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Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio III.

Utrum memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint idem in essentia cum anima.1

Tertio loco quaeritur de comparatione istarum potentiarum ad animam sive ad subiectum, utrum videlicet sint idem in essentia cum anima. Et videtur quod sic.

1. Augustinus dicit in decimo de Trinitate2: « Haec tria, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una vita, una essentia, ac per hoc una substantia ».

2. Item, Bernardus super Cantica3: « Tria quaedam in anima intueor, memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, et haec tria ipsam ». Si tu dicas, quod hoc dicitur per causam; hoc nihil est, quia Augustinus de Spiritu et anima4 dicit, quod anima « est quaedam sua, ut potentiae, et quaedam non sua, ut virtutes »; quod si per causam esset dictum, utrumque posset dici.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur velle dicere Philosophus5, quia idem dicit esse principium essendi et operandi: ergo cum principium essendi sit ipsa forma substantialis, principium operandi erit ipsa; sed principium operandi est potentia: ergo potentia est principium essendi; sed non est principium essendi nisi forma substantialis in homine: ergo potentia et forma substantialis sunt idem in substantia.

4. Item, ratione ostenditur: Sicut materia prima nata est recipere omnia per veritatem, sic anima secundum similitudinem6; sed potentia materiae primae respectu formarum suscipiendarum non differt per essentiam ab ipsa7: ergo similiter videtur, quod potentia animae. Probatio: si enim per essentiam differret, aut esset substantia, aut accidens. Non accidens, quia antecedit omnem formam et omne

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accidens; si substantia, aut ergo materia, aut forma. Praeterea, si differret, illius esset materia capax8.

5. Item, forma accidentalis non est simplicior forma substantiali; sed potentia operandi non differt a forma accidentali, utpote potentia calefaciendi non differt per essentiam a caliditate, nec potentia illuminandi ab ipsa luce: ergo similiter videtur, quod nec potentia animae ab ipsa anima.

6. Item, quod est accidens, nulli substantiae est substantiale9; sed potentiae istae sunt substantiales: ergo animae non sunt accidentia10: ergo sunt substantia; constat quod non alia quam anima. Probatio minoris: quia anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis in homine non dicit diversitatem substantiarum, sed potentiarum: ergo constat, quod in homine istae differentiae: vegetabile, sensibile, rationale, accipiuntur a potentiis; sed11 huiusmodi differentiae sunt substantiales: ergo et potentiae: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate12 assignat differentiam imaginis creatae ad Trinitatem illam, scilicet increatam, quia in illa Trinitate est habens id quod habetur, hic autem habens non est id quod habetur: ergo si anima habet tres potentias, ergo essentialiter non est illae.

2. Item, Dionysius13 dicit, quod in quolibet creato differunt haec tria: substantia, virtus et operatio: ergo et in anima differunt substantia et potentiae.

3. Item, Boethius14: « In quolibet creato differunt quo est et quod est, sive quid est et esse »: ergo similiter, immo multo fortius, quod potest et quo potest.

4. Item, rationibus ostenditur sic: quae differunt genere, differunt essentia, et unum de altero non praedicatur essentialiter15; sed potentiae et anima sunt huiusmodi, quia anima est in genere substantiae, sed potentiae eius sunt in secunda specie qualitatis, scilicet naturalis potentiae vel impotentiae: ergo etc.

5. Item, illa quorum unum est extra alterum, differunt essentialiter et substantialiter; sed virtus egreditur substantiam16, quia operatur in obiectum, quod est extra; sed impossibile est, quod operetur ubi non est; si ergo virtus est ubi operatur, et operatur extra substantiam cuiuslibet: ergo egreditur extra substantiam: ergo etc.

6. Item, ad hoc est alia ratio, quia si eadem per essentiam essent anima et potentiae, ergo17 unum non multiplicaretur nisi secundum multiplicationem alterius; et sic, cum una tantum sit anima, haberet tantum unam potentiam; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Potentiae animae sunt substantiales et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima; non sunt tamen cum ipsa omnino idem per essentiam.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam notandum est, quod potentia naturalis dicitur dupliciter18. Uno modo, prout dicit modum existendi naturalis potentiae in subiecto, secundum quem dicitur subiectum facile vel difficile ad aliquid agendum; et sic naturalis potentia dicit modum qualitatis et est generaliter in secunda specie qualitatis, ut patet, cum dicitur cursor et pugillator, quorum utrumque dicit facilitatem, quae consequitur19 modum existendi potentiae gradiendi vel resistendi sive agendi in subiecto. Alio modo potentia naturalis dicitur potentia naturaliter egrediens a subiecto20. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter. Nam aliqua potentia egreditur a substantia cum accidente, ut

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potentia calefaciendi. Ignis enim per suam substantiam non calefacit sine caliditate; et haec potentia non est alterius generis quam sit qualitas, a qua egreditur; unde potentia21 calefaciendi est in eodem genere cum caliditate. Alio modo dicitur naturalis potentia, quae naturaliter egreditur a22 substantia et immediate, sicut potentia generandi quantum ad inductionem ultimae formae; et haec quidem non est alterius generis quam substantia, sed reducitur ad genus substantiae tanquam substantialis differentia. Per hunc modum intelligendum est in potentiis animae. Nam uno modo contingit nominare potentias animae secundum primum modum, ut dicunt facilitatem, quae dicit modum potentiae existendi in subiecto, sicut ingeniositas et tarditas; et haec quidem sunt in secunda specie qualitatis. Alio modo contingit nominare potentias, prout dicunt ordinem substantiae ad actum, qui est mediante aliqua proprietate accidentali, ut potentia syllogizandi, quae est in anima, cum habet habitum syllogizandi; et haec est in eodem genere, in quo est scientia syllogizandi, ut23 in prima specie qualitatis. Contingit iterum nominare potentias animae, ut immediate egrediuntur a substantia, ut per24 haec tria: memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Et hoc patet, quia omni accidente circumscripto25, intellecto quod anima sit substantia spiritualis, hoc ipso quod est sibi praesens et sibi coniuncta, habet potentiam ad memorandum et intelligendum et diligendum se27. Unde istae potentiae sunt animae consubstantiales26 et sunt in eodem genere per reductionem, in quo est anima. Attamen, quoniam egrediuntur ab anima — potentia enim se habet per modum egredientis — non sunt omnino idem per essentiam, nec tamen adeo differunt, ut sint alterius generis, sed sunt in eodem genere per reductionem.

