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Dist. 7, Art. 2, Q. 1

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 177

Articulus II. De locutionibus exprimentibus unionis praedestinationem.

Consequenter quantum ad secundum articulum quaeritur de locutionibus exprimentibus unionis praedestinationem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Filius Dei est praedestinatus. Secundo quaeritur de hac: Filius Dei est praedestinatus esse homo. Tertio vero quaeritur de hac: homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei.

Quaestio I. Utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus.

Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Filius Dei sit praedestinatus. Et quod sic, videtur.

(Ad oppositum.) 1. Haec conceditur: Filius Dei est homo; sed omnis homo aut est praescitus, aut praedestinatus1; sed Filius Dei non est homo praescitus: ergo praedestinatus.

2. Item, exceptis vocabulis importantibus unionem, necesse est, esse idiomatum communicationem2; sed vocabulum praedestinationis unionem non importat, quantum est de se: ergo cum ille homo sit praedestinatus, et ille homo sit Filius Dei, necessario sequitur, quod Filius Dei sit praedestinatus.

3. Item, magis repugnat temporale aeterno, quam aeternum aeterno; sed esse praedestinatum dicit quid aeternum3; sed esse conceptum et natum quid temporale; sed haec conceditur: Filius Dei est natus de Virgine: ergo et haec: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

4. Item, nulli non convenit alicui nisi ex tempore, pro eo quod effectum dicit temporalem4; sed simpliciter conceditur: Filius Dei est in carnem missus: ergo multo magis ista concedi debet: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

5. Item, praedestinatio non est aliud quam praeparatio gratiae in praesenti et gloriae in futuro5; sed Filio Dei Christo collata fuit gratia et gloria in tempore et praevisa sibi conferri ab aeterno; sed cuicumque convenit definitio, et definitum: ergo necesse est Filium Dei concedere esse praedestinatum.

6. Item, haec est vera: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, secundum quod homo; sed ista determinatio homo non diminuit aliquid circa subiectum: ergo, ipsa subtracta, licet inferre, Filium Dei simpliciter esse praedestinatum. Cum ergo «ad verum non sequatur nisi verum6», videtur, quod locutio praedicta, scilicet Filius Dei est praedestinatus, tanquam vera sit concedenda.

(Fundamenta.) Sed contra: 1. Origenes7: «Praedestinatur qui nondum est; haec verba dicuntur propter illos qui in Unigenitum Dei impietatem loquuntur. Putant enim, eum inter illos connumerandum esse, qui, antequam fierent, praedestinati sunt, ut essent»: ergo impium est dicere, Filium Dei esse praedestinatum.

2. Item, super illud ad Romanos octavo8: Quos praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; Glossa: «Praedestinavit non existentes, vocavit ante aversos»: si ergo praedestinatio est non existentis, et Filius Dei semper existit, nunquam videtur praedestinatus esse.

3. Item, praedestinatio de ratione nominis dicit antecessionem praedestinantis ad praedestinatum9; sed Filium Dei nihil antecedit, cum sit aeternus: ergo nullo modo convenit ei inter praedestinatos connumerari.

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4. Item, nullus semetipsum praedestinavit1b — sicut enim alius est qui creatur, alius est qui creat; sic et qui praedestinat, et qui praedestinatur — sed omnes, quotquot praedestinantur, a Filio Dei praedestinantur: ergo nullatenus est concedendum: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

Conclusio

Locutio: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, non admittitur a theologis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis haec sit concedenda: Christus est praedestinatus, pro eo quod Christus nominat hypostasim in duabus naturis; et haec: Christus est praedestinatus, in quantum homo, ratione determinationis adiunctae; (Conclusio.) haec tamen communiter non recipitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus. — Et ratio huius est propter repugnantiam intellectuum, (Triplex ratio.) quae quidem invenitur inter subiectum et praedicatum.

Reperitur autem ibi triplex repugnantia. Nam vocabulum praedestinationis circa praedestinatum (Tria in praedestinatione.) tria importat, videlicet habitudinem effectuum2b respectu causae, acceptationem per donum gratiae, et inchoationem quantum ad esse naturae. Et primum intellectum habet, quia descendit a verbo passivo; secundum vero intellectum habet, quia descendit ab actu dicente ordinationem ad finem3b; tertium intellectum habet, quia componitur a praepositione dicente antecessionem, sicut ab hac praepositione prae. — Econtra Filius Dei dicit illam (Triplex repugnantia.) personam ut causam, non ut effectum. Dicit etiam illam personam, prout competit illi filiatio per naturam, non per gratiae donum. Dicit etiam illam personam ut aeternam, non ut habentem initium. Et sic expresse est repugnantia intellectuum inter (Corollarium.) subiectum et praedicatum. — Et potest ista repugnantia reduci ad triplex genus oppositionis, videlicet contradictionis, contrarietatis et relationis4b. Et propter hanc triplicem repugnantiam non admittunt magistri praedictam locutionem. — Unde concedendae sunt rationes, quae sunt ad partem istam.

(Solutio oppositorum.) 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod haec conceditur: Filius Dei est homo; dicendum, quod non est ibi repugnantia intellectuum, immo potius consonantia. Homo enim nominat naturam habilem ad unionem, non sic autem hoc praedicatum praedestinatum5b. Et ideo non sequitur ex hoc, quod si Filius Dei est homo, quod propter hoc sit praescitus, vel praedestinatus, nisi addatur ei: secundum quod homo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod communicatio idiomatum est in omnibus, exceptis nominibus unionem importantibus; dicendum, quod non solum (Notandum.) sunt illa excipienda nomina, sed etiam vocabula illa, ex quibus consurgit intellectuum repugