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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II. De secunda assignatione imaginis.

Consequenter est quaestio de secunda assignatione imaginis per mentem, notitiam et amorem. Et1 circa hanc quaeruntur tria.

Primum est de istis absolute, utrum videlicet imago attendatur in istis ut in potentiis, aut in habitibus, aut in potentiis simul et habitibus, aut in substantia et habitibus.

Secundum est de istis in comparatione ad invicem.

Tertium, utrum haec trinitas imaginis ducat necessario in cognitionem Trinitatis quantum ad personas.

Quaestio I. Utrum imago attendatur in mente, notitia et amore ut in potentiis, aut ut in habitibus, aut in utrisque simul, aut secundum substantiam et habitus.

Circa primum sic proceditur.

1. Ostenditur primo, quod non in his ut in potentiis attendatur imago, quia praedicta assignatio2 fuit in potentiis: ergo si haec etiam esset in potentiis, non esset nisi inculcatio verborum.

Praeterea, notitia et amor non dicunt potentiam, sed habitus, licet mens possit dicere potentiam: ergo praedicta tria non possunt poni sub ratione potentiarum.

2. Item ostenditur, quod non dicunt habitus, quia Augustinus3 dicit in imaginis assignatione et approbatione: «Mens novit se, diligit se»; sed nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare: ergo etc.

Item, si mens stat pro habitu, quaero, pro quo habitu? Si pro habitu memoriae, de quo magis videtur, quia non est alium dare; sed actus huius habitus est meminisse, non alius; sed Augustinus4 assignat menti hos actus, scilicet nosse et amare: ergo etc.

3. Item ostenditur, quod non5 in potentiis et habitibus. Cum enim potentiae sint tres, et habitus tres, tunc non esset ternarius, sed senarius.

4. Item quaero, pro qua potentia stat ibi mens? aut enim stat pro omnibus, aut pro duabus, aut pro una. Si pro omnibus, tunc non est ibi trinitas; si pro duabus, tunc est ibi quaternitas, cum duo sint habitus; si pro una, non potest habere istos duos actus, nosse et amare: ergo non sumitur trinitas secundum habitus et potentias simul.

Ad oppositum confusionis:

1. Item ostenditur, quod non secundum animae substantiam et habitus6. Cum enim habitus cognoscendi et amandi consequantur ipsam substantiam tempore, et substantia etiam possit esse sine his, ratio autem imaginis sit ipsi animae perpetua et inseparabilis et concreata: ergo non est in habitibus et substantia simul.

2. Item, si substantia connumeratur habitibus, cum7 habitus sint tres, et substantia una: ergo erit

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ibi quaternitas. Si tu dicas, quod non differt notitia, secundum quod est habitus intelligentiae8 et memoriae; contra: habitus sunt dispositiones potentiarum; cum ergo sint tres potentiae, erunt tres habitus.

3. Item, Magister dicit in littera9, quod mens accipitur non pro animae substantia, sed pro eo quod est in ea eminentius.

Conclusio

In hac secunda assignatione imaginis, quae est mens, notitia, amor, trinitas attenditur quantum ad substantiam animae et quantum ad duos habitus notitiae et amoris.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod differt secundum quosdam assignatio haec a praecedenti, quia prior fuit in potentiis, haec est in habitibus. Et respondent obiectionibus per distinctionem mentis. Mens enim secundum quadruplicem modum accipiendi diversificatur. Dicitur enim uno modo a mene, quod est luna sive defectus: et sic dicitur de tota animae substantia propter transmutationes, quas habet10. Secundo modo dicitur a metiendo; et sic stat pro iudicativa vi, et sic accipit eam Damascenus11, ponens ipsam in potentiis cognitivis. Tertio modo dicitur ab eminendo; et sic stat pro superiori parte rationis, et sic accipit eam Augustinus frequenter12. Quarto modo dicitur a meminisse; et sic stat pro memoria et quantum ad actum et quantum ad habitum13. Dicunt ergo, quod in assignatione huius trinitatis mens stat pro habitu memoriae; sed in adaptatione, cum dicit Augustinus14: «Mens novit se et diligit», stat pro potentia memorandi.

Sed istud non videtur convenienter dictum, quia adaptatio debet respondere assignationi. Et praeterea, cum actus proprius mentis, ut stat pro memoria, sit meminisse, ille15 deberet tangi; sed Augustinus in hac assignatione nunquam facit mentionem nisi de duobus actibus, scilicet nosse et amare, qui non sunt memoriae, sed aliarum potentiarum.