Et potest satis manifestum exemplum dari in re et in similitudine eius. Nam res non habet tantam identitatem cum sua similitudine, ut sint unum numero, nec tantam diversitatem, ut differant genere29. Similitudo enim Martini non adeo distat a Martino, ut penitus differat ab eo. Et ita similitudo rei in eodem genere est per reductionem cum eo, cuius est similitudo. Quia enim egreditur, ideo differt, sed non transit in aliud genus. Et loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis, id est, prout a subiecto28 exit et non recedit, ut splendor a luce. Concedendae ergo sunt rationes probantes, quod anima non est suae potentiae per essentiam.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium de Augustino et Bernardo, quod anima est suae potentiae; dicendum, quod non est ibi praedicatio accidentis de subiecto, nec eiusdem per essentiam, sed substantialis vel essentialis.

Propter quod notandum, quod essentiale dicitur quatuor modis. Primo modo essentiale dicitur31 quod dicit rei essentiam totam, sicut species singularis. Secundo modo dicitur essentiale quod est de essentia et constitutione rei, ut materia et forma. Tertio modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest esse nec potest intelligi esse, ut sunt illa in quibus attenditur ratio vestigii, ut unitas, veritas, bonitas. Quarto modo dicitur essentiale sine quo res non potest cogitari habere perfectum esse, ut sunt potentiae in anima, in quibus attenditur imago; et hoc est minimo modo substantiale sive essentiale; tamen non transit in aliud genus32: ideo anima dicitur suae potentiae30.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod idem est principium essendi et operandi; dicendum, quod verum est de principio remoto, sed de proximo est impos-

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sibile. Nam si idem omnino esset principium proximum, tunc idem esset in re esse et operari. Similiter, si idem esset principium proximum, cum res semper habeat esse, semper haberet operari. Quoniam igitur33 forma dicit proximum et immediatum principium essendi, potentia vero proximum et immediatum principium operandi, patet quod impossibile est esse omnino idem.

Ad 4. Ad aliud quod obiicitur de potentia materiae, dicendum, quod materia non est sua potentia per essentiam, quoniam non est ipsa ordinatio ad formam34; est tamen ipsa potentia materiae essentialis ipsi materiae, sicut potentia activa ipsi substantiae. Et minus quidem elongatur potentia materiae a materia quam potentia activa a substantia; quoniam potentia materiae est potentia passiva, quae dicit ordinem ad aliud cum privatione, sed potentia activa dicit ordinem cum positione: et ideo minus addit potentia materiae supra materiam, quam potentia activa supra substantiam. Et hinc est, quod non ita distinguuntur diversae potentiae in eadem materia, sicut in eadem substantia.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de forma accidentali, dicendum, quod forma accidentalis non est sua potentia. Nam potentia eius est, in quantum influit in alterum; attamen potentia illa non tantum addit quantum potentia formae substantialis, quoniam potentia formae accidentalis dicit ordinationem ad actum, sed non sufficientem per se, sed per virtutem substantiae. Sicut enim accidens non est per se, ita non habet virtutem operandi per se, sed per virtutem substantiae; et ita hoc patet.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur ultimo, dicendum est35, quod potentiae animae non sunt accidentales. Tamen argumentum non valet, quia fortassis rationale, sensibile, vegetabile non accipiuntur a potentiis, sed a diversis naturis repertis in anima.

Illud autem argumentum, quod factum est ad oppositum, quod differunt, quia sunt in diversis generibus, solvendum est per interemptionem36, quia non sunt in diversis generibus, sed in eodem per reductionem.

Scholion

I. Circa principalem quaestionem illis temporibus tres sententiae defendebantur, quas S. Bonav. (II. Sent. d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.) accurate explicat. Prima sententia ibi posita non admittit inter essentiam animae et potentias nisi distinctionem rationis. Ita Gulielmus Paris., Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 1.), Henr. Gand. (Quodl. IV. q. 7.), insuper omnes Nominales. — Secunda docet distinctionem realem, et quidem talem, ut potentiae nec in genere cum substantia conveniant, cum ad genus accidentium trahantur. Illi S. Thom. (hic q. 4. a. 2; S. I. q. 54. a. 3. et q. 77. a. 1. et 3; de Spirit. Creaturis a. 11; de Anima q. 12.); B. Albert. (hic a. 34.); Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 5. a. 2.). — Tertia sententia praecedenti valde appropinquat, quam docet Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 65. m. 4. et q. 21. m. 1.). Huic etiam S. Bonav. magis favet; tamen dicit: « Quaelibet autem dictarum positionum suos habet defensores, nec est facile rationibus cogentibus earum aliquam improbare ». Haec igitur ultima sententia admittit quidem inter animae substantiam et potentias eius connaturales et consubstantiales distinctionem quandam realem, quae tamen non trahat potentias ad diversum genus praedicamenti, nempe accidentis (tamen habitus acquisiti, quibus alia extra animam cognoscuntur et amantur, certe cadunt sub genere accidentium). Immo si potentiae non essent animae consubstantiales, nunquam anima sciret et amaret aliquid ad extra, quia, ut dicit S. Augustinus, nullum accidens excedit subiectum, scil. sua virtute. Nam accidens, sicut non est nisi virtute substantiae, sic nec operari potest nisi virtute substantiae, et nisi aliquid substantiale ei substernatur. Unde nec habitus acquisiti agere possunt nisi virtute habituum vel potentiarum substantialium, cfr. hic ad 5. et art. 2. q. 2. ad 4. et S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 4. — Videtur autem, quod S. Bonav. et Alex. conceptum accidentis sumant pro accidente logico, S. Thom. pro accidente metaphysico, ita ut in re conveniant. En verba Alexandri (S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1.): « Dicendum, quod anima est quodammodo sua potentia, ut fiat distinctio inter potentias substantiales sive vires ex una parte et accidentia ex alia, quantum ad hoc, quod potentiae et vires substantialiter inhaerent et unum sunt cum anima quantum ad substantiam, non dico quantum ad essentiam; potentiis enim substantialibus subsistit anima. Accidentia vero, ut prudentia, fortitudo et huiusmodi, non adhaerent substantialiter, quia haec accidentaliter adsunt. Unde potentiae et vires substantiales dicuntur idem quod anima ratione indivisionis et adhaerentiae substantialis, accidentia vero non, quia substantialiter non adhaerent ». Fere idem est quod S. Thom. (S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.) docet. Hic enim distinguit duplicem sensum vocabuli accidentis, et in secundo sensu, sive « secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium », concedit, quod « aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens », et quod « potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales ».

