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Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 40

Textus Latinus
p. 702

Articulus I.

De praedestinatione quantum ad entitatem.

Quaestio I.

Utrum praedestinatio sit quid aeternum, an temporale.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Quod autem praedestinatio sit quid aeternum, videtur:

1. Quia quod est ante mundi constitutionem est quid aeternum; praedestinatio est huiusmodi, quia praedestinatio est electio, ad Ephesios primo1: Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem: ergo etc.

2. Item, «praedestinatio est praescientia beneficiorum»2; sed quidquid Deus praescit, aeternaliter praescit: ergo cum omnis praescientia sit aeterna, et omnis praedestinatio est praescientia, omnis praedestinatio est aeterna.

3. Item, «praedestinatio est propositum miserendi»3; sed propositum est quid proponentis praecedens res, quae proponuntur: ergo cum sit propositum Dei, et Deus aeternaliter proponit, patet etc.

4. Item, de ratione sui nominis praedestinatio dicit praecessionem sive antecessionem, sed non nisi praedestinantis ad praedestinatum; sed praedestinans est aeternus: ergo dicit ordinem et antecessionem aeterni ad temporale. Sed antecessio illa est aeterna: ergo etc.

Contra:

1. Praedestinatio importat relationem ad praedestinatum; sed omnis relatio ponit respectum verum4 vel in utroque extremorum, vel saltem in altero; sed praedestinatio non potest verum respectum ponere in praedestinante: ergo ponit respectum verum in praedestinato. Sed verus respectus non fundatur nisi supra quid creatum: ergo praedestinatio dicit quid creatum et temporale.

2. Item, praedestinatio importat actionem, et omni actioni respondet passio: cum ergo actio et passio non sint in eodem, quia non est idem praedestinans et praedestinatus, necesse est, quod sit in alio. Sed aliud non est nisi quid temporale et creatum: ergo praedestinatio importat quid temporale et creatum: ergo non est aeterna.

3. Item, praedestinatio importat ordinem praedestinantis ad praedestinatum, aut ergo secundum esse, quod habet in Deo, aut secundum esse quod habet in proprio genere. Non secundum esse, quod habet in Deo, quia sic est Deus et non sequitur Deum: ergo secundum esse, quod habet in proprio genere. Sed esse, quod habet in proprio genere, est quid temporale et creatum: ergo praedestinatio similiter: et sic etc.

4. Item, omnis actus divinus, qui non reflectitur supra essentiam vel personam, transit extra, et omnis actus transiens extra ex tempore5 dicitur de Deo: cum ergo praedestinatio non transeat in personam vel essentiam, sed extra, ergo est temporalis.

5. Item, praedestinatio est praeparatio6; sed nihil dicitur praeparari, antequam incipiat aliquid fieri secundum principia intrinseca — artifex enim non dicitur praeparare domum ante ligna et lapides sola cogitatione — ergo necesse est, quod ponatur in re.

p. 703

Conclusio.

Praedestinatio est aeterna, ratione principalis significati et antecessionis ad connotatum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in praedestinatione non sunt nisi duo, scilicet principale significatum et connotatum. Principale significatum est divina essentia, connotatum vero est creatura, ut gratia et gloria et persona salvanda7. Et haec duo importat praedestinatio cum ordine antecessionis unius ad alterum ratione praepositionis.

Quoniam igitur significatum principale est aeternum, ita praedestinatio est quid aeternum8. Rursus, quoniam importat antecessionem significati ad connotatum, et illa antecessio est ab aeterno: ideo praedestinatio est quid aeternum et ab aeterno. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.

Ad argumenta in oppositum:

Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur de relatione, dicendum, quod res9 sive relatio potest significari in Deo dupliciter: vel respectu existentis in actu, vel respectu existentis in potentia, futuri aliquando in actu; et quando respectu existentis in actu, tunc necesse est, quod respondeat verus respectus in actu; quando vero respectu existentis in potentia, sufficit quod respondeat in potentia, et talis fundatur super ens in potentia; et ideo actu nihil ponit nisi Deum.

Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de actione, dicendum, quod est actio secundum rem, et est actio secundum modum10. Actioni secundum rem, quae est principium efficiens aliquid, respondet passio differens secundum rem, ut creationi-actioni creationi-passio11. Actioni vero secundum modum non respondet nisi passio secundum modum differens, ut cognitioni-actioni ipsius Dei respondet ipsum cognosci; et hoc quidem realiter non est aliud, sed secundum modum. Quoniam igitur praedestinatio non importat nisi praecognitionem sive active sive passive; ideo est quid aeternum et non est aliud quam Deus12.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de ordine, dicendum, quod est ordo secundum nobilitatem, et secundum durationem13; et ordo secundum nobilitatem ponit extrema simul, ordo vero secundum durationem, eo ipso quod ordo est, ponit, extrema non esse simul; et secundum rationem antecedendi ordo simul est cum antecedente sive cum praecedente, similiter secundum rationem subsequendi simul est cum subsequente. Quoniam igitur praedestinatio importat ordinem secundum rationem praecedendi, ideo aeterna est, quamvis sit respectu temporalis; quoniam non est simul cum illo, sed antecedit.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod praedestinatio transit extra; dicendum, quod transire extra est dupliciter: aut in aliquid quod est extra, aut in aliquid quod est intra, sed erit extra. Et primo modo connotat aliquid in actu et dicit quid temporale, ut creare et conservare; secundo modo non, ut praedestinare14.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praeparatione, quod attenditur15 secundum principia intrinseca, non secundum causam efficientem; dicendum, quod quaedam est causa efficiens, quae operatur secundum materiam praeiacentem; et ista quidem, quia alio indiget, non dicitur praeparare, quando solum vult et disponit intus, sed quando materiam aptat exterius. Quaedam est causa efficiens, quae nullo indiget ad operandum, sed statim, cum vult, operatur; et in tali praeparare non est aliud quam disponere et proponere; et talis est Deus, quia nullo alio a se indiget ad operandum.

Scholion

I. «Praedestinare est praeordinare in finem... Praedestinatio tria connotat, scilicet praeordinatum, et hoc est homo; et rationem praeordinandi, et haec est gratia; et rationem finis et haec est gloria: et sic sunt tria, scilicet quod, et per quod, et ad quod» (infra a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.). Praedestinatio secundum Augustinum (de Dono persever. c. 14. n. 35.) est: «et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicumque liberantur»; secundum S. Thomam (S. I. q. 23. a. 1.) est «ratio transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae»; secundum Scotum (hic q. unica, n. 2.) est p. 704«ratio electionis per voluntatem divinam alicuius creaturae intellectualis vel rationalis ad gratiam et gloriam». Cum his definitionibus convenit triplex descriptio praedestinationis, quae ex S. Augustino infra q. 2. proponitur. Pro ampliore explicatione servire potest quod a. 3. q. 2. ad 2. dicitur de differentia inter propositum, electionem et praedestinationem, nec non hic dub. 7. de triplici causalitate, quae importatur in praedestinatione, et III. Sent. d. 11. a. 1. q. 1. 2. 3. de praedestinatione Christi.

Catholica de praedestinatione doctrina media via incedit inter innumeros errores, ad extrema delapsos, dum alii praedestinationem distorquent in perniciosissimum fatalismum, qui liberum arbitrium bonorumque operum merita suffocat, alii vero eandem sub specie humanae independentiae omnino eliminant, vel saltem ita infirmant, ut nimis derogetur gratuitis Dei donis gratiae, perseverantiae finalis et electionis. In hoc autem omnes catholici doctores conveniunt, infallibilem et immutabilem esse electorum praedestinationem, sed ita, ut minime libertatem laedat creaturarum; item, ab aeterno praeparasse Deum bona opera, «ut in illis ambulemus» (Eph. 2, 10), sed ita, ut «dona Dei sint etiam bona ipsius iustificati merita» (Trident. sess. 6. can. 32.), cum «tanta sit (Dei) erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae sunt ipsius dona» (ibid. c. 16.); denique, esse aeternam Dei inter electos et reprobos distinctionem, sed ita, ut nemo adultus nisi ob propriam culpam reprobetur, nemo autem nisi per divinam misericordiam salvetur. — Si autem descenditur ad specialiores quaestiones, praesertim ad eas quae dependent a modo, quo voluntas creata cooperatur divinae gratiae, et in genere a determinatione concursus divini ad actiones liberas creaturarum, difficultates et controversiae scholarum fere in immensum crescunt, ita ut sapientes in nonnullis stent contra sapientes, et ut sapientiores, propriam ignorantiam confitentes, cum Apostolo (Rom. 11, 33.) dicant: altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt iudicia eius! Vide praeclara verba Seraphici infra d. 41. a. 1. q. 2. in fine.