Respondendum igitur, quod trinitas illa non est in potentiis; quia amor et notitia non dicunt potentias16; nec in habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro habitu, cum ipsa accipiatur ut agens; nec potest esse in potentiis et habitibus, quia mens non potest stare pro una potentia, cum assignentur ei actus duarum potentiarum; nec potest similiter17 stare pro pluribus potentiis, quia non esset trinitas. Restat ergo, quod necesse est ponere, quod trinitas ista attendatur quantum ad substantiam animae, ratione mentis se noscentis et amantis, et quantum ad habitus, ratione notitiae et amoris; et sic est trinitas, cum substantia sit una, et habitus sint duo.

Differt ergo haec assignatio a praecedenti: quia praecedens fuit per uniformitatem in potentiis per comparationem ad habitus et18 actus, sed haec est in substantia et habitibus. Differt iterum in hoc, quia praecedens fuit per conversionem animae ad Deum, haec est per conversionem animae supra se; et pluribus modis non attenditur imago in homine, ut supra dictum fuit19. Differt etiam, quia praecedens assignatio imaginis magis est propria et conveniens quam haec. Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et20 virtutibus theologicis. Unde Augustinus hanc assignationem primo ponit investigando, ut per hanc deveniat ad illam, in qua finit speculationem suam21. Unde haec assignatio non est propria, sicut alia; unde Magister eam secundo ponit tanquam non principalem.

Ad argumenta:

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod habitus non sunt coaevi etc.; dicendum, quod triplex est habitus. Quendam enim habitum habet animae potentia ab acquisitione, quendam ab innata dispositione, tertium habet a sui ipsius origine. Hoc autem patet, quia habitus est quo potentia facilis est in actum; potentia autem his tribus modis est facilis, verbi gratia, affectus noster habet facilitatem ad diligendum bonum alienum per acquisitam dispositio-

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nem, ut per virtutem; ad diligendum vero bonum suum22 per innatam dispositionem; et ad diligendum se ipsum per sui naturalem originem. Cum enim sit sibi indistanter unitus, semper est habilis ad se amandum. Similiter, cum intellectus noster semper sit sibi praesens, semper est habilis sibi ad se cognoscendum. Et sic patet illud quod obiicitur de coaevitate; nam quoad tales habitus est bene coaevitas.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tres debent23 esse habitus secundum tres potentias; dicendum, quod in hac trinitate non cadit nec habet locum habitus memoriae, quia attenditur24 in ipsa anima secundum quod convertitur supra se: et ideo ipsa animae substantia tenet locum memoriae, et ipsa praesentia et oblatio, qua anima offert se semper suae intelligentiae, tenet locum habitus et actus memoriae. Et ita patet, quod ibi cadunt tantum habitus duarum potentiarum; et ideo est ibi trinitas.

3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur de verbo Magistri; dicendum, quod intelligitur non pro animae substantia tota25; quod si aliter intelligatur, non habet veritatem verbum Magistri. Quod patet per Augustinum, qui occasione huius imaginis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam habere cognitionem sui innatam, quae est cognitio26 suae substantiae. Et praeterea, nihil unum in anima cognoscit et diligit nisi substantia: ergo si mens staret pro una potentia, non haberet illos duos actus, scilicet nosse et amare.