Quartam sententiam adiunxit Scot. (II. Sent. d. 16. q. unica I Dico igitur), qui hic applicat suam distinctionem formalem; in re autem a S. Bonav. vix discedit, ut vult Brulifer in Comment. ad hunc locum.

De quaestione hac cfr. praeter iam citatos B. Albert., S. p. 1. tr. 3. q. 15. m. 2. a. 2. subp. 1. — Ægid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. a. 2. — Durand., hic p. II. q. 2. et seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 13. — Biel, II. Sent. d. 24. et 25.

II. Ut facilius intelligantur verba Doctoris in fine conclusionis posita: « Loquor de similitudine secundum rationem similitudinis, non intentionis », haec notamus. Praeter similitudinem accidentalem, quae est v. g. in figura exteriori, et essentialem, quae est in convenientia in natura et specie, aliam similitudinem duplicem distinguit S. Doctor, scil. similitudinem secundum rationem, qua aliqua sunt similia in ratione quadam essentiali, ut splendor respectu lucis, et similitudinem secundum intentionem, quae est inter aliqua, quorum unum est factum ad imitationem alterius. Ex hoc patet, quod splendor, qui est similitudo lucis, licet exeat a luce, tamen non recedit ab ea, manens in eodem genere lucis.

III. In solut. ad 1. et 2. distinguit S. Doctor triplicem praedicationem. Praedicatio per essentiam tunc fit, quando praedicatum est de intrinseca ratione subiecti. Haec est iterum duplex, nempe secundum duplicem sensum vocabuli essentialis, a S. Doctore hic distinctum. Etenim tum essentia metaphysica, quam moderni vocant (scil. genus et differentia), tum partes constitutivae physicae (scil. forma et materia) sunt de essentia rei et de subiecto essentialiter praedicantur. Huic opponitur praedicatio accidentalis, quando praedicatum subiecto tantum accidentaliter convenit, ut, homo est sapiens. — Circa tertiam praedicationem, quae hic distinguitur, notandum est, quod aliud est « esse de essentia alicuius rei », aliud « esse idem in essentia cum aliquo ». « Proprium enim alicuius rei non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens » (S. Thomas, S. I. q. 77. a. 1. ad 5.). Etiam potentiae animae non sunt de essentia animae, nec praedicantur de ea in primo dicendi modo per se, sicut genus praedicatur de specie. Nihilominus participant potentiae eandem naturam cum essentia animae, sive sunt « idem in essentia cum ipsa ». De quo cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 18. m. 2. et B. Albert., hic q. 34.

Notatu digna est doctrina Seraphici in solut. ad 4. de potentia materiae. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 65. m. 1.; Scot., libr. I. Physicor. q. 20; de Rerum princip. q. 8. a. 2; I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1. — Richard. a Med., II. Sent. d. 12. q. 10. — S. Thom., hic q. 4. a. 2. ad 4. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 26. a. 6. ad. 8.

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English Translation
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Question III.

Whether memory, understanding, and will are the same in essence as the soul.1

In the third place there is asked, concerning the comparison of these powers to the soul or to the subject, namely whether they are the same in essence as the soul. And it seems that they are.

1. Augustine says in book ten On the Trinity2: "These three, memory, understanding, and will, are one mind, one life, one essence, and through this one substance."

2. Likewise, Bernard on the Song of Songs3: "I behold three things in the soul: memory, understanding, and will; and these three are the soul itself." If you should say that this is said by causation, this is nothing, because Augustine On the Spirit and the Soul4 says that the soul "is in a certain way its own [properties], as powers, and in a certain way not its own, as virtues"; but if it had been said by causation, both could be said.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher seems to wish to say this same thing5, because he says that the principle of being and of operating is the same: therefore since the principle of being is the substantial form itself, the principle of operating will be the same; but the principle of operating is a power: therefore a power is a principle of being; but there is no principle of being except the substantial form in man: therefore the power and the substantial form are the same in substance.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reason: As prime matter is by nature fitted to receive all things in truth, so is the soul according to likeness6; but the power of prime matter with respect to forms to be received does not differ in essence from it7: therefore likewise it seems concerning the power of the soul. Proof: for if it differed in essence, it would either be a substance or an accident. Not an accident, because it precedes every form and every

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accident; if a substance, then either matter or form. Furthermore, if it differed, matter would be capable of receiving it8.

5. Likewise, an accidental form is not simpler than a substantial form; but the power of operating does not differ from the accidental form, just as the power of heating does not differ in essence from heat, nor the power of illuminating from light itself: therefore likewise it seems that neither does the power of the soul differ from the soul itself.

