Dist. 37, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 37
Quaestio II.
Utrum esse ubique ab aeterno Deo conveniat.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, utrum esse ubique conveniat Deo semper sive aeternaliter. Et quod sic, videtur:
1. Quia, sicut semper se habet ad tempus, ita ubique ad locum; sed ante omne tempus Deus fuit semper: ergo ante omnem locum Deus fuit ubique.
2. Item, proprium Dei essentialius ei convenit quam propria passio alicui subiecto; sed propter necessariam convenientiam passionis ad subiectum distributio suppositorum includit distributionem temporum1 — unde « dici de omni est, quod non est in quodam sic, in quodam non, nec aliquando sic, aliquando non », sed in quolibet et semper — ergo similiter hoc quod est ubique includit sempiternitatem: ergo esse ubique semper convenit Deo, ergo ab aeterno.
3. Item, res sunt in Deo, et Deus in rebus, sed res sunt in Deo ab aeterno: ergo a relativis, cum dicantur haec ad convertentiam2, Deus est in rebus ab aeterno, sed non nisi in omnibus: ergo etc.
Si dicas, quod non dicuntur correlative: contra: cum dicitur: Deus est in rebus, non significatur respectus nec dependentia Dei ad res, sed rerum ad Deum: ergo nihil aliud est dicere, Deum esse in rebus, quam res esse in Deo.
4. Item, si Deus non fuit ubique ab aeterno, et fuit, ergo fuit alibi quam ubique; et modo est ubique: ergo mutavit locum, ergo in Deo cadit mutatio. Sed hoc falsum: ergo et primum. Si tu dicas, quod mutatio est in connotato3; contra: cum dicitur: Deus est in loco, non notatur effectus, sed solum Dei praesentia: ergo videtur, quod secundum hoc non significetur mutatio in connotato, sed solum in ipso Deo: restat ergo per impossibile, quod Deus est ubique aeternaliter.
Contra:
1. Ubique praesupponit ubi, et ubi praesupponit locum; et locum non est ponere nisi ex tempore: ergo et Deum esse ubique, non est ponere nisi ex tempore.
2. Item, bene sequitur: Deus est ubique, ergo est in caelo; ergo destructo consequente, destruitur et antecedens; sed ab aeterno non fuit in caelo: ergo etc.
3. Item, bene sequitur: Deus est ubique, ergo in ista domo; sed ista domus non fuit nisi ex tempore et post initium temporis: ergo et esse ubique.
Conclusio.
Esse ubique convenit Deo ab initio rerum et locorum, qui connotantur, non aeternaliter, nisi per esse ubique intelligatur praesentialitas divinae immensitatis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod esse ubique dupliciter potest accipi de Deo, sicut et esse semper. Uno enim modo semper importat divinam immensitatem secundum durationem, et sic idem est quod aeternitas, et convenit Deo aeternaliter; alio modo connotat simultatem temporis, et sic convenit ei a principio temporis. Sic esse ubique uno modo importat praesentialitatem divinae immensitatis, per
quam est praesens omni ei quod est, sive sibi, sive alii; et sic idem est Deum esse ubique quod Deum esse immensum. Et sic convenit Deo aeternaliter, et secundum hoc procedit prima ratio.
Alio modo, prout connotat locum creatum sive rem; et tunc convenit ei ab initio rerum et locorum propter connotatum, et convenit semper; et adhuc est proprium, quia convenit soli, et semper uno modo, licet non aeternaliter; sicut etiam in demonstrativis4. Et sic procedit secunda ratio. Et iste modus accipiendi Deum esse ubique est usitatior, et secundum hunc modum non convenit ei aeternaliter.
3. Quod vero obiicitur contra hoc, quod conveniat aeternaliter per suam conversam5; dicendum, quod non est sua conversa. Cum enim dicitur, quod res sunt in Deo, hoc intelligitur ratione exemplaritatis, et nihil connotatur actu; sed cum dicitur Deus esse in rebus, connotatur aliquid creatum. Nam nihil est in eo6 quod non est: ergo si Deus est in rebus et locis, res et loca sunt; non-ens tamen secundum se bene est in exemplari tanquam in principio. Unde haec: Deus est in rebus, non est conversa huius: res sunt in Deo, sed haec: Deus est exemplar rerum, et utraque est vera aeternaliter. Et huius: Deus est in rebus conversa est: res continentur a Deo et conservantur ab ipso.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si Deus non fuit ubique, et modo est, ergo est mutatus; dicendum, quod non sequitur, quia hoc non est propter mutationem Dei7.