Scholion

I. De hac quaestione audiendus est ipse S. Doctor, qui in anecdoto primo Prologo ad II. Sententiarum (cuius initium iam dedimus in Prolegomenis c. 1. § 2.) dicit: «Fortassis autem alicui videbitur, me declinasse a positionibus Magistri Sententiarum maxime in duobus: in hoc scilicet, quod cum Magister parte secunda distinctionis tertiae in secunda assignatione trinitatis, quam dicit consistere in mente, notitia et amore, dicat, mentem accipi non pro anima, sed pro superiori portione, a me dictum reperitur, mentem ibi pro substantia animae stare. Rursus, cum Magister dicat d. 7., quod potentia generandi communis est tribus personis, utpote nomen significans essentiam, magis illi opinioni adhaesi, quae dicit, potentiam generandi dictam esse propter relationem. Sed si quis recte inspiciat, in neutro praedictorum inveniet me nec a positione Magistri nec a veritatis tramite declinasse. Nam quando dixi, in illa trinitatis assignatione mentem accipi pro animae substantia ratione superioris partis, hoc ideo dictum est, quia, si mens staret ibi pro superiori portione, cum illa sit animae potentia, et non sit unius potentiae nosse et amare, sicut videbitur infra (cfr. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.), iam non esset ibi trinitas, sed quaternitas. Iterum, potentiae proprie non est agere, sed substantiae per potentiam; et ideo, si proprie et vere loquitur Augustinus, cum dicit, mens novit etc., mens ibi supponit animae substantiam. Et hoc iterum innuit Augustinus, cum postea occasione huius trinitatis quasi per totum decimum de Trinitate ostendit, animam nosse se ipsam. Postremo, cum illi habitus notitiae et amoris sint omnino consubstantiales, non addunt novam essentiam super potentiam, sed se ipsis potentiae sunt habiles, et ita non possunt ipsis potentiis communicari sive cum superiori parte rationis. Et propterea non negat Magister, quod mens non accipiatur pro ipsa anima, sed quod non accipiatur pro tota anima secundum omnes potentias, sed pro ipsa substantia ratione superioris portionis. In hoc igitur Magistro non contradixi, sed potius verbum eius iuxta veritatis regulam, ut aestimo, explicavi».

II. Verba in 2. fund., quod «nullius habitus est se nosse nec amare», sic intelliguntur: se intelligere et amare non sunt actus alicuius habitus acquisiti, sed potentiae animae concreatae et consubstantialis, licet ad hos actus etiam habitus dispositive concurrere possint. Unde etiam B. Albert. (hic a. 36.) de eodem textu Augustini dicit: «Habitus non est nosse se et amare se, sed potius habentis habitum secundum ipsum habitum vel per ipsum habitum est nosse se et amare se». Item Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 7. a. 1.) ait: «Ad cognoscendum vero se ipsam mens nullo habitu utitur». Cfr. etiam Bonav. hic q. 2. ad 4.

III. In solut. ad 1. triplex habitus distinguitur, scil. ab acquisitione, ab innata dispositione, a sui ipsius origine. Differentia secundi et tertii in hoc consistit, quod secundus habitus non est proprie animae concreatus et coaevus, licet dispositio ad hunc habitum sit concreata et coaeva. Sic anima cognoscit et diligit ex innata dispositione proprium bonum (commodum). Tertius vero habitus, quo anima se ipsam cognoscit et diligit, est proprie ipsi concreatus, cfr. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — In eadem solut. tangitur quaestio, quo sensu intellectus noster semper se intelligat. Doctrina Seraphici de hoc omnino concordat cum S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 7. ad 4.), Scot. (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 8. n. 13.), et Richard. (hic a. 2. q. 2.). Hi negant, animam actualem sui intellectionem habere, praesertim talem qua se discernat ab aliis; concedunt tamen, quod propter praesentiam obiecti «nihil deficit actui primo... ad quem debet sequi actus secundus, qui est intellectio. Et forte propter hoc dicit frequenter Augustinus, quod anima novit semper se, propter istam propinquitatem ad actum noscendi, ubi nulla est imperfectio in actu primo. Hoc autem modo anima non semper novit lapidem» etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Alii tamen doctores, ut Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 3.) et Henr. Gand. (Quodl. 4. q. 7.) docent, animam semper se nosse et amare, non tantum habitualiter, sed etiam actualiter, quin tamen advertat hos intimos actus. Cfr. etiam Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 12.), qui in hac quaestione anceps haeret.

IV. De ipsa conclusione: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., hic q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., hic q. 5; S. 1. q. 93. a. 6. — B. Albert., hic a. 36; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 6. a. 1. et q. 7. a. unic. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 3. q. 1. — Biel, hic q. 10.

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English Translation
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Article II. On the second assignation of the image.

Consequently there is a question on the second assignation of the image through mind, knowledge, and love. And1 concerning this three things are asked.

The first is about these absolutely: namely, whether the image is found in them as in powers, or in habits, or in powers and habits at once, or in substance and habits.

The second is about these in comparison to one another.

The third, whether this trinity of the image necessarily leads to knowledge of the Trinity with respect to the persons.

Question I. Whether the image is found in mind, knowledge, and love as in powers, or as in habits, or in both at once, or according to substance and habits.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus.

1. It is shown first, that the image is not found in these as in powers, because the aforesaid assignation2 was in powers: therefore if this also were in powers, it would be nothing but a reiteration of words.

Likewise, knowledge and love do not bespeak a power, but habits, although mind can bespeak a power: therefore the aforesaid three cannot be placed under the formal character of powers.

2. Likewise it is shown that they do not bespeak habits, because Augustine3 says in the assignation and approbation of the image: «The mind knows itself, loves itself»; but it belongs to no habit to know or love itself: therefore etc.

Likewise, if mind stands for a habit, I ask, for which habit? If for the habit of memory, of which it more seems so, because there is no other to assign; but the act of this habit is to remember, not another; but Augustine4 assigns to mind these acts, namely to know and to love: therefore etc.

3. Likewise it is shown, that not5 in powers and habits. For since the powers are three, and the habits three, then there would not be a ternary, but a senary.

4. Likewise I ask, for which power does mind there stand? for either it stands for all, or for two, or for one. If for all, then there is no trinity there; if for two, then there is a quaternity there, since two are habits; if for one, it cannot have those two acts, to know and to love: therefore the trinity is not taken according to habits and powers at once.

To the opposite of the confusion:

1. Likewise it is shown, that not according to the substance of the soul and habits6. For since the habits of knowing and loving follow the substance itself in time, and substance can also be without them, but the formal character of the image is to the soul itself perpetual and inseparable and co-created: therefore it is not in habits and substance at once.

2. Likewise, if substance is counted together with the habits, since7 the habits are three, and the substance one: therefore there will be

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a quaternity there. If you say that knowledge does not differ insofar as it is a habit of understanding8 and of memory; on the contrary: habits are dispositions of powers; since therefore there are three powers, there will be three habits.

3. Likewise, the Master says in the text9, that mind is taken not for the substance of the soul, but for that which is more eminent in it.

Conclusion

In this second assignation of the image, which is mind, knowledge, love, the trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul and with respect to the two habits of knowledge and love.

I respond: It must be said, that according to certain men this assignation differs from the preceding, because the prior was in powers, this is in habits. And they answer the objections through a distinction of "mind." For mens is diversified according to a fourfold mode of being taken. For in one mode it is said from mene, which is moon or defect: and so it is said of the whole substance of the soul on account of the transmutations which it has10. In a second mode it is said from metiri (to measure); and so it stands for the judicative power, and so Damascene11 takes it, placing it among the cognitive powers. In a third mode it is said from eminere (to be eminent); and so it stands for the superior part of reason, and so Augustine often takes it12. In a fourth mode it is said from meminisse (to remember); and so it stands for memory both with respect to act and with respect to habit13. They say therefore, that in the assignation of this trinity mind stands for the habit of memory; but in the adaptation, when Augustine says14: «The mind knows itself and loves [itself]», it stands for the power of remembering.

But this does not seem fittingly said, because the adaptation ought to correspond to the assignation. And further, since the proper act of mind, as it stands for memory, is to remember, that15 would have to be touched on; but Augustine in this assignation never makes mention except of two acts, namely to know and to love, which are not of memory, but of the other powers.

It must therefore be answered, that that trinity is not in powers; because love and knowledge do not bespeak powers16; nor in habits, because mind cannot stand for a habit, since it is taken as agent; nor can it be in powers and habits, because mind cannot stand for one power, since the acts of two powers are assigned to it; nor likewise17 can it stand for several powers, because there would not be a trinity. It remains therefore, that it is necessary to hold, that this trinity is found with respect to the substance of the soul, by reason of the mind knowing and loving itself, and with respect to the habits, by reason of knowledge and love; and thus there is a trinity, since the substance is one, and the habits are two.

This assignation therefore differs from the preceding: because the preceding was through uniformity in powers in comparison to habits and18 acts, but this is in substance and habits. It differs again in this, that the preceding was through a turning of the soul to God, this is through a turning of the soul upon itself; and the image is not found in man in more modes, as was said above19. It differs also, because the preceding assignation of the image is more proper and fitting than this one. For properly speaking, the image consists in unity of essence and trinity of powers, according to which the soul is born to be sealed by that highest Trinity with the image of likeness, which consists in grace and20 the theological virtues. Whence Augustine sets down this assignation first by way of investigation, in order that through this he may arrive at that one, in which he ends his speculation21. Whence this assignation is not proper, as the other is; whence the Master places it second, as not principal.

