Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Latin (`La.`) is verbatim from the Quaracchi apparatus; English (`En.`) is a literal rendering. Variant readings preserve the apparatus's manuscript-sigla style (e.g., Cod. T, Vat., ed. 1).

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de responsione Magistri, quam ponit ibi: Horum doctrinis novis et humanis. Videtur enim insufficienter respondere, quia non solvit argumentum, sed dicit, quod est incomprehensibile; et videtur, quod ista evasio nulla sit. Aut enim argumentum necessario concludit, aut sophistice: si necessario, tunc ergo, cum procedat ex veris, conclusio est vera; si non necessario, tunc ergo sophisticum est; sed unum sophisma non est incomprehensibile: et ita¹ videtur, quod male applicet auctoritatem Hilarii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ad argumentum facile est respondere, quia ibi est sophisma secundum accidens: proprietas est essentia; et essentia non distinguitur²: ergo nec proprietas. Sed hoc Magister non dicit incomprehensibile, sed dimittit tanquam sophisticum et indignum discussione maiorum. Sed illa quaestio veritatis, quae sequitur incomprehensibilis est secundum statum viae: quoniam, si per omnimodam identitatem praedicatur essentia de proprietatibus et e converso, haec distinguitur, et illa non; et hoc est nobis incomprehensibile. Quia enim videmus per speculum³, intelligimus per similitudinem sumtam a creaturis; et hoc nullum sub caelo habet simile, immo solius Dei est proprium propter summam simplicitatem: ideo Magister dicit esse incomprehensibile. — Nec est simile de genere et differentia: quia genus praedicatur de differentia, et haec distinguit, et illud non, quia non praedicatur per identitatem. Ideo et nos cum Hilario dicit, quod est incomprehensibile, et describit incomprehensibilitatem quantum ad triplicem vim: quantum ad receptivam, cum dicit incomprehensibile etc.; quantum ad expressivam, cum dicit extra sermonis significationem; quantum ad iudicativam⁴, cum dicit extra sensus intentionem. Et alia, quae sequuntur, his tribus aptantur, ut patet inspicienti.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de responsione Magistri, quam facit ibi: Quorum audaciae resistentes etc. Dicit enim, quod proprietates sunt in hypostasibus et eas determinant; in essentia sunt, sed eam non determinant. Videtur enim esse oppositio, quia omnis proprietas est determinativa eius in quo est, alioquin in illo non est: ergo si proprietates non determinant essentiam, non sunt in essentia.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister⁵ bene respondet, quia haec praepositio in notat diversas habitudines. Aliter enim dicitur Pater in Filio, aliter paternitas in Patre. Pater enim in Filio esse dicitur non sicut proprietas distinctiva, sed sicut persona consubstantialis; paternitas in Patre, sicut proprietas distinctiva. Sic vult dicere Magister, quod aliter sunt sive dicuntur esse proprietates in essentia quam in persona. Nam in essentia dicuntur esse propter identitatem, ita quod in omnino dicit identitatem; in personis dicuntur esse, sicut verae proprietates in hypostasibus et determinationes in determinatis. In creaturis autem non est unus modus sine alio, quia proprietas non omnino idem est cum eo cuius est proprietas: et ideo in creaturis non dicitur esse proprietas in aliquo, nisi in eo cui inhaeret; non sic in divinis.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de alia responsione Magistri, quam facit ibi: Respondeo et hic tibi cum Hilario etc.⁶ Videtur enim falsum quod dicit, quod solutionem istius quaestionis Archangeli nesciunt. Cum enim sint comprehensores, constat quod omnia cognoscunt, quae sunt de substantia gloriae: ergo cognoscunt distinctionem personarum et essentiae unitatem et modum: ergo vident, quare proprietates determinant hypostasim, non essentiam. Et iterum, si comprehensio erit⁷ de quibus est modo fide tenemus: ergo in patria cognoscemus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Augustinus de Trinitate⁸: «Sicut fovea dicitur esse caeca, non quia ipsa non videat, sed quia quod habet non ostendit aliis»; sic Angeli dicuntur ignorare et Sancti propter hoc, quod non revelant talia, sed magis intelligibilia; et quia talia non habent simile in creatura, immo magis dissimile: ideo dicuntur nobis incomprehensibilia. Et removet Hilarius triplicem cognitionem, quam habemus de rebus divinis: una est per Angelorum revelationem, alia per Prophetarum illustrationem, tertia per Apostolorum praedicationem. Et dicit, Angelos non audire, quia ipsi recipiunt revelationem a maioribus et nobis non exprimunt⁹. — Magister igitur bene respondet, ostendendo insufficientiam. Si enim quaeratur, quare proprietas est in persona ut distinguens, in essentia non; respondetur, quod persona se habet ad aliam et refertur et distinguitur. Et si hoc respondeatur, adhuc manet quaestio, quare persona refertur; et respondetur, quod una est essentia, tres personae. Si tu quaeras huiusmodi omnino simile, non invenies; et ideo in fundamento fidei oportet sistere.

DUB. IV.

Notandum super ista solutione Magistri quam ponit hic: Nos autem ista aliter intelligenda fore dicimus, quod locutiones istae, quas proponit Augustinus¹⁰, scilicet «Pater non eo est substantia, quo est Pater» et consimiles, duplices sunt, quia ablativus importat habitudinem in ratione formae sive causae formalis, quamvis in divinis non cadat vere habitudo causae quantum ad rem, tamen quantum ad rationem intelligendi. Potest igitur causalitas cadere sub negatione, ut sit negatio causalitatis; et tunc locutio est vera, et in hoc sensu accipit Augustinus, et Magister exponit. Est enim sensus: non eo est Deus, quo Pater; quia paternitate est Pater tanquam ratione dicendi vel intelligendi; non sic autem paternitas est ratio dicendi, ipsum esse Deum, vel intelligendi; et sic locutio vera est et nihil facit pro Porretano. Potest iterum esse causalitas negationis; et tunc est falsa, et est sensus: non eo est Deus quo Pater, id est quantum ad illud quod est Pater, non est Deus; et in hoc sensu accipit Porretanus, et ita est falsus intellectus, et sic non accipit Augustinus¹¹.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning the response of the Master, which he sets down there: By the new and human teachings of these men. For he seems to respond insufficiently, because he does not solve the argument, but says that it is incomprehensible; and it seems that this evasion is none at all. For either the argument concludes necessarily, or sophistically: if necessarily, then since it proceeds from true [premises], the conclusion is true; if not necessarily, then it is sophistical; but a single sophism is not incomprehensible: and so¹ it seems that he ill applies the authority of Hilary.

I respond: It must be said that to the argument it is easy to reply, because there is there a sophism according to accident: a property is the essence; and the essence is not distinguished²: therefore neither is the property. But this the Master does not call incomprehensible, but dismisses as sophistical and unworthy of the discussion of greater minds. But that question of truth, which follows, is incomprehensible according to the state of the wayfarer: for if by complete identity essence is predicated of the properties and conversely, this is distinguished and that not; and this is for us incomprehensible. For because we see through a glass³, we understand by a likeness drawn from creatures; and this has nothing under heaven like it, rather it is the property of God alone on account of the highest simplicity: therefore the Master says it is incomprehensible. — Nor is it like the case of genus and difference: for the genus is predicated of the difference, and the latter distinguishes and the former does not, because it is not predicated by identity. Therefore he too with Hilary says that it is incomprehensible, and describes the incomprehensibility with respect to a threefold power: with respect to the receptive, when he says incomprehensible etc.; with respect to the expressive, when he says beyond the signification of speech; with respect to the judicative⁴, when he says beyond the intention of the senses. And the other things which follow are fitted to these three, as is plain to one who inspects.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning the response of the Master, which he makes there: Resisting the audacity of these, etc. For he says that the properties are in the hypostases and determine them; in the essence they are, but they do not determine it. For there seems to be opposition here, because every property is determinative of that in which it is, otherwise it is not in it: therefore if the properties do not determine the essence, they are not in the essence.

I respond: It must be said that the Master⁵ answers well, because this preposition in signifies different relations. For it is said in one way that the Father is in the Son, in another that paternity is in the Father. For the Father is said to be in the Son not as a distinctive property, but as a consubstantial person; paternity in the Father, as a distinctive property. So the Master means to say that properties are or are said to be in essence otherwise than in person. For in the essence they are said to be on account of identity, so that in says identity altogether; in the persons they are said to be as true properties in hypostases and determinations in things determined. In creatures, however, the one mode is not without the other, because a property is not altogether the same as that of which it is the property: and therefore in creatures a property is not said to be in something, except in that to which it inheres; not so in divine things.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning the other response of the Master, which he makes there: I respond here also to you with Hilary, etc.⁶ For what he says seems false, that the Archangels do not know the solution of this question. For since they are comprehenders, it is established that they know all things which are of the substance of glory: therefore they know the distinction of the persons and the unity and mode of the essence: therefore they see why the properties determine the hypostasis, not the essence. And again, if comprehension will be⁷ of those things of which we now hold by faith: therefore in the fatherland we shall know.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says On the Trinity⁸: "As a pit is said to be blind, not because it does not itself see, but because it does not show to others what it has"; so the Angels are said to be ignorant, and the Saints, on this account, that they do not reveal such things, but rather things [more] intelligible; and because such things have nothing like in creation, indeed [they are] more unlike: therefore they are said to be incomprehensible to us. And Hilary removes the threefold cognition which we have of divine things: one is through the revelation of the Angels, another through the illumination of the Prophets, the third through the preaching of the Apostles. And he says that the Angels do not hear, because they receive revelation from greater ones and do not express it to us⁹. — The Master therefore answers well, by showing the insufficiency. For if it is asked, why the property is in the person as distinguishing, [but] not in the essence; the answer is that the person comports itself toward another and is referred and distinguished. And if this is answered, the question still remains, why the person is referred; and it is answered that there is one essence, three persons. If you seek something altogether like this, you will not find it; and therefore in the foundation of faith one must stand fast.

DOUBT IV.

It is to be noted concerning that solution of the Master which he sets down here: But we say that these things are to be understood otherwise, that those locutions which Augustine¹⁰ proposes, namely "The Father is not substance by that by which he is Father" and the like, are twofold, because the ablative imports a relation in the account of form or of formal cause, although in divine things the relation of cause does not truly fall as regards the thing, yet as regards the account of understanding [it does]. Therefore causality can fall under negation, so that there is a negation of causality; and then the locution is true, and in this sense Augustine takes [it], and the Master expounds [it]. For the sense is: God is not by that by which Father; because by paternity he is Father as by an account of speaking or of understanding; but paternity is not in this way the account of speaking, viz. for [his] very being God, or of understanding; and so the locution is true and makes nothing for the Porretan. Again, there can be a causality of negation; and then it is false, and the sense is: God is not by that by which Father, that is, with respect to that which is Father, he is not God; and in this sense the Porretan takes [it], and so it is a false understanding, and Augustine does not take it so¹¹.

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