Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus

p. 77

Dubia circa litteram Magistri.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram¹ de rationibus illis, quas ponit Magister quantum ad rationem probandi et vim² inferendi, quia videntur omnes vel non valere vel dubium supponere.

Prima namque ratio talis est³. Qui potest quod nulla creatura potest, est supra omnem creaturam; sed qui fecit mundum istum, fecit quod nulla potest creatura: ergo non est creatura, sed super omnem creaturam. Et incipit haec ratio ibi: Nam sicut ait Ambrosius, ut Deus etc. In ista ratione videtur supponi duplex⁴ dubium, videlicet quod mundus iste sit factus, et quod creatura ipsum non possit facere, quorum utrumque est valde dubium.

Secunda ratio est haec⁵. Qui fecit corporalia et spiritus mutabiles, est super omnia corporalia et mutabilia: ergo est spirituale et immutabile. Hic similiter videtur supponi dubium, quod Deus fecerit spiritus. Et iterum, non sequitur ex hoc, quod⁶ si fecit mutabilia, quod sit immutabilis, immo potius videtur sequi oppositum, scilicet quod sit mutabilis.

Tertia ratio haec est. Qui fecit bona et meliora, est optimus; sed Deus fecit corporalia, quae sunt bona, et spiritualia, quae sunt meliora: ergo Deus est optimus. Haec similiter ratio videtur nullam habere apparentiam, quia tunc similiter quilibet artifex, qui facit⁷ bona et meliora, esset optimus, quod falsum est.

Quarta ratio haec est. Qui fecit pulcra et pulcriora, est ipsa pulcritudo sive species, et hoc est speciosissimum; sed videmus, corporalia esse speciosa, et spiritualia esse speciosiora⁸: ergo qui fecit haec, est speciosissimus. Similiter videtur, quod nec ratio praedicta valeat propter praedictam instantiam.

Item quaeritur de differentia istarum rationum, et quomodo distinguuntur. Si dicas, sicut dicunt aliqui, quod sunt quatuor penes quatuor genera causarum, hoc nihil est, quia genus causae materialis non cadit in Deo. Si dicas, quod penes modos cognoscendi; contra: non sunt nisi tres, scilicet in ratione causae, ablationis et excellentiae⁹.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnes istae rationes ad hoc¹⁰, ut probent et inferant, supponunt aliquod certum. Prima enim ratio supponit, quod productio rei de nihilo non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita¹¹. Hoc supposito, cum certum sit, nullam creaturam habere potentiam infinitam, sequitur, quod¹²

p. 78

actus productionis rerum de nihilo sit eius, qui¹³ est super omnem creaturam. Et ita ex hoc actu tanquam ex proprio cognoscitur Deus omnipotens, immensus. — In aliis tribus rationibus supponitur status, sicut in tota philosophia supponitur status in causis; et ideo omne mutabile reducitur ad immutabile, quia in mutabili non est status in genere efficientis nisi in movente non moto: omne enim quod movetur, ab alio movetur¹⁴. Similiter bonum et melius reducuntur ad optimum, quia non est status in genere finis nisi in optimo. Similiter pulcrum et pulcrius ad pulcherrimum, quia non est status in genere speciei et formae, nisi in eo quod est ipsa species per essentiam.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de distinctione rationum, ex dictis iam patet responsio. Non enim possunt distingui penes genus causarum tantum, nec penes modos cognoscendi tantum, sed penes utrumque¹⁵. Prima enim ratio sumitur secundum rationem causae; aliae sumuntur penes rationem causae et excellentiae, quia considerant ordinem et distinguuntur secundum ordinem in triplici genere causae¹⁶, efficientis sive moventis, finientis et exemplaris.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod postea dicit Magister, quod ex perpetuitate intelligitur Conditor aeternus. Nihil enim valet: effectus est perpetuus¹⁷, ergo efficiens est aeternus.

