Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum praedestinatio sit Dei scientia, an voluntas.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, quid sit praedestinatio, utrum scilicet Dei scientia, vel voluntas. Et supposito, quod dicat aliquid, quod sit in utroque genere, — est enim sicut dicit Augustinus¹ praescientia beneficiorum, et propositum miserendi — quaeritur, quod istorum importet principalius et per modum complementi. Et quod importet scientiam, videtur:

1. Quia compositum trahit significatum a componentibus; sed destinatio, cum dicatur et missio et ordinatio, in ratione praedestinationis accipitur ut ordinatio — nam, sicut dicit Augustinus², praedestinare idem est quod praeordinare — sed artifex licet volens et sciens praeordinet, non tamen ordinat in quantum volens, sed in quantum sciens: ergo etc.

2. Item, scientia non dividitur secundum rationem accipiendi in virtutes vel in ea quae sunt voluntatis, sed in ea quae sunt cognitionis: sed nos dividimus divinam scientiam in praedestinationem et reprobationem: ergo praedestinatio, secundum quod huiusmodi, ad scientiam spectat.

Contra:

1. Praedestinatio est causa gratiae et gloriae³; sed gratia et gloria immediate sunt a voluntate: ergo praedestinatio de se dicit quid in genere voluntatis. Si dicas, quod ex vi nominis non importat illam causalitatem; contra: esto, quod Deus praesciret, aliquem habiturum gratiam et gloriam aliunde quam ab ipso, non diceretur praedestinare: ergo de se dicit causalitatem.

2. Item, praedestinatio importat scientiam et voluntatem; sed quoties haec duo in aliquo importantur, voluntas se habet per modum consequentis et addentis ad scientiam⁴; sed quod consequitur et addit, se habet per modum differentiae et complementi, et a tali est res denominanda: videtur ergo, quod completius importet voluntatem, et ita male situet Magister.

Conclusio.

Praedestinatio, quae est causa gratiae et gloriae, importat et scientiam et potentiam et voluntatem, sed principalius est in genere voluntatis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum praedestinatio significet divinam essentiam ut causam gratiae et gloriae, et hoc secundum ordinatam distributionem gratiae et gloriae, quantum est de se, non tantum importat scientiam, sed etiam voluntatem et potentiam. Sed quoniam causalitas gratiae et gloriae attribuitur proprie voluntati ut efficienti, sed scientiae ut disponenti, et potentiae ut exsequenti; ideo, etsi praedestinatio importet illa tria, tamen principalius est in genere voluntatis. Et ideo ab Augustino definitur praedestinatio per illa tria: primo per illud quod respicit potentiam, in libro de Fide ad Petrum⁵: «Praedestinatio est gratuitae donationis praeparatio»; secundo per illud quod respicit scientiam, in libro de Bono perseverantiae⁶: «Praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum Dei»; tertio per illud quod respicit voluntatem et propriissime, in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum⁷: «Praedestinatio, inquit ibi, est propositum miserendi».

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur quod dicit ordinem; dicendum, quod est ordo duplex: unus, dispositio rerum in universo, et hic appropriatur scientiae; alius, directio in finem, et hic appropriatur bonitati sive voluntati, et hoc modo est de ratione praedestinationis.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est pars praescientiae; dicendum, quod quemadmodum fides et prudentia sunt in genere cognitionis, tamen addunt supra cognitionem aliquid, quod distrahit in genus virtutis, quod respicit voluntatem; per hunc modum et in proposito est intelligendum. Et quoniam scientia non tantum accipitur pro simplici notitia, sed etiam, ut frequenter, pro practica, et hoc modo complectitur scientiam cum voluntate, et Magister sic accipit generaliter; ideo enumerat praedestinationem inter ea quae sunt scientiae. — Voluerunt tamen aliqui dicere, quod principalius est in genere scientiae, eo quod in ratione praedestinationis cadit scientia in recto, sed voluntas in obliquo; est enim praedestinatio scientia beneplaciti. Uterque modus dicendi satis est probabilis, sed primus magis.

Question II.

Whether predestination is God's knowledge or [his] will.

Secondly it is asked what predestination is, namely whether it is God's knowledge or [his] will. And given that it states something which is in both genera — for it is, as Augustine says¹, the foreknowledge of benefits, and the proposal of having mercy — it is asked which of these it imports more principally and by way of completion. And that it imports knowledge seems [to be the case]:

1. Because a compound takes its signified from its components; but destinatio (sending-fixing), since it is said both as missio (sending) and ordinatio (ordering), is taken in the ratio of predestination as ordinatio — for, as Augustine says², to predestinate is the same as to pre-ordain — but a craftsman, although he pre-ordains willingly and knowingly, nevertheless does not ordain inasmuch as he wills, but inasmuch as he knows: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, knowledge is not divided according to the ratio of taking [it] into virtues or into things which belong to the will, but into things which belong to cognition: but we divide divine knowledge into predestination and reprobation: therefore predestination, as such, pertains to knowledge.

On the contrary:

1. Predestination is the cause of grace and glory³; but grace and glory are immediately from the will: therefore predestination of itself states something in the genus of will. If you say that from the force of the name it does not import that causality; on the contrary: suppose that God foreknew that someone would have grace and glory from elsewhere than from himself, he would not be said to predestinate: therefore of itself it states causality.

2. Likewise, predestination imports knowledge and will; but as often as these two are imported in something, the will is related by way of consequent and as adding to knowledge⁴; but what is consequent and adds, is related by way of difference and completion, and from such is the thing to be denominated: it seems therefore that it imports the will more completely, and so the Master places [it] badly.

Conclusion.

Predestination, which is the cause of grace and glory, imports both knowledge and power and will, but is more principally in the genus of will.

I respond: It must be said that, since predestination signifies the divine essence as cause of grace and glory, and this according to the ordained distribution of grace and glory, of itself it imports not only knowledge, but also will and power. But since the causality of grace and glory is properly attributed to the will as efficient [cause], to knowledge as disposing, and to power as executing; therefore, although predestination imports those three, yet it is more principally in the genus of will. And therefore predestination is defined by Augustine through those three: first, through that which regards power, in the book On Faith to Peter⁵: «Predestination is the preparation of a gratuitous gift»; secondly, through that which regards knowledge, in the book On the Gift of Perseverance⁶: «Predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits»; thirdly, through that which regards the will and most properly, in the book On the Predestination of the Saints⁷: «Predestination», he says there, «is the proposal of having mercy».

To the arguments:

To 1. To that, then, which is objected — that it states an order; it must be said that order is twofold: one, the disposition of things in the universe, and this is appropriated to knowledge; the other, the directing toward an end, and this is appropriated to goodness or the will, and in this way it belongs to the ratio of predestination.

To 2. To that which is objected, that it is a part of foreknowledge; it must be said that just as faith and prudence are in the genus of cognition, yet add something above cognition which draws [them] into the genus of virtue, which regards the will; in this way [the matter] is also to be understood in the matter at hand. And since knowledge is not only taken for simple notice, but also, as frequently [happens], for practical [knowledge], and in this way it embraces knowledge together with will, and the Master takes [it] thus generally; therefore he enumerates predestination among the things that belong to knowledge. — Some, however, have wished to say that it is more principally in the genus of knowledge, on this account that in the ratio of predestination knowledge falls in the direct case (in recto), but the will in the oblique (in obliquo); for predestination is the knowledge of [God's] good-pleasure. Either mode of speaking is sufficiently probable, but the first more so.