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Dist. 24, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
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Quaestio II. Utrum superior et inferior portio potentiarum sint diversae potentiae.

Secundo quaeritur de illa divisione potentiarum animae, quae est per superiorem et inferiorem portionem; et est quaestio, utrum superior portio et inferior sint diversae potentiae. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Sicut dicit Augustinus duodecimo de Trinitate1, inter superiorem portionem rationis et inferiorem est coniugium, quia haec dicitur vir, et illa dicitur mulier; sed non est coniugium eiusdem ad se, sed diversi ad diversum: cum igitur inter haec duo sit coniugium, in quantum sunt potentiae, ergo in genere potentiae sunt diversae.

2. Item, sicut in pluribus locis in libro de Trinitate2 dicit Augustinus, imago non consistit in ratione quantum ad inferiorem partem, sed quantum ad superiorem; sed esse ad imaginem non est accidens potentiis animae, sed est eis essentiale: cum igitur superior portio et inferior differant per esse ad imaginem et non esse ad imaginem, videtur, quod sint potentiae per essentiam diversae.

3. Item, sicut vult Augustinus3, superior portio se habet ad inferiorem, sicut regens ad rectum; regens autem et rectum sunt ad invicem relative opposita: si ergo relative opposita non possunt esse circa idem, necesse est, aliam esse potentiam quae regit, aliam quae regitur.

4. Item, nihil secundum idem agit et patitur4; sed superioris portionis est movere inferiorem, et inferioris est moveri: ergo impossibile est, quod concurrant in eandem potentiam: ergo etc.

5. Item, si ratio superior et inferior non differrent, nisi quia haec intendit aeternis, et illa intendit temporalibus5, ergo non plus differrent, quam oculus aspiciens sursum et aspiciens deorsum; sed nullo modo dividitur oculus in superiorem et inferiorem, pro eo quod aspicit sursum et deorsum: ergo nec ratio sic dividi deberet. Si ergo dividitur, ergo ratio superior et inferior non differunt tantum penes actus et aspectus, sed etiam penes id quod sunt.

6. Item, si solum penes aspectus diversos et actus esset ibi differentia, cum ratio Angeli aspiciat et superiora et inferiora, videtur, quod deberet dividi in superiorem et inferiorem; sed talis divisio in potentiis Angeli non consuevit assignari: amplius ergo differunt quam secundum actus et aspectus: ergo redit idem quod prius, quod sunt diversae potentiae secundum id quod sunt.

Sed contra: 1. Augustinus dicit duodecimo de Trinitate6: « Cum disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus; nec eam per haec duo, quae commemoravi, nisi per officia geminamus » — sermo praecesserat de superiori portione rationis et inferiori — ergo etc.

2. Item, « anima, sicut dicit Philosophus7, secundum intellectum quodam modo est omnia »; sed hoc non esset, nisi potentia intellectiva, cum sit una, nata esset cognoscere omnia: si ergo dicitur ratio superior, in quantum cognoscit superiora, et inferior, in quantum cognoscit inferiora, ergo non est alia et alia potentia.

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3. Item, idem est habitus, qui dirigit animam ad amorem Dei et proximi, utpote caritas8: ergo multo fortius eadem potentia, qua convertimur ad Deum et ad proximum; sed haec est ratio superior et inferior: ergo etc.

4. Item, lux increata se habet ad creaturas, sicut se habet lux solis ad colores, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloquiorum9; sed eadem est potentia sensitiva, qua cognoscimus tam lucem quam colorem: si ergo intellectiva potentia multo largior est et liberior quam potentia sensitiva, videtur, quod una et eadem potentia sit, qua convertatur anima ad lucem aeternam et ad haec temporalia.

Conclusio. Portio superior et inferior non sunt diversae potentiae, sed differunt secundum dispositiones atque officia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod divisio rationis in superiorem portionem et inferiorem non est adeo per diversa membra, ut haec et illa sit potentia alia et alia, sicut rationes ostendunt ad secundam partem inductae; nec est per membra ita convenientia, ut non sit in eis differentia nisi solum secundum aspectus. Est enim differentia in eis secundum dispositiones et secundum officia: secundum dispositiones, quia haec fortis et illa debilis; secundum officia, quia haec regit et illa regitur. Ratione diversae dispositionis in debilitate et fortitudine haec vocatur vir, et illa mulier; ratione diversitatis in officio et regimine haec vocatur superior, quia regit, et illa inferior, quia regitur.

