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Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
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QUAESTIO II. Utrum anima Adae fuerit producta ex materia.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum anima Adae producta fuerit ex materia. Et quod non, videtur:

Ad oppositum.

1. Primo per philosophum1, qui dicit, quod «forma est compositioni contingens in simplici essentia consistens». Si igitur anima rationalis vere forma est, ergo simplex est: ergo non componitur ex materia et forma.

2. Item, Philosophus in principio tertii de Anima2 dicit, quod «intellectus est impermixtus et impassibilis»; sed omne quod habet materiam, habet potentiam passivam: ergo substantia intellectiva non habet materiam.

3. Item, Magister in littera3: «Substantiam animae, in qua viveret, creavit Deus non de materia aliqua corporali, vel spirituali, sed de nihilo».

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit, nisi abstrahatur a materia4; sed in actu cognoscendi fit assimilatio cognoscentis ad cognoscibile, et e converso: ergo si ad hoc, quod intelligatur, necesse est, quod abstrahatur a materia, ad hoc, quod aliqua substantia intelligat, necesse est, quod sit per naturam a materia separata. Sed anima Adae fuit huiusmodi: ergo etc.

5. Item, quanto forma nobilior, tanto simplicior5; sed anima inter omnes formas est nobilissima: ergo simplicissima. Sed aliae formae non componuntur ex materia et forma: ergo multo fortius nec rationalis anima.

6. Item, omne quod habet materiam et formam ut partes constitutivas, est hoc aliquid et est completum6; nihil autem, quod est hoc aliquid et completum in se, venit ad constitutionem tertii; sed anima rationalis venit ad constitutionem tertii, ita quod ex anima et corpore fit unum per essentiam: ergo anima non est hoc aliquid: ergo vel est materia, vel forma pura; non materia: ergo forma.

Sed contra:

Fundamenta.

1. In tertio de Anima7 dicit Philosophus, quod «sicut in omni natura est materia et efficiens, sic in anima est intellectus, quo est omnia fieri, et intellectus, quo est omnia facere». Si igitur potentia passiva est a materia, et haec est in anima, patet etc.

2. Item, in nono8 Primae Philosophiae dicit Philosophus, quod «sicut materia est subiectum formarum substantialium, sic compositum est subiectum accidentis»; sed anima rationalis est subiectum scientiarum et virtutum, etiam secundum se considerata: ergo composita est ex materia et forma.

3. Item, Philosophus in octavo9 Metaphysicae: «Operans et generans non facit aliud nisi propter materiam»: ergo si Deus facit animam, quae est

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aliud quam ipse, necesse est, quod materia vel sit in Deo, vel sit in anima; sed non est in Deo, ergo est in anima.

4. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione. Omne creatum, cui debetur propria operatio, habet haec duo diversa, scilicet quod agit et quo agit10; sed animae secundum se consideratae debetur propria operatio: ergo videtur, quod non solum sit forma, quia, si pure forma esset, tunc ageret se ipsa: ergo habet aliquid de materia.

5. Item, omne illud quod secundum sui mutationem est susceptibile contrariorum, est hoc aliquid et substantia per se existens in genere11, et omne tale compositum est ex materia et forma; sed anima secundum sui mutationem est susceptiva gaudii et tristitiae: ergo anima rationalis composita est ex materia et forma.

6. Item, anima rationalis non solummodo vitam praebet corpori, sed etiam ipsa vivit; aut igitur est sua vita, aut non. Si sic: ergo non differt in ea vivens, et quo vivit. Et iterum, si est sua vita, non vivit per participationem, sed per essentiam; quae duo sunt contra Boethium12 et Augustinum: ergo ponere est in anima, secundum se considerata, aliquid quod det vitam, et aliquid quod recipiat. Et si hoc, ergo est composita ex materia et forma. — Et ad hoc possunt adduci rationes, quae adductae sunt supra13 ad ostendendum, Angelum esse compositum ex materia et forma.

CONCLUSIO. Anima rationalis, non autem brutalis, habet materiam, quae vocatur spiritualis.

Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa opinati sunt.

Opinio 1. Quidam enim dixerunt, nullam animam, nec rationalem nec brutalem, habere materiam, quia spiritus sunt simplices; animam tamen rationalem dixerunt habere compositionem ex quo est et quod est, quia ipsa est hoc aliquid et nata est per se et in se subsistere. — Non probatur. Sed cum planum sit, animam rationalem posse pati et agere et mutari ab una proprietate in aliam et in se ipsa subsistere; non videtur, quod illud sufficiat dicere, quod in ea sit tantum compositio ex quo est et quod est, nisi addatur esse in ea compositio materiae et formae.

