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Dist. 17, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 410

Articulus I. De productione hominis quoad animam.

Quaestio I. Utrum anima humana sit ex Dei substantia.

Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod anima humana sit ex Dei substantia:

Ad oppositum:

1. Primo auctoritate, Genesis secundo1: Inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae; sed inspiratio est per egressum alicuius ab intrinseco: ergo sicut Spiritus sanctus, qui est eiusdem naturae cum spirante, sic humanus spiritus, qui fuit inspiratus a Deo, est de natura divina. Si tu dicas, quod insufflatio vel inspiratio potest esse rei diversae per naturam; obiicitur, quia Glossa dicit super illud Ioannis2: Insufflavit eos et dixit eis: Accipite etc.: Augustinus dicit ibi, quod in hoc ostendit, ex se procedere Spiritum sanctum: si ergo Deus insufflavit in faciem hominis spiraculum vitae, videtur, quod spiritum hominis produxit ex se.

2. Item, Ecclesiastis ultimo3: Donec pulvis re- p. 411 vertatur in terram, unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum, qui dedit illum: si igitur spiritus redit ad Deum, sicut pulvis redit ad terram, sicut homo quantum ad carnem est de terra, ita videtur, quod quantum ad spiritum est de Dei substantia.

3. Item, Actuum decimo septimo4: Genus enim Dei sumus, sicut quidam poetarum vestrorum dixerunt; sed quae sunt eiusdem generis sunt eiusdem naturae: ergo nos et Deus sumus eiusdem naturae. Sed non quantum ad corpus; ergo quantum ad animam: ergo anima est de Dei substantia.

4. Item, ratione videtur. Omnia corporalia producuntur ex aliqua materia, quae est in omnibus corporalibus una: ergo pari ratione spiritualia producuntur ex aliqua spirituali natura, quae in omnibus spiritibus sit una; sed spiritualis substantia, in omnibus reperta per identitatem, non est nisi divina: ergo anima facta est ex Dei substantia5.

5. Item, solus Deus est immortalis per naturam6, ergo nulli convenit immortalitas per naturam, nisi quod est vel Deus, vel ex Deo; nulli autem convenit esse imaginem Dei, nisi cui convenit esse immortalem per naturam — «non enim esset imago, sicut dicit Augustinus, si mortis termino clauderetur» — si igitur anima rationalis naturaliter est imago, ergo naturaliter est immortalis: ergo de Dei substantia producta fuit.

6. Item, Deus est lux spiritualis, quae est fons omnis illuminationis spiritualis, sicut sol est fons illuminationis corporalis; sed corpora luminosa sunt eiusdem naturae cum luce et cum sole: ergo pari ratione spiritus naturaliter luminosi sunt eiusdem naturae cum fonte lucis spiritualis7. Sed quidquid est eiusdem naturae cum Deo, vel est Deus, vel de Deo: ergo etc.

Contra:

Fundamenta.

1. Genesis primo8: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; hoc non est dictum secundum corpus, ergo secundum animam: ergo anima hominis est facta; et circa divinam naturam non cadit factio vel mutatio: ergo non est ex Dei natura sive substantia.

2. Item, si anima est ex Dei natura, cum anima sit pars hominis, Dei natura venit ad constitutionem hominis; sed pars est minus nobilis quam totum: ergo Deus est minus nobilis quam homo. Sed hoc est falsum et impium9: ergo etc.

3. Item, si anima est ex divina natura, aut ergo habet aliquam formam superinductam illi naturae, ex qua est, aut nullam. Si nullam: ergo non videtur esse nec facta nec a Deo diversa. Si aliquam: ergo divina natura est ipsius animae materia. Sed quod est materiale principium alicuius est minus completum et imperfectum10: ergo Deus est incompletus et imperfectus per naturam; quod est blasphemia.

4. Item, si anima est ex Dei substantia; et anima depravatur: ergo contingit, divinam substantiam depravari; et si contingit, Dei substantiam depravari, Deus non est summe bonus. Cum igitur rationalis spiritus peccare possit, sicut patet, rationalis spiritus non est ex Deo.