Item quaeritur similiter¹⁸ de hoc quod dicit: Ex magnitudine omnipotens. Nihil enim valet: fecit magna, ergo est omnipotens vel potest facere omnia.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod tantum est quaedam persuasio per signum, non necessaria argumentatio. Dicunt enim, quod omnipotentia et aeternitas, cum sint infinitae, non possunt sufficienter probari per creaturas, quae sunt finitae¹⁹. — Aliter tamen potest dici, quod quamvis non sequatur in quolibet efficiente, tamen necessario sequitur in efficiente sive perpetuante primo. Impossibile enim est, quod creatura habeat esse et magnum esse²⁰ et hoc totum ab aliquo, qui non possit in totum; et qua ratione in hoc totum, et in quodlibet. Similiter, si est primum perpetuans, est omnino in actu et nihil in potentia; et si hoc, cum possit facere durare aliud in infinitum, ipsum est actu infinitum duratione: ergo aeternum.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Omnia quae arte divina condita[^21] sunt, unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Videtur enim primo dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum haec tria condita sint, tunc habent unitatem, speciem et ordinem, et sic de aliis: ergo si est stare, tunc aliqua condita sunt, quae haec non habent²².

Item videtur male enumerare, quia Augustinus²³ ponit ista tria: modum, speciem et ordinem, et haec alia: unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem. Quaeritur ergo de diversis modis enumerandi, unde veniant.

Respondeo: Ad hoc dicunt aliqui, quod hoc intelligitur de creaturis perfectis, vel si de omnibus²⁴, tunc illa tria non dicunt conditiones in re creata, sed in exemplari increato. — Potest tamen dici, quod in primis intentionibus et generalibus²⁵ est reflexio et ideo status, nec est ultra procedendum.

Ad illud quod quaeritur de enumeratione illorum trium, quod non videtur conveniens; dicendum quod res creata habet tripliciter considerari: aut in

p. 79

se, aut in comparatione ad alias creaturas, aut in comparatione ad causam primam. Et secundum hos omnes modos contingit reperire trinitatem dupliciter.

Si enim consideretur quantum in se vel quantum ad se, hoc est, aut quantum ad substantiam principiorum; et sic est illa trinitas: materia, forma, compositio, quae ponitur in libro de Regula fidei²⁶; aut quantum ad habitudines; et sic est illa, Sapientiae undecimo²⁷: Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti. In numero enim intelligitur principiorum distinctio, in pondere propria ipsorum inclinatio, in mensura eorum²⁸ ad invicem proportio.

Item, si consideretur una creatura in comparatione ad alias creaturas, hoc potest esse²⁹ aut in quantum agit actione naturali; et sic sumitur illa trinitas Dionysii³⁰, substantia, virtus et operatio; aut in quantum agit actione spirituali; et sic illa Augustini, de octoginta tribus Quaestionibus³¹, «quo constat, quo congruit, quo discernitur», et ultimum refertur ad animam.

Si autem considerentur³² in comparatione ad Deum, hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut in quantum referuntur tantum; et sic est illa, modus, species et ordo; aut in quantum referuntur et assimilantur; et sic est illa, unitas, veritas et³³ bonitas.

Quoniam ergo vestigium attenditur in comparatione ad Deum proprie, ideo in his ultimis conditionibus proprie accipitur vestigium. Et quia magna est inter istas comparationes convenientia, ideo Magister miscet haec ad invicem propter multam convenientiam et correspondentiam³⁴; quia unitas respondet modo, qui respicit Deum ut causam efficientem; veritas speciei, quae respicit ipsum ut exemplar; bonitas ordini, qui³⁵ respicit Deum ut finem.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod appropriat veritatem Filio dicens: Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris. Sed contra Augustinus in Soliloquio³⁶: «Veritas est id quod est»; sed ens nulli personae appropriatur: ergo nec veritas.