To the arguments:

1. To that therefore which is objected, that habits are not coeval etc.; it must be said, that habit is threefold. For the power of the soul has one habit by acquisition, another by innate disposition, a third it has from its own origin. This is clear, because a habit is that by which a power is facile in act; but a power is facile in these three modes, for example, our affect has facility for loving another's good through acquired disposi-

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tion, as through virtue; for loving one's own22 good through innate disposition; and for loving oneself through one's natural origin. For since [the soul] is undividedly united to itself, it is always apt to loving itself. Likewise, since our intellect is always present to itself, it is always apt to itself for knowing itself. And so that is clear which is objected concerning coevality; for as regards such habits there is indeed coevality.

2. To that which is objected, that there ought23 to be three habits according to the three powers; it must be said, that in this trinity the habit of memory does not fall in nor has it place, because [the trinity] is found24 in the soul itself according as it turns upon itself: and therefore the substance of the soul itself holds the place of memory, and the very presence and offering, by which the soul always offers itself to its understanding, holds the place of the habit and act of memory. And so it is clear, that there fall in there only the habits of two powers; and therefore there is a trinity there.

3. To that which is last objected concerning the word of the Master; it must be said, that it is understood not for the whole substance of the soul25; for if it be understood otherwise, the word of the Master does not have truth. Which is clear through Augustine, who on the occasion of this image, through almost the whole tenth [book] On the Trinity, shows that the soul has an innate knowledge of itself, which is the knowledge26 of its substance. And besides, nothing one in the soul knows and loves except the substance: therefore if mind stood for one power, it would not have those two acts, namely to know and to love.

Scholion

I. Concerning this question the holy Doctor himself is to be heard, who in the unpublished first Prologue to Book II of the Sentences (whose beginning we have already given in the Prolegomena, c. 1, § 2) says: "But perhaps it will seem to someone that I have departed from the positions of the Master of the Sentences chiefly in two things: namely in this, that whereas the Master in the second part of the third distinction in the second assignation of the trinity, which he says consists in mind, knowledge, and love, says that mind is taken not for the soul but for the superior portion, by me it is found said that mind there stands for the substance of the soul. Again, since the Master says in d. 7 that the power of generating is common to the three persons, as a name signifying the essence, I have rather adhered to that opinion which says that the power of generating is so called on account of relation. But if anyone rightly examines, in neither of the aforesaid will he find me to have departed either from the Master's position or from the path of truth. For when I said that in that assignation of the trinity mind is taken for the substance of the soul by reason of the superior part, this was said because, if mind stood there for the superior portion, since that is a power of the soul, and to know and to love are not [the act] of one power, as will be seen below (cf. II. Sent. d. 24. p. 1. a. 2. q. 1.), there would not now be a trinity there, but a quaternity. Again, to act is not properly of the power, but of the substance through the power; and therefore, if Augustine speaks properly and truly, when he says, the mind knows etc., mind there stands for the substance of the soul. And this again Augustine intimates when later, on the occasion of this trinity, through almost the whole tenth [book] On the Trinity, he shows that the soul knows itself. Finally, since those habits of knowledge and love are altogether consubstantial, they do not add a new essence over the power, but the powers are apt by themselves, and so they cannot be communicated to the powers themselves or with the superior part of reason. And therefore the Master does not deny that mind is taken for the soul itself, but that it is not taken for the whole soul according to all the powers, but for the substance itself by reason of the superior portion. In this therefore I have not contradicted the Master, but rather, as I judge, explained his word according to the rule of truth."

II. The words in the 2nd fundament, that "it belongs to no habit to know or love itself," are thus understood: to understand and to love oneself are not acts of any acquired habit, but of a power of the soul that is concreated and consubstantial, although habits can also dispositively concur in these acts. Whence also Blessed Albert (here a. 36) on the same text of Augustine says: "It is not the habit that knows itself and loves itself, but rather it belongs to the one having the habit, according to that habit or through that habit, to know oneself and love oneself." Likewise Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 7. a. 1.) says: "For knowing itself, however, the mind uses no habit." Cf. also Bonav. here q. 2. ad 4.

