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Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37

Textus Latinus
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Articulus II.

Esse ubique est Deo proprium.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur, utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei. Et quia proprium est quod soli convenit et semper1, ideo quantum ad hoc duo quaeruntur. Primo, utrum esse ubique conveniat soli Deo. Secundo, utrum conveniat ei semper sive ab aeterno.

Quaestio I.

Utrum esse ubique soli Deo conveniat.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem soli Deo conveniat, videtur.

1. Augustinus in libro de Symbolo2: «Ubique esse est Deum esse»; sed nulli creaturae convenit Deum esse, immo hoc est Dei propriissimum: ergo nulli creaturae convenit esse ubique.

2. Item, Ambrosius in libro de Spiritu sancto3: «Cum omnis creatura certis suae naturae sit circumscripta limitibus, esse ubique et in omnibus rebus divinitatis et dominationis est proprium».

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur ratione, quia omnis creatura, per se existens et in se, est hoc aliquid4; sed omne quod est hoc aliquid, est singulare, et omne singulare est hic et nunc, et nihil tale natura est esse ubique: ergo solius Dei est esse ubique.

4. Item, conditio ista, qua Deus est ubique, convenit Deo ratione suae immensitatis; sed immensitas est proprietas solius Dei, quae nulli creaturae potest convenire: ergo nec esse ubique.

Contra hoc:

1. Obiicitur de universali, quoniam universale est semper et ubique5, et tamen non est Deus. — Si tu dicas, quod est ubique respectu suorum singularium et non simpliciter; obiicitur tunc, quod aliquod universale est, cuius singularia sunt ubique, et impossibile est aliquid fieri, quod non sit eius singulare vel in singulari, ut hoc universale substantia: ergo est ubique.

2. Item, obiicitur de numero, qui est in omnibus entibus, et nihil potest fieri, in quo non sit numerus6; et praeterea, in omnibus entibus est unus numerus: ergo cum numerus non sit Deus, esse ubique non est proprium solius Dei. — Si dicas, quod non est ibi totus, sed secundum partem et partem; obiicitur de voce, quae est in auribus diversorum tota et in toto aere: esto quod vox esset ita magna, quod per totum mundum audiretur, tunc esset ubique tota et una. Probatio7: quia si multae, cum infinitae sint partes aeris, et vox sit in qualibet parte: tunc ergo infinitae sunt voces actu; quod est impossibile.

3. Item, obiicitur de anima, quae est in qualibet

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parte animalis tota, ut supra monstratum est8: esto ergo, quod fieret animal giganteum ita magnum quasi totus mundus, tunc anima esset ubique: ergo quod non sit, hoc est propter defectum corporis, et non suum. — Si dicas, quod est in pluribus tanquam in uno loco, unde nunquam una anima est nisi in uno corpore; obiicitur de corpore Christi, quod totum et integrum est in diversis altaribus distinctis.

4. Item, obiicitur per rationem. Cum enim de natura singularis sit esse hic et nunc, tamen alicui dat Deus semper esse, ut Angelis: ergo pari ratione alicui dabit esse ubique.

5. Item, si aliqua duo inseparabiliter sunt unita, ubicumque est unum, et alterum; sed humana natura et divina in Christo inseparabiliter sunt unita: ergo ubi est divina9, et humana. Sed divina natura est ubique: ergo et humana, et sic etc.

Conclusio.

Soli Deo proprie et singulariter convenit esse ubique.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod esse ubique, sicut dicunt Sancti, convenit soli Deo proprie et singulariter, ita quod nulli convenit alii, nec intelligi potest convenire, si recte intelligatur10. — Nam Deus dicitur esse ubique, ita quod ex parte Dei intelligitur identitas et totalitas, ex parte loci pluralitas et universalitas. Per conditionem identitatis excluditur universale, quod quamvis sit in omnibus singularibus, tamen secundum aliud et aliud suppositum, et ita numeratum. Per conditionem totalitatis excluditur numerus; nam quamvis numerus sit ubique, tamen secundum aliam et aliam partem. Per conditionem pluralitatis a parte loci excluditur spiritus creatus, qui quamvis sit in pluribus partibus corporis, non tamen11 in omnibus nisi ut unitis. Per conditionem universalitatis excluditur corpus Christi sub Sacramento, quod quamvis sit in pluribus, non tamen est in omnibus nec esse potest, quia hoc solum convenit ei sub Sacramento.

Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:

Ad 1, 2, 3. Et ita patent primae instantiae. Quod tamen obiicitur de voce, intelligendum, quod generatio sensibilium in medio est per diffusionem, unde non numeratur vox, sicut nec lux, nisi ad numerationem susceptibilis — unde quot sunt aures tot sunt voces, quoniam vox in aere erat multiplicabilis, et non multiplicata — et ideo patet, quod nec tota ubique ante numerationem, sicut nec lux diffusa, nec eadem post numerationem. Et ideo exemplum de existentia vocis non est multum simile Deo.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus dat sempiternitatem; dicendum, quod tam esse ubique, quam semper, importat quandam infinitatem; et infinitas sempiternitatis est infinitas durationis, quae est secundum potentiam; et haec non repugnat creaturae, quia non impedit durationem creaturae esse finitam actu et infinitam potentia; et ideo omni durationi creaturae necesse est aliquid adiici. Sed esse ubique dicit immensitatem actu, quia importat simultatem locorum: et haec repugnat creaturae, et ideo non potest ei omnino communicari. Communicatur tamen secundum possibilitatem creaturae, secundum quod participat magis et minus de natura spiritualitatis. Nam nihil est omnino spirituale nisi solus Deus, sicut dicit Augustinus de Moribus Ecclesiae12: «Solus Deus est incorporeus, quia omnia replet». Creaturae autem quaedam sunt spirituales per abstractionem, ut universale et numerus; et istae possunt esse in pluribus propter communitatem ad plura, et ita secundum sui plurificationem. Quaedam spirituales sunt per separationem a materia corporali, ut animae13; et istae sunt in pluribus, tamen non multiplicatis. Quaedam autem spirituales per unionem, ut corpus Christi est cibus spiritualis naturae, quamvis sit verum corpus, et ideo quasi est medium inter animam et Deum, et ideo in quantum cibus plus sapit naturam spiritualitatis; et ideo est in pluribus, ut sunt plura loca, non tamen in omnibus, quia ratio cibationis non se extendit ad omnia. Et sic patet, quare sub Sacramento est in pluribus.

Ad 5. Quod obiicitur de inseparabiliter unitis, solvendum est per interemptionem14, cum alterum excedit alterum, ut patet in genere et specie. Quod obiicitur, per unionem homo est Deus; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur per communicationem idiomatum; similiter et esse ubique convenit per idiomatum communicationem.

Scholion

I. Quatuor conditiones, quae soli divinae ubiquitati conveniunt, ex ipsa eminentia divinae perfectionis resultant, et facile intelliguntur per argumenta ad opposita. — Verba in solut. ad 2: «quot sunt aures, tot sunt voces», intelligendae sunt de speciebus in medio et in organo receptis, non de ipsa voce. Eadem fere solutio quaestionis et obiectionum invenitur apud Alexandrum Hal., S. Thomam, Richardum a Med. aliosque.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 8. a. 4; Quodlib. II. q. I. a. I. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. a. 3. q. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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English Translation
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Article II.

To be everywhere is proper to God.

Consequently, with regard to the second article, it is asked whether to be everywhere is proper to God. And because proper is what belongs to one alone and always1, two questions are accordingly asked here. First, whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone. Second, whether it belongs to him always or from eternity.

Question I.

Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone.

That, however, it belongs to God alone is shown thus.

1. Augustine in the book On the Symbol2: «To be everywhere is to be God»; but to be God belongs to no creature, indeed this is most properly God's own: therefore to be everywhere belongs to no creature.

2. Likewise, Ambrose in the book On the Holy Spirit3: «Since every creature is circumscribed by certain limits of its own nature, to be everywhere and in all things is proper to divinity and dominion».

3. Likewise, this same thing appears by reason: because every creature, existing per se and in itself, is this something4; but every this something is singular, and every singular is here and now, and nothing of such a nature is to be everywhere: therefore to be everywhere belongs to God alone.

4. Likewise, this condition by which God is everywhere belongs to God by reason of his immensity; but immensity is a property of God alone, which can belong to no creature: therefore neither can being everywhere.

On the contrary:

1. It is objected concerning the universal, since the universal is always and everywhere5, and yet is not God. — If you say that it is everywhere with respect to its singulars and not simply; then it is objected that there is some universal whose singulars are everywhere, and it is impossible for anything to come about which is not its singular or in a singular, as this universal substance: therefore it is everywhere.

2. Likewise, it is objected concerning number, which is in all beings, and nothing can come about in which there is no number6; and besides, in all beings there is one number: therefore since number is not God, to be everywhere is not proper to God alone. — If you say that it is not there as a whole, but according to part and part; it is objected concerning the voice, which is whole in the ears of various people and whole in the whole air: suppose that the voice were so great that it were heard throughout the whole world, then it would be everywhere whole and one. Proof7: because if many, since the parts of the air are infinite, and the voice is in any given part: then there would actually be infinite voices; which is impossible.