II. Praedestinationem esse aeternam non tantum quoad ipsum actum praedestinantis, sed etiam ratione aeternae connotationis ad personam praedestinati, ad gratiam et ad gloriam (cfr. hic dub. 1.), communiter docetur (cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 1. a. 1.; S. Thom., S. I. q. 23. a. 2. ad 2.). — Solutio ad 2. fundatur in hoc, quod differt actio secundum rem, quae est principium efficiens aliquid, id est, quae transit in materiam extraneam, et actio secundum modum intelligendi, non transiens extra subiectum, ut est in Deo actus cognoscendi creaturam. Huic non respondet in creatura nisi passio secundum modum, quia creatura praecise ut cognita tantum denominationem, non aliquid reale ab extrinseco recipit (cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. ad 1.). — Notabilis est etiam solut. ad 5, de quo conferri potest Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3.; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 2.; Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. ad 2.

III. Praeter auctores iam citatos: B. Albert., hic a. 2. 8.; S. p. I. tr. 16. q. 63. m. 1. q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 1, et a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 2. R. — Aegid., de hac et seq. q. hic I. princ. q. 1. a. 1. 2. — Durand., de hac et seq. q. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. qq. hic q. unica.

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English Translation
p. 702

Article I.

On predestination as regards its entity.

Question I.

Whether predestination is something eternal or temporal.

That predestination is something eternal seems [to be the case]:

1. Because what is before the foundation of the world is something eternal; predestination is of this sort, since predestination is election, [as] in Ephesians 11: "He chose us before the foundation of the world": therefore etc.

2. Likewise, "predestination is the foreknowledge of [God's] benefits"2; but whatever God foreknows, he foreknows from eternity: therefore since all foreknowledge is eternal, and all predestination is foreknowledge, all predestination is eternal.

3. Likewise, "predestination is the purpose of having mercy"3; but a purpose is something of the one purposing, preceding the things which are proposed: therefore since it is the purpose of God, and God purposes from eternity, it is plain etc.

4. Likewise, by the ratio of its name, predestination says a precession or antecedence — but only of the predestiner to the predestined; but the predestiner is eternal: therefore it says an order and antecedence of the eternal to the temporal. But that antecedence is eternal: therefore etc.

On the contrary:

1. Predestination involves a relation to the predestined; but every relation places a true respect4 either in both extremes, or at least in one; but predestination cannot place a true respect in the predestiner: therefore it places a true respect in the predestined. But a true respect is founded only on something created: therefore predestination says something created and temporal.

2. Likewise, predestination involves an action, and to every action a passion corresponds: therefore since action and passion are not in the same [subject] — for the predestiner and the predestined are not the same — it is necessary that [the passion] be in another. But "another" is nothing but something temporal and created: therefore predestination involves something temporal and created: therefore it is not eternal.

3. Likewise, predestination involves an order of the predestiner to the predestined, either then according to the being which it has in God, or according to the being which it has in its proper genus. Not according to the being which it has in God, since thus it is God and does not follow God: therefore according to the being which it has in its proper genus. But the being which it has in its proper genus is something temporal and created: therefore predestination [is] likewise: and so etc.

4. Likewise, every divine act which is not bent back upon the essence or person passes outward, and every act passing outward is said of God from time5: therefore since predestination does not pass into the person or essence, but outward, therefore it is temporal.