Item videtur male appropriare ordinem Spiritui sancto, quia in praecedenti capitulo dicit, quod ex ordine intelligitur sapiens³⁷; sed sapientia appropriatur Filio: ergo et ordo.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod veritas potest dupliciter considerari, sicut et³⁸ color. Nam uno modo color consideratur secundum id in quo est; et sic definitur in libro de Sensu et sensato³⁹: «Color est extremitas perspicui in corpore terminato». Alio modo in comparatione ad visum, quem movet; et sic definitur in libro de Anima⁴⁰: «Color est motivum visus secundum actum lucidi».

Similiter veritas potest considerari in comparatione ad id in quo est; et sic verum est⁴¹ id quod est; alio modo per comparationem ad intellectum, quem movet; et sic veritas, ut dicit Philosophus in secundo Metaphysicae⁴², «est finis intelligentiae speculativae». Secundum primum modum dicit Anselmus⁴³: «Veritas Patris est essentia Patris». Quantum ad secundum modum dicit Hilarius⁴⁴, quod «veritas est declarativum esse». Et quoniam Filius⁴⁵ procedit ut Verbum, cui appropriatur ratio decla-

p. 80

randi, ideo ei appropriatur ratio exemplaris et per consequens ratio veritatis, quantum ad secundum modum veritatis; ipse autem accipit primo modo.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine, dicendum, quod est ordo rerum in universo; et hic appropriatur sapientiae; et est ordo rerum in finem; et hic appropriatur bonitati; et sic patet, quod non est contrarietas.

---

English Translation

Doubts concerning the Master's text.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text¹ regarding those reasons which the Master sets forth, with respect to their ground of proof and force² of inference, since they all appear either to be invalid or to presuppose what is doubtful.

For the first reason is of this sort³. Whoever can do what no creature can do is above every creature; but he who made this world did what no creature can do: therefore he is not a creature, but is above every creature. And this reason begins there: For as Ambrose says, that God, etc. In this reason a twofold⁴ doubt seems to be presupposed, namely, that this world has been made, and that no creature could have made it, both of which are very much in doubt.

The second reason is this⁵. Whoever made corporeal things and changeable spirits is above all corporeal and changeable things: therefore he is spiritual and unchangeable. Here likewise it seems to presuppose a doubt, namely that God made spirits. And again, it does not follow from this — that⁶ if he made changeable things, he is therefore unchangeable; rather, the opposite seems to follow, namely that he is changeable.

The third reason is this. Whoever made good things and better things is best; but God made corporeal things, which are good, and spiritual things, which are better: therefore God is best. This reason likewise seems to have no plausibility, because in that case any craftsman whatever who makes⁷ good and better things would be best, which is false.

The fourth reason is this. Whoever made beautiful and more beautiful things is beauty itself, or beautiful form, and this is most beautiful; but we see that corporeal things are beautiful, and spiritual things more beautiful⁸: therefore he who made them is most beautiful. Likewise this seems also not to hold, on account of the aforesaid counter-instance.

Likewise, the question is asked concerning the difference among these reasons, and how they are distinguished. If you say, as some say, that they are four corresponding to the four kinds of causes, this is nothing, because the kind of material cause does not apply in God. If you say that they correspond to modes of knowing — on the contrary: there are only three, namely, the mode of cause, of removal, and of excellence⁹.

I respond: It must be said that all these reasons, in order¹⁰ that they may prove and infer, presuppose something certain. For the first reason presupposes that the production of a thing from nothing cannot occur except from infinite power¹¹. This being supposed, since it is certain that no creature has infinite power, it follows that¹²

the act of producing things from nothing is of him who¹³ is above every creature. And so from this act as from something proper to him, God is known to be omnipotent and immense. — In the other three reasons a stopping-point is presupposed, just as in the whole of philosophy a stopping-point is presupposed in causes; and therefore every changeable thing is reduced to an unchangeable, because in the changeable there is no stopping-point in the genus of efficient cause except in a mover that is not moved: for everything that is moved is moved by another¹⁴. Likewise the good and the better are reduced to the best, because there is no stopping-point in the genus of end except in the best. Likewise the beautiful and the more beautiful are reduced to the most beautiful, because there is no stopping-point in the genus of beautiful form except in that which is beautiful form itself by essence.

