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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II.

Utrum mens, notitia et amor habeant ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

Secundo quaeritur de istis in comparatione ad invicem, secundum triplicem comparationem, quam ponit Augustinus, videlicet ordinis, aequalitatis et consubstantialitatis, et Magister recitat in littera1. Ordo est inter haec, quia mens est parens, notitia est proles, tertius est amor ab utroque procedens. Aequalitas etiam est ibi, quia mens tantum se novit, quantum est, et tantum se2 diligit, quantum se novit. Consubstantialitas etiam; unde Augustinus nono de Trinitate3: « Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, substantialiter haec in anima existere, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, aut ulla qualitas aut quantitas; quidquid enim tale est, non excedit substantiam, in qua est. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare etiam aliud »; et ita vult, quod amor sit consubstantialis menti.

1. Sed obiicitur contra hoc: Primo videtur, quod in his non sit ordo nec4 origo. Aut enim accipiuntur pro habitibus innatis, aut acquisitis. Si pro innatis, nullus est ordo, quia simul sunt cum ipsa anima; si pro acquisitis, sic amor praecedit notitiam; nullus enim acquirit5 vel studet aliquid addiscere, nisi amet scire. Unde Augustinus in fine noni de Trinitate6: « Partum mentis antecedit appetitus, quo id quod nosse volumus quaerendo et inveniendo, nascitur proles, quae est ipsa notitia ». Aut ergo non est ordo, aut non est talis ordo.

2. Item, videtur quod non sit ibi aequalitas. Aut enim notitia et amor accipiuntur per comparationem ad res inferiores, aut ad animam. Si ad res inferiores, manifestum est, quod non est ibi aequalitas; multa enim novimus, quae non amamus; si in comparatione7 ad animam, aut est aequalitas quantum ad intensionem, aut quantum ad extensionem. Quantum ad extensionem, non; illud constat, quia unum tantum8 est ibi: ergo quantum ad intensionem; sed quod hoc sit falsum, videtur, quia cum sciamus animam minorem Deo et maiorem corpore, contingit quandoque, quod eam amamus magis quam Deum, et minus quam corpus; et ita quantitas9 amoris non sequitur quantitatem notitiae.

3. Item, quod non sit ibi consubstantialitas, videtur, quia amor et notitia sunt habitus et sunt10 qualitates; ergo videtur, quod essentialiter differant ab ipsa mente.

4. Item, ratio Augustini11 est, quod non sint in anima sicut accidentia, quia se extendunt extra; sed hoc nihil est, quia accidentia se extendunt extra, ut calor calefaciendo et color immutando visum. Praeterea, homo cognoscit aliqua cognoscibilia scientia acquisita, quae est accidens, et ita se extendit extra.

Conclusio. Mens, notitia et amor habent ordinem, aequalitatem et consubstantialitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus12 assignat, in his est ordo, aequalitas et consubstantialitas.

Ordo autem attenditur in his habitibus animae connaturalibus in comparatione ad actus, sicut ponitur ordo in13 fide, spe et caritate, licet simul infundantur.

Ad 1. Et sic patet quod obiicitur in contrarium, quia non est ordo in ipsis habitibus absolute consideratis, sed per relationem ad actus.

Similiter est ibi aequalitas secundum conversionem animae supra se et praedictorum habituum perfectionem. Unde dicit Augustinus in nono de Trinita-

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te11, quod non est in his habitibus aequalitas, nisi secundum quod perfecti sunt.

Ad 2. Et sic patet solutio ad illud quod de amore obiicitur, quia ille amor non est perfectus amor, sed libidinosus et inordinatus. — Vel dicendum, quod aequales sunt, secundum quod sunt connaturales; quantum enim est quis habilis vel facilis ad cognoscendum se, tantum ad se amandum; de habitibus vero acquisitis, malis vel bonis, non est verum; et de his non intelligitur.

Similiter est ibi tertium, scilicet consubstantialitas, quia, secundum quod dictum est supra12, amor et notitia animae connaturales sunt, secundum quod supra se convertitur; et sic nihil omnino addunt super ipsas potentias. Per hoc enim, quod anima sibi praesens est, habet notitiam; per hoc, quod est unum sibi, habet habitum amoris: et ideo, sicut potentiae sunt consubstantiales animae, ut supra visum est, ita et huiusmodi habitus. Unde etsi videantur dicere modum habitus vel qualitatis, realiter tamen nihil supra potentias addunt.