5. Item, si anima est ex Deo, aut igitur per generationem, aut per spirationem. Si primo modo, tunc anima nihil aliud est quam Verbum; si secundo, tunc anima non est aliud quam Spiritus sanctus: ergo omnis homo esset Deus.

6. Item, si anima hominis esset ex Deo, aut de toto Deo, aut de parte. Si de parte: ergo Deus est compositus et habet partem et partem; quod est omnino falsum11. Si de toto; sed Deus est immensus et infinitus: ergo cuiuslibet hominis anima est immensa et infinita. Et si hoc, quilibet homo est omnipotens; quod nullus dubitat esse falsum.

Conclusio.

Anima humana non est producta ex Dei substantia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquorum positio fuit, Opinio 1. quod intellectus humanus non erat aliud quam intellectus divinus; sed divinus intellectus dicebatur, prout considerabatur in se, humanus vero, prout perficiebat corpus aliquod. — Improbatur. Sed cum Deus nullius sit pars constitutiva propter suam summam perfectionem et absolutionem, positio haec fuit stulta et erronea.

Est et alia positio non minus stulta et impia, Opinio 2. p. 412 Manichaeorum videlicet, quod spiritus rationalis sit de Dei substantia et natura. Dicunt enim, quod in homine est duplex anima, sicut recitat Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus12, quarum una inclinat ad bona, et alia inclinat ad mala; et illa quae facit bona, nunquam potest facere mala; et illa quae facit mala, nunquam potest facere bona; et illa quae inclinat ad faciendum bonum, est de Dei natura. — Refellitur. Sed haec positio multipliciter a veritate est aliena. Primum, quia ponit, Deum eiusdem naturae esse cum creatura et alicuius creaturae esse materiam, cum ponit, creaturam fieri ex Dei substantia. Et ad hanc positionem sequuntur innumerabilia inconvenientia, et hoc praecipuum est, quia implicat in se duo opposita, dum ponit, animam a Deo esse factam, et eam esse de substantia divina. — Deviat etiam a veritate in hoc, quod ponit in nobis duas animas; sed huius improbatio melius tangetur infra13.

Et ideo tertia positio est vera et catholica. Sententia catholica et conclusio. Anima non est producta de Dei substantia. Deus enim ad creaturas se habet in ratione efficientis et formalis14 et finis; sed nullo modo potest se habere in ratione materialis, quantumcumque creatura sit nobilis. Et ideo rationes hoc probantes concedendae sunt.

Solutio oppositorum.

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod inspiravit in faciem eius etc.; dicendum, quod inspirare idem est ibi quod spiritum facere et factum corpori infundere; similiter et insufflare est flatum hominis facere et factum corpori infundere15. Unde sicut, quando Deus res produxit dicendo, non fuit ibi vox materialis, sic, quando insufflavit, non fuit mediantibus faucibus et instrumentis corporalibus. Et ideo non valet illud simile de Ioannis vigesimo16, ubi ad litteram: sufflavit, et illa insufflatio erat processionis Spiritus sancti signatio et ostensio.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Ecclesiaste: Et spiritus redeat ad Deum etc.; dicendum, quod sicut corporis resolutio stat, cum perventum est ad terram, sic mutabilitas animae tunc demum stat, quando coniungitur ei, secundum quem facta est. In solo enim Deo invenit perfectam quietem17. Et ideo non vult Sapiens dicere, quod spiritus redeat ad Deum per corruptionem, sicut corpus in terram; sed similitudo est quantum ad quietationem.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod genus Dei sumus; dicendum, quod genus dupliciter accipi potest: Genus dupliciter. uno modo proprie; et sic dicuntur aliqua convenire in genere, quae conveniunt in aliqua forma et natura communi. Alio modo accipitur large; et sic dicuntur aliqua convenire in genere, in quibus est aliqua convenientia specialis secundum habitudinem analogiae. Et sic dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Trinitate18, quod anima Notandum de luce creata. «cognoscit in quadam luce sui generis»; et vocat illam lucem lucem increatam, quam dicit esse sui generis propter hoc, quod est spiritualis, sicut anima. Et sic intelligitur verbum Apostoli.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod corporalia sunt ex aliquo uno; respondendum est, quod hoc non concludit, quod spiritus rationales fiant ex Deo: illud enim unum, ex quo fiunt corporalia, est ens in potentia respectu illorum; Deus autem respectu nullius potest esse in potentia; et ideo ex hoc non sequitur, quod spirituales substantiae producantur de divina natura.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solus Deus est immortalis per naturam; dicendum, quantum sufficit ad praesens — quia infra19 habebitur de immortalitate — quod immortalitas per naturam, dicta de Deo, intelligitur per privationem omnis gratiae, sive gratia dicat aliquid superadditum naturae, sive dicat gratuitam influentiam, per quam conservatur natura; quia Deus se ipso permanet, anima autem, etsi de sui natura sit ad permanendum idonea, tamen nunquam permaneret, nisi conservaretur per gratuitam Dei influentiam.

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus est lux spiritualis etc.; dicendum, quod non est simile Lux corporalis differt a spirituali. de luce spirituali et corporali omnino. Lux enim spiritualis, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum. Cum autem sit omnipotentissima, potest producere et facere lucem creatam aliquo modo sibi conformem; quae tamen sibi non sufficit, etiam postquam p. 413 producta est, nisi adsit ei summae lucis influentia. Et sic intelligendum est in anima humana, quod ipsa habet lucem propriam, scilicet creatam, per quam completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et conservatur. Lux autem corporalis in diversis corporibus potest reperiri ut perfectio, cum non sit forma omnino simplex, sed sit nata coniungi materiae.

Scholion

I. De errore nefando hic notato, qui ultimis saeculis sub variis formis renovatus est, dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 1.): «Iam quoque a philosophis atque theologis plenissime est probatum et demonstrative ostensum, quod supergloriosissimus Deus sit purus actus, bonitas pura, incommutabile, incircumscriptibile penitusque perfectum ens, universis et singulis prorsus in infinitum sublimior... Ideo superstultissimum et ineffabiliter rudissimum ac imperitissimum est putare, aliquid factum esse, aut fieri posse de substantia Dei; quoniam sequeretur, Dei substantiam esse mutatam, aut rem factam Deo esse consubstantialem». In solutione ad 3. notanda est expositio verborum S. Augustini, quod «anima cognoscit in quadam luce sui generis»; quae interpretatio respondet sententiae S. Bonaventurae de modo, quo intelligibilia cognoscuntur per rationes aeternas (cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. I, scholion). Alii aliter haec verba interpretantur. — Item notanda est in solut. ad 6. differentia inter lucem corporalem et duplicem lucem spiritualem, scil. increatam et creatam. De luce ut forma cfr. supra d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 1. — Scot., in utroque Scripto, hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 90. a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 85. — B. Albert., hic a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Biel, hic q. 1.

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English Translation

Article I. On the production of man with regard to the soul.

Question I. Whether the human soul is from the substance of God.

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the human soul is from the substance of God:

To the opposite [side]:

1. First, by authority, Genesis chapter two1: He breathed into his face the breath of life; but inspiration is by the going-forth of something from within: therefore just as the Holy Spirit, who is of the same nature with the one breathing forth, so the human spirit, which was breathed into [man] by God, is of the divine nature. If you say that an in-breathing or inspiration can belong to a thing of a different nature; the objection is raised, because the Gloss says on that text of John2: He breathed on them and said to them: Receive etc.: Augustine says there that in this he shows that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself: if therefore God breathed into the face of man the breath of life, it seems that he produced the spirit of man from himself.

2. Likewise, the last [chapter] of Ecclesiastes3: Until the dust return to the earth, whence it was, and the spirit return to God who gave it: if therefore the spirit returns to God just as the dust returns to the earth, just as man with respect to his flesh is of the earth, so it seems that with respect to his spirit he is of the substance of God.