5. Likewise, predestination is preparation6; but nothing is said to be prepared before something begins to come-to-be according to intrinsic principles — for an artisan is not said to prepare a house by mere thought before the wood and stones — therefore it is necessary that it be placed in the thing.

p. 703

Conclusion.

Predestination is eternal, by reason of [its] principal significate and of [its] antecedence to its connotatum.

I respond: It must be said that in predestination there are only two [things], namely the principal significate and the connotatum. The principal significate is the divine essence; the connotatum, however, is the creature, namely grace and glory and the person to-be-saved7. And these two [things] predestination involves, with the order of antecedence of one to the other by reason of [its] preposition.

Since therefore the principal significate is eternal, so predestination is something eternal8. Again, since it involves an antecedence of the significate to the connotatum, and that antecedence is from eternity: therefore predestination is something eternal and from eternity. And the reasonings to this effect are to be granted.

To the arguments to the contrary:

To 1. To that which is objected concerning relation, it must be said that a thing9 or relation can be signified in God in two ways: either with respect to one existing in act, or with respect to one existing in potency, [as] one to be at some time in act; and when [it is signified] with respect to one existing in act, then it is necessary that there correspond a true respect in act; but when [it is signified] with respect to one existing in potency, it suffices that [a respect] correspond in potency, and such [a respect] is founded upon being-in-potency; and therefore in act it places nothing but God.

To 2. To that which is objected concerning action, it must be said that there is action according to thing (secundum rem), and there is action according to mode (secundum modum)10. To action secundum rem, which is the principle efficient of something, there corresponds a passion differing secundum rem, as to the action of creating [there corresponds] the passion of being-created11. But to action secundum modum there corresponds only a passion differing secundum modum, as to the action of God's own knowing there corresponds the very being-known; and this is not really another [thing], but [is so only] secundum modum. Since therefore predestination does not involve anything except foreknowledge — whether actively or passively — therefore it is something eternal and is not other than God12.

To 3. To that which is objected concerning order, it must be said that there is order according to nobility and [order] according to duration13; and order according to nobility places its extremes [as] simultaneous, but order according to duration, by the very fact that it is order, places [its] extremes [as] not-simultaneous; and according to the ratio of antecedence, order is simultaneous with the antecedent, that is, with the preceding [term]; likewise according to the ratio of subsequence it is simultaneous with the subsequent [term]. Since therefore predestination involves an order according to the ratio of preceding, therefore it is eternal — although it [is] with respect to a temporal [term]; since it is not simultaneous with that [temporal term], but precedes [it].

To 4. To that which is objected, that predestination passes outward; it must be said that to-pass-outward is twofold: either into something which is outside, or into something which is within, but will be outside. And in the first mode it connotes something in act and says something temporal, as to create and to conserve; in the second mode not so, as to predestine14.

To 5. To that which is objected concerning preparation, that it is reckoned15 according to intrinsic principles, not according to efficient cause; it must be said that there is a certain efficient cause which operates according to a pre-lying matter; and this indeed, since it has need of another, is not said to prepare when it only wills and disposes within, but [only] when it fits the matter outwardly. There is [also] a certain efficient cause which has need of nothing for operating, but as soon as it wills, it operates; and in such a one to prepare is nothing other than to dispose and propose; and such is God, since he has need of no other beside himself for operating.

Scholion

I. "To predestine is to pre-ordain to an end... Predestination connotes three [things], namely the pre-ordained, and this is the human being; and the ratio of pre-ordaining, and this is grace; and the ratio of the end, and this is glory: and so there are three, namely the that-which, and the through-which, and the toward-which*" (below a. 3. q. 2. ad 3.). Predestination according to Augustine (On the Gift of Perseverance c. 14, n. 35) is: "and the preparation of God's benefits, by which most certainly are freed whoever are freed"; according to St. Thomas (S. I, q. 23, a. 1) it is "the ratio of the transmission of the rational creature into the end of eternal life"; according to Scotus (here q. unica, n. 2) it is <!-- page 704 -->"the ratio of the election by the divine will of some intellectual or rational creature to grace and glory". To these definitions corresponds the threefold description of predestination, which is set forth from St. Augustine below at q. 2. For a fuller explanation, what is said at a. 3, q. 2, ad 2 about the difference between purpose, election, and predestination can serve, as also here at dub. 7 about the threefold causality which is involved in predestination, and III Sent.* d. 11, a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3 on the predestination of Christ.

