← Back to Distinction 3

Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
p. 92

Quaestio III. Utrum trinitas imaginis, quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore, necessario ducat in cognitionem trium divinarum personarum.

Tertio et ultimo quaeritur, utrum haec trinitas imaginis, scilicet mentis, notitiae et amoris, ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas. Et videtur quod sic:

1. Quia in hac trinitate imaginis est relatio1; non est relatio nisi quoad personas: ergo etc.

2. Item, in hac trinitate est distinctio, quia notitia non est amor; sed in Deo non est distinctio nisi personarum: ergo etc.

p. 93

3. Item, in hac trinitate est origo nascentis unius2 ab uno et tertii ab utroque: ergo cum ista sint propria personarum, patet etc.

4. Item, in hac trinitate est3 amor tertio, qui est proprium Spiritus sancti et qui est ad alterum: ergo videtur, quod necessario ducat in Trinitatem personarum.

Contra: 1. Haec trinitas intelligitur in creatura sine distinctione personali: ergo potest intelligi et in Deo; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

2. Item, notitia et amor sunt in qualibet personarum; sed per ea quae sunt in omnibus, non venitur in cognitionem distinctionis personalis: ergo etc.

3. Item, intellecto quod una tantum esset persona, adhuc nosceret et amaret se: ergo etc.

4. Item, philosophi istam trinitatem cognoverunt, et tamen non cognoverunt Trinitatem personarum: ergo haec non necessario4 ducit in illam.

Conclusio. Ratio sola ab hac trinitate mentis, notitiae et amoris non ascendit ad cognitionem Trinitatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod per hanc trinitatem est attribuendo ea quae in hac trinitate sunt illi summae Trinitati. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter. Aut enim ista tria possunt Deo attribui secundum substantiam, ut per mentem5 intelligamus mentem in Deo, et per notitiam in anima notitiam in Deo, et sic de tertio; et sic non ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis nisi quantum ad appropriata; et sic intellexerunt philosophi.

Possunt etiam ista6 trahi ad Deum ratione proprietatum, quae sunt ordo et origo, distinctio et relatio; et sic ducunt in cognitionem Trinitatis quoad propria.

Sed ista ponere vel intelligere in Deo potest fides, sed7 non ratio; et ita perfecta cognitio imaginis non habetur nisi a fide. Unde bene concedendum est, quod imago, perfecte cognita ut imago, ducit in cognitionem Trinitatis, non autem simpliciter. Et per hoc patet utraque pars.

Ad 1 et 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de amore, dicendum, quod amor potest dicere complacentiam, et sic est commune; vel potest dicere connexionem sive communionem vel donum, et sic habet rationem personae.8

Scholion

I. Hanc quaestionem alii antiquiores Scholastici praeter Aegid. (hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 4.) ex professo non tractant. Solutio eius pendet ab iisdem principiis, quae supra p. I. q. I. posita sunt. De proprietatibus divinarum personarum, et quatenus important ordinem et originem, relationem et distinctionem cfr. infra dd. 26. et 33. — S. Doctor primum et ultimum obiectum non solvit explicite, quia solutionis principia continentur clare in corp. quaestionis; secundum et tertium breviter solvit, loquendo expresse tantum de amore essentiali et personali, quod ad notitiam facile applicare potest.

---

English Translation

Question III. Whether the trinity of the image, which consists in mind, knowledge, and love, necessarily leads to the knowledge of the three divine persons.

Thirdly and lastly it is asked whether this trinity of the image — namely of mind, knowledge, and love — necessarily leads to knowledge of the Trinity with respect to the persons. And it seems that it does:

1. Because in this trinity of the image there is relation1; but there is no relation except with regard to persons: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in this trinity there is distinction, since knowledge is not love; but in God there is no distinction except of persons: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in this trinity there is the origin of one being born2 from one, and of a third from both: therefore, since these are proper to the persons, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, in this trinity there is3 love in the third place, which is proper to the Holy Spirit and which is toward another: therefore it seems that it necessarily leads to the Trinity of persons.

On the contrary: 1. This trinity is understood in the creature without personal distinction: therefore it can also be understood in God; but this is false: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, knowledge and love are in each of the persons; but through those things which are in all, one does not arrive at knowledge of personal distinction: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, supposing that there were only one person, that person would still know and love itself: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the philosophers knew this trinity, and yet they did not know the Trinity of persons: therefore this trinity does not necessarily4 lead to that.

Conclusion. Reason alone does not ascend from this trinity of mind, knowledge, and love to knowledge of the Trinity.