Opinio 2. Ideo fuerunt et alii, qui dixerunt, non solum animam rationalem, sed etiam brutalem ex materia et forma compositam esse, cum utraque sit motor corporis sufficiens. — Non probatur. Sed quia anima brutalis propriam14 operationem non habet nec est nata per se subsistere, non videtur, quod habeat materiam intra se.

Opinio 3. Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi, tenens medium inter utrumque, scilicet quod anima rationalis, cum sit hoc aliquid et per se nata subsistere et agere et pati, movere et moveri15, quod habet

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intra se fundamentum suae existentiae et principium materiale, a quo habet existere, et formale, a quo habet esse. Conclusio 1. De brutali autem non oportet illud dicere, cum ipsa fundetur in corpore. Cum igitur principium, a quo est fixa existentia creaturae in se, Conclusio 2. sit principium materiale: concedendum est, animam humanam materiam habere. Illa autem materia sublevata est supra esse extensionis, et supra esse Conclusio 3. privationis et corruptionis, et ideo dicitur materia spiritualis. — Corollarium. Et propterea illi qui locuti sunt de materiali principio quantum ad esse extensionis, et prout habet esse sub privatione, dixerunt, animam rationalem non habere materiam, non intendentes de materia in sua generalitate, sed prout ad eam stat resolutio physica, sicut dictum est de simplicitate Angeli16. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes hoc ostendentes.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis forma est simplex; dicendum, quod auctor ille, definiens formam, loquitur de forma illa, quae est forma tantum non de ea, quae est forma et hoc aliquid; unde vel definit ibi formam accidentalem, vel definit formam universalem17.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellectus est impassibilis et impermixtus; dicendum, quod Philosophus removet ab intellectu materiam, secundum quod consideratur sub privatione et sub potentia ad transmutationem secundum esse; non removet materiam universaliter, immo ponit, cum dicit, quod in intellectu est natura, qua est facere, et qua est fieri.

3. Ad illud quod dicit Magister in littera, dicendum, quod Magister non vult dicere, quod anima non habeat materiam, sed quod non habeat materiam praeiacentem; huius autem ratio habebitur infra18, scilicet, quare anima non est producta nec producitur ex praeiacenti materia.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod substantia intellectiva nihil cognoscit, nisi quod abstrahitur a materia; dicendum, quod hoc non facit Ratio notabilis 1. propter hoc, quod ipsa sit omnino immaterialis, sed propter hoc, quod res non potest ei uniri secundum veritatem. Ideo oportet, quod uniatur secundum similitudinem, Alia ratio. quam anima abstrahit a re19. — Alia est etiam ratio, quia intellectus per similitudinem, per quam intelligit, debet fieri in actu intelligendi; illud autem, quod facit, rem esse in actu, species est et forma. Ideo anima non cognoscit rem, nisi speciem eius et formam sibi imprimat; et hoc non potest esse, nisi illa abstrahatur a materia20. Nec ex hoc sequitur, quod anima careat materia; res enim abstracta a materia propria bene potest fieri in re alia, quae suam habet propriam materiam et formam, sicut similitudo coloris in speculo.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod quanto forma nobilior, tanto simplicior est; dicendum, quod istud habet locum in his quae sunt purae formae; anima autem non tantum est forma, immo etiam est hoc aliquid; et ideo, si comparetur forma animae ad alias formas, absque dubio simplicior erit quam aliae formae. Ipsa autem anima, cum sit rationalis, cum sit per se existens, aliquam compositionem habet, quam aliae formae non sunt natae per se habere, dum non sunt natae per se existere; nihilominus tamen ipsa anima simplicior aliis formis dici potest.