Talis autem dispositionum diversitas ortum habet non ex diversitate naturae, sed ex diversa comparatione eiusdem potentiae. Dum enim ratio nostra ad superiora convertitur, purgatur et illuminatur et perficitur; dum leges aeternas conspicit et immutabilitatem divinae virtutis et aequitatis, in bono fortificatur et vigoratur; dum autem ad haec inferiora convertitur, utpote ad sensibilitatem1012 et carnem, quodam modo trahitur et emollitur. Et ideo sunt eiusdem naturae ratio superior et inferior, differentes secundum fortitudinis et debilitatis dispositionem. — Et quia una oritur ab altera et ei coniungitur tanquam adiutorium simile sibi1113; recte haec dicitur vir, et illa dicitur mulier, et inter eas dicitur esse coniugium.

Diversitas autem officiorum similiter non venit ex diversitate naturarum, sed ex diversitate dispositionum. Quia enim haec fortis est et illa debilis, haec intelligens et consulens divinam voluntatem, illa vero opere exsequens; ideo haec regit et illa regitur, et ex hoc illa superior et ista inferior appellatur.

Et sic patet, quod superior portio rationis et inferior, etsi aliquo modo recte condividantur, tamen diversae potentiae non sunt — ista enim membra, videlicet superius et inferius, essentiam potentiae non variant — sed dispositiones et officia; et hoc insinuant ipsa nomina.

Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa: 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de coniugio, iam patet responsio. Hoc enim dictum est relative, non quia ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae, sicut vir et mulier sunt diversae14 personae, sed quia, cum una ab altera educatur, natura tamen non differunt, sed sibi invicem coniunguntur quasi ad mutuum obsequium.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod haec est ad imaginem et illa non; dicendum, quod cum negamus, inferiorem portionem rationis esse ad imaginem, non hoc dicimus, quia imago non sit in illa potentia, sed quia non attenditur secundum conversionem illam. Unde non removetur ratio imaginis a portione inferiori, secundum id quod est imago et secundum id quod est ratio, sed solum secundum comparationem superadditam15.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod regens et rectum sunt opposita; dicendum, quod verum est; sed ex hoc non sequitur diversitas in spirituali potentia, in ea maxime, quae nata est reflecti super se ipsam; et talis est ratio et voluntas16. — Quod ergo obiicitur, quod relative opposita non possunt esse circa idem; dicendum, quod verum est secundum idem et ad idem; cum autem aliquid comparatur ad diversa, nihil impedit in eo simul reperiri relationes mutuas sine repugnantia et oppositione. — Praeterea, illud habet locum in relativis secundum esse, et non secundum dici17.

4. Et per hoc patet responsio ad illud quod sequitur, quod nihil secundum idem agit et patitur. Hoc verum est de actione et passione physica; de passione autem spirituali, qua dicimus, idem a se moveri et regi, veritatem non habet, cum dicat Anselmus18 « voluntatem esse instrumentum se ipsum movens ».

5. 6. Ad duo ultima iam patet responsio. Concedo enim, quod illa divisio non solum attenditur secundum diversitatem in aspectu, sed etiam in dispositione et officio, quae non reperitur in Angelo, vel in oculo, sicut patet per ea quae praedicta sunt. Et ista sufficiant.

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Scholion

I. « Intellectus, in quantum contemplatur incommutabilem veritatem, dicitur portio rationis superior; in quantum autem contemplatur ista inferiora ad ministrandum, quamvis recte, dicitur portio inferior... Super mentem nostram sunt quaedam regulae incommutabiliter manentes, quibus recte approbamus vel improbamus, quae nos contingit recte approbare vel improbare ». Ita Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 4.), qui pro ultima assertione citat August., IX. et XII. de Trinitate. — Hinc iam patet, quod haec divisio intellectus non coincidit cum distinctione intellectus speculativi et practici, ut expresse observat S. Thom. (hic q. 2. a. 2.), « quasi ad diversa obiecta respiciant, de quibus fiat ratiocinatio; sed magis distinguuntur secundum media, unde ratiocinatio sumitur. Ratio enim inferior consiliatur, ad electionem tendens, ex rationibus rerum temporalium, ut quod aliquid est superfluum vel diminutum; utile vel honestum... Superior vero consilium sumit ex rationibus aeternis et divinis ». — Nec ratio superior est omnino idem cum illa parte mentis, in qua consistit imago; nam ad invicem se habent « ut excedentia et excessa », ut idem explanat loc. cit. ad 3. — De variis modis, quibus potentiae dividi possunt, cfr. seq. quaest. in corp.