I respond: It must be said that through this trinity [knowledge of the Trinity is had] by attributing those things which are in this trinity to that highest Trinity. But this can be done in two ways. For either these three can be attributed to God according to substance — so that by mind5 we understand the mind in God, and by knowledge in the soul knowledge in God, and so of the third; and in this way it does not lead to knowledge of the Trinity except as regards the appropriated [attributes]; and thus the philosophers understood it.

These [three] can also6 be carried over to God by reason of properties, which are order and origin, distinction and relation; and in this way they lead to knowledge of the Trinity with regard to what is proper [to the persons].

But to posit or to understand these in God is something faith can do, but7 not reason; and so the perfect knowledge of the image is not had except by faith. Hence it should rightly be granted that the image, perfectly known as image, leads to knowledge of the Trinity — but not without qualification. And by this both sides are made clear.

To 1 and 2. To that which is objected concerning love, it must be said that love can signify complacency, and so it is common [to the persons]; or it can signify connection or communion or gift, and so it has the character of a person.8

Scholion

I. This question, apart from Giles [of Rome] (here, third principle, q. 2, a. 4), the other older Scholastics do not treat ex professo. Its solution depends on the same principles which were laid down above in p. I, q. I. Concerning the properties of the divine persons, and insofar as they import order and origin, relation and distinction, see below, dd. 26 and 33. — The Holy Doctor does not explicitly resolve the first and the last objection, because the principles of their solution are clearly contained in the body of the question; the second and third he resolves briefly, speaking expressly only of essential and personal love — which can easily be applied to knowledge.

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 4. n. 4: Recte igitur diximus, haec tria, cum perfecta sunt, esse consequenter aequalia. [Augustinus, De Trinitate lib. IX, c. 4, n. 4.]
    Chapter 4, n. 4: We have therefore rightly said that these three, when they are perfect, are consequently equal. [Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. IX, c. 4, n. 4.]
  2. Cod. Z addit quod non valet. Paulo ante plures codd. ut A G I T cc post solutio ponunt punctum, deinde cod. cc post obiicitur adiungit dicendum; nihil tamen immutandum duximus.
    Codex Z adds quod non valet. A little earlier several codices, such as A, G, I, T, cc, place a period after solutio, and then codex cc, after obiicitur, appends dicendum; we have, however, judged that nothing should be altered.
  3. Hic a. 2. q. I. ad I.
    Here, a. 2, q. I, ad I.
  4. Art. I. q. 3.
    Art. I, q. 3.
  5. Supple: mens, notitia et amor. — Mox codd. inter se non conveniunt, alii ut A G H K T etc. cum Vat. legunt qualitas, alii vero ut B D E F H I X Z cum ed. 1 qualitates, quos sequimur.
    Supply: mind, knowledge, and love. — Shortly afterwards the codices do not agree among themselves: some, such as A, G, H, K, T, etc., together with the Vatican edition, read qualitas; others, however, such as B, D, E, F, H, I, X, Z, together with edition 1, read qualitates, which reading we follow.
  6. Mendum Vat. ex hoc pro et hoc est, et paulo post conclusit pro concludit castigatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
    The error of the Vatican edition, ex hoc for et hoc est, and a little after conclusit for concludit, is corrected from the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6.
  7. Vat. contra mss. et ed. I sed loco nisi. Paulo ante codd. P Q ultra pro extra; deinde nonnulli codd. ut D E F H K Y aliud, cod. T alterum, codd. L O aliquid loco alium. Codd. Q (T in margine) post substantiae addunt quia per se non agit; lectio non spernenda.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, reads sed in place of nisi. A little earlier codices P, Q read ultra for extra; then several codices, such as D, E, F, H, K, Y, aliud; codex T, alterum; codices L, O, aliquid in place of alium. Codices Q (and T in the margin) after substantiae add quia per se non agit; a reading not to be despised.
  8. Ita codd. Q T cum ed. I; multi codd. ut A B E F G H K P X Y Z aa etc. et sic, Vat. sic, quae et paulo infra post intelligentia ponit punctum, quo posito argumentum, quod explicatur in Scholio, perturbatur. In fine Vat. contra mss. et edd. I, 2, 3 substantiales.
    So codices Q, T with edition I; many codices, such as A, B, E, F, G, H, K, P, X, Y, Z, aa, etc., read et sic; the Vatican edition reads sic, quae and a little below, after intelligentia, places a period — and once that period is placed, the argument which is explained in the Scholion is disturbed. At the end the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and editions I, 2, 3, reads substantiales.
← Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2Dist. 3, Part 1, Dubia→