Multiplex simplicitas. — Est enim multiplex genus simplicitatis, secundum quod et multiplex est genus compositionis et partium. Sunt enim partes substantiales et sunt partes quantitativae, et compositio ex partibus substantialibus et compositio ex partibus quantitativis21. Et sic simplex dicitur dupliciter: aut quod caret partibus constitutivis, aut quod caret partibus quantitativis. Quamvis igitur anima non sit aliis formis simplicior quantum ad partes constitutivas, quia tales partes habere spectat ad complementum et perfectionem; hoc enim facit, rem esse per se; simplicior tamen est quantum ad privationem partium quantitativarum. Notandum. Ipsa enim nec habet extensionem per se nec habet extensionem per accidens, nec quantum ad substantiam nec quantum ad proprium actum. Aliae autem formae per accidens possunt habere extensionem et partibilitatem, vel secundum id quod sunt, vel secundum id quod operantur. Et ideo quantum ad hoc anima, et maxime rationalis, est forma nobilior.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod compositum ex materia et forma est ens completum, et ita non venit22 ad constitutionem tertii; dicendum, quod Notandum. hoc non est verum generaliter, sed tunc, quando materia terminat omnem appetitum formae, et forma omnem appetitum materiae; tunc23 non est appetitus ad aliquid extra, et ita nec possibilitas ad composi-

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tionem, quae praeexigit in componentibus appetitum et inclinationem. Licet autem anima rationalis compositionem habeat ex materia et forma, appetitum tamen habet ad perficiendam corporalem naturam; sicut corpus organicum ex materia et forma compositum est, et tamen habet appetitum ad suscipiendam animam.

Scholion

I. Quaestio haec non intelligitur in eo sensu, quod anima producta sit de materia praeiacente, sive quae tempore praecesserit productionem animae, sed in eo sensu, quod producta anima constet ex materia et forma tanquam principiis constituentibus. Aliud enim est, aliquid habere materiam in qua fiat, ut est in omnibus formis corporalibus; aliud, ex qua fiat ut ex aliquo praeiacente, sicut est in generabilibus et corruptibilibus; aliud, ex qua sit, quod olim supponebatur quoad corpora incorruptibilia, et a nonnullis quoad spirituales substantias creatas (cfr. Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2.). Eadem igitur quaestio hic de anima humana ponitur, quae supra (d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1. 2. 3.) quoad Angelos discussa est; eadem etiam principia a S. Doctore adhibentur ad eandem conclusionem ponendam, eademque est auctorum dissensio, quae ibi in scholio ad q. 1. est notata.

S. Thom. (hic q. 1. a. 2.) dicit: «Mihi non videtur, in anima vel in aliqua spirituali substantia aliquo modo esse materiam, sed ipsas esse simplices formas et naturas, quamvis quidam aliter dicant. Et praeter alias rationes, quibus hoc de Angelis impossibile videtur... etiam quadam speciali ratione materia a ratione animae secluditur. Cum enim anima sit forma corporis, oportet, quod vel secundum totam essentiam suam sit corporis forma, vel secundum partem essentiae suae. Si secundum essentiam suam totam, impossibile est, quod pars essentiae sit materiae... Si autem secundum partem substantiae suae est forma corporis, per quam est in actu, et non secundum alteram, quae est materia eius, sequuntur duo inconvenientia» etc. In fine addit: «Nec tamen negamus, animam rationalem quendam modum compositionis habere, scil. ex esse et quod est... Qui tamen compositionis modus in aliis formis non invenitur, quia non possunt esse subsistentes quasi in esse suo, sed sunt per esse compositi. Et in hoc anima deficit a simplicitate divina». Praenotatum argumentum grave repetitur Sum. I. q. 75. a. 5. in corp. (cfr. S. c. Gent. II. c. 30.). — Eandem obiectionem, quod scil. compositum ex materia et forma non possit esse alterius compositi forma, S. Bonav., hic ad 6, solvere nititur; similiter Richard. (qui utramque opinionem probabilem aestimat), hic a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. sic ad eam respondet: «Dico, quod hoc esset verum, si materia esset unigenea. Sed materia animae non est unigenea cum materia ipsius corporis, sed est actualior quam forma incompleta in corpore humano, praecedens ordine naturae animae intellectivae infusionem». Et ibid. ad 3. ex hoc, quod materia non est unigenea, concludit: «Unde potest esse pars perfectionis illius». — Alex. Hal. (S. p. II. q. 61. m. 1.) ad principalem quaest. respondet: «Anima humana dicitur composita ex forma et materia intellectuali; nullatenus autem sic habet materiam et formam, sicut dicuntur corpora habere materiam et formam, sive sint caelestia sive inferiora. Materiae enim corporalis terminus est magnitudo; spiritualis autem materiae (magnitudo) non est terminus». — Iam in praedicto scholio notavimus ipsius S. Thomae verbis, quod ex sententia S. Bonaventurae, Alexandri et Scoti minime sequatur praeiudicium contra immortalitatem animae; item verbis Petri a Tar. (loc. cit.), quod haec opinio, quae nunc est obsoleta, tunc esset celebris et a multis probata.