3. Likewise, it is objected concerning the soul, which is whole in any given

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part of the animal, as has been shown above8: suppose then that there came to be a giant animal as great as the whole world, then the soul would be everywhere: therefore that it is not so, this is on account of the defect of the body, and not its own. — If you say that it is in many things as in one place, whence one soul is never except in one body; it is objected concerning the body of Christ, which is whole and entire in different distinct altars.

4. Likewise, it is objected by reason. For since it is of the nature of a singular to be here and now, nevertheless to some God grants always-being, as to the Angels: therefore by parity of reasoning he will grant to some to be everywhere.

5. Likewise, if any two are inseparably united, wherever the one is, the other is also; but the human and the divine nature in Christ are inseparably united: therefore where the divine is9, the human also is. But the divine nature is everywhere: therefore the human also, and so on.

Conclusion.

To God alone properly and singularly does it belong to be everywhere.

I respond: It must be said that to be everywhere, as the Saints say, belongs to God alone properly and singularly, in such a way that it belongs to no other, nor can it be understood to belong, if rightly understood10. — For God is said to be everywhere in such a way that on the side of God identity and totality are understood, and on the side of place plurality and universality. By the condition of identity, the universal is excluded, which, although it is in all singulars, is so according to one supposit and another, and thus numbered. By the condition of totality, number is excluded; for although number is everywhere, it is so according to one part and another. By the condition of plurality on the side of place, the created spirit is excluded, which, although it is in many parts of the body, is nevertheless not11 in all except as united. By the condition of universality, the body of Christ under the Sacrament is excluded, which, although it is in many, is yet not in all nor can be, because this belongs to it only under the Sacrament.

To the arguments on the opposite side:

To 1, 2, 3. And thus the first instances are clear. As for what is objected concerning the voice, it is to be understood that the generation of sensibles in the medium is by diffusion, whence the voice is not numbered, just as light is not, except according to the numbering of the recipient — whence as many ears as there are, so many voices, since the voice in the air was multipliable, and not multiplied — and so it is clear that it is neither whole everywhere before numbering, just as diffused light is not, nor the same after numbering. And therefore the example concerning the existence of voice is not very similar to God.

To 4. As for what is objected, that God grants sempiternity; it must be said that both being everywhere and being always import a certain infinity; and the infinity of sempiternity is the infinity of duration, which is according to potency; and this is not repugnant to the creature, because it does not impede the duration of the creature from being finite in act and infinite in potency; and therefore to every duration of the creature it is necessary that something be added. But to be everywhere expresses immensity in act, because it imports a simultaneity of places: and this is repugnant to the creature, and therefore cannot be wholly communicated to it. Yet it is communicated according to the possibility of the creature, according as it participates more and less in the nature of spirituality. For nothing is wholly spiritual except God alone, as Augustine says On the Morals of the Church12: «God alone is incorporeal, because he fills all things». Now of creatures, some are spiritual by abstraction, as the universal and number; and these can be in many on account of their commonness to many, and so according to their being multiplied. Some are spiritual by separation from corporeal matter, as souls13; and these are in many, yet not multiplied. And some are spiritual by union, as the body of Christ is the food of spiritual nature, although it is a true body, and so is, as it were, a mean between the soul and God, and therefore inasmuch as it is food it has more of the nature of spirituality; and therefore it is in many, as there are many places, yet not in all, because the account of feeding does not extend to all. And so it is clear why it is in many under the Sacrament.

To 5. What is objected concerning things inseparably united must be solved by interemption14, when the one exceeds the other, as is clear in genus and species. As for what is objected, that by union man is God; it must be said that this is understood by communication of idioms; and likewise to be everywhere belongs by communication of idioms.

Scholion

I. The four conditions which belong to the divine ubiquity alone result from the very eminence of the divine perfection, and are easily understood through the arguments to the opposite. — The words in the solution to argument 2: «as many as the ears, so many the voices», are to be understood concerning the species received in the medium and in the organ, not concerning the voice itself. Almost the same solution of the question and of the objections is found in Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas, Richard of Middleton, and others.