Quod obiicitur, quod ubique non connotat effectum, sed solum praesentiam; dicendum, quod praesentia importat habitudinem ad duo, scilicet eius qui praesens est, et cui est praesens, et ideo potest esse inceptio ratione rei cui praesens est, non novi effectus.
Quod obiicitur ad oppositum, procedit secundum quod ubique connotat locum creatum.
Quod tamen ultimo obiicitur, non valet, immo est ibi fallacia accidentis, sicut hic: iste triangulus incipit habere tres: non ergo omnis triangulus semper habuit tres, quia non fit distributio pro partibus8 ut nunc, sed simpliciter.
I. Conclusiones facile intelliguntur, supposita illa distinctione circa sensum vocabulorum esse ubique et esse semper. In sensu absoluto, qui sensus est minus usitatus (ad 2.), primum significat divinam immensitatem, quatenus importat praesentiam in habere et eo primo et per se; in sensu vero usitatiore (ad 1. contra) connotat etiam locum creatum, et tunc esse ubique idem est ac esse in omni loco creato. Simili modo esse semper significat vel absolute aeternitatem, vel connotando tempus et supponendo initium temporis. — Ultimum argum. pro parte negativa merito reiicitur propter fallaciam accidentis, quae committitur, quando id quod vere praedicatur de subiecto respectu accidentis, quod habet, praedicatur etiam de subiecto qua tali. Ita in exemplo proposito, quando in tabula delineatur triangulus, verum est, sed tantum per accidens, quod ista figura incipit habere tres angulos, sed absolute ab aeterno competit triangulo habere tres angulos. Eodem modo in illo argumento falso fit transitus a sensu per accidens propositionis: Deus est ubique, ad sensum absolutum eiusdem, sicut hic: Deus est in rebus. De differentia harum propositionum cfr. supra d. 36. dub. 1, et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3, et Aegid. Rom., hic. — S. Thomas (hic q. 2. a. 3. ad 2.) aliique esse ubique accipiunt solummodo in sensu usitatiore, quatenus connotat locum creatum; unde maiorem in arg. 1. pro parte affirm. non distinguunt, sed simpliciter negant. Tamen in ipsa doctrina non est differentia.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 3; S. 1. q. 8. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. ad 5. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic a. 2. in princ.
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Question II.
Whether being everywhere belongs to God from eternity.
Secondly it is asked whether being everywhere belongs to God always or eternally. And that it does, it seems:
1. Because, just as "always" stands to time, so "everywhere" stands to place; but before all time God always was: therefore before all place God was everywhere.
2. Likewise, what is proper to God belongs to him more essentially than a proper attribute (propria passio) belongs to any subject; but on account of the necessary suitability of the attribute to the subject, the distribution of supposits includes the distribution of times1 — whence "to be said of every is what is not in some thus, in some not so, nor at one time so and at another not so," but in any whatsoever and always — therefore likewise the term everywhere includes everlastingness: therefore being everywhere belongs to God always, therefore from eternity.
3. Likewise, things are in God, and God is in things, but things are in God from eternity: therefore from the relatives, since these are said by way of conversion2, God is in things from eternity, but only in all things: therefore etc.
If you say that they are not predicated correlatively: on the contrary: when one says God is in things, no relation or dependence of God on things is signified, but rather of things on God: therefore to say "God is in things" is nothing other than to say "things are in God."
4. Likewise, if God was not everywhere from eternity, and now is, therefore he was elsewhere than everywhere; and now he is everywhere: therefore he changed place, therefore change falls in God. But this is false: therefore so too is the first. If you say that the change is in the connoted term3; on the contrary: when one says God is in a place, no effect is noted but only the presence of God: therefore it seems that according to this no change is signified in the connoted term, but only in God himself: it remains then by impossible inference that God is everywhere eternally.