3. Likewise, Acts chapter seventeen4: For we are of the race of God, as also certain of your poets have said; but things which are of the same race (genus) are of the same nature: therefore we and God are of the same nature. But not with respect to the body; therefore with respect to the soul: therefore the soul is of the substance of God.

4. Likewise, it seems by reason. All corporeal things are produced from some matter, which is one in all corporeal things: therefore by parity of reasoning spiritual things are produced from some spiritual nature, which is one in all spirits; but a spiritual substance, found in all things by identity, is none other than the divine: therefore the soul has been made from the substance of God5.

5. Likewise, God alone is immortal by nature6; therefore immortality by nature befits nothing save what is either God or from God; but nothing befits being the image of God except what befits being immortal by nature — «for it would not be an image, as Augustine says, if it were enclosed by the boundary of death» — if therefore the rational soul is naturally an image, it is therefore naturally immortal: therefore it was produced from the substance of God.

6. Likewise, God is a spiritual light, who is the fount of all spiritual illumination, just as the sun is the fount of corporeal illumination; but luminous bodies are of the same nature with light and with the sun: therefore by parity of reasoning naturally luminous spirits are of the same nature with the fount of spiritual light7. But whatever is of the same nature with God is either God or from God: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

Foundations.

1. Genesis chapter one8: Let us make man to our image and likeness; this is not said with respect to the body, therefore with respect to the soul: therefore the soul of man is made; and making or change does not fall upon the divine nature: therefore it is not from the nature or substance of God.

2. Likewise, if the soul is from the nature of God, since the soul is a part of man, the nature of God comes into the constitution of man; but a part is less noble than the whole: therefore God is less noble than man. But this is false and impious9: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if the soul is from the divine nature, either it has some form superinduced upon that nature from which it is, or none. If none: therefore it appears not to be made nor distinct from God. If some: therefore the divine nature is the matter of the soul itself. But that which is the material principle of something is less complete and imperfect10: therefore God is incomplete and imperfect by nature; which is blasphemy.

4. Likewise, if the soul is from the substance of God; and the soul is depraved: therefore it happens that the divine substance is depraved; and if it happens that the substance of God is depraved, God is not the highest good. Since therefore the rational spirit can sin, as is plain, the rational spirit is not from God.

5. Likewise, if the soul is from God, then either by generation, or by spiration. If in the first way, then the soul is nothing other than the Word; if in the second, then the soul is nothing other than the Holy Spirit: therefore every man would be God.

6. Likewise, if the soul of man were from God, either from all of God, or from a part. If from a part: therefore God is composite and has part and part; which is wholly false11. If from the whole; but God is immense and infinite: therefore the soul of any man is immense and infinite. And if this, then any man is omnipotent; which no one doubts to be false.

Conclusion.

The human soul is not produced from the substance of God.

I respond: It must be said that the position of some was, Opinion 1. that the human intellect was nothing other than the divine intellect; but the divine intellect was so called insofar as it was considered in itself, the human, insofar as it perfected some body. — It is refuted. But since God is the constitutive part of nothing on account of his highest perfection and absoluteness, this position was foolish and erroneous.

There is also another position no less foolish and impious, Opinion 2. namely of the Manichaeans, that the rational spirit is of the substance and nature of God. For they say that in man there is a double soul, as Augustine recounts in the book On the Two Souls12, of which one inclines to the good, and the other inclines to evils; and that which does good can never do evil; and that which does evil can never do good; and that which inclines toward doing good is of the nature of God. — It is refuted. But this position is in many ways foreign to the truth. First, because it posits that God is of the same nature with the creature and that he is the matter of some creature, when it posits that the creature is made from the substance of God. And from this position there follow innumerable incongruities, and this is chief, that it implies in itself two opposites, when it posits that the soul is made by God, and that it is of the divine substance. — It also deviates from the truth in this, that it posits two souls in us; but the refutation of this is better treated below13.

And therefore the third position is true and catholic: Catholic opinion and conclusion. the soul is not produced from the substance of God. For God is related to creatures in the character of efficient and formal14 and final [cause]; but in no way can he be related in the character of material, however noble the creature be. And therefore the reasons proving this are to be conceded.

