilominus alia ratio assignari, quia respectus reflexus supra absolutum ibi quietatur, ita quod absolutum respectui dat fundamentum, et respectus dat complementum. Sed cum respectus reflectitur supra se, quia uter-
que dicit comparationem ad alterum, unus non potest dare fundamentum, nec alter complementum; et ideo non potest reflecti. Sed in simplicibus primis, cuiusmodi est veritas, quia aut non important relationem, aut si important, important relationem quae communiter12 respicit substantiam et eius proprietates, ut puta esse a Deo, ideo supra se reflectuntur; non sic in proposito, quia productio respicit personam.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est vera: generans est paternitas; dicendum, quod generans subiicitur13 ratione hypostasis, et ita notatur praedicatio per identitatem; sed cum praedicatur, accipitur ratione formae, ideo mutatur modus accipiendi; ideo non sequitur. Si tamen intelligeretur ratione suppositi praedicari, vera esset; tunc enim esset sensus14: paternitas est ille qui generat; sed tunc non sequitur, generatio generat, immo est ibi accidens.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod repugnantia non sit ibi15; dicendum, quod est ibi repugnantia a parte modi intelligendi. Nam notio non denominat nisi suppositum, unde talis modus non convenit notioni. Unde sicut haec est falsa: albedo est alba, sic in proposito est intelligendum.
Scholion.
I. Constat, eandem notionem de se ipsa praedicari posse per identitatem, id est in abstracto, unde dici potest: paternitas est generatio activa. Quaeritur tantum, utrum hoc fieri possit etiam in concreto seu denominative, v. g. dicendo: generatio est generans sive generat. A Richardo a Med. aliisque eadem quaestio his verbis proponitur: «Utrum adiectiva personalia praedicantur de proprietatibus». Rationes principales falsae opinionis sunt argg. 1. et 2. ad opposit., quae concludunt a paritate, quia videlicet adiectiva essentialia denominant abstracta; et etiam primae intentiones, id est transcendentales, ut unum, verum, bonum, denominative de se praedicantur. Non subsistere hanc paritatem, probatur in corp. et ad 1. 2. Sententiam Seraphici approbat et magis explicat Richard. a Med. (hic a. 3. q. 2.) his verbis: «Quamvis eandem rem significet generatio et generare, tamen diverso modo: quia generare significat actum et per modum actus, generatio vero non sic, sed per modum cuiusdam formae. Et quia actus sunt suppositorum (quamvis per formas), non autem proprie ipsarum formarum ut agentium, sed ut principiorum, per quae supposita agunt: ideo, quamvis haec sit concedenda: Pater generat, haec tamen non est concedenda: Paternitas generat». — Quod primae (transcendentales) intentiones super se reflectuntur, id est de se praedicantur, iam dictum est supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 3, et d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad 4.
II. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 40. a. 1. ad 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 8. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Question IV.
Whether the same property can be predicated denominatively of itself.
In the fourth place there is inquiry concerning the comparison of the same property to itself. The question, then, is whether the same property or notion is predicated of itself denominatively1. And that it is so, seems to be the case:
1. By a parallel, since essential adjectives denominate abstracts, as greatness is great and goodness is good: therefore by parity of reason generation generates and spiration spirates.
2. Likewise, since in the primaries2 there is a stopping-point, they are denominated by themselves — whence unity is itself one — therefore since the personal properties have nothing prior to them, but rather are themselves primary, then they denominate themselves.
3. Likewise, an indefinite affirmative is equivalent to a particular3, therefore it converts simpliciter; but this is granted: the generator is paternity or generation: therefore generation is generator.
4. Likewise, if this is not granted: paternity is4 generator, either this is on account of an incompatibility on the side of the thing, or on the side of the mode: not on the side of the thing, since it is the same thing; not on the side of the mode, since the same property and relation is involved: therefore in no way is there an incompatibility there: therefore the locution is simpliciter true.
On the contrary:
1. Just as it is proper to a property to distinguish, so it is proper to a person to produce another; but this is false: the person distinguishes, since it does not distinguish but rather is distinguished: therefore this also is false: the property generates.
2. Likewise, "everything that is referred is something, except that which is said relatively"5; but a property is nothing but a relation: therefore a property is not referred. But to generate is to be referred: therefore the property does not generate.