As to the question raised concerning the distinction among the reasons, the answer is already clear from what has been said. For they cannot be distinguished by the kinds of causes alone, nor by the modes of knowing alone, but by both¹⁵. For the first reason is taken according to the mode of cause; the others are taken according to the mode of cause and of excellence, because they consider order and are distinguished according to order in the threefold genus of cause¹⁶ — the efficient or moving, the final, and the exemplar.

Doubt II.

Likewise, the question is raised concerning what the Master afterwards says, that from perpetuity the eternal Creator is understood. For it is worth nothing: the effect is perpetual¹⁷, therefore the agent is eternal.

Likewise, the question is similarly¹⁸ raised about what he says: From greatness, omnipotent. For it is worth nothing: he made great things, therefore he is omnipotent, or can make all things.

I respond: To this some say that it is only a kind of persuasion by sign, not a necessary argument. For they say that omnipotence and eternity, since they are infinite, cannot be sufficiently proved through creatures, which are finite¹⁹. — Yet it can be said otherwise: although it does not follow in any agent whatever, it nevertheless necessarily follows in the first agent or first perpetuator. For it is impossible that a creature should have being and great being²⁰ and all this from someone who cannot do the whole; and by the same reasoning by which he can do the whole, he can also do each particular thing. Likewise, if it is the first perpetuator, it is wholly in act and nothing in potency; and if so, since it can make another endure infinitely, it itself is actually infinite in duration: therefore eternal.

Doubt III.

Likewise, the question is raised concerning what he says: All things which have been made by divine art[^21] show in themselves a certain unity and beautiful form and order. For he seems first to say something false, because if so — since these three are made — then they have unity, beautiful form, and order, and so for the others: therefore if there is to be a stopping-point, then some things have been made which do not have these²².

Likewise, he seems to enumerate badly, because Augustine²³ sets forth these three: mode, beautiful form, and order, and these others: unity, truth, and goodness. Therefore the question is raised about the various ways of enumerating, and whence they come.

I respond: To this some say that this is to be understood of perfect creatures, or, if of all²⁴, then those three do not name conditions in the created thing, but in the uncreated exemplar. — Yet it can be said that in first and general notions²⁵ there is reflection, and therefore a stopping-point, and one ought not to proceed further.

As to the question raised concerning the enumeration of those three, that it does not seem fitting; it must be said that the created thing can be considered in three ways: either in

itself, or in comparison with other creatures, or in comparison with the first cause. And according to all these modes it happens that a trinity is found, in two ways.

For if it is considered as in itself or with respect to itself, that is, either with respect to the substance of its principles — then there is that trinity: matter, form, composition, which is set forth in the book On the Rule of Faith²⁶; or with respect to its relations — then there is that one from Wisdom chapter eleven²⁷: Thou hast disposed all things in number, weight, and measure. For in number is understood the distinction of principles, in weight their proper inclination, in measure their²⁸ proportion to one another.

Likewise, if one creature is considered in comparison with other creatures, this can be²⁹ either insofar as it acts by natural action — and so the trinity of Dionysius³⁰ is taken, substance, power, and operation; or insofar as it acts by spiritual action — and so that of Augustine, On Eighty-Three Questions³¹: «that by which it consists, that by which it agrees, that by which it is distinguished», and the last is referred to the soul.

But if they are considered³² in comparison with God, this can be in two ways: either insofar as they are merely referred to him — and so there is that one, mode, beautiful form, and order; or insofar as they are referred to him and made like him — and so there is that one, unity, truth, and³³ goodness.

Therefore, since vestige is properly noted in comparison with God, vestige is properly taken in these last conditions. And because there is great agreement among these comparisons, the Master mingles them with one another on account of their great agreement and correspondence³⁴; because unity corresponds to mode, which regards God as efficient cause; truth corresponds to beautiful form, which regards him as exemplar; goodness corresponds to order, which³⁵ regards God as end.