III. In the solution to 1, a threefold habit is distinguished, namely from acquisition, from innate disposition, from its own origin. The difference of the second and third consists in this, that the second habit is not properly concreated and coeval to the soul, although the disposition to this habit is concreated and coeval. Thus the soul knows and loves from innate disposition its own good (advantage). The third habit, however, by which the soul knows and loves itself, is properly concreated to it; cf. II. Sent. d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. — In the same solution there is touched the question, in what sense our intellect always understands itself. The Seraphic Doctor's doctrine on this fully agrees with St. Thomas (here q. 4. a. 5; S. I. q. 93. a. 7. ad 4.), Scotus (II. Sent. d. 3. q. 8. n. 13.), and Richard (here a. 2. q. 2.). These deny that the soul has actual intellection of itself, especially such as to discern itself from others; they concede, however, that on account of the presence of the object "nothing is lacking to the first act... to which a second act ought to follow, which is intellection. And perhaps on account of this Augustine frequently says that the soul always knows itself, on account of that proximity to the act of knowing, where there is no imperfection in the first act. In this mode, however, the soul does not always know a stone" etc. (Scot. loc. cit.). Other doctors, however, such as Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 5. a. 3.) and Henry of Ghent (Quodl. 4. q. 7.) teach that the soul always knows and loves itself, not only habitually but also actually, although it does not advert to these intimate acts. Cf. also Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 12.), who in this question remains uncertain.