Ad 3. Et sic patet responsio ad obiectum, quod non sunt qualitates isto modo.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ratione Augustini dicendum, quod illa ratio non concludit principaliter, quod amor vel notitia sint substantialiter in anima; et hoc est, quia tunc pari ratione posset dici et obiici de omni amore; sed concludit ex consequenti, quod patet sic. Cum enim amor extenditur extra suum subiectum alium amando, hoc est per virtutem substantiae, sicut per se non est, nisi per substantiam. Si ergo amor et notitia extenduntur per virtutem substantialem, et hae sunt intelligentia et voluntas; et amor, quo anima amat se, est idem cum ipsa voluntate; et similiter notitia, qua cognoscit, non est aliud quam intelligentia: restat ergo, quod amor et notitia respectu sui sunt ipsi menti consubstantiales.

Scholion

I. Pro faciliore intelligentia triplicis conclusionis notandum, quod ratio ordinis, quem habent mens, notitia et amor, non intelligitur, quatenus ista tria absolute et in se considerantur, sed in respectu ad suos actus. Similiter aequalitas non attenditur quoad aequalitatem in entitate, sed quoad actus super animam reflexos, dum anima intelligit se totam et se diligit, quantum se cognoscit. Quoad solutionem argumenti contra aequalitatem cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. Denique consubstantialitas non intelligitur absoluta cum exclusione cuiusvis distinctionis, sed in sensu in praecedenti quaestione explicato. — Insuper notandum, quod consubstantialitas, quam notitia et amor habent cum mente, non accipitur proprie, quatenus sunt actus (quia actus secundi et accidentia non possunt esse realiter idem cum substantia animae), sed quatenus sunt habitus concreati. In hoc sensu dicit Scot. (hic q. 9.): « Ista tria ex parte animae, ut sunt sub tribus actibus suis, in istis, inquam, tribus est consubstantialitas ».

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II. In solutione ad 4. supponitur, quod nullum accidens se possit extendere ad extra virtute propria, sed tantum virtute alicuius substantialis, uti iam diximus in Scholio ad q. 3. articuli praecedentis. Hoc substantiale est ipsa duplex potentia intellectus et voluntatis; et hoc est verum de actu quocumque, sive tendat ad extra, sive super se reflectatur. Si autem actus harum potentiarum ad ipsam mentem ut cognitam et amatam referuntur, non sunt in anima sicut accidens in subiecto, sed substantialiter. — Eodem modo etiam S. Thomas hanc sententiam S. Augustini explicat, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. et ad 5.

III. Hanc quaestionem explicite tractant Alex. Hal., p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. — Scot., hic q. 9. — B. Albert., hic a. 37. et seq.; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 11.

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English Translation

Question II.

Whether mind, knowledge, and love have order, equality, and consubstantiality.

Secondly, the question is raised concerning these in comparison to one another, according to the threefold comparison which Augustine sets down, namely of order, of equality, and of consubstantiality, which the Master recites in the text1. There is order among these, because mind is parent, knowledge is offspring, and the third is love proceeding from both. There is also equality there, because mind knows itself as much as it is, and loves itself2 as much as it knows itself. There is also consubstantiality; whence Augustine, in the ninth book On the Trinity3, says: "We are admonished, if in any way we can see it, that these exist substantially in the soul, not as in a subject, as color in a body, nor any quality or quantity; for whatever is such does not exceed the substance in which it is. But the mind, by the love by which it loves itself, can also love something else"; and thus he holds that love is consubstantial with the mind.

1. But it is objected against this: First, it seems that in these there is neither order nor4 origin. For either they are taken as innate habits, or as acquired. If as innate, there is no order, because they are simultaneous with the soul itself; if as acquired, then love precedes knowledge; for no one acquires5 or strives to learn anything unless he loves to know. Whence Augustine at the end of the ninth book On the Trinity6: "An appetite precedes the offspring of the mind, by which, when we seek and find what we wish to know, an offspring is born, which is knowledge itself." Therefore either there is no order, or there is not such an order.