Doubt IV.

Likewise, the question is raised about his appropriating truth to the Son when he says: Most perfect beauty is understood as the Son, namely the truth of the Father. But on the contrary Augustine in the Soliloquy³⁶: «Truth is that which is»; but being is not appropriated to any person: therefore neither is truth.

Likewise, he seems badly to appropriate order to the Holy Spirit, because in the preceding chapter he says that from order the wise one is understood³⁷; but wisdom is appropriated to the Son: therefore so also is order.

I respond: It must be said that truth can be considered in two ways, just as³⁸ color. For in one way color is considered according to that in which it is; and so it is defined in the book On Sense and the Sensed³⁹: «Color is the extremity of the transparent in a bounded body». In another way, in comparison with vision, which it moves; and so it is defined in the book On the Soul⁴⁰: «Color is the mover of vision according to the act of the luminous».

Likewise, truth can be considered in comparison with that in which it is; and so the true is⁴¹ that which is; in another way, by comparison with the intellect, which it moves; and so truth, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the Metaphysics⁴², «is the end of speculative thought». According to the first mode Anselm⁴³ says: «The truth of the Father is the essence of the Father». As to the second mode Hilary⁴⁴ says that «truth is declarative being». And since the Son⁴⁵ proceeds as the Word, to whom the account of declaring

is appropriated, therefore the account of exemplar is appropriated to him, and consequently the account of truth — with respect to the second mode of truth; while he himself receives [truth] in the first mode.

To what is objected concerning order, it must be said that there is the order of things in the universe, and this is appropriated to wisdom; and there is the order of things to their end, and this is appropriated to goodness; and so it is clear that there is no contradiction.