II. Praeter auctores citatos: Scotus, de Anima, q. 13; de Rerum princ. q. 7. a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Alios vide in scholio supra d. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1.

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English Translation

QUESTION II. Whether the soul of Adam was produced from matter.

Secondly it is asked, whether the soul of Adam was produced from matter. And that it was not, it seems:

To the opposite.

1. First, through the Philosopher1, who says that «form is something belonging to composition, consisting in a simple essence». If therefore the rational soul is truly form, then it is simple: therefore it is not composed of matter and form.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the beginning of De Anima III2 says that «the intellect is unmixed and impassible»; but everything which has matter has passive potency: therefore the intellective substance does not have matter.

3. Likewise, the Master in the text3: «The substance of the soul, in which it might live, God created not from any corporeal or spiritual matter, but from nothing».

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. The intellective substance knows nothing unless it is abstracted from matter4; but in the act of knowing there is an assimilation of the knower to the knowable, and conversely: therefore if, for something to be understood, it is necessary that it be abstracted from matter, then for some substance to understand, it is necessary that it be by nature separated from matter. But the soul of Adam was of this kind: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, the nobler a form, the simpler it is5; but the soul is the noblest among all forms: therefore the simplest. But the other forms are not composed of matter and form: therefore much more so the rational soul.

6. Likewise, everything which has matter and form as constitutive parts is something this and complete6; but nothing which is something this and complete in itself comes to the constitution of a third; but the rational soul comes to the constitution of a third, so that from soul and body there is made one thing through essence: therefore the soul is not something this: therefore it is either matter or pure form; not matter: therefore form.

On the contrary:

Fundamenta.

1. In De Anima III7 the Philosopher says that «just as in every nature there is matter and an efficient cause, so in the soul there is the intellect by which it is all things in becoming, and the intellect by which it is all things in making». If therefore passive potency is from matter, and this is in the soul, it is plain etc.

2. Likewise, in the ninth book8 of First Philosophy the Philosopher says that «just as matter is the subject of substantial forms, so the composite is the subject of accident»; but the rational soul is the subject of sciences and virtues, even considered in itself: therefore it is composed of matter and form.

3. Likewise, the Philosopher in Metaphysics VIII9: «An operating and generating agent does no other thing except on account of matter»: therefore if God makes a soul, which is

other than himself, it is necessary that matter either be in God, or be in the soul; but it is not in God, therefore it is in the soul.

4. Likewise, this same thing seems to follow by reason. Every created thing to which a proper operation is owed has these two distinct things, namely that which acts and that by which it acts10; but to the soul considered in itself a proper operation is owed: therefore it seems that it is not only form, because, if it were pure form, then it would act of itself: therefore it has something of matter.

5. Likewise, every thing which, according to its mutation, is receptive of contraries, is something this and a substance existing per se in a genus11, and every such thing is composed of matter and form; but the soul, according to its mutation, is receptive of joy and sadness: therefore the rational soul is composed of matter and form.

6. Likewise, the rational soul not only gives life to the body, but is itself alive; therefore either it is its own life, or not. If so: then in it the living and that by which it lives do not differ. And further, if it is its own life, it does not live by participation, but by essence; which two things are against Boethius12 and Augustine: therefore one must posit in the soul, considered in itself, something which gives life and something which receives it. And if this, then it is composed of matter and form. — And to this can be brought the reasons which were brought above13 to show that an Angel is composed of matter and form.

CONCLUSION. The rational soul, but not the brute soul, has matter, which is called spiritual.

I respond: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that on this matter different men have held different opinions.

Opinion 1. For some have said that no soul, neither rational nor brute, has matter, because spirits are simple; yet they said that the rational soul has a composition out of that by which it is and that which it is, because it itself is something this and is fit to subsist per se and in itself. — It is not proved. But since it is plain that the rational soul can suffer and act and be changed from one property to another and subsist in itself; it does not seem that it suffices to say that in it there is only a composition out of that by which it is and that which it is, unless one add that there is in it a composition of matter and form.

Opinion 2. Therefore there were also others who said that not only the rational soul, but also the brute soul, is composed of matter and form, since each is a sufficient mover of the body. — It is not proved. But because the brute soul does not have its proper14 operation nor is it fit to subsist per se, it does not seem that it has matter within itself.

