Dist. 27, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27
ARTICULUS UNICUS. De proprietate paternitatis, de abstractione proprietatum, de certitudine huius doctrinae.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum esse Patrem et generare sit una et eadem[^1] notio.
Quantum ad primum, quod sit eadem3 notio, ostenditur sic.
1. Una sola proprietas est hypostasis, quae dat esse distinctum. Nam non est in ratione accidentis, sed formae; sed illa est una sola unius. Sed generare est proprietas, per quam hypostasis Patris distinguitur, similiter et esse patrem: ergo est eadem notio.
2. Item, Patris ad Filium est una sola relatio, quia una tantum origo et unus modus emanandi; sed generare dicit relationem Patris ad Filium, similiter et esse patrem: ergo est eadem relatio vel notio.
3. Item4, si sunt diversae proprietates, tunc ergo notiones erunt plures quam quinque, immo infinitae. Sicut enim ad generare sequitur esse patrem, ita sequitur ad referri ad patrem distingui a patre etc.; quae si sint notiones aliae, tunc ergo infinitus est numerus notionum. Hoc autem est inconveniens, et sequitur, si illae proprietates sint diversae: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Si eadem proprietas est esse patrem et generare: ergo omnino idem importatur nomine patris et nomine genitoris. Ergo sicut est baptizatus, si quis baptizetur in nomine Patris, ita si in nomine Genitoris; sed hoc communiter negatur.
2. Item, proprietates et notiones sunt diversae et cognoscuntur esse diversae, quia de diversis praedicantur — quia de uno praedicatur una, de quo non praedicatur alia — sed haec conceditur: essentia est Pater; haec negatur: essentia generat2: ergo etc. Si dicas, quod hoc est propter diversum modum significandi5; contra: hoc nihil est, quia tam esse patrem quam generare, utrumque in concretione dicitur.
3. Item, diversae probantur esse proprietates quando una de altera non praedicatur, ut paternitas et innascibilitas; sed generare, ut patebit infra6, non dicitur de paternitate — haec enim non admittitur: paternitas generat — ergo sunt diversae.
CONCLUSIO. Paternitas et generatio sunt una proprietas secundum rem; sed secundum modum significandi est inter eas triplex differentia.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnino sunt eadem proprietas secundum rem; et huius ratio manifeste apparet. Nam una dicitur de altera non solum in concretione, ut Pater generat, sed etiam in abstractione, ut paternitas est generatio; quod non esset, si differrent.
Cum autem sit eadem proprietas, differenti tamen modo significatur, et hoc quantum ad tria. Primum quidem, quia generatio proprietatem personae generalius exprimit quam hoc quod est pater. Nam, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in libro tertio, distinctione quarta, ad esse patrem sequitur generare, sed non convertitur. Homo enim dicitur generare pediculos, non tamen dicitur pater eorum. Alia ratio est, quia hoc quod est pater importat intra se hypostasim, circa quam notat proprietatem; sed hoc verbum generat non importat hypostasim, immo eget sibi apponi ab extra; et hanc ponit Magister in littera. Tertia est, quia cum proprietas duo importet, scilicet emanationem et habitudinem, quae quamvis idem sint re, differunt tamen ratione intelligendi — quia hoc quod est generare importat productionem, et generatio emanationem; sed hoc quod est esse patrem proprie importat habitudinem.
1. Ex his patent obiecta. Nam quod non sit baptismus in nomine Genitoris, hoc non est propter diversitatem rei, sed modi exprimendi; et utrumque consideratur ibi, sicut patebit in quarto.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non praedicatur etc.; dicendum, quod hoc est propter diversum modum significandi. Nam hoc quod est generare, quia non habet suppositum intra, ponit rem circa essentiam, et ideo ipsam significat distingui; non sic autem hoc quod est pater, cum habeat suppositum intra. Sensus enim est: essentia est pater, id est ille qui generat.
3. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod una non praedicatur de altera; dicendum, quod est praedicatio per modum denominationis, et haec est per concretionem; et est praedicatio per modum identitatis, et haec est per abstractionem. Quoniam ergo generare et esse patrem est una et eadem proprietas, ideo non secundum modum denominandi tantum, sed per abstractionem praedicatur, ut paternitas est generatio.
I. Attendendum est ad differentiam inter hanc quaestionem et eam, quae tractatur d. 33. q. 3, utrum unius personae duae notiones de se possint praedicari. Haec differentia in solut. ad 3. attingitur. — De duplici praedicatione per modum denominationis et identitatis cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3. (Scholion), et d. 34. q. 2.
II. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 68. m. 5. a. 6. § 1. — Scot., de hac et seq. q. Report. hic q. 1. — S. Thom. tangit hanc q. hic q. 1. a. 1; S. q. 33. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q. S. a. 58. q. 3. — Biel, hic q. 1.
---
ARTICLE UNIQUE. On the property of paternity, on the abstraction of properties, on the certainty of this teaching.
QUESTION I. Whether to be the Father and to beget are one and the same[^1] notion.
As to the first [point], that it is the same3 notion, is shown thus.
1. The one and only property is the hypostasis, which gives [it] to be distinct. For it is not in the account of an accident, but of a form; but that [form] is one only of one. But to beget is the property by which the hypostasis of the Father is distinguished, and likewise to be the Father: therefore it is the same notion.
2. Likewise, of the Father to the Son there is one and only relation, since there is only one origin and one mode of emanating; but to beget expresses the relation of the Father to the Son, and likewise to be the Father: therefore it is the same relation or notion.