---

Apparatus Criticus

Ope mss. substituimus ultimo pro ulterius et immediate post adiunximus quod.
With the help of the manuscripts we have substituted ultimo for ulterius and immediately after have added quod.
Cod. Y quam ad acquirendam; lectio haud spernenda.
Codex Y reads quam ad acquirendam; a reading not to be despised.
Aliqui codd. ut X Y pro vim minus bene verum, codd. G I inde. Mox ex mss. et ed. 1 post omnes supplevimus vel.
Some codices such as X Y have, less well, verum for vim; codices G I have inde. Then from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied vel after omnes.
Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit namque et talis est. Paulo infra post nulla bis fide textus Magistri expunximus alia, utpote distorquens sensum, licet primo loco etiam in mss. et ed. 1 inveniatur. Deinde verba Et incipit usque ad Deus desunt in Vat., sed exstant in mss. et ed. 1.
The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, omits namque and talis est. A little below, after nulla twice, on the authority of the Master's text we have struck out alia, as distorting the sense, although in the first place it is found also in the manuscripts and edition 1. Further, the words Et incipit down to Deus are missing in the Vatican edition, but stand in the manuscripts and edition 1.
Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus duplex loco dupliciter, quod Vat. minus bene habet. Cod. I supponere, supple: Magister.
From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted duplex for dupliciter, which the Vatican edition has less well. Codex I has supponere, supplying: Magister.
Vat. hic et deinceps post ratio omittit est haec; item, refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, mox post mutabilia legit Deus est huiusmodi: ergo Deus est spirituale immutabile.
The Vatican edition here and henceforward after ratio omits est haec; likewise, against the manuscripts and edition 1, just after mutabilia it reads Deus est huiusmodi: ergo Deus est spirituale immutabile.
Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 quod, quia fecit mutabilia, ideo sit.
The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts and edition 1, reads quod, quia fecit mutabilia, ideo sit.
Vat. est, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. 1 fecit pro facit.
The Vatican edition reads est, but the manuscripts and edition 1 stand against it. A little earlier codex 1 has fecit for facit.
Ita codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, sed Vat.: Sed Deus fecit pulcra sive speciosa quia corporalia, et speciosiora quia spiritualia; et paulo infra contra mss. et ed. 1 videtur ratio ista non valere.
So the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, but the Vatican edition reads: But God made beautiful or specious things because corporeal, and more specious because spiritual; and a little below, against the manuscripts and edition 1, this reason seems not to hold.
Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 7, §. 3: Via et ordine pro viribus ascendimus in ablatione et in superlatione omnium et in omnium causa. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 1. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. divisio textus. — Vat. hic addit: Ad obiectiones contra quatuor rationes iam dictas respondetur, quod deest in mss. et ed. 1.
Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 7, §. 3: By way and order according to our powers we ascend in the removal and in the supereminence of all things and in the cause of all. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa pt. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 1. — St. Thomas, I Sent. d. 3, p. I, divisio textus. — The Vatican edition here adds: To the objections against the four reasons already given the reply is, which is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.
Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 verba ad hoc. Immediate post codd. E Y quod loco ut, ac paulo infra plures codd. ut I R aa bb ff tertium pro certum.
We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the words ad hoc. Immediately after, codices E Y have quod for ut, and a little below several codices, such as I R aa bb ff, have tertium for certum.
Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 79. (c. ult.) iuxta ed. Venet. 1489: Non ergo finiti est potentia infinita. Forte cod. X hanc propositionem intendit, licet falso alleget libr. IV. Phys. — Mox post nihilo cod. K legit non potest esse nisi a potentia infinita, et quod sit actus eius quod est super naturam et super omnem creaturam; deinde omittit cetera usque ad In aliis.
Aristotle, Physics VIII, text 79 (last chapter), according to the Venice edition of 1489: The power of the infinite is not therefore [the power] of the finite. Codex X perhaps intends this proposition, although it falsely alleges Physics book IV. — Then after nihilo codex K reads cannot be except from infinite power, and that it is the act of him who is above nature and above every creature; then it omits the rest down to In aliis.
Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 quae. Paulo infra ed. 1 primo pro proprio.
The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, reads quae. A little below edition 1 reads primo for proprio.
Aristot., VII. Phys. text. 1. et 3. — Mox cod. R post quia addit in bono et paulo infra cod. Y post pulcrius adiungit reducuntur.