Solution of the opposing [arguments].

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that he breathed into his face etc.; it must be said that to inspire is the same here as to make a spirit and to infuse what is made into a body; similarly to breathe in is to make the breath of man and to infuse what is made into the body15. Hence just as, when God produced things by speaking, there was no material voice there, so, when he breathed in, it was not by means of jaws and corporeal instruments. And therefore that similarity drawn from John chapter twenty16 does not hold, where literally: he breathed, and that breathing-in was a signification and showing of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

2. To that which is objected from Ecclesiastes: And the spirit return to God etc.; it must be said that just as the resolution of the body stops when it has come to the earth, so the mutability of the soul finally stops when it is joined to him according to whom it was made. For in God alone does it find perfect rest17. And therefore the Wise Man does not mean that the spirit returns to God by corruption, as the body to the earth; but the likeness is with respect to coming-to-rest.

3. To that which is objected, that we are of the race of God; it must be said that race (genus) can be taken in two ways: Genus twofold. in one way properly; and so some things are said to agree in genus, which agree in some common form and nature. In another way it is taken broadly; and so some things are said to agree in genus in which there is some special agreement according to the disposition of analogy. And so Augustine says in the twelfth [book] On the Trinity18 that the soul Note on created light. «knows in a certain light of its own kind»; and he calls that light an uncreated light, which he says is of its own kind on this account, that it is spiritual, just as the soul is. And so the word of the Apostle is to be understood.

4. To that which is objected, that corporeal things are from some one [thing]; it must be answered that this does not conclude that rational spirits come into being from God: for that one [thing], from which corporeal things come into being, is being in potency with respect to them; but God can be in potency with respect to nothing; and therefore from this it does not follow that spiritual substances are produced from the divine nature.

5. To that which is objected, that God alone is immortal by nature; it must be said, so far as suffices for the present — since immortality will be treated below19 — that immortality by nature, said of God, is understood by the privation of all grace, whether grace mean something superadded to nature, or whether it mean the gratuitous influence by which nature is conserved; because God remains by himself, but the soul, although by its own nature it is fit to remain, nevertheless would never remain unless it were conserved by the gratuitous influence of God.

6. To that which is objected, that God is a spiritual light etc.; it must be said that the case is not entirely alike Corporeal light differs from spiritual. concerning spiritual and corporeal light. For the spiritual light which God is, since it is most simple, cannot be the perfection of things of diverse natures. But since it is most omnipotent, it can produce and make a created light in some way conformed to itself; which nevertheless does not suffice for itself, even after it has been produced, unless the influence of the highest light be present to it. And so it must be understood in the human soul, that it has its own light, namely a created one, by which it is completed, which from the eternal light is both produced and conserved. But corporeal light can be found in diverse bodies as a perfection, since it is not a wholly simple form, but is born to be joined to matter.