3. Likewise, a property involves origin and relation: therefore if it is reflected upon itself and denominates itself, then there will be an origin of an origin and a relation of a relation; which the Philosopher6 and every reasoning [holds] for an absurdity.
4. Likewise, when it is said: generation generates, the verb is construed either by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form: not [by reason] of the form, since a relation does not act7; nor by reason of the supposit, since when the notion is supposed [as subject] no person is supposed — for something pertains to the person which does not pertain to the notion, as has been shown above8 — therefore the locution is simpliciter false.
Conclusion.
No property can denominate itself.
I respond: It must be said that the foresaid locutions are false; for no notion denominates itself.
And the reason for this is that the denomination of a notion involves an emanation as an act, and involves also a relation9. And since production properly belongs to a supposit, not to a form, likewise relation is of something as of a supposit; therefore every such denomination concerns a supposit. It is not so with the essential properties — or as it is with the primaries10, such as one and true — but rather they regard the form; therefore they denominate themselves. Because this is not [the case] in adjectives of this notional kind, the locutions cannot be true by reason of the form. Nor can they be true by reason of the supposit, since a notion does not supposit a person, since several notions are in the same person. Yet essence supposits substance, since there is one essence and one substance, and therefore this is true: the Godhead creates, since Godhead supposits God; but this is false: paternity generates, since it does not supposit the Father.
Replies to the arguments:
To 1 and 2. What is objected concerning the essential conditions and the primaries is plain that it is not similar, by the reason11 already stated. — Yet there can nonetheless be assigned another reason, namely that a relation reflected upon an absolute comes to rest there, in such a way that the absolute gives the foundation to the relation, and the relation gives the completion. But when a relation is reflected upon itself, since each one bespeaks a comparison to another, the one cannot give the foundation, nor the other the completion;
and therefore it cannot be reflected. But in simple primaries, of which kind is truth, since either they do not involve a relation, or, if they do, they involve a relation which commonly12 regards substance and its properties, such as to be from God, therefore they are reflected upon themselves; not so in the case at hand, since production regards a person.
To 3. As to what is objected, that this is true: the generator is paternity; it must be said that generator is taken as subject13 by reason of the hypostasis, and so a predication by identity is signified; but when it is predicated, it is taken by reason of the form, therefore the manner of taking is changed; therefore the inference does not follow. If, however, it were understood to be predicated by reason of the supposit, it would be true; for then the sense would be14: paternity is the one who generates; but then it does not follow, generation generates; rather, there is an accidental fallacy there.
To 4. As to what is objected, that there is no incompatibility there15; it must be said that there is an incompatibility there on the side of the mode of understanding. For a notion does not denominate anything but a supposit, whence such a mode does not befit a notion. Whence just as this is false: whiteness is white, so it must be understood in the case at hand.
Scholion.
I. It is established that the same notion can be predicated of itself by identity, that is, in the abstract, whence it can be said: paternity is active generation. The question is only whether this can also occur in the concrete, or denominatively, e.g. by saying: generation is generator or generates. By Richard of Mediavilla and others the same question is proposed in these words: "Whether personal adjectives are predicated of properties." The principal grounds of the false opinion are arguments 1 and 2 ad oppositum, which conclude from a parity, namely, that essential adjectives denominate abstracts; and also that the primary intentions, that is the transcendentals, such as one, true, good, are predicated denominatively of themselves. That this parity does not hold is proved in the body and in the replies to 1 and 2. The opinion of the Seraphic Doctor is approved and more fully explained by Richard of Mediavilla (here, a. 3, q. 2) in these words: "Although generation and to generate signify the same thing, yet in a different manner: because to generate signifies an act and after the manner of an act, but generation not so, but after the manner of a certain form. And since acts belong to supposits (although through forms), and not properly to the forms themselves as agents, but as principles by which the supposits act: therefore, although this is to be granted: the Father generates, this nonetheless is not to be granted: Paternity generates." — That the primary (transcendental) intentions reflect upon themselves, that is, are predicated of themselves, has already been said above at d. 3, p. I, dub. 3, and d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad 4.
II. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1; S. I, q. 40, a. 1, ad 3. — Bl. Albert, here a. 8. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 1. — Denis the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- Commutatis verbis: utrum actus personales praedicentur de proprietatibus per modum denominativum, ita ut dici possit: generatio generat, spiratio spirat.With the words rephrased: whether the personal acts are predicated of the properties after the denominative manner, so that it could be said: generation generates, spiration spirates.
- Simul audi: formis, vel intentionibus sive conditionibus. Cfr. supra pag. 78, nota 13.Understand together: forms, or intentions or conditions. Cf. above p. 78, n. 13.
- Sic haec indefinita propositio affirmativa: homo est iustus, aequivalet huic alteri: aliquis homo est iustus. Nam prima propositio: homo est iustus, aequivalet suae propositioni conversae: aliquod iustum est homo, quae propositio ut particularis simpliciter convertitur in hanc: aliquis homo est iustus. Ex quo sequitur, ut et haec propositio: homo est iustus, simpliciter converti possit in illam: iustus est homo.Thus this indefinite affirmative proposition: a man is just, is equivalent to this other: some man is just. For the first proposition: a man is just, is equivalent to its converted proposition: some just [thing] is a man, which proposition, as a particular, is converted simpliciter into this: some man is just. From which it follows that this proposition also: a man is just, can be converted simpliciter into that: a just [one] is a man.
- Non pauci codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 verbo est praefigunt non, at perperam, ut iam ex argumento praecedenti liquet.Not a few codices, with editions 1, 2, 3, prefix non to the verb est, but wrongly, as is already clear from the preceding argument.
- August., VII. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2. — Mox multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 post non est male omittunt nisi; codd. autem T Z ee cum ed. I legunt sed proprietas est relatio.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 1, n. 2. — Soon, many codices with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 after non est wrongly omit nisi; while codices T Z ee with edition I read sed proprietas est relatio.
- De quo vide supra pag. 453, nota 8. — Paulo superius verba si supra se reflectitur idem significant ac si de se praedicatur.Concerning which see above p. 453, n. 8. — A little higher up, the words si supra se reflectitur signify the same as si de se praedicatur.
- Actiones enim sunt suppositorum. — Paulo ante pro non formae codd. V X non ratione formae. — De propositione sequenti vide pag. 576, nota 1.For actions belong to supposits. — A little before, in place of non formae, codices V X [read] non ratione formae. — On the following proposition see p. 576, n. 1.
- Hic q. 1. et 2. — Paulo ante verbis quod non cod. bb adiungit convenit.Here q. 1 and 2. — A little before, to the words quod non, codex bb adds convenit.
- Cod. Y addit ut modum.Codex Y adds ut modum ["as a mode"].
- Intellige: intentionibus.Understand: intentions.
- Multi codd. incongrue de ratione, cod. bb verius ex.Many codices unfittingly [read] de ratione; codex bb more truly [reads] ex.
- Per communiter cod. R similiter.In place of communiter, codex R [reads] similiter.
- Sive: subiectum est in ista propositione. Similiter verbo praedicatur, quod mox sequitur, vix subiicienda est: est praedicatum in hac propositione: paternitas est generans. — Post praedicatur plurimi codd. nec non edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 adiciunt Pater, ed. 1 paternitas; mendose.Or: it is the subject in this proposition. Similarly, with the verb praedicatur, which immediately follows, [the subject] can scarcely be subjoined: it is the predicate in this proposition: paternity is begetting. — After praedicatur, very many codices and editions 2, 3, 4, 5 add Pater (Father), edition 1 [adds] paternitas (paternity); erroneously.
- Plures codd. ut G S T W cc ff cum ed. 1, immutata interpunctione, sic: vera esset tunc, et esset sensus.Several codices such as G, S, T, W, cc, ff with edition 1, with the punctuation altered, [read] thus: it would then be true, and the sense would be.
- Codd. A P Q T cum ed. 1 quae repugnantia sit ibi; alii codd. non pauci cum edd. 2, 3 quod repugnantia sit ibi. — De ultima propos. solutionis vide supra d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. obiect. 4.Codices A, P, Q, T with edition 1 [read] quae repugnantia sit ibi ("what contradiction there is in it"); not a few other codices, with editions 2 and 3, [read] quod repugnantia sit ibi ("that there is contradiction in it"). — On the last proposition of the solution, see above d. 17. p. 1. q. 2, objection 4.