Opinion 3. And therefore there is a third mode of speaking, holding the middle between both, namely that the rational soul, since it is something this and is fit per se to subsist and to act and suffer, to move and be moved15, has

within itself the foundation of its existence and a material principle, from which it has existing, and a formal one, from which it has being. Conclusion 1. Concerning the brute soul, however, it is not necessary to say this, since it is itself founded in the body. Since therefore the principle from which there is a fixed existence of a creature in itself, Conclusion 2. is a material principle: it must be conceded that the human soul has matter. But that matter is raised above the being of extension, and above the being Conclusion 3. of privation and of corruption, and therefore it is called spiritual matter. — Corollary. And on this account those who spoke of a material principle as far as the being of extension is concerned, and inasmuch as it has being under privation, said that the rational soul does not have matter, not meaning matter in its generality, but inasmuch as physical resolution stops at it, just as has been said about the simplicity of the Angel16. — Hence the reasons showing this are to be granted.

Solution of the opposed arguments.

1. To that which is objected, that every form is simple; it must be said that that author, in defining form, is speaking of that form which is form alone, not of that which is form and something this; hence either he is defining there accidental form, or he is defining universal17 form.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect is impassible and unmixed; it must be said that the Philosopher removes from the intellect matter insofar as it is considered under privation and under potency for change according to being; he does not remove matter universally, indeed he posits it, when he says that in the intellect there is a nature by which it makes and by which it becomes.

3. To that which the Master says in the text, it must be said that the Master does not mean to say that the soul does not have matter, but that it does not have pre-existent matter; the reason for this will be had below18, namely, why the soul is not produced nor is it produced from pre-existent matter.

4. To that which is objected, that the intellective substance knows nothing except what is abstracted from matter; it must be said that this is not so Notable reason 1. on account of the fact that it is altogether immaterial, but on account of the fact that the thing cannot be united to it according to reality. Therefore it must be united to it according to likeness, Another reason. which the soul abstracts from the thing19. — There is also another reason, because the intellect, through the likeness by which it understands, must be made into act in understanding; but that which makes a thing be in act is species and form. Therefore the soul does not know a thing unless it impresses upon itself its species and form; and this cannot be unless that is abstracted from matter20. Nor does it follow from this that the soul lacks matter; for a thing abstracted from its proper matter can well come to be in another thing which has its own proper matter and form, just as the likeness of a color in a mirror.

5. To that which is objected, that the nobler a form, the simpler it is; it must be said that this holds in those which are pure forms; but the soul is not only form, indeed it is also something this; and therefore, if the form of the soul be compared to other forms, without doubt it will be simpler than the other forms. But the soul itself, since it is rational, since it is per se existing, has some composition which other forms are not naturally able to have per se, since they are not naturally able per se to exist; nevertheless the soul itself can be called simpler than other forms.

Manifold simplicity. — For there is a manifold kind of simplicity, according as there is also a manifold kind of composition and parts. For there are substantial parts and there are quantitative parts, and there is composition out of substantial parts and composition out of quantitative parts21. And so simple is said in two ways: either as lacking constitutive parts, or as lacking quantitative parts. Although therefore the soul is not simpler than other forms as regards constitutive parts, since to have such parts pertains to completion and perfection; for this is what makes a thing be per se; nevertheless it is simpler as regards the privation of quantitative parts. Note. For it has neither extension per se nor extension per accidens, neither as regards substance nor as regards its proper act. But other forms per accidens can have extension and divisibility, either according to what they are, or according to what they operate. And therefore as regards this the soul, and especially the rational soul, is a nobler form.

6. To that which is objected, that what is composed of matter and form is a complete being, and so does not come22 to the constitution of a third; it must be said that Note. this is not true generally, but only when matter terminates every appetite of form, and form every appetite of matter; then23 there is no appetite for anything outside, and so neither is there possibility for composi-

tion, which pre-requires in the components an appetite and an inclination. Although, however, the rational soul has a composition out of matter and form, yet it has an appetite for perfecting corporeal nature; just as an organic body is composed of matter and form, and yet has an appetite for receiving the soul.

Scholion

I. This question is not to be understood in the sense that the soul was produced from pre-existent matter, that is, from matter which preceded the production of the soul in time, but in the sense that the produced soul stands together out of matter and form as constitutive principles. For it is one thing for something to have matter in which it is made, as is the case in all corporeal forms; another, from which it is made as from something pre-existent, as is the case in things generable and corruptible; another, from which it is, which was once supposed concerning incorruptible bodies, and by some concerning created spiritual substances (cfr. Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2). The same question therefore is here set down about the human soul which was discussed above (d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1, 2, 3) concerning the Angels; the same principles also are employed by the Holy Doctor for laying down the same conclusion, and the same is the disagreement of authors, which is noted there in the scholion to q. 1.