2. Likewise, it seems that there is no equality there. For either knowledge and love are taken in comparison to inferior things, or to the soul. If to inferior things, it is manifest that there is no equality there; for we know many things which we do not love; if in comparison7 to the soul, either there is equality with respect to intension, or with respect to extension. As to extension, no; this is plain, because there is only one8 thing there: therefore as to intension; but that this is false seems clear, because, since we know the soul to be less than God and greater than body, it sometimes happens that we love it more than God and less than the body; and so the quantity9 of love does not follow the quantity of knowledge.

3. Likewise, that there is no consubstantiality there seems to follow, because love and knowledge are habits and are10 qualities; therefore it seems that they differ essentially from the mind itself.

4. Likewise, Augustine's reason11 is that they are not in the soul as accidents, because they extend themselves outward; but this is nothing, because accidents do extend themselves outward, as heat by heating and color by altering the sight. Moreover, a man knows certain knowable things by acquired knowledge, which is an accident, and thus extends itself outward.

Conclusion. Mind, knowledge, and love have order, equality, and consubstantiality.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine12 assigns, in these there is order, equality, and consubstantiality.

Now order is attended to in these connatural habits of the soul in comparison to acts, just as order is posited in13 faith, hope, and charity, although they are infused together.

To 1. And thus what is objected to the contrary is clear, because there is no order in these habits considered absolutely, but through their relation to acts.

Likewise there is equality there according to the soul's turning back upon itself and the perfection of the aforesaid habits. Whence Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity11 that there is no equality in these habits except according as they are perfect.

To 2. And thus the solution is clear to that which is objected concerning love, because that love is not perfect love, but disordered and lustful. — Or it must be said that they are equal in so far as they are connatural; for as much as one is apt or capable of knowing himself, so much also of loving himself; but concerning acquired habits, whether evil or good, it is not true; and the statement is not understood of them.

Likewise there is the third thing there, namely consubstantiality, because, as was said above12, love and knowledge are connatural to the soul, in so far as the soul turns back upon itself; and thus they add nothing at all over and above the powers themselves. For by the very fact that the soul is present to itself, it has knowledge; by the fact that it is one with itself, it has the habit of love: and therefore, just as the powers are consubstantial with the soul, as was seen above, so also are habits of this kind. Hence, although they may seem to bespeak the mode of a habit or quality, in reality they add nothing over the powers.

To 3. And thus the response to the objection is clear, that they are not qualities in that manner.

To 4. To that which is objected from Augustine's reasoning, it must be said that that reasoning does not principally conclude that love or knowledge are substantially in the soul; and this is so, because then by parity of reasoning the same could be said and objected concerning every love; but it concludes consequentially, which is plain thus. For when love extends itself outside its subject by loving another, this is through the power of the substance, just as it does not exist of itself except through the substance. If therefore love and knowledge extend themselves through substantial power, and these are intelligence and will; and the love by which the soul loves itself is the same as the will itself; and likewise the knowledge by which it knows is nothing other than intelligence: it remains, therefore, that love and knowledge with respect to themselves are consubstantial to the mind itself.

Scholion

I. For the easier understanding of the threefold conclusion, it must be noted that the account of the order which mind, knowledge, and love have is not understood according as these three are considered absolutely and in themselves, but in respect to their acts. Likewise, equality is not attended to with respect to equality in being, but with respect to acts reflected back upon the soul, when the soul understands itself wholly and loves itself as much as it knows itself. As to the solution of the argument against equality, see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. Finally, consubstantiality is not understood as absolute with exclusion of every distinction, but in the sense explained in the preceding question. — Moreover, it must be noted that the consubstantiality which knowledge and love have with the mind is not taken properly, in so far as they are acts (because second acts and accidents cannot be really the same with the substance of the soul), but in so far as they are con-created habits. In this sense Scotus says (here, q. 9.): "These three on the part of the soul, as they are under their three acts — in these three, I say, there is consubstantiality."

II. In the solution to the fourth it is supposed that no accident can extend itself outward by its own power, but only by the power of something substantial, as we have already said in the Scholion to q. 3 of the preceding article. This substantial thing is the very twofold power of intellect and will; and this is true of any act whatever, whether it tend outward or be reflected back upon itself. But if the acts of these powers are referred to the mind itself as known and loved, they are not in the soul as an accident in a subject, but substantially. — In the same way also St. Thomas explains this opinion of St. Augustine, Summa I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 1. and ad 5.