6. Likewise, what is an accident is substantial to no substance9; but these powers are substantial: therefore they are not accidents of the soul10: therefore they are substance; it is clear that [they are] none other than the soul. Proof of the minor: because rational, sensible, and vegetable soul in man do not denote a diversity of substances, but of powers: therefore it is clear that in man these differences — vegetable, sensible, rational — are taken from powers; but11 differences of this kind are substantial: therefore the powers also [are substantial]: therefore etc.

Contra:

1. Augustine in book fifteen On the Trinity12 assigns the difference of the created image from that uncreated Trinity, namely that in that Trinity the haver is that which is had, but here the haver is not that which is had: therefore if the soul has three powers, then essentially it is not them.

2. Likewise, Dionysius13 says that in every creature these three differ: substance, power, and operation: therefore in the soul also substance and powers differ.

3. Likewise, Boethius14: "In every creature that by which it is (quo est) and that which is (quod est), or what it is (quid est) and to be (esse), differ": therefore likewise — indeed much more strongly — what can [act] and that by which it can.

4. Likewise, it is shown by reasons thus: things which differ in genus differ in essence, and one is not essentially predicated of the other15; but the powers and the soul are of this kind, because the soul is in the genus of substance, but its powers are in the second species of quality, namely of natural potency or impotency: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, those things one of which is outside the other differ essentially and substantially; but power goes out from the substance16, because it operates upon an object which is outside; but it is impossible that it should operate where it is not; if therefore power is where it operates, and operates outside the substance of any thing: therefore it goes out beyond substance: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, there is another reason to this point: that if the soul and its powers were the same in essence, therefore17 one would not be multiplied except according to the multiplication of the other; and thus, since the soul is only one, it would have only one power; but this is false: therefore etc.

Conclusion.

The powers of the soul are substantial and are in the same genus by reduction as the soul; nevertheless they are not altogether the same with it in essence.

Respondeo: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that natural power is said in two ways18. In one way, insofar as it denotes the mode of existence of a natural power in a subject, according to which a subject is said to be easy or difficult for doing something; and thus natural power denotes a mode of quality and is generally in the second species of quality, as is clear when one says "runner" and "boxer," each of which denotes a facility which follows19 the mode of existence of the power of stepping or resisting or acting in the subject. In another way, natural power is said to be a power naturally going forth from the subject20. And this can be in two ways. For one power goes forth from the substance with an accident, as

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the power of heating. For fire does not heat through its own substance without heat; and this power is not of another genus than the quality from which it goes forth; hence the power21 of heating is in the same genus as heat. In another way natural power is said [to be] that which naturally goes forth from22 the substance and immediately, like the power of generating with respect to the induction of the ultimate form; and this indeed is not of another genus than substance, but is reduced to the genus of substance as a substantial difference. According to this mode it must be understood with respect to the powers of the soul. For in one way it happens to name the powers of the soul according to the first mode, as they denote a facility which denotes the mode of a power of existing in the subject, like cleverness and slowness; and these indeed are in the second species of quality. In another way it happens to name the powers insofar as they denote the order of substance toward act, which is by the mediation of some accidental property, like the power of syllogizing which is in the soul when it has the habit of syllogizing; and this is in the same genus as the knowledge of syllogizing, namely23 in the first species of quality. Again it happens to name the powers of the soul insofar as they go forth immediately from substance, as by24 these three: memory, understanding, and will. And this is clear, because, with every accident set aside25, it being understood that the soul is a spiritual substance, by the very fact that it is present to itself and conjoined to itself, it has the power of remembering and understanding and loving itself27. Hence these powers are consubstantial26 with the soul, and are in the same genus by reduction as the soul. Yet, since they go forth from the soul — for power has the manner of one going forth — they are not altogether the same in essence, nor however do they so differ as to be of another genus, but they are in the same genus by reduction.

And an example sufficiently clear can be given in a thing and its likeness. For a thing does not have so great an identity with its likeness that they are one in number, nor so great a diversity that they should differ in genus29. For the likeness of Martin is not so distant from Martin that it utterly differs from him. And so the likeness of a thing is in the same genus by reduction with that of which it is the likeness. For because it goes forth, therefore it differs, but it does not pass over into another genus. And I speak of likeness according to the formal character of likeness, not of intention, that is, insofar as it goes out from a subject28 and does not recede, as splendor from light. Therefore the reasons proving that the soul is not its own powers in essence are to be conceded.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:

Ad 1, 2. To that which is objected on the contrary side concerning Augustine and Bernard, that the soul is its own powers; it must be said that there is there not the predication of an accident of a subject, nor of the same in essence, but a substantial or essential [predication].

For which reason it must be noted that "essential" is said in four ways. In the first way "essential" is said31 [of] what denotes the whole essence of a thing, as the singular species [does]. In the second way "essential" is said [of] what is of the essence and constitution of a thing, like matter and form. In the third way "essential" is said [of] that without which a thing cannot be nor can it be understood to be, as are those things in which the character of a vestige is regarded, like unity, truth, goodness. In the fourth way "essential" is said [of] that without which a thing cannot be thought to have perfect being, as the powers in the soul are, in which the image is regarded; and this is in the least degree substantial or essential; nevertheless it does not pass over into another genus32: therefore the soul is said [to be] its own powers30.

Ad 3. To that which is objected, that the principle of being and of operating is the same; it must be said that this is true of the remote principle, but of the proximate principle it is impos-

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sible. For if the proximate principle were altogether the same, then in the thing to-be and to-operate would be the same. Likewise, if the proximate principle were the same, since the thing always has being, it would always have operation. Since therefore33 form denotes the proximate and immediate principle of being, while power [denotes] the proximate and immediate principle of operating, it is clear that it is impossible [for them] to be altogether the same.