3. Likewise4, if there are diverse properties, then the notions will be more than five — indeed, infinite. For just as upon to beget there follows to be the Father, so upon being referred to the Father there follows to be distinguished from the Father, etc.; and if these be other notions, then the number of notions is infinite. But this is unfitting, and it follows if those properties are diverse: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. If the same property is to be the Father and to beget: therefore altogether the same is imported by the name Father and by the name Begetter. Therefore just as one is baptized if someone is baptized in the name of the Father, so [also] if in the name of the Begetter; but this is commonly denied.
2. Likewise, properties and notions are diverse and are known to be diverse, since they are predicated of diverse [things] — for of one [thing] one is predicated, of which another is not predicated — but this is conceded: the essence is the Father; this is denied: the essence begets2: therefore etc. If you say that this is on account of a diverse mode of signifying5; on the contrary: this is nothing, since both to be the Father and to beget, each is said in concretion.
3. Likewise, properties are proved to be diverse when one is not predicated of the other, as paternity and unbegottenness; but to beget, as will be plain below6, is not said of paternity — for this is not admitted: paternity begets — therefore they are diverse.
CONCLUSION. Paternity and generation are one property according to the thing; but according to the mode of signifying there is a threefold difference between them.
I respond: It must be said that they are altogether the same property according to the thing; and the reason for this manifestly appears. For the one is said of the other not only in concretion, as the Father begets, but also in abstraction, as paternity is generation; which would not be, if they differed.
Since, however, they are the same property, it is signified in a different mode, and this as to three [points]. The first indeed is, since generation expresses the property of the person more generally than this [word] father. For, as Augustine says and as is found in the third book, distinction four, upon being the father there follows to beget, but it does not convert. For a man is said to beget lice, yet is not called their father. Another reason is that this [word] father imports within itself the hypostasis, around which it notes the property; but this verb begets does not import the hypostasis, but rather requires [a hypostasis] to be applied to it from outside; and this the Master places in the littera. The third [reason] is that, since a property imports two [things], namely emanation and relation, which though they are the same in thing, yet differ in account of understanding — since this [word] to beget imports production, and generation emanation; but this [phrase] to be the Father properly imports relation.
1. From these things the objections are plain. For [the fact] that there is no baptism in the name of the Begetter, this is not on account of a diversity of thing, but of the mode of expressing; and both are considered there, as will be plain in the fourth [book].
2. To that which is objected, that it is not predicated etc.; it must be said that this is on account of the diverse mode of signifying. For this [word] to beget, since it does not have a supposit within, posits the thing around the essence, and therefore signifies it to be distinguished; not so, however, this [word] father, since it does have a supposit within. For the sense is: the essence is the father, that is, he who begets.
3. To that which is finally objected, that one is not predicated of the other; it must be said that there is a predication by mode of denomination, and this is through concretion; and there is a predication by mode of identity, and this is through abstraction. Therefore, since to beget and to be the Father are one and the same property, therefore [the predication] is not only according to the mode of denominating, but [also] is predicated by abstraction, as paternity is generation.
I. Attention must be paid to the difference between this question and that which is treated in d. 33, q. 3, [namely] whether two notions of one person can be predicated of one another. This difference is touched upon in the solution to [objection] 3. — On the twofold predication by mode of denomination and of identity, cf. below d. 33, q. 3 (Scholion), and d. 34, q. 2.
II. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 68, m. 5, a. 6, § 1. — Scotus, on this and the following question, Reportata here, q. 1. — St. Thomas touches this question here, q. 1, a. 1; Summa q. 33, a. 2, ad 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question, Summa a. 58, q. 3. — Biel, here q. 1.
---
- Sola Vat. eaedem.The Vatican [edition] alone [reads] eaedem ("the same" [feminine plural]).
- Nullo suffragante cod., Vat. omittit quia, et dein post cuius subiicit et.With no codex supporting [it], the Vatican [edition] omits quia ("since"), and then after cuius ("of which") inserts et ("and").
- Codd. Z aa cum ed. 1 eadem, lectio aliquanto concinnior, quia et infra in initio quaestionis legitur eadem notio.Codices Z aa with ed. 1 [read] eadem ("the same"), a somewhat smoother reading, since also below at the beginning of the question one reads eadem notio ("the same notion").
- Sic plurimi codd. cum ed. I; cod. V Sed; Vat. cum cod. cc Vel; codd. RSU omittunt Item. In subsequenti propositione ad evitandam ambiguitatem cum Vat. retinuimus particulam ad, verbis generare et referri praemissam, etsi in antiquioribus mss. deest.Thus most codices with ed. I; cod. V [reads] Sed ("But"); the Vatican [edition] with cod. cc [reads] Vel ("Or"); codices RSU omit Item ("Likewise"). In the following proposition, to avoid ambiguity, we have retained with the Vatican [edition] the particle ad placed before the words generare ("to beget") and referri ("to be referred"), even though in the older manuscripts it is missing.
- Cfr. supra d. 5. a. I. q. I.Cf. above d. 5, a. I, q. I.
- Dist. 33. q. 1. — Paulo superius pro quando, quod posuimus auctoritate codd. G H P Q X et ed. I, Vat. quin.Distinction 33, q. 1. — A little above, in place of quando ("when"), which we placed on the authority of codices G H P Q X and ed. I, the Vatican [edition] [reads] quin ("but that").