St. Thomas (here q. 1, a. 2) says: «To me it does not seem that there is in any way matter in the soul or in any spiritual substance, but that they are simple forms and natures, although some say otherwise. And besides the other reasons by which this seems impossible concerning the Angels... also by a certain special reason matter is excluded from the account of the soul. For since the soul is the form of the body, it must be that either according to its whole essence it is the form of the body, or according to part of its essence. If according to its whole essence, it is impossible that a part of the essence be of matter... But if according to part of its substance it is the form of the body, by which it is in act, and not according to the other, which is its matter, two inconveniences follow,» etc. At the end he adds: «Nor however do we deny that the rational soul has a certain mode of composition, namely out of being and that which is... Which mode of composition however is not found in other forms, because they cannot be subsistent as if in their own being, but they are through composite being. And in this the soul falls short of divine simplicity». The weighty argument noted is repeated in Summa I, q. 75, a. 5, in corp. (cfr. Summa contra Gentiles II, c. 30). — The same objection, namely that what is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another composite, St. Bonaventure here tries to solve at ad 6; similarly Richard (who esteems both opinions probable), here a. 1, q. 1, ad 2, responds to it thus: «I say that this would be true if the matter were of one kind. But the matter of the soul is not of one kind with the matter of the body itself, but it is more actual than the incomplete form in the human body, preceding by the order of nature the infusion of the intellective soul». And in the same place ad 3, from the fact that the matter is not of one kind, he concludes: «Hence it can be a part of the perfection of that thing». — Alexander of Hales (Summa, p. II, q. 61, m. 1) responds to the principal question: «The human soul is said to be composed of intellectual form and matter; in no way however does it have matter and form thus, as bodies are said to have matter and form, whether they be celestial or lower. For the limit of corporeal matter is magnitude; but of spiritual matter the (magnitude) is not the limit». — Now in the aforesaid scholion we have noted in the very words of St. Thomas, that from the opinion of St. Bonaventure, Alexander, and Scotus there in no way follows a prejudice against the immortality of the soul; likewise in the words of Peter of Tarentaise (loc. cit.), that this opinion, which is now obsolete, was then celebrated and approved by many.