Aristotle, Physics VII, texts 1 and 3. — Then codex R after quia adds in bono, and a little below codex Y after pulcrius adds reducuntur.
Fide mss. et ed. 1 substituimus utrumque loco utraque et immediate post loco autem posuimus enim.
On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted utrumque for utraque, and immediately after we have put enim in place of autem.
Vat. hic addit ut, sed obstant mss. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. — Plura de his argumentis vide infra d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 2. et Hexaem. Serm. 5. et 10.
The Vatican edition here adds ut, but the manuscripts with editions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 stand against it. — For more on these arguments see below, d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, and Hexaemeron sermons 5 and 10.
Hoc est, qui licet habeat initium, non tamen habet finem. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittendo verba Nihil enim valet, obiectionem ita proponit: Effectus non est perpetuus: ergo neque efficiens est aeternus; sed minus ad rem, ut liquet ex responsione S. Doctoris ad obiectionem.
That is, one who, although it has a beginning, nevertheless has no end. — The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1, omitting the words Nihil enim valet, proposes the objection thus: The effect is not perpetual: therefore neither is the agent eternal; but it is less to the point, as is clear from the holy Doctor's reply to the objection.
Restituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 verbum similiter.
We have restored from the manuscripts and edition 1 the word similiter.
Hanc sententiam defendit Scot., 1. Sent. d. 2. q. 3. n. 6. et d. 42. q. unic. et Quodlib. q. 7.
Scotus defends this opinion, Sent. I, d. 2, q. 3, n. 6, and d. 42, q. unic., and Quodlibet q. 7.
Depravatam lectionem Vat. habeat ita magnum esse et ita dispositum, et hoc emendavimus ex mss. et ed. 1.
We have corrected the corrupt reading of the Vatican edition, habeat ita magnum esse et ita dispositum, from the manuscripts and edition 1.
Plures codd. omittunt divina, omnes autem habent condita contra Vat., quae ponit facta.
Several codices omit divina, but all have condita, against the Vatican edition, which puts facta.
Perturbata lectio Vat. falsum, quod quae condita sunt sive facta, habeant ista tria, scilicet unitatem, speciem et ordinem: quia aliqua condita sunt quae haec non habent, sicut diabolus et reprobi castigatur ope codd. et ed. 1, qui quoad substantiam lectionis in textum receptae consentiunt, licet quoad accidentalia divergantur; sic cod. A quia similiter loco quia si hoc, cod. O post condita sunt satis bene addit haec; codd. I K ergo pro tunc, cod. M tunc haberent loco tunc habent.
The disturbed reading of the Vatican edition — false, because the things that are made or fashioned have these three, namely unity, beautiful form, and order: because some things are made which do not have these, such as the devil and the reprobate — is corrected with the help of the codices and edition 1, which agree as to the substance of the reading received into the text, although they diverge as to incidentals; thus codex A has quia similiter for quia si hoc, codex O after condita sunt quite well adds haec; codices I K have ergo for tunc, codex M tunc haberent in place of tunc habent.
Libr. de Natura boni, c. 3: Haec ergo tria: modus, species, ordo tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo factis sive in spiritu, sive in corpore. Similia habet V. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. De unitate, veritate et bonitate vide libr. de Vera Relig. c. 11, 36. et 55. — Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus ponit pro enumerat ac paulo infra post veritatem supplevimus et.
Book On the Nature of the Good, c. 3: These three then — mode, beautiful form, order — are general goods, as it were, in the things made by God, whether in spirit or in body. Similar things are in On the City of God V, c. 11. On unity, truth, and goodness see the book On True Religion c. 11, 36, and 55. — With the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted ponit for enumerat, and a little below after veritatem we have supplied et.
Codd. V W hic addunt et.
Codices V W here add et.
Hoc est, in transcendentalibus rationibus unitatis, veritatis et bonitatis unaquaeque potest de se et aliis praedicari, v. g. veritas est vera, una et bona; in aliis autem rationibus seu formis haec reflexio proprie non admittitur; sic improprie dicitur albedo est alba. Cfr. infra d. 17. p. I. q. 2. ad ult. — Difficultas a Seraphico hic proposita tangitur et infra d. 33. q. 4. ad. 1. et 2. Cfr. et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 1. ad 1. et p. II. q. 7. m. 2. ad 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 15. — Richard. a Med., hic circa lit. et d. 33. a. 3. q. 2.
That is, in the transcendental accounts of unity, truth, and goodness each can be predicated of itself and the others — e.g. truth is true, one, and good; but in other accounts or forms this reflection is not properly admitted; thus whiteness is white is said improperly. Cf. below d. 17, p. I, q. 2, ad ult. — The difficulty here proposed by the Seraphic [Doctor] is touched on below d. 33, q. 4, ad 1 and 2. See also Alexander of Hales, Summa pt. I, q. 18, m. 1, ad 1, and pt. II, q. 7, m. 2, ad 6. — Blessed Albert, here, a. 15. — Richard of Mediavilla, here on the text and d. 33, a. 3, q. 2.