II. In conclusione omnes antiqui Scholastici conveniunt; sed quoad ipsam determinationem intellectus superioris Durand. (hic q. 4.) ab aliis discedit asserens, quod ratio superior sit « deducens aliquid ex principiis per revelationem habitis », inferior vero « deducens practice vel speculative aliquid ex principiis naturaliter cognitis ». — Scot. autem, eandem distinctionem explicite adhibet non tantum quoad rationem sed generalius agit de eadem divisione respectu memoriae, intellectus et voluntatis, quod alii faciunt implicite. — Quo sensu intelligenda sint verba in corp.: « Dum leges aeternas conspicit », a S. Doctore magis explanatur in Itiner. mentis in Deum, praecipue c. 3; et Hexaem., Serm. 2. 3. 4, sed clarissime sententia eius exponitur et probatur in quaest. disputata et quodam sermone, a nobis editis in libro de Humanae Cognitionis ratione.

III. Praeter citatos: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 69. m. 1. 4, q. 62. m. 5. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 79. a. 9; de Verit. q. 15. a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 10. 11; S. p. II. tr. 13. q. 93. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic p. 1. q. 2. a. 1. et dub. lat. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. — Biel, hic q. unica.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether the superior and inferior portions of the powers are diverse powers.

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning that division of the powers of the soul which is by the superior and inferior portion; and the question is whether the superior portion and the inferior are diverse powers. And that they are, it seems.

1. As Augustine says in the twelfth book of On the Trinity1, between the superior portion of reason and the inferior there is a marriage, because the one is called man and the other is called woman; but there is no marriage of the same with itself, but of one diverse with another: since therefore between these two there is a marriage, inasmuch as they are powers, therefore in the genus of power they are diverse.

2. Likewise, as Augustine says in many places in the book On the Trinity2, the image does not consist in reason as regards the inferior part, but as regards the superior; but to be according to the image is not an accident of the powers of the soul, but is essential to them: since therefore the superior portion and the inferior differ by being according to the image and not being according to the image, it seems that they are powers diverse by essence.

3. Likewise, as Augustine holds3, the superior portion stands to the inferior as ruling to ruled; but the ruling and the ruled are relatively opposed to one another: if therefore relative opposites cannot be about the same thing, it is necessary that the power which rules be one, and the power which is ruled be another.

4. Likewise, nothing acts and is acted upon according to the same thing4; but it belongs to the superior portion to move the inferior, and to the inferior to be moved: therefore it is impossible that they concur in the same power: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if superior and inferior reason did not differ except because the one is intent on eternal things and the other intent on temporal things5, then they would differ no more than an eye looking upward and an eye looking downward; but the eye is in no way divided into superior and inferior because it looks upward and downward: therefore neither ought reason to be so divided. If therefore it is divided, then superior and inferior reason do not differ only in respect of acts and aspects, but also in respect of what they are.

6. Likewise, if there were difference there only in respect of diverse aspects and acts, then since the reason of an Angel looks upon both higher and lower things, it seems that it ought to be divided into superior and inferior; but such a division is not customarily assigned in the powers of the Angel: therefore they differ more than according to acts and aspects: therefore the same returns as before, that they are diverse powers according to what they are.

On the contrary: 1. Augustine says in the twelfth book of On the Trinity6: « When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are discussing one single thing; nor do we make it twofold by these two which I have mentioned, except by their offices » — the discourse had preceded concerning the superior portion of reason and the inferior — therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « the soul, as the Philosopher says7, according to the intellect is in a certain way all things »; but this would not be so unless the intellective power, since it is one, were of a nature to know all things: if therefore reason is called superior inasmuch as it knows higher things, and inferior inasmuch as it knows lower things, then it is not one power and another.

3. Likewise, the habit which directs the soul to the love of God and of neighbor is the same, namely charity8: therefore much more strongly is the power the same by which we are turned to God and to neighbor; but this is superior and inferior reason: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the uncreated light stands to creatures as the light of the sun stands to colors, as Augustine says in the book of the Soliloquies9; but the sensitive power is the same by which we know both the light and the color: if therefore the intellective power is much more ample and freer than the sensitive power, it seems that the power is one and the same by which the soul is turned to the eternal light and to these temporal things.

Conclusion. The superior and inferior portion are not diverse powers, but differ according to dispositions and offices.