Ad 4. To the other [objection] which is brought concerning the power of matter, it must be said that matter is not its own power in essence, since it is not itself the ordering toward form34; nevertheless the power of matter is itself essential to matter, just as active power [is essential] to substance. And indeed the power of matter is less far removed from matter than active power [is] from substance; for the power of matter is a passive power, which denotes an order toward another with privation, whereas active power denotes an order with positing: and therefore the power of matter adds less above matter than active power [adds] above substance. And hence it is that diverse powers are not so distinguished in the same matter as in the same substance.

Ad 5. To that which is objected concerning the accidental form, it must be said that the accidental form is not its own power. For its power [exists] insofar as it flows into another; nevertheless that power does not add as much as the power of the substantial form, since the power of the accidental form denotes an ordering toward act, but not sufficient through itself, but through the power of substance. For as an accident is not through itself, so it does not have the virtue of operating through itself, but through the virtue of substance; and so this is clear.

Ad 6. To that which is objected last, it must be said35 that the powers of the soul are not accidental. Nevertheless the argument is not valid, because perhaps rational, sensible, vegetable are not taken from powers, but from diverse natures found in the soul.

But that argument which was made for the opposite side, that they differ because they are in diverse genera, is to be solved by negation (interemptio)36, because they are not in diverse genera, but in the same one by reduction.

Scholion

I. Concerning the principal question, in those times three opinions were defended, which St. Bonaventure (II Sent. d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 1) carefully sets forth. The first opinion there proposed admits only a distinction of reason between the essence of the soul and the powers. So William of Paris, Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 1), Henry of Ghent (Quodl. IV, q. 7), and moreover all the Nominalists. — The second teaches a real distinction, and indeed such that the powers do not agree even in genus with the substance, since they are drawn to the genus of accidents. To this [belong] St. Thomas (here q. 4, a. 2; Summa I, q. 54, a. 3, and q. 77, a. 1 and 3; De Spiritualibus Creaturis a. 11; De Anima q. 12); Blessed Albert (here a. 34); Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 5, a. 2). — The third opinion comes very close to the preceding, which Alexander of Hales teaches (S. p. II, q. 65, m. 4, and q. 21, m. 1). To this also St. Bonaventure more favors; nevertheless he says: "But any of the said positions has its defenders, nor is it easy to refute any of them by compelling reasons." This last opinion therefore admits indeed between the substance of the soul and its connatural and consubstantial powers a certain real distinction, which nevertheless does not draw the powers to a different genus of category, namely of accident (though acquired habits, by which other things outside the soul are known and loved, certainly fall under the genus of accidents). Indeed, if the powers were not consubstantial with the soul, never would the soul know and love anything externally, because, as St. Augustine says, no accident exceeds its subject, namely by its own virtue. For an accident, as it is not [present] except by the virtue of substance, so it cannot operate except by the virtue of substance, and unless something substantial underlies it. Hence neither can acquired habits act except by the virtue of substantial habits or powers; cf. here Ad 5 and a. 2, q. 2, Ad 4, and St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 77, a. 1, Ad 4. — But it seems that St. Bonaventure and Alexander take the concept of accident for logical accident, St. Thomas for metaphysical accident, so that in fact they agree. Behold the words of Alexander (S. p. II, q. 21, m. 1): "It must be said that the soul is in a certain way its own power, so that there be made a distinction between substantial powers or strengths on the one side and accidents on the other, inasmuch as the powers and strengths substantially inhere and are one with the soul as to substance, I do not say as to essence; for the soul subsists by its substantial powers. But accidents, like prudence, fortitude, and the like, do not adhere substantially, because these are present accidentally. Hence substantial powers and strengths are said to be the same as the soul by reason of indivision and substantial adherence, but accidents are not, because they do not adhere substantially." Almost the same is what St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 77, a. 1, Ad 5) teaches. For he there distinguishes a twofold sense of the word accident, and in the second sense, namely "according to which it is posited as one of the five universals," he concedes that "there is something intermediate between substance and accident," and that "the powers of the soul can be called intermediate between substance and accident, as it were natural properties of the soul."

A fourth opinion Scotus added (II Sent. d. 16, q. unica I, Dico igitur), who here applies his formal distinction; but in fact he scarcely departs from St. Bonaventure, as Brulifer claims in his Commentary on this passage.

On this question, beyond those already cited, see Blessed Albert, S. p. 1, tr. 3, q. 15, m. 2, a. 2, subp. 1. — Giles of Rome, here 3 princ., q. 1, a. 2. — Durandus, here p. II, q. 2 and following. — Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 13. — Biel, II Sent. d. 24 and 25.

II. That the words of the Doctor placed at the end of the conclusion may be more easily understood — "I speak of likeness according to the formal character of likeness, not of intention" — we note these things. Besides accidental likeness, which is e.g. in external figure, and the essential, which is in agreement in nature and species, the Holy Doctor distinguishes another twofold likeness, namely likeness according to formal character, by which some things are alike in a certain essential character, like splendor with respect to light, and likeness according to intention, which is between things one of which is made in imitation of the other. From this it is clear that splendor, which is a likeness of light, although it goes out from light, nevertheless does not recede from it, remaining in the same genus of light.

III. In the solution to 1 and 2 the Holy Doctor distinguishes a threefold predication. Predication by essence occurs when the predicate is from the intrinsic character of the subject. This is again twofold, namely according to the twofold sense of the word essential, distinguished here by the Holy Doctor. For both the metaphysical essence, as the moderns call it (namely genus and difference), and the constitutive physical parts (namely form and matter) are of the essence of the thing and are predicated essentially of the subject. To this is opposed accidental predication, when the predicate belongs to the subject only accidentally, as in "the man is wise." — Concerning the third predication which is here distinguished, it must be noted that "to be of the essence of some thing" is one thing, and "to be the same in essence with something" is another. "For the proper of some thing is not of the essence of the thing, but is caused from the essential principles of the species, whence it is intermediate between essence and accident" (St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 77, a. 1, Ad 5). Likewise the powers of the soul are not of the essence of the soul, nor are they predicated of it in the first mode of predication per se, as the genus is predicated of the species. Nevertheless the powers participate the same nature with the essence of the soul, or are "the same in essence with it." Concerning which cf. Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 18, m. 2, and Blessed Albert, here q. 34.

The doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor] in the solution to 4 concerning the power of matter is worthy of note. Alexander of Hales teaches the same, S. p. II, q. 65, m. 1; Scotus, lib. I Physic. q. 20; De Rerum Principio q. 8, a. 2; I Sent. d. 12, q. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, II Sent. d. 12, q. 10. — St. Thomas, here q. 4, a. 2, Ad 4. — Blessed Albert, I Sent. d. 26, a. 6, Ad 8.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. De prima assignatione vide IX. de Trin. per totum; de secunda ibid. X. c. 11. et 12; de completissima imaginis ratione ibid. XIV. c. 8. ac 12. seqq.
    On the first assignment see On the Trinity IX throughout; on the second, ibid. X, cc. 11 and 12; on the most complete formal character of the image, ibid. XIV, cc. 8 and 12 and following.
  2. Vat. contra mss. respondeo.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts, reads respondeo.
  3. Cod. O addit suum.
    Codex O adds suum.
  4. Cap. II. n. 18. Vide etiam hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. in initio.
    Chapter II, n. 18. See also here the littera Magistri, c. 2, at the beginning.
  5. Serm. 11. In fine textus citati supple cum ed. operum Bernardi animam esse. Vat. in initio huius textus omittit Tria et circa finem legit haec tria ipsa est.
    Sermon 11. At the end of the cited text supply, with the edition of Bernard's works, animam esse ["the soul to be"]. The Vatican edition at the beginning of this text omits Tria and near the end reads haec tria ipsa est.
  6. Cap. 13: Deus est omnia sua, et anima quaedam sua. Habet siquidem naturalia et ipsa omnia est. Potentiae namque eius et vires idem sunt quod ipsa. Habet accidentalia, et ipsa non est. Suae vires est, suae virtutes non est. — In fine argumenti Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 omittit dictum.
    Chapter 13: "God is all His own, and the soul [is] in a certain way its own. For it has natural things and is itself all [of them]. For its powers and strengths are the same as itself. It has accidental things, and is not [those]. It is its own strengths, it is not its own virtues." — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, omits dictum.
  7. Vide Aristot., II. Phys. text. 28. (c. 3.); VII. Metaph. text. 59. 60. (VI. c. 17.) et VIII. Metaph. text. 8. (VII. c. 3.) ac II. de Anima, text. 2, ubi docet, formam substantialem esse principium essendi, in quantum scil. sua actualitate dat esse rei remque in certa specie constituit; II. Phys. text. 11. seqq. (c. 1.), ubi asserit, formam substantialem esse naturam i. e. principium motus et quietis; II. de Anima, text. 24. (c. 2.), ubi animam ut formam substantialem describit: id quo vivimus et sentimus et movemur et intelligimus primo.
    See Aristotle, Physics II, text 28 (c. 3); Metaphysics VII, texts 59–60 (VI, c. 17), and Metaphysics VIII, text 8 (VII, c. 3), and De Anima II, text 2, where he teaches that the substantial form is the principle of being insofar as by its actuality it gives being to the thing and constitutes the thing in a definite species; Physics II, text 11 ff. (c. 1), where he asserts that the substantial form is a nature, i.e., a principle of motion and rest; De Anima II, text 24 (c. 2), where he describes the soul as a substantial form: "that by which we primarily live, sense, are moved, and understand."
  8. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima text. 17. et 37. seqq. (c. 5. et 8.).
    Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III, text 17 and 37 ff. (cc. 5 and 8).
  9. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. seq. (c. ult.); VIII. Metaph. text. 3. seqq. et XII. text. 26. (VII. c. 1. et XI. c. 5.). Ita docet Averroes, in libr. de Substantia orbis. — Mox post quod substituimus ex mss. et ed. 1 potentia loco potentiae. Dein post Probatio Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit minoris.
    Aristotle, Physics I, text 81 ff. (last chapter); Metaphysics VIII, text 3 ff., and Metaphysics XII, text 26 (VII, c. 1, and XI, c. 5). Averroes likewise teaches this in his book On the Substance of the Orb. — Soon after quod we substituted, from the manuscripts and the first edition, potentia for potentiae. Then after Probatio the Vatican edition, against the older codices and the first edition, adds minoris.
  10. Ed. 1 illius esset incapax.
    The first edition: illius esset incapax ["it would be incapable of it"].
  11. Est simpliciter conversa huius propositionis: Quod vere est (i. e. substantia) nulli accidit, quam ponit Aristot., I. Phys. text. 27. (c. 3.).
    It is the simple converse of this proposition: What truly is (i.e., substance) is accidental to nothing, which Aristotle states, Physics I, text 27 (c. 3).
  12. Interpolatam Vat. lectionem quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentia, castigavimus ex mss. et ed. 1, qui et mox post constat omittunt a Vat. additum autem.
    We corrected, from the manuscripts and the first edition, the Vatican edition's interpolated reading quod uni est accidens, nulli substantia est, sed istae potentiae sunt ipsi animae substantiales, ergo non sunt ei accidentales et per consequens non sunt accidentia; the same [witnesses] also omit, soon after constat, the autem added by the Vatican.
  13. Vat., obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, et loco sed. Paulo ante cod. M potentiis praemittit istis.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition [which resist], [reads] et in place of sed. A little earlier codex M prefixes istis to potentiis.
  14. Textum vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. in initio.
    See the text above in the littera Magistri, c. 3, at the beginning.
  15. De Caelest. Hierarch. c. 11. Cfr. supra p. I. huius d. dub. 3. — Fide codd. et ed. 1 paulo infra post ergo adiecimus et.
    On the Celestial Hierarchy, c. 11. Cf. above, p. I of this distinction, dub. 3. — On the authority of the codices and the first edition, a little below after ergo we added et.
  16. In libro, Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, sive de Hebdomadibus ait: Diversum est esse et id quod est. Et paulo post: Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est. In huius propositionis explicatione Gilbertus Porretan. ait: Aliud est quod est, aliud quo est. Vide etiam libr. de Trin. c. 2. — Plures codd. ut AES VWX post sive legunt quid est esse, cod. Y quidquid erat esse.