IV. On the conclusion itself: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 62. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., here q. 9; Report. q. 7. — S. Thom., here q. 5; S. 1. q. 93. a. 6. — B. Albert., here a. 36; S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. p. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 6. a. 1. and q. 7. a. unic. — Aegid. R., here 2. princ. q. 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 3. q. 1. — Biel, here q. 10.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vat. omittit Et, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra post Tertium ed. 1 addit est.
    The Vatican edition omits Et, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1. A little below, after Tertium, ed. 1 adds est.
  2. Scilicet memoria, intellectus et voluntas, de qua supra in a. 1. — Mox substituimus ex mss. haec loco hic.
    Namely memory, intellect, and will, on which see above in a. 1. — Shortly after we have substituted haec in place of hic from the manuscripts.
  3. Textum Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Vat. paulo ante loco dicunt habitus ponit ut in habitibus, et paulo post omittit et approbatione, sed contra mss. et ed. 1. — Mox ex cod. X cum ed. 1 post est supplevimus, rei veritate exigente, se.
    For Augustine's text see above in the Master's text, c. 3, near the middle. — The Vatican edition shortly before, in place of dicunt habitus places ut in habitibus, and shortly after omits et approbatione, but against the manuscripts and ed. 1. — Shortly after, from codex X with ed. 1, after est we have supplied, the truth of the matter requiring it, se.
  4. Verba Augustini inveniuntur supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. circa medium. — Paulo supra post meminisse auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 expunximus et, quod Vat. addit.
    Augustine's words are found above in the Master's text, c. 3, near the middle. — A little above, after meminisse, on the authority of the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 we have struck out et, which the Vatican edition adds.
  5. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et sex primis edd., addit ut.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, adds ut.
  6. Ita codd. et sex primae edd. contra Vat., quae habet Contra. Ostenditur, quod non ut in substantia et habitibus simul et paulo post sequantur pro consequantur.
    Thus the codices and the first six editions, against the Vatican edition, which has Contra. It is shown, that not as in substance and habits at once and shortly after sequantur for consequantur.
  7. Codd. X Y addunt scilicet.
    Codices X and Y add scilicet.
  8. Substituimus ope mss. et ed. 1 hic cum loco et ac paulo infra intelligentiae pro intellectivae.
    We have substituted, by means of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here cum in place of et and a little below intelligentiae for intellectivae.
  9. Cap. 3. circa medium, quem tamen textum plurimi mss. cum sex primis edd. hic mutarunt, pro anima ponendo animae substantia tota; codd. vero T X animae substantia, quos sequimur, quia eorum lectio correspondet sensui obiicientium. Cfr. Scholion.
    Chap. 3, near the middle; which text however many manuscripts with the first six editions have here altered, putting in place of anima the words animae substantia tota; but codices T X read animae substantia, which we follow, because their reading corresponds to the sense of those objecting. Cf. the Scholion.
  10. De hac mentis acceptione vide libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11.
    On this acceptation of mens see the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11.
  11. Libr. II. de Fide orthod. c. 22: «Vires in cognitione positae sunt mens, cogitatio, opinio, sensus». Et singula perpendens de mente dicit: quod verum est iudicat (considerat, discernit; sive, ut refert Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69. in princ.: mens a metiendo dicitur.).
    Book II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 22: "The powers placed in cognition are mind, thought, opinion, sense." And weighing each, he says of mind: that it judges what is true (considers, discerns; or, as Alexander of Hales reports, S. p. II. q. 69. at the beginning: mind is so called from measuring [a metiendo]).
  12. Cfr. Enarratio in Psalm. 3. n. 3; XV. de Trin. c. 7. n. 11. Vide etiam libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 11. et 34. Consentit Isidor., XI. Etymolog. c. 1.
    Cf. Exposition on Psalm 3. n. 3; XV. On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 11. See also the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 11 and 34. Isidore concurs, XI. Etymologies, c. 1.
  13. Cfr. Isidor. loc. cit. et libr. de Spiritu et anima, c. 34. — De his quatuor etymologiis, quae ex more illius aetatis iudicari debent, vide Alex. Hal., S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. circa finem (in aliis edd. q. 55.).
    Cf. Isidore loc. cit. and the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 34. — On these four etymologies, which should be judged according to the custom of that age, see Alexander of Hales, S. p. IV. q. 12. m. 1. a. 2. near the end (in other editions q. 55).
  14. Codd. sunt inter se divisi; plures siquidem ut G O T bb habent Augustinus, quos sequimur, alii vero ut A C L S Z etc. ecce; omnes tamen contra Vat. dicit loco dicitur. Ed. 1 dicit Magister et Augustinus: ecce mens.
    The codices are divided among themselves; for many, as G O T bb, have Augustinus, which we follow, but others, as A C L S Z etc., ecce; all however against the Vatican edition's dicit in place of dicitur. Ed. 1: the Master and Augustine say: behold the mind.
  15. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 ibi pro ille.
    The Vatican edition, against the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1, has ibi in place of ille.
  16. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 minus bene dicuntur potentiae.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, less well [reads] dicuntur potentiae.
  17. Plures codd. ut A F G H K T Y bb simul pro similiter.
    Many codices, as A F G H K T Y bb, [read] simul in place of similiter.
  18. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, repetit hic ad. Paulo infra post Differt ex pluribus codd. ut H P Q X Z ee posuimus iterum loco etiam.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and ed. 1, repeats here ad. A little below, after Differt, from many codices, as H P Q X Z ee, we have placed iterum in place of etiam.
  19. Hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp.
    Here a. 1. q. 2. in the body [of the article].
  20. Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 indebite omittit gratia et. Nam distinguitur gratia sanctificans a virtutibus.
    The Vatican edition, without any authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, unduly omits gratia et. For sanctifying grace is distinguished from the virtues.
  21. Vide IX. de Trin. c. 2. n. 2. et ibid. X. c. 11. n. 17; XIV. ac XV. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. — Sub vocabulo hanc intellige secundam assignationem.
    See IX. On the Trinity, c. 2, n. 2 and ibid. X, c. 11, n. 17; XIV and XV, c. 3, n. 5 and following. — Under the word hanc understand the second assignation.
  22. Codd. L O summum loco suum; sed non bene. Mox cod. T post sibi addit ipsi et paulo infra incongrue cum aliis omittit intellectus noster.
    Codices L O [read] summum in place of suum; but not well. Shortly after, codex T after sibi adds ipsi and a little below incongruously with the others omits intellectus noster.
  23. Ope mss. et ed. 1 substituimus debent pro dicuntur.
    By means of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted debent for dicuntur.
  24. Supple: trinitas.
    Supply: trinitas (trinity).
  25. Cod. Z addit sed parte superiori scilicet, ed. 1 autem: sed supple pro conversione animae ad Deum vel reflexione ad sui considerationem ad Deum.
    Codex Z adds but namely by the superior part, while ed. 1: but supply for a turning of the soul to God or a reflection upon consideration of itself toward God.
  26. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 agnitio; et immediate post propterea loco praeterea, sed falso, quia revera novum [printed entry ends here at the bottom of p.90; ACCEPT-AS-TRUNCATED-IN-SOURCE].
    The Vatican edition, against the trust of the manuscripts and ed. 1, [reads] agnitio; and immediately after, propterea in place of praeterea, but falsely, because in truth a new [printed footer entry ends here at the bottom of p.90; ACCEPT-AS-TRUNCATED-IN-SOURCE — the next page begins a fresh footer-note sequence with no continuation].
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