I respond: It must be said that the division of reason into the superior portion and the inferior is not so much by diverse members that the one and the other is a power distinct and distinct, as the reasons adduced for the second part show; nor is it by members so harmonious that there is no difference in them except only according to aspects. For there is a difference in them according to dispositions and according to offices: according to dispositions, because the one is strong and the other weak; according to offices, because the one rules and the other is ruled. By reason of the diverse disposition in weakness and strength the one is called man and the other woman; by reason of the diversity in office and rule the one is called superior because it rules, and the other inferior because it is ruled.

But such diversity of dispositions takes its origin not from diversity of nature, but from the diverse comparison of the same power. For when our reason is turned to higher things, it is purged and illumined and perfected; when it beholds the eternal laws and the immutability of the divine power and equity, it is fortified and invigorated in the good; but when it is turned to these lower things, namely to sensibility1012 and the flesh, it is in a certain way drawn down and softened. And therefore superior and inferior reason are of the same nature, differing according to the disposition of strength and weakness. — And because the one arises from the other and is joined to it as a helper like to itself1113; the one is rightly called man, and the other is called woman, and between them there is said to be a marriage.

But the diversity of offices likewise does not come from diversity of natures, but from diversity of dispositions. For because the one is strong and the other weak, the one understanding and consulting the divine will, the other carrying it out in work; therefore the one rules and the other is ruled, and from this the one is called superior and this other inferior.

And so it is plain that the superior portion of reason and the inferior, even though in some way they are rightly co-divided, are nevertheless not diverse powers — for these members, namely the superior and the inferior, do not vary the essence of the power — but the dispositions and offices do; and this the very names suggest.

To the arguments for the affirmative part: 1. To that, then, which is objected concerning the marriage, the response is already plain. For this was said relatively, not because superior and inferior reason are diverse powers, as man and woman are diverse14 persons, but because, since the one is brought forth from the other, yet they do not differ in nature, but are joined to one another for mutual service.

2. To that which is objected, that the one is according to the image and the other not; it must be said that when we deny that the inferior portion of reason is according to the image, we do not say this because the image is not in that power, but because it is not attended to according to that conversion. Hence the character of image is not removed from the inferior portion, according to that which is image and according to that which is reason, but only according to the superadded comparison15.

3. To that which is objected, that the ruling and the ruled are opposites; it must be said that this is true; but from this there does not follow diversity in a spiritual power, especially in one which is of a nature to reflect upon itself; and such is reason and will16. — As to what is objected, that relative opposites cannot be about the same thing; it must be said that this is true according to the same and to the same; but when something is compared to diverse things, nothing prevents mutual relations being found in it at once without conflict and opposition. — Furthermore, that holds in relatives according to being, and not according to being said17.

4. And by this the response is plain to that which follows, that nothing acts and is acted upon according to the same thing. This is true of physical action and passion; but of spiritual passion, by which we say that the same thing is moved and ruled by itself, it does not hold, since Anselm says18 « that the will is an instrument moving itself ».

5. 6. To the last two the response is already plain. For I concede that that division is attended to not only according to diversity in aspect, but also in disposition and office, which is not found in the Angel, or in the eye, as is plain from what has been said before. And let these things suffice.

Scholion

I. « The intellect, inasmuch as it contemplates the immutable truth, is called the superior portion of reason; but inasmuch as it contemplates these lower things in order to administer them, although rightly, it is called the inferior portion... Above our mind are certain rules abiding immutably, by which we rightly approve or disapprove, things which it befalls us rightly to approve or disapprove. » So Richard of Mediavilla (here a. 2, q. 4), who for the last assertion cites Augustine, On the Trinity IX and XII. — Hence it is now plain that this division of the intellect does not coincide with the distinction of speculative and practical intellect, as St. Thomas expressly observes (here q. 2, a. 2), as « regarding diverse objects about which reasoning is made; but rather they are distinguished according to the media whence the reasoning is drawn. For the inferior reason takes counsel, tending toward choice, from the grounds of temporal things, as that something is superfluous or deficient; useful or honorable... But the superior takes counsel from eternal and divine grounds. » — Nor is superior reason altogether the same as that part of the mind in which the image consists; for they stand to one another « as exceeding and exceeded », as the same author explains in the place cited, in the reply to 3. — On the various ways in which the powers can be divided, see the following question in the body.

II. In the conclusion all the ancient Scholastics agree; but as to the very determination of the superior intellect Durandus (here q. 4) departs from the others, asserting that superior reason is « deducing something from principles held by revelation », while the inferior is « deducing practically or speculatively something from principles naturally known ». — Scotus, however, employs the same distinction explicitly not only as regards reason but treats more generally of the same division with respect to memory, intellect, and will, which the others do implicitly. — In what sense the words in the body are to be understood: « When it beholds the eternal laws », is more fully explained by the Holy Doctor in the Itinerary of the Mind into God, especially c. 3; and in the Hexaemeron, Sermons 2, 3, 4, but most clearly his teaching is set forth and proved in the disputed question and a certain sermon, published by us in the book On the Manner of Human Knowledge.

III. Besides those cited: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 69, m. 1, 4; q. 62, m. 5. — Scotus, in both Scripta here, question unica. — St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 79, a. 9; On Truth q. 15, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 10, 11; Summa p. II, tr. 13, q. 93, m. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 2. — Giles of Rome, here p. 1, q. 2, a. 1, and disputed dubium 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3. — Biel, here question unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 3. et Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 87. m. 1. a. 2. §.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 3, and Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 87, m. 1, a. 2, §.
  2. Cap. 3. n. 3. et c. 12. n. 17. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 4. seqq., ubi et principia seqq. argg. habentur.
    Chapter 3, n. 3, and c. 12, n. 17. Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 4 ff., where also the principles of the following arguments are found.
  3. Libr. XII. c. 4. n. 4; c. 7. n. 10. 12. et XIV. c. 8. n. 11.
    Book XII, c. 4, n. 4; c. 7, nn. 10, 12; and XIV, c. 8, n. 11.
  4. Libr. II. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 14. n. 20. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 11. Cfr. etiam August., XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3. et c. 8. n. 13.
    Book II of On Genesis against the Manichees, c. 14, n. 20. See here the text of the Master, c. 11. Cf. also Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 3, n. 3, and c. 8, n. 13.
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 347, nota 7. Ex eodem principio Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 17. seq. (c. 5.), distinctionem intellectus agentis et possibilis derivat, de qua distinctione vide infra q. 4.
    Cf. above p. 347, note 7. From the same principle Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 17 ff. (c. 5), derives the distinction of the agent and possible intellect, on which distinction see below, q. 4.
  6. Sicut docet August., XII. de Trin. c. 3. n. 3.
    As Augustine teaches, On the Trinity XII, c. 3, n. 3.
  7. Vat. diferentia.
    The Vatican edition reads diferentia.
  8. Cap. 4. n. 4, ubi in textu originali in haec duo pro per haec duo.
    Chapter 4, n. 4, where in the original text in haec duo stands for per haec duo.
  9. Libr. III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).
    Book III of On the Soul, text 37 (c. 8).
  10. Sicut ostenditur III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 2. De minori cfr. August., XII. de Trin. c. 13. n. 21. — Paulo inferius sola Vat. post ad Deum adiungit est ad Deum.
    As is shown in III Sent., d. 27, a. 1, q. 2. On the minor cf. Augustine, On the Trinity XII, c. 13, n. 21. — A little below, the Vatican edition alone, after to God, adds is to God.
  11. Libr. 1. c. 8. n. 15. Cfr. supra pag. 266, nota 2.
    Book 1, c. 8, n. 15. Cf. above p. 266, note 2.
  12. Plures codd., ut W aacc ee, cum ed. 1 sensualitatem.
    Several codices, such as W aa cc ee, with ed. 1, read sensualitatem.
  13. Gen. 2, 18.
    Genesis 2:18.
  14. In Vat. et edd. 3, 4 desunt verba potentiae, sicut vir et mulier sunt diversae. Cod. V translative pro relative.
    In the Vatican and editions 3, 4 the words powers, as man and woman are diverse are lacking. Codex V reads translative for relative.
  15. Scilicet in quantum convertitur ad creaturas inferiores. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 3. p. II. a. 1. q. 2.
    That is, inasmuch as it is turned toward lower creatures. Cf. I Sent., d. 3, p. II, a. 1, q. 2.
  16. Cfr. infra d. 25. p. 1. q. 3.
    Cf. below, d. 25, p. 1, q. 3.
  17. Sive secundum modum intelligendi.
    Or according to the manner of understanding.
  18. De Concord. grat. et lib. arb. q. 3. c. 11. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 17. p. 1. q. 2. ad 4. et d. 37. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 4, ubi similis obiectio de hoc eodem dicto Anselmi solvitur.
    On the Concord of Grace and Free Will q. 3, c. 11. Cf. I Sent., d. 17, p. 1, q. 2, ad 4, and d. 37, p. II, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4, where a similar objection about this same saying of Anselm is resolved.
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