II. Besides the authors cited: Scotus, De Anima, q. 13; De Rerum princ. q. 7, a. 2. — Bl. Albert, Summa, p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1, a. 3. — See others in the scholion above d. 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Intellige cum Vat. auctorem Sex Principiorum (c. 1.), scilicet Gilbertum Porretanum.
    Understand with the Vatican edition the author of the Sex Principia (c. 1), namely Gilbert of Poitiers.
  2. Text. 3. seq. (c. 4.). — Non pauci codd. cum Vat. de Animalibus; perperam.
    Text 3 ff. (c. 4). — Not a few codices with the Vatican edition read de Animalibus; erroneously.
  3. Hic c. 2.
    Here, c. 2.
  4. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 9. seqq. et text. 37. seqq. (c. 4. et 8.). De minori vide eiusdem VI. Ethic. c. 1.
    Cfr. Aristotle, De Anima III, text 9 ff. and text 37 ff. (cc. 4 and 8). On the minor see the same author's Ethics VI, c. 1.
  5. Vide infra d. 37. a. 1. q. 2. et I. Sent. d. 37. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — De seqq. cfr. infra d. 18. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 24. p. I. a. 2. q. 2.
    See below d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, and I Sent. d. 37, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, in corp. — On the following see below d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, and d. 24, p. I, a. 2, q. 2.
  6. Cfr. liber de Causis, prop. 10. et 17.
    Cfr. Liber de Causis, prop. 10 and 17.
  7. Vide supra pag. 109, nota 7. et pag. 197, nota 3. — De seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., VII. Metaph. text. 49. (VI. c. 13.).
    See above p. 109, note 7, and p. 197, note 3. — On the following proposition cfr. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 49 (VI, c. 13).
  8. Text. 17. seq. (c. 5.).
    Text 17 ff. (c. 5).
  9. Text. 12. (VIII. c. 7.). Verba non sunt ipsius Aristotelis, sed exhibent summam longioris expositionis.
    Text 12 (VIII, c. 7). The words are not Aristotle's own, but they present the substance of a longer exposition.
  10. Text. 11. seq. (VII. c. 4.); sententialiter; clarius VII. text. 28, quem iam supra pag. 109, nota 5. allegavimus. — Plures codd. cum edd. 1, 2 nihil facit pro non facit.
    Text 11 ff. (VII, c. 4); in substance; more clearly VII, text 28, which we have already cited above p. 109, note 5. — Several codices, with editions 1 and 2, read nihil facit for non facit.
  11. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. fundam. 3. et d. 8. p. II. q. 2, ubi haec ex Boethio formata propositio explicatur.
    Cfr. I Sent. d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, fundam. 3, and d. 8, p. II, q. 2, where this proposition formed from Boethius is explained.
  12. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia. — Pro seq. prop. cfr. Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 12. (I. brevior, c. 2.) et XII. text. 10. (XI. c. 2.), ubi dicit, quod in omni eo quod movetur sive mutatur, materia inveniatur. — August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 6. n. 9. inquirens, utrum anima ex materia spirituali producta sit, ait: Si enim quiddam incommutabile esset anima, nullo modo eius quasi materiam quaerere deberemus; nunc autem mutabilitas eius satis indicat, eam interim vitiis atque fallaciis deformem reddi, formari autem virtutibus veritatisque doctrina, sed in sua iam natura, qua est anima, sicut etiam caro in sua natura, qua iam caro est, et salute decoratur et morbis vulneribusque foedatur etc.
    Aristotle, De Praedicamentis, c. on Substance. — For the following proposition cfr. Aristotle, Metaphysics II, text 12 (I, the shorter, c. 2) and XII, text 10 (XI, c. 2), where he says that in every thing which is moved or changed, matter is found. — Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram VII, c. 6, n. 9, inquiring whether the soul was produced from spiritual matter, says: For if the soul were something incommutable, we ought in no way to seek for it as it were a matter; but now its mutability sufficiently indicates that it is in the meantime rendered deformed by vices and falsehoods, and is formed by virtues and the teaching of truth, yet now in its own nature, by which it is soul, just as also flesh in its own nature, by which it is now flesh, is both adorned by health and disfigured by diseases and wounds, etc.
  13. De Trin. c. 2: «Reliqua [praeter Deum] enim non sunt id quod sunt; unumquodque enim habet esse suum ex his, ex quibus est, id est ex partibus suis, et est hoc atque hoc, id est partes suae coniunctae, sed non hoc, vel hoc singulariter, ut cum homo terrenus constet ex anima corporeque, corpus et anima est, non vel corpus, vel anima». In libro de Hebdomadibus docet, quod creaturae non sint suum esse, sed participent esse. In libro autem de Unitate et uno dicit, quod tam Angelus quam anima sint aliquod «unum coniunctione materiae et formae». Similiter August., II. de Moribus Manich. c. 4. n. 6. docet, quod creaturae sint bonae «participando bonum et habendo». In Ioan. tract. 19. n. 13, exponens illa verba: Vitam dedit Filio, ut habeat eam in semetipso, per oppositionem ad vitam animae dicit de Filio Dei: «Dedit ei, ut Filius esset, genuit, ut vita esset, hoc est Dedit ei habere vitam in semetipso, ut esset vita non egens vita, ne participando intelligatur habere vitam. Si enim participando haberet vitam, posset et amittendo esse sine vita». Libr. de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 36. comparatur vita animae cum Dei vita: «Vita Deus est, vita et anima est, similis, sed dispar; similis, quod vita, quod se ipsa vivens... dispar, quoniam ille creator est, et ista creatura. Nisi enim ab illo creata esset, non esset; et nisi ab illo vivificata non viveret... Vita anima est, vivens quidem, sed non aliunde quam se ipsa; et ob hoc non tam vivens, quam vita est» etc. Haec verba, quae sumta sunt ex Bernard., in Cant. serm. 81. n. 3. seq., intelligit Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 1. a. 2. § 2. in eodem sensu ac S. Bonav., scil. «anima vivit se ipsa i. e. aliquo sibi intrinseco, utpote formali principio»; et explicat exemplo sumto ab animali: «Animal enim dicitur se ipso moveri i. e. ab aliquo principio sibi intrinseco, eo modo quo dicitur anima vivere se».