Alanus ab Insulis, de Arte seu Articulis catholicae fidei, a. 24: Materia et forma earumque compago tria prorsus diversa sunt. — Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus convenienter ponuntur. Cod. V compositum loco compositio.
Alan of Lille, On the Art or Articles of the Catholic Faith, a. 24: Matter and form and their joining are three wholly diverse things. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, less suitably has ponuntur. Codex V has compositum for compositio.
Vers. 21. — Paulo ante post habitudines Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, omittit et.
Verse 21. — A little before, after habitudines the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, omits et.
Cod. W propria eorum.
Codex W has propria eorum.
Cod. X adiungit dupliciter.
Codex X adds dupliciter.
De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11: In tria dividuntur secundum se supermundana ratione omnes divini intellectus: in essentiam et virtutem et operationem.
On the Celestial Hierarchy c. 11: All divine intellects are divided into three with respect to themselves by a supermundane account: into essence and power and operation.
Quaest. 18: Aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit. — In quo textu multi mss. cum sex primis edd. loco quo habent quod, sed inepte. Cod. X glossando: quod constat ex suis principiis, quod congruit in ordine cum creaturis aliis, quod discernitur ab aliis creaturis per rationem imaginis.
Question 18: One thing is that by which it consists, another that by which it is distinguished, another that by which it agrees. — In which text many manuscripts with the first six editions have quod for quo, but ineptly. Codex X glossing: that it consists of its principles, that it agrees in order with other creatures, that it is distinguished from other creatures by the account of image.
Supple: creaturae.
Supply: creatures.
Ex codd. supplevimus et.
From the codices we have supplied et.
Vat. praeter fidem mss. respondentiam.
The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts, has respondentiam.
Mendum Vat. quae correximus ex mss. — Quamvis in propositione principali, quod scil. in omni creatura sit vestigium Trinitatis, omnes scholastici conveniant, tamen in enumeratione et explicatione partium huius vestigii est aliqua inter ipsos differentia, ut videre licet apud Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. Cfr. et B. Albert., S. I. tract. 3. q. 15. m. 2. et hic a. 13. seqq.; ac S. Thom., hic q. 2 a. 3; et S. I. q. 45. a. 7. ac q. 93. a. 6.
A blemish of the Vatican edition which we have corrected from the manuscripts. — Although in the principal proposition — that in every creature there is a vestige of the Trinity — all the scholastics agree, nevertheless in the enumeration and explanation of the parts of this vestige there is some difference among them, as may be seen in Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. Cf. also Blessed Albert, Summa I, tract. 3, q. 15, m. 2, and here a. 13 ff.; and St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 3; and Summa I, q. 45, a. 7, and q. 93, a. 6.
Libr. II. c. 5: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est.
Book II, c. 5: The true seems to me to be that which is.
Cod. V X cum edd. 2, 3 sapientia, sed contra textum Magistri.
Codices V X with editions 2, 3 read sapientia, but against the Master's text.
Restituimus ex mss. cum ed. 1 indebite omissam particulam et.
We have restored from the manuscripts with edition 1 the particle et unduly omitted.
Cap. 3: Quare color utique erit perspicui extremitas in determinato corpore (ed. Venet. 1489).
Chapter 3: Wherefore color will be the extremity of the transparent in a determined body (Venice edition 1489).
Libr. II. de Anima, text. 67. (c. 7.): Omnis enim color movens est eius quod secundum actum diaphani (ed. Venet. 1489).
Book II On the Soul, text 67 (c. 7): For every color is a mover of that which is according to the act of the transparent (Venice edition 1489).
Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic minus apte addit: quod dicit Augustinus: Veritas est id.
The Vatican edition, against the faith of the manuscripts and edition 1, here less aptly adds: which Augustine says: Truth is that.
Text. 3, secundum ed. Venet. 1489: Finis enim scientiae speculativae est veritas.
Text 3, according to the Venice edition of 1489: For the end of speculative science is truth.
Verba citata videntur esse desumta ex Monolog. c. 46, ubi ostendit, quod Filius sit veritas et ipsa essentia paternae substantiae.
The cited words appear to be drawn from the Monologion c. 46, where he shows that the Son is the truth and the very essence of the paternal substance.
Colligitur ex V. de Trin. n. 3. seq., ubi exponit, quod «veritas ex natura et ex virtute est», sive ut paulo infra habetur, quod «naturae virtus praestat veritatem».
It is gathered from On the Trinity V, n. 3 ff., where he expounds that «truth is from nature and from power», or as it is given a little below, that «the power of nature affords truth».
Fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus est qui, quod Vat. hic addit.
On the authority of very many codices and edition 1 we have struck out est qui, which the Vatican edition here adds.

← Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3 Dist. 3, Part 2, Dubia→