The Catholic doctrine on predestination proceeds by a middle way among innumerable errors which have lapsed to extremes — while some distort predestination into a most pernicious fatalism, which suffocates free choice and the merits of good works; and others, in turn, eliminate the same [doctrine] altogether under the appearance of human independence, or at least so weaken it that the gratuitous gifts of God — of grace, of final perseverance, and of election — are too much detracted from. In this, however, all Catholic doctors agree: that the predestination of the elect is infallible and immutable, but in such a way that it in no way harms the freedom of creatures; likewise, that God from eternity prepared good works "that we should walk in them" (Eph. 2:10), but in such a way that "the gifts of God are also the good merits of the justified one" (Trent, sess. 6, can. 32), since "so great is (God's) goodness toward all men, that he wills their merits, which are his own gifts, to be theirs" (ibid. c. 16); and finally, that the eternal distinction between elect and reprobate by God is real, but in such a way that no adult is reprobated except for his own fault, and no one is saved except through divine mercy. — But if one descends to more particular questions — especially to those which depend upon the mode in which the created will cooperates with divine grace, and in general upon the determination of the divine concurrence to the free actions of creatures — the difficulties and controversies of the schools grow almost beyond measure, so that the wise stand in some matters against the wise; and the wiser ones, confessing their own ignorance, say with the Apostle (Rom. 11:33): "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! how incomprehensible are his judgments!" See the brilliant words of the Seraphic [Doctor] below at d. 41, a. 1, q. 2, at the end.

II. That predestination is eternal not only as regards the act itself of the predestiner, but also by reason of the eternal connotation toward the person of the predestined, toward grace, and toward glory (cf. here dub. 1), is commonly taught (cf. Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 28, m. 1, a. 1; St. Thom., S. I, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2). — The solution to [arg.] 2 is founded on this, that action secundum rem — which is the principle efficient of something, that is, which passes into extraneous matter — differs from action according to the mode of understanding, not passing outside the subject, as in God is the act of knowing the creature. To this no [passion] corresponds in the creature except a passion secundum modum, since the creature, precisely as known, receives only a denomination, not anything real, from the extrinsic [agent] (cf. St. Thom., here q. 1, a. 1, ad 1). — Notable also is the solution to [arg.] 5, on which Alex. Hal., loc. cit. a. 3, may be consulted; St. Thom., here q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, ad 2.