II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 8. a. 4; Quodlib. II. q. I. a. I. — B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 55. a. 3. q. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. — Ægid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic p. I. q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Secundum Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4, et V. c. I, et Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio quatuor modis sumi potest proprium: vel quod convenit soli, sed non omni; vel omni, sed non soli; vel soli et omni, sed non semper; vel soli et omni et semper. Hic proprium quarto modo sumitur vel, ut dici solet, in sensu stricto.
    According to Aristotle, Topics I c. 4 and V c. 1, and Porphyry, On the Predicables c. On the Proper, proprium can be taken in four ways: either what belongs to one alone, but not to every [member]; or to every, but not to one alone; or to one alone and to every, but not always; or to one alone and to every and always. Here proprium is taken in the fourth way, or, as is customarily said, in the strict sense.
  2. Ad Catechumenos (Serm. III.), c. 7. n. 7: Hoc est enim esse Deum, ubique esse totum.
    To the Catechumens (Sermon III), c. 7 n. 7: For this is to be God, to be everywhere whole.
  3. Libr. I. c. 7. n. 81. Cfr. hic Lit. Magistri, c. I. In textu hic allato pro divinitatis Vat. cum cod. cc Dei virtutis, et subinde pro dominationis plures codd. cum ed. 1 durationis.
    Book I c. 7 n. 81. Cf. here the Letter of the Master, c. I. In the text here cited, in place of divinitatis the Vatican [edition] with codex cc reads Dei virtutis, and further for dominationis several codices with edition 1 read durationis.
  4. Sive substantia. Cfr. supra pag. 620, nota 3. — Quod attinet ad minorem, ex Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Substantia notentur haec: «Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare. In primis (i. e. singularibus) igitur substantiis indubitabile et verum est, quod hoc aliquid significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis (i. e. generibus et speciebus) videtur quidem similiter... non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significant; neque enim unum est quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de multis homo dicitur et animal».
    Or substance. Cf. above p. 620, note 3. — As regards the minor premise, from Aristotle, Categories c. On Substance, note these: «Every substance, however, seems to signify this something. In primary substances (i. e. singulars) it is therefore indubitable and true that they signify this something. For what is signified is an individual and one in number. In secondary substances (i. e. genera and species) it seems indeed similar... yet it is not true, but rather they signify a certain quale; for what is the subject is not one, as in the first substance, but man and animal are said of many».
  5. Et I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.) ait: Neque per sensum est scire; si enim est sensus talis huius (i. e. singularis rei) et non huius alicuius (i. e. universalis); sed sentire hoc aliquid est necesse, et ubi et nunc. Universale autem, quod est in omnibus, impossibile est sentire; neque enim hoc aliquid est, neque nunc neque ubi; neque enim utique esset universale; quod enim semper est et ubique universale dicimus esse.
    And the Posterior Analytics I c. 24 (c. 31) says: Nor is it [possible] to know through sense; for if such-and-such a sense is of this (i. e. of a singular thing) and not of some [universal] thing (i. e. of a universal); but to sense is necessarily of this something, and where and when. The universal, however, which is in all, is impossible to sense; for it is neither this something, nor now nor where; for it would not in any way be universal; for what we call universal is what is always and everywhere.
  6. Vide notam praecedentem.
    See the preceding note.
  7. Nam quodlibet ens productum, eo ipso quod est singulare, erit numero unum. — Sequenti propositioni haec subiecta est sententia: in omnibus entibus collective sumtis est numerus determinatus. — In conclusione post ergo cum cod. T repetit unus.
    For any produced being, by the very fact that it is singular, will be one in number. — To the following proposition this sense underlies: in all beings taken collectively there is a determined number. — In the conclusion after ergo it repeats, with codex T, unus.
  8. Pro Probatio Vat. prolatio, quam vocem, suppresso puncto antecedenti, cum verbis et una immediate coniungit. Mox post parte cod. V interserit aeris.
    For Probatio the Vatican [edition reads] prolatio, which word, with the preceding period suppressed, it joins immediately with the words et una. Soon after parte codex V inserts aeris.
  9. Supple cum Vat. est.
    Supply with the Vatican [edition] est.
  10. Cod. Z intelligatur, cod. W addit esse. — Paulo post pro quasi cod. T cum aliquibus aliis codd. ut, et in fine argumenti pro suum cod. K minuit.
    Codex Z [reads] intelligatur; codex W adds esse. — A little later, in place of quasi codex T with some other codices reads ut, and at the end of the argument in place of suum codex K reads minuit.
  11. Cod. T subiicit est.
    Codex T subjoins est.
  12. Verba citata in libro de Moribus Ecclesiae non habentur, sed in Gennadii libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus (qui olim nomini Augustini addicebatur) c. 11 sic legitur: Nihil incorporeum et invisibile natura credendum, nisi solum Deum Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum; qui ex eo incorporeus creditur, quia ubique est et omnia implet et constringit.
    The words cited are not found in the book On the Morals of the Church, but in Gennadius's book On Ecclesiastical Doctrines (which was formerly attributed to the name of Augustine) c. 11 it reads thus: Nothing is to be believed incorporeal and invisible by nature, except only God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; who is believed to be incorporeal because he is everywhere and fills and contains all things.
  13. Vat. cum cod. cc animae.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc reads animae.
  14. Cfr. supra pag. 87, nota 4. — Sive unio. (i. e. interemptio sive unio per quam alterum exceditur ab altero, ut in genere et specie.)
    Cf. above p. 87, note 4. — That is, union. (I. e., interemption or union by which one is exceeded by the other, as in genus and species.)
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