III. This question is treated explicitly by Alexander of Hales, p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 7. — Scotus, here q. 9. — Blessed Albert, here a. 37 and following; Summa p. I. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. q. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 6. a. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here 3. princ. q. 2. a. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 11.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 3. circa finem. — Mox Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 post ordo addit autem et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 ponit quod loco quia ac ultimus pro tertius.
    Chapter 3, near the end. — Shortly thereafter the Vatican edition, against most codices and edition 1, adds autem after ordo, and against older codices and edition 1 puts quod in place of quia and ultimus for tertius.
  2. Fide codd. I aa adiecimus se certe supplendum.
    On the trust of codices I aa we have added se, which certainly had to be supplied.
  3. Cap. 4. n. 5: Simul etiam admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in anima existere et tanquam involuta evolvi, ut sentiantur et dinumerentur substantialiter, vel, ut ita dicam, essentialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas. Quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subiectum, in quo est. Non enim color iste aut figura huius corporis potest esse et alterius corporis. Mens autem amore, quo se amat, potest amare et aliud praeter se. — In quo textu plurimi codd. falso habent utrumque loco utcumque et minus bene animo pro anima; Vat. autem ponit consistere loco existere.
    Chapter 4, n. 5: "We are likewise admonished, if in any way we can see it, that these exist in the soul and are unfolded as it were from what is folded up, so that they may be perceived and enumerated substantially, or, so to speak, essentially, not as in a subject, as color or figure in a body or any other quality or quantity. For whatever is such does not exceed the subject in which it is. For this color or figure of this body cannot be also of another body. But the mind, by the love by which it loves itself, can love also something other than itself." — In which text many codices wrongly have utrumque in place of utcumque and less well animo for anima; the Vatican edition puts consistere in place of existere.
  4. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 incongrue vel pro nec.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and edition 1, inappropriately reads vel for nec.
  5. Ita omnes codd. et edd. Magis placeret inquirit, si haec lectio aliquo cod. fulciretur.
    So all codices and editions. Inquirit would be more pleasing, if this reading were supported by any codex.
  6. Cap. 12. n. 18, in quo textu post appetitus originale addit quidam et in fine omittit verba quae est; Vat. autem post quo addit ad et ponit noscere loco nosse.
    Chapter 12, n. 18, in which text the original adds quidam after appetitus and at the end omits the words quae est; the Vatican edition, however, adds ad after quo and puts noscere in place of nosse.
  7. Vat. per comparationem, sed contra mss. Mox codd. V X post animam addunt tunc, ed. 1 et tunc.
    The Vatican edition reads per comparationem, but against the manuscripts. Shortly thereafter codices V X add tunc after animam, edition 1 et tunc.
  8. Multi codd. ut A F T V X Y etc. cum ed. 1 omittunt tantum.
    Many codices such as A F T V X Y etc., together with edition 1, omit tantum.
  9. Plures codd. ut A CL R S U aa bb cum ed. 1 minus apte qualitas; agitur siquidem de gradu intensionis.
    Several codices such as A CL R S U aa bb, with edition 1, less aptly read qualitas; for the matter at hand concerns the degree of intension.
  10. Ex mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus sunt.
    From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have added sunt.
  11. Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 4. n. 5; vide supra fundam. 1. huius q. — Paulo post Vat. praeter fidem mss. accidentia enim pro quia accidentia et in fine argumenti extendunt loco extendit.
    Book IX On the Trinity c. 4. n. 5; see above, fundamentum 1 of this question. — Shortly thereafter the Vatican edition, beyond the trust of the manuscripts, reads accidentia enim for quia accidentia and at the end of the argument extendunt in place of extendit.
  12. Libr. IX. de Trin. c. 12. n. 18; vide in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa finem.
    Book IX On the Trinity c. 12. n. 18; see in the text of the Master, c. 3, near the end.
  13. Ope mss. et ed. 1 sustulimus hic additum et. Paulo ante plures codd. ut ACGKLST bb cum ed. 1 crebro in in loco ordo in.
    By the aid of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have removed an added et here. Shortly before, several codices such as ACGKLST bb, with edition 1, [read] crebro in in place of ordo in.
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