Scholion

I. Concerning the wicked error here noted, which in recent ages has been renewed in various forms, Dionysius the Carthusian says (here q. 1.): «It has now also been most fully proved by philosophers and theologians and demonstratively shown that the most superlatively glorious God is pure act, pure goodness, an incommutable, incircumscribable and utterly perfect being, sublimer beyond all things and each thing infinitely... Therefore it is most super-foolish and unspeakably crude and most ignorant to think that anything has been made, or can come into being, from the substance of God; since it would follow that the substance of God is changed, or that the thing made is consubstantial with God». In the solution to 3, the exposition of the words of St. Augustine is to be noted, that «the soul knows in a certain light of its own kind»; which interpretation answers to the teaching of St. Bonaventure on the mode by which intelligibles are known through eternal reasons (cfr. I Sent. d. 3. p. I. q. 1, scholion). Others interpret these words otherwise. — Likewise to be noted in the solution to 6 is the difference between corporeal light and the twofold spiritual light, namely uncreated and created. On light as form cfr. above d. 13. a. 2. q. 2.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 60. m. 1. — Scot., in each Scriptum, here q. 1. — S. Thom., here q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 90. a. 1; S. c. Gent. II. c. 85. — B. Albert., here a. 2; S. p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1. a. 1. — Aegid. R., here q. 1. a. 1. — Biel, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 7. — Cfr. August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 3, et II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 8. n. 11, ubi hoc arg. tribuit Manichaeis.
    Verse 7. — Cf. Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter, VII, c. 2, n. 3, and On Genesis against the Manichaeans, II, c. 8, n. 11, where he attributes this argument to the Manichaeans.
  2. Cap. 20. 22: Insufflavit et dixit etc. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis, sumta est ex August., in Ioan. tract. 121. n. 4: Insufflando significavit, Spiritum sanctum non Patris solius esse Spiritum, sed et suum.
    Ch. 20, v. 22: «He breathed and said» etc. — The Gloss, which is interlinear, is drawn from Augustine, Tractates on John 121, n. 4: «By breathing he signified that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father alone, but also his own».
  3. Vers. 7: Et revertatur pulvis in terram etc.
    Verse 7: «And let the dust return to the earth» etc.
  4. Vers. 28: Sicut et quidam vestrorum poetarum dixerunt: Ipsius enim et genus sumus. — Vat. et ed. 4 philosophorum nostrorum, codd. cum ed. 1 poetarum nostrorum pro poetarum vestrorum.
    Verse 28: «As also certain of your poets have said: For we are also his offspring». — The Vatican edition and edition 4 read of our philosophers; the codices with edition 1 read of our poets instead of of your poets.
  5. Hoc arg. usus est David de Dinanto (circa an. 1204) in suo libro de tomis, hoc est de divisionibus, in quo docet, Deum esse principium materiale omnium, ut refert B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 20. m. 2. q. incid. et p. II. tr. 12. q. 72. m. 4. a. 2. Cfr. S. Thom., I. S. contr. Gent. c. 17; hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 3. a. 8.
    This argument was used by David of Dinant (circa 1204) in his book On Sections, that is On Divisions, in which he teaches that God is the material principle of all things, as B. Albert reports, Summa p. I, tr. 4, q. 20, m. 2, q. incid., and p. II, tr. 12, q. 72, m. 4, a. 2. Cf. S. Thomas, I, Summa contra Gentes, c. 17; here q. 1, a. 1; Summa I, q. 3, a. 8.
  6. Epist. 1. Tim. 6. 16: Qui solus habet immortalitatem. — Seq. textus Augustini invenitur in libro de Spiritu et anima (inter opera Augustini), c. 18: Non enim poterat esse imago et similitudo Dei, si mortis termino clauderetur. Eadem propositio occurrit in Cassiodori libro de Anima, c. 8, et formata esse videtur ex iis quae dicit August., XIV. de Trin. c. 3. n. 6.
    Epistle 1 Tim. 6:16: «Who alone hath immortality». — The following text of Augustine is found in the book On the Spirit and the Soul (among the works of Augustine), c. 18: «For it could not be the image and likeness of God, if it were enclosed by the boundary of death». The same proposition occurs in Cassiodorus, On the Soul, c. 8, and seems to be formed from what Augustine says, On the Trinity XIV, c. 3, n. 6.
  7. Alluditur in hoc arg. ad opinionem Manichaeorum dicentium, Deum esse lucem visibilem. Cfr. August., I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 3. n. 6. et de Haeresibus, c. 46. — In maiori plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 bis habent finis pro fons.