    De Trinitate c. 2: «For the rest [besides God] are not what they are; for everything has its being from those things from which it is, that is, from its parts, and is this and this, that is, its conjoined parts, but not this or this singly, just as when an earthly man stands together out of soul and body, he is both body and soul, not either body or soul». In the book De Hebdomadibus he teaches that creatures are not their own being, but participate in being. In the book De Unitate et uno he says that both Angel and soul are some «one by the conjunction of matter and form». Similarly Augustine, De Moribus Manichaeorum II, c. 4, n. 6, teaches that creatures are good «by participating in good and by having it». In Tractate on John 19, n. 13, expounding those words: He gave life to the Son, that he might have it in himself, by opposition to the life of the soul he says of the Son of God: «He gave to him to be Son, he begot, that he might be life, this is He gave him to have life in himself, that he might be life not needing life, lest by participating he be understood to have life. For if by participating he had life, he could also by losing it be without life». In the book De Spiritu et anima (among the works of Augustine), c. 36, the life of the soul is compared with the life of God: «God is life, and the soul is life, similar, but unlike; similar, in that it is life, in that it lives by itself... unlike, since he is creator, and this is creature. For unless created by him it would not be; and unless vivified by him it would not live... Life is the soul, living indeed, but from no other than itself; and on this account it is not so much living as life itself» etc. These words, which are taken from Bernard, In Cantica serm. 81, n. 3 ff., Alexander of Hales, S. p. II, q. 87, m. 1, a. 2, § 2, understands in the same sense as St. Bonaventure, namely «the soul lives by itself, i.e. by something intrinsic to itself, as by a formal principle»; and he explains it by an example taken from the animal: «For an animal is said to be moved by itself, i.e. by some principle intrinsic to itself, in the way in which the soul is said to live by itself».
  14. Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1.
    Dist. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1.
  15. Intellige propriam per se ipsam sive independentem a corpore, quia omnis operatio animae sensitivae est coniuncti. Cfr. Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 12. seqq. (c. 1.). — Ex hac ratione deducitur sequens, scil. quod anima brutalis non est nata per se subsistere. — Paulo inferius in codd. O R S habetur per se et intra se pro intra se.
    Understand proper through itself or independent of the body, since every operation of the sensitive soul is of the conjoined whole. Cfr. Aristotle, De Anima I, text 12 ff. (c. 1). — From this reason the following is deduced, namely that the brute soul is not naturally fit per se to subsist. — A little below, in codices O R S, per se et intra se is given for intra se.
  16. Cfr. supra pag. 89, nota 5.
    Cfr. above p. 89, note 5.
  17. Supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2, ubi etiam plura praecedentium explicantur. — Vat. resolutio philosophica pro resolutio physica.
    Above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2, where also many of the foregoing matters are explained. — The Vatican edition reads resolutio philosophica for resolutio physica.
  18. Cod. T formalem substantialem universalem, scil. «secundum essentiam abstractam», ut dicit Bonav., I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1. In cod. A additur universalis est «species, genus, vel intelligitur de particulari, sicut est anima bruti».
    Codex T reads formalem substantialem universalem, namely «according to abstracted essence», as Bonaventure says in I Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1. In codex A is added: the universal is «a species, a genus, or is understood of the particular, as is the soul of a brute».
  19. Dist. 18. a. 2. q. 3. — Paulo superius post primum materiam cod. A subiungit concreatam, vel coexistentem.
    Dist. 18, a. 2, q. 3. — A little above, after the first materiam, codex A appends concreatam, or coexistentem.
  20. De hac ratione cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 38. seq. (c. 8.). — Paulo superius in multis codd. et edd. 1, 2 desideratur Ideo [pro quo cod. V ponit unde], et paulo inferius falso legitur quam intelligit pro per quam intelligit.
    On this reason cfr. Aristotle, De Anima III, text 38 ff. (c. 8). — A little above, in many codices and editions 1 and 2, Ideo is missing [for which codex V puts unde], and a little below, quam intelligit is falsely read for per quam intelligit.
  21. Cfr. Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 28. seqq. (c. 7.).
    Cfr. Aristotle, De Anima III, text 28 ff. (c. 7).
  22. Vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. et I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2. — Vat. omittit et compositio ex partibus substantialibus.
    See above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, and I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2. — The Vatican edition omits et compositio ex partibus substantialibus.
  23. Ita plures codd. ut F W aa, alii codd. cum edd. convenit.
    Thus several codices such as F W aa; other codices with the editions read convenit. ---
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