    In the book How Substances Are Good in That They Are, or De Hebdomadibus, he says: "Esse (to be) and id quod est (that which is) are diverse." And a little after: "In every composite thing, esse (to be) is one thing, and ipsum est (the thing itself which is) is another." In the explanation of this proposition Gilbert Porretanus says: "Quod est (that which is) is one thing, quo est (that by which it is) is another." See also the book De Trinitate, c. 2. — Several codices, like AES VWX, after sive read quid est esse; codex Y quidquid erat esse.
  17. Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.): Genere (differunt) quidem, quorum non est communis materia nec generatio ad invicem, quorumcumque alia figura categoriae (praedicationis). — Paulo infra post sed potentiae restituimus lectionem mss. et ed. 1 addendo eius et paulo post vel impotentiae. Paulo ante cod. X sed potentiae animae et anima. — De quatuor qualitatum speciebus vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali.
    Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 12 (IX, c. 3): "Things differ in genus when their matter is not common nor is there generation from one to the other; whatever things have a different figure of category (predication)." — A little below after sed potentiae we restored the reading of the manuscripts and the first edition by adding eius; and a little further on, vel impotentiae. A little before, codex X [reads] sed potentiae animae et anima. — On the four species of quality, see Aristotle, De Praedicamentis, ch. On Quality.
  18. Hoc est, extra substantiam; sic Tacitus pluries dicit terminos egredi. — Paulo post verbo operetur cod. X praemittit ibi. Mox cod. M loco cuiuslibet habet cuius est, cod. T vero cuiusque.
    That is, outside the substance; thus Tacitus several times says terminos egredi. — A little after, before the word operetur, codex X prefixes ibi. Soon, codex M in place of cuiuslibet has cuius est, while codex T has cuiusque.
  19. Fide mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ergo et paulo infra ex codd. BDHNPQVWX aa ee pro unum substituimus una. Cod. F sicut anima est una tantum, cum quo concordant codd. IO, eo excepto, quod pro una legunt unum ac dein post tantum addunt sic anima. — Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 63. m. 1. idem argumentum refert addit que principium, in quo fundatur, scil.: Quaecumque enim uni et eidem sunt eadem, inter se sunt eadem.
    On the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition we supplied ergo, and a little below from codices BDHNPQVWX aa ee we substituted una for unum. Codex F [reads] sicut anima est una tantum, with which codices IO agree, except that in place of una they read unum and then after tantum they add sic anima. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 63, m. 1, reports the same argument and adds the principle on which it is founded, namely: "For whatever things are the same as one and the same, are the same as each other."
  20. Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 minus correcte tripliciter. Mox, postulantibus mss., substituimus Uno et paulo infra Alio modo loco Primo et Secundo modo.
    The Vatican edition, against nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, less correctly [reads] tripliciter. Soon, at the demand of the manuscripts, we substituted Uno and a little below Alio modo for Primo and Secundo modo.
  21. Vat. sequitur et paulo post et loco vel, sed obstant mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition [reads] sequitur and a little later et in place of vel, but the manuscripts and the first edition oppose this.
  22. Vat., minus stricte exhibet oppositionem cum primo divisionis membro ponendo a substantia loco a subiecto, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1; mox pro Nam habet Uno modo.
    The Vatican edition, less strictly, shows the opposition with the first member of the division by putting a substantia in place of a subiecto, against the resistance of the manuscripts and the first edition; soon, in place of Nam it has Uno modo.
  23. Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic male additum quae est. Paulo post cod. Y Secundo modo loco Alio modo, pro quo multi codd. ut ABDEINST etc. cum ed. 1 minus apte Tertio loco.
    With the help of the manuscripts and the first edition we expunged here the ill-added quae est. A little later codex Y [reads] Secundo modo in place of Alio modo, for which many codices, like ABDEINST etc., with the first edition, less aptly [read] Tertio loco.
  24. Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, de loco a et immediate post minus bene omittit et. Paulo infra eadem auctoritate post genere posuimus quam pro cum, utpote grammatice melius ac praecedentibus magis conforme.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, [reads] de loco a, and immediately after, less well, omits et. A little below, on the same authority, after genere we placed quam instead of cum, as being grammatically better and more conformable to what precedes.
  25. Edd. 1, 5 videlicet loco ut. Mox cod. X Ultra tertio modo contingit pro Contingit iterum.
    Editions 1 and 5 [read] videlicet in place of ut. Soon codex X [reads] Ultra tertio modo contingit for Contingit iterum.
  26. Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. omittit per. — Immediate egredi potentias a substantia docet etiam S. Thom., S. I. q. 77. a. 6. Cfr. insuper Dionys. Carth., hic q. 14.
    The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first six editions, omits per. — That the powers go forth immediately from the substance is taught also by St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 77, a. 6. Cf. moreover Dionysius Carthusianus, here q. 14.
  27. Hoc est, excluso sive praescindendo ab ipso. — In fine huius propositionis in Vat. omittitur et diligendum, in plurimis vero codd. et intelligendum, sed contra contextum et alios codd. ut IT aa cum ed. 1.
    That is, with [it] excluded, or by abstracting from it. — At the end of this proposition the Vatican edition omits et diligendum; in very many codices, et intelligendum; but [this is] against the context and other codices such as IT aa with the first edition.