On the contrary:
1. Everywhere presupposes where, and where presupposes place; and place is not to be posited except from time: therefore neither is God's being everywhere to be posited except from time.
2. Likewise, the inference is sound: God is everywhere, therefore he is in heaven; therefore with the consequent destroyed, the antecedent too is destroyed; but from eternity he was not in heaven: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the inference is sound: God is everywhere, therefore in this house; but this house was not except from time and after the beginning of time: therefore neither was being everywhere.
Conclusion.
Being everywhere belongs to God from the beginning of things and places that are connoted, not eternally, unless by being everywhere is understood the presentiality of the divine immensity.
I respond: It must be said that being everywhere can be taken of God in two ways, just as being always. For in one way always imports the divine immensity according to duration, and so it is the same as eternity, and belongs to God eternally; in another way it connotes simultaneity with time, and so belongs to him from the beginning of time. Likewise being everywhere in one way imports the presentiality of the divine immensity, by
which he is present to everything that is, whether to himself or to another; and so it is the same to say God is everywhere as God is immense. And in this way it belongs to God eternally, and according to this the first reason proceeds.
In another way, insofar as it connotes a created place or thing; and then it belongs to him from the beginning of things and places on account of the connoted term, and belongs always; and even so it is proper, because it belongs to him alone, and always in one way, although not eternally; just as also in demonstratives4. And in this way the second reason proceeds. And this way of taking God is everywhere is the more usual, and according to this way it does not belong to him eternally.
3. As to what is objected against this — that it would belong eternally through its converse5 — it must be said that it is not its converse. For when it is said that things are in God, this is understood by reason of exemplarity, and nothing is connoted in act; but when it is said that God is in things, something created is connoted. For nothing is in him6 which is not: therefore if God is in things and places, things and places are; non-being, however, is in itself well in the exemplar as in a principle. Hence this proposition: God is in things, is not the converse of this: things are in God, but rather this: God is the exemplar of things — and both are true eternally. And the converse of God is in things is: things are contained by God and conserved by him.
4. To that which is objected — that if God was not everywhere, and now is, therefore he is changed — it must be said that this does not follow, because this is not on account of any change of God7.
To what is objected, that everywhere does not connote an effect, but only presence; it must be said that presence imports a relation to two terms, namely to him who is present, and to that to which he is present; and therefore there can be a beginning by reason of the thing to which he is present, not of any new effect.
What is objected on the opposite side proceeds insofar as everywhere connotes a created place.
What is finally objected does not hold; rather, there is here a fallacy of accident, just as in this: this triangle begins to have three [angles]: therefore not every triangle has always had three — because the distribution is not made for the parts8 as now, but absolutely.
I. The conclusions are easily understood, given that distinction concerning the sense of the words being everywhere and being always. In the absolute sense — which sense is less usual (cf. ad 2) — the first signifies the divine immensity, inasmuch as it imports presence in having and in that (eo) primarily and per se; but in the more usual sense (ad 1 contra) it also connotes a created place, and then being everywhere is the same as being in every created place. Likewise being always signifies either eternity absolutely, or, by connoting time and supposing a beginning of time. — The last argument on the negative side is rightly rejected on account of the fallacy of accident, which is committed when that which is truly predicated of a subject in respect of an accident which it has, is also predicated of the subject as such. So in the example proposed: when a triangle is drawn upon a tablet, it is true, but only per accidens, that this figure begins to have three angles; but absolutely from eternity it belongs to the triangle to have three angles. In the same way, in that argument, a false transition is made from the per accidens sense of the proposition God is everywhere to its absolute sense, just as here: God is in things. On the difference of these propositions cf. above d. 36 dub. 1, and Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 9, m. 3, and Aegidius Romanus, here. — St. Thomas (here q. 2 a. 3 ad 2) and others take being everywhere only in the more usual sense, insofar as it connotes a created place; whence in the major in arg. 1 on the affirmative side they do not distinguish but simply deny. Yet in the doctrine itself there is no difference.
II. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 9, m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 3; Summa I, q. 8 a. 4. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1 q. 3 ad 5. — Aegidius Romanus, here princ. 2 q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here a. 2 in principio.
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- Sensus est: sed propria passio rei creatae non convenit tantum omni et soli, sed etiam semper. Cfr. supra pag. 642, nota 1. De notione distributionis vide supra pag. 99, Scholion, 1. n. 2. — Verba, quae mox citantur, sunt ex Aristot., I. Poster. c. 4. Cfr. etiam V. Topic. c. I.The sense is: a proper attribute of a created thing belongs not only to every and only [its subject], but also always. Cf. above p. 642, note 1. On the notion of distributio see above p. 99, Scholion 1, n. 2. — The words quoted just now are from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, c. 4. Cf. also Topics V, c. I.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Relatione. — Verbis [...] relativis significatur modus argumentandi, qui nititur in habitudine unius relativorum ad alterum, et generaliter exprimitur his propositionibus: posito uno relativorum, ponitur et reliquum: remoto uno relativorum, removetur et reliquum.Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Relation. — By the words [...] of relatives is signified the mode of arguing which rests on the relation of one of the relatives to the other, and is generally expressed in these propositions: if one of the relatives is posited, the other is also posited; if one of the relatives is removed, the other is also removed.
- Cod. Z connotatum.Codex Z reads connotatum.
- Simul audi: scientiis suo modo est. In his enim propria passio monstratur semper inesse sive convenire subiecto, licet sit quid creatum. Ad hoc ait Boeth., in Comment. in Aristotelis libr. de Interpretatione, edit. secund. libr. III. in principio: Aliae vero sunt (propositiones), quae non sempiterna significantes, sunt tamen et ipsae necessariae, quousque illa subiecta sunt, de quibus propositio aliquid affirmat aut negat, ut cum dico: homo mortalis est, quamdiu homo est, tamdiu hominem mortalem esse necesse est. Nam si quis dicat: ignis calidus est quamdiu est ignis, tamdiu ex necessitate vera est propositio. Paulo inferius pro non convenit ei aeternaliter aliqui codd., ut I Z, convenit ei temporaliter.At the same time hear: it is in the demonstrative sciences in its own way. For in these the proper attribute is shown to inhere or belong to the subject always, even though it be something created. To this Boethius says, in his Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation, second edition, book III, at the beginning: "There are other [propositions] which, though not signifying eternal things, are nevertheless themselves necessary, so long as those subjects exist of which the proposition affirms or denies something — as when I say: man is mortal: as long as man is, so long is it necessary that man be mortal. For if one should say: fire is hot, as long as it is fire, just so long is the proposition by necessity true." A little further below, for non convenit ei aeternaliter some codices, such as I and Z, read convenit ei temporaliter.
- Nempe propositio: res sunt in Deo, non idem significat ac haec: Deus est in rebus. De differentia harum propositionum cfr. supra d. 36. dub. 1, et Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 9. m. 3, et Aegid. Rom., hic. — Mox pro X Z nihil tamen, et nihil codd.Namely, the proposition things are in God does not signify the same as this: God is in things. On the difference between these propositions cf. above d. 36, dub. 1, and Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 9, m. 3, and Giles of Rome, here. — Just below, for nihil tamen, codd. X Z and nihil read otherwise.
- Multi codd. cum edd. 2, 3 perperam in Deo; codd. FL Nam in nullo est Deus.Many codices with editions 2 and 3 read, wrongly, in Deo; codices F and L read For God is in nothing.
- Vat. cum paucis mss. addit sed rerum.The Vatican edition with a few mss. adds sed rerum ("but of things").
- Ita fere omnes codd.; cod. S pro rebus, cod. T a prima manu in rebus, Vat. cum cod. cc de tribus. Sensus nostrae lectionis est: distributio per signum omnis refertur ad partes subiectivas (sive inferiores sub toto universali), prout sunt simpliciter secundum earum naturam, non prout fiunt hic et nunc, v. g. triangulus formatur. — Paulo superius Vat. sola fuit pro fit.So nearly all the codices; cod. S reads rebus, cod. T at first hand reads in rebus, the Vatican with cod. cc reads de tribus. The sense of our reading is: the distribution by the sign omnis refers to the subjective parts (or lower [members] under the universal whole), insofar as they are taken absolutely according to their nature, not insofar as they come to be here and now — e.g., a triangle is formed. — A little above, the Vatican reads sola fuit in place of fit.