    In this argument allusion is made to the opinion of the Manichaeans saying that God is a visible light. Cf. Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichaeans I, c. 3, n. 6, and On Heresies, c. 46. — In the major [premise] many codices with edition 1 twice have end (finis) for fount (fons).
  8. Vers. 26. — Cfr. de hoc et 4. arg. August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 2. n. 3; c. 11. n. 17; II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 8. n. 11; I. de Anima et eius origine, c. 4. n. 4; Disput. contra Fortun. Manich. primae diei n. 11.
    Verse 26. — Cf. on this and on the 4th argument Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter VII, c. 2, n. 3; c. 11, n. 17; On Genesis against the Manichaeans II, c. 8, n. 11; On the Soul and its origin I, c. 4, n. 4; Disputation against Fortunatus the Manichaean, of the first day, n. 11.
  9. Vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 2.
    See I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 2.
  10. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 19. p. II. q. 3.
    Cf. I Sent. d. 19, p. II, q. 3.
  11. Non pauci codd. incongrue addunt hoc.
    Not a few codices incongruously add this (hoc).
  12. Cap. 1. n. 1. seqq. Cfr. I. Retract. c. 15. n. 1. — Paulo inferius in paucis codd. et in omnibus edd., excepta secunda, desideratur et illa quae facit bona, nunquam potest facere mala.
    Ch. 1, n. 1 and following. Cf. Retractations I, c. 15, n. 1. — A little below, in a few codices and in all editions except the second, the phrase and that which does good can never do evil is lacking.
  13. Dist. 31. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 34. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. supra d. 1. p. I. a. 2. q. 1.
    Distinction 31, a. 1, q. 1, and d. 34, a. 1, q. 1. Cf. above d. 1, p. I, a. 2, q. 1.
  14. Intellige exemplaris, quod indicant codd. Y aa legendo et formalis exemplaris. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4. — Paulo inferius post nobilis ed. 4 et Vat. subiungunt quia quod se habet ut materiale respectu alicuius, est minus completum ipso.
    Understand exemplary, which codices Y aa indicate by reading and exemplary formal. Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 4. — A little below, after noble, edition 4 and the Vatican edition add because that which is related as material with respect to something is less complete than it.
  15. Eodem modo explicat August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 3. n. 5. seqq. et XIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 24. — Paulo superius post et factum corpori plures codd. cum edd. 2, 3 insinuare, Vat. cum ed. 4 insinuare vel infundere pro infundere. Paulo inferius Vat. verbo pro dicendo.
    Augustine explains in the same way, On Genesis according to the letter VII, c. 3, nn. 5 and following, and On the City of God XIII, c. 24. — A little above, after and what is made into the body, many codices with editions 2 and 3 read to insinuate; the Vatican edition with edition 4 reads to insinuate or to infuse instead of to infuse. A little below the Vatican edition reads by a word instead of by speaking.
  16. Vers. 22. Textus graecus ἐνεφύσησε; idem verbum habetur in hac propositione ex Gen. 2, 7, de qua August., VII. de Gen. ad lit. c. 1. n. 2: Ac primum illud videamus, quod scriptum est Flavit vel Sufflavit in faciem eius flatum vitae. Nonnulli enim codices habent Spiravit vel Inspiravit in faciem eius. Sed cum Graeci habeant ἐνεφύσησεν, non dubitatur, flavit vel sufflavit esse dicendum. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 2. — Vat., omisso ubi, dein substituit Insufflavit; nam illa pro sufflavit et illa.
    Verse 22. The Greek text [reads] ἐνεφύσησε; the same word occurs in the proposition from Gen. 2:7, on which Augustine, On Genesis according to the letter VII, c. 1, n. 2: «Let us first see what is written: He breathed or He breathed in into his face the breath of life. For some codices have He inspired or He inspired into his face. But since the Greeks have ἐνεφύσησεν, there is no doubt that one must say flavit or sufflavit». Cf. here the letter of the Master, c. 2. — The Vatican edition, omitting ubi, then substitutes Insufflavit; nam illa for sufflavit et illa.
  17. August., I. Confess. c. 1. n. 1: Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.
    Augustine, Confessions I, c. 1, n. 1: «Because thou hast made us toward thee, and our heart is restless until it rests in thee».
  18. Cap. 15. n. 24. Cfr. opusculum a nobis editum de Humanae Cognitionis ratione. — Plures codd. cum Vat. convenientia spiritualis pro convenientia specialis.
    Ch. 15, n. 24. Cf. the little work edited by us On the Method of Human Knowledge. — Many codices with the Vatican edition read spiritual agreement instead of special agreement.
  19. Dist. 19. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. a. 2. q. 2.
    Distinction 19, a. 1, q. 1. Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, a. 2, q. 2. ---
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