III. Besides authors already cited: B. Albert, here a. 2, 8; S. p. I, tr. 16, q. 63, m. 1, q. incid. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1, and a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 1, q. 2, R. — Aegid., on this and the following question here, I, princ. q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Durand., on this and the following question here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., on this q. 1. — Biel, on this and the following questions, here q. unica.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Vers. 4, ubi in Vulg. post nos additur in ipso. — Plura de hoc, quod praedestinatio sit electio, invenies infra a. 3. q. 2.
    Verse 4, where in the Vulgate after nos ("us") in ipso ("in him") is added. — More on this, that predestination is election, will be found below at a. 3, q. 2.
  2. Haec definitio est Augustini, de Dono persev. c. 14. n. 35. Cfr. q. seq. in corp. — Cod. B voci beneficiorum adiungit Dei.
    This definition is Augustine's, On the Gift of Perseverance c. 14, n. 35. Cf. the following question in the body. — Codex B adds Dei ("of God") to the word beneficiorum ("of benefits").
  3. Definitio haec est etiam Augustini, de Praedest. Sanctor. c. 17. n. 34, et fundatur in verbis Apostoli ad Romanos 9, 13–18, ubi concluditur: «Ergo cuius vult miseretur», et ad Ephes. I, 5: Qui praedestinavit nos... secundum propositum voluntatis suae. Cfr. q. seq. in corp.
    This definition is also Augustine's, On the Predestination of the Saints c. 17, n. 34, and is founded on the words of the Apostle to the Romans 9:13–18, where it is concluded: "Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will", and to Ephesians 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us... according to the purpose of his will". Cf. the following question in the body.
  4. Id est realem, de quo vide supra d. 30. q. 3. — In fine argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc omittit verba conclusionis: ergo praedestinatio dicit quid creatum.
    That is, real [respect], on which see above d. 30, q. 3. — At the end of the argument, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc omits the concluding words: ergo praedestinatio dicit quid creatum ("therefore predestination says something created").
  5. Cfr. supra pag. 521, nota 2.
    Cf. above p. 521, note 2.
  6. Respicitur definitio praedestinationis sumta ex libro Fulgentii de Fide ad Petrum, c. 35. n. 78. Cfr. q. seq.
    Reference is made to the definition of predestination taken from Fulgentius's book On the Faith, to Peter, c. 35, n. 78. Cf. the following question.
  7. Et quidem gratia ut medium per quod, gloria ut terminus ad quem, persona salvanda ut subiectum. Quod sequitur: haec duo etc. refertur ad principale significatum et connotatum.
    And indeed grace [is] as the medium through which, glory as the terminus toward which, [and] the person to-be-saved as the subject. What follows: haec duo etc. ("these two etc.") refers to the principal significate and the connotatum.
  8. Obiici posset de creatione, quae active sumta etiam quoad principale significatum est divina essentia, nec tamen dicitur aeterna; sed vide infra solut. ad 2. et 4, et S. Thom. hic q. 4. a. 1. ad 1.
    It could be objected concerning creation, which, taken actively, is also as regards [its] principal significate the divine essence, and yet is not called eternal; but see below the solution to [arg.] 2 and 4, and St. Thomas here, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1.
  9. Pro res cod. X (V in marg.) respectus. Aliquanto inferius post verus respectus Vat. cum cod. cc non bene omittit in actu.
    In place of res ("thing") codex X (V in the margin) [reads] respectus ("respect"). Somewhat below, after verus respectus ("a true respect"), the Vatican with codex cc, not rightly, omits in actu ("in act").
  10. Scilicet intelligendi. Haec distinctio actionis fundatur in illa, qua actio distinguitur in actionem transeuntem et immanentem. Actioni transeunti respondet passio in effectu, non vero immanenti, etiamsi respiciat rem externam, v. g. visioni respectu rei visae. Cfr. supra pag. 686, nota 4.
    That is, [a mode] of understanding. This distinction of action is founded on that by which action is distinguished into transient and immanent action. To transient action there corresponds a passion in the effect, but not to immanent [action], even if it regards an external thing — e.g. vision with respect to the thing seen. Cf. above p. 686, note 4.
  11. Eodem modo loquendi utitur Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 6. m. 2. a. 5.
    Alex. Hal. uses the same mode of speaking, S. p. II, q. 6, m. 2, a. 5.
  12. Cfr. supra d. 20. a. 2. q. 1. in corp.
    Cf. above d. 20, a. 2, q. 1, in the body.
  13. Hoc magis explicatur supra solut. ad 2. et 3. — Paulo ante pro connotat aliquid, quae lectio invenitur in codd. A T Y, Vat. cum aliis codd. et ed. 1 connotat aliud.
    This is more explicated above in the solutions to [args.] 2 and 3. — A little earlier, in place of connotat aliquid ("connotes something") — the reading found in codices A T Y — the Vatican with the other codices and edition 1 [reads] connotat aliud ("connotes another").
  14. Cod. quae attenditur; Vat. cum cod. cc quod antecedititur.
    Codex [reads] quae attenditur ("which is reckoned"); Vatican with codex cc [reads] quod antecedititur ("which is preceded" [sic]).
  15. Vat. cum cod. cc pro praeparare substituit praeparatione.
    Vatican with codex cc, in place of praeparare ("to prepare"), substitutes praeparatione ("by preparation").
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