  28. Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 posuimus consubstantiales pro substantiales.
    On the authority of the manuscripts and the first edition we placed consubstantiales in place of substantiales.
  29. In plurimis mss. et Vat. manifeste falso habetur numero pro genere, quod tamen exhibet cod. Z. Mox plerique codd. cum ed. 1 mendose Petrus differt loco penitus differat. Ioan. Damasc., Orat. 3. de Imag. dicit: Nam aliud est imago, et aliud id quod imagine repraesentatur; ac necesse est, ut nonnihil inter utrumque discriminis animadvertatur; siquidem nec istud alia res esset, nec illud alia. — Paulo infra, postulantibus mss., substituimus ita pro ideo.
    In very many manuscripts and the Vatican edition there is manifestly falsely numero for genere, which however codex Z exhibits. Soon most codices with the first edition wrongly [read] Petrus differt in place of penitus differat. John Damascene, Oration 3, On Images, says: "For the image is one thing, and that which is represented by the image is another; and it is necessary that some difference be observed between them; otherwise neither would the latter be another thing, nor the former." — A little below, at the demand of the manuscripts, we substituted ita for ideo.
  30. Cod. A substantia. In fine responsionis cod. aa addit haec: Vel potest dici, quod anima consideratur aut secundum essentiam ut essentiam, aut secundum essentiam ut substantiam, aut secundum essentiam ut subiectum. Si primo modo, sic consistit ex suis principiis, et sic non est idipsum anima quod suae potentiae, sed consequenter se habent ad eam, eo quod fundantur super vigorem existentiae ipsius secundum sua principia. Si secundo modo, tunc est anima et suae potentiae, quia anima subsistit in suis potentiis. Si tertio modo secundum essentiam ut in ratione subiecti, sic subiicitur ipsa anima suis virtutibus, et sic non est idem cum potentiis. Glossema ad mentem Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 21. m. 1. ad. 2. et q. 65. m. 1.
    Codex A [reads] substantia. At the end of the response codex aa adds these [words]: "Or it can be said that the soul is considered either according to essence as essence, or according to essence as substance, or according to essence as subject. If in the first way, thus it consists of its principles, and thus the soul is not the very same as its powers, but [the powers] follow upon it, because they are founded upon the vigor of its existence according to its principles. If in the second way, then the soul is its powers, because the soul subsists in its powers. If in the third way, according to essence as in the character of subject, thus the soul is itself subjected to its strengths, and thus it is not the same as the powers." A gloss in the mind of Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 21, m. 1, Ad 2, and q. 65, m. 1.
  31. Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus dicitur. Mox mss. sunt dubiae lectionis; legi enim potest totam et tantum; quamvis ed. 1 ponat tantum, retinemus tamen totam propter contextum. Et confirmatur a B. Alberto, S. I. tract. 3. q. 13. m. 5. dicente: Dicit enim Boethius, quod species est totum esse individuorum. (Boeth., III. Comment. in Porphyr. agens de specie ait: Homo vero Socratis aut Ciceronis tota substantia est.) — Dein post species claritatis gratia Vat. addit dicit totam essentiam, licet desit in mss.
    From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6 we supplied dicitur. Soon the manuscripts are of doubtful reading; for one can read totam and tantum; although the first edition has tantum, we nevertheless retain totam on account of the context. And it is confirmed by Blessed Albert, S. I, tr. 3, q. 13, m. 5, saying: "For Boethius says that the species is the whole being of individuals." (Boethius, III Comment. on Porphyry, treating of species, says: "But man is the whole substance of Socrates or Cicero.") — Then after species, for clarity's sake the Vatican edition adds dicit totam essentiam, although it is absent from the manuscripts.
  32. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 repetit hic quia non transit in aliud genus.
    The Vatican edition, beyond the witness of the manuscripts and the first edition, here repeats quia non transit in aliud genus.
  33. Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 Quia ergo.
    The Vatican edition, against very many codices and the first edition, [reads] Quia ergo.
  34. Cod. O addit formam aut.
    Codex O adds formam aut.
  35. Ex codd. et ed. 1 addidimus est. Plures codd. ut A T etc. paulo ante habent quaeritur loco obiicitur.
    From the codices and the first edition we added est. Several codices, like A T etc., a little before, have quaeritur in place of obiicitur.
  36. Petrus Hispan., Summula, tract. de Syll. soph. seu de Fallaciis, in fine de fall. aequivocationis ait: Recta solutio est manifestatio syllogismi falsi et propter quid est falsus. Et contingit dupliciter, scil. vel distinguendo vel aliquam praemissarum interimendo; et hoc secundo modo respondendum est ad omnes peccantes in materia (i. e. propositiones falsas). Aristot., II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 18.) duplicem hunc solutionis speciem proponendo usus est verbis διαιρεῖν et ἀναιρεῖν, quae Boethius lingua latina reddidit per verba distinguere et interimere (i. e. negando auferre.). — Paulo supra aliqui codd. ut A G H K T etc. cum ed. 1 differant pro differunt.
    Peter of Spain, Summula, treatise On Sophistical Syllogisms or On Fallacies, at the end of the [section] On the Fallacy of Equivocation, says: "Correct solution is the manifestation of the false syllogism and on account of what it is false. And it happens in two ways, namely either by distinguishing or by negating one of the premises; and in this second way one must respond to all those erring in matter" (i.e., to false propositions). Aristotle, Elenchi II, c. 3 (c. 18), in proposing this twofold kind of solution, used the words διαιρεῖν and ἀναιρεῖν, which Boethius rendered in the Latin tongue by the words distinguere and interimere (i.e., to negate). — A little above, some codices such as A G H K T etc., with the first edition, [read] differant in place of differunt.
← Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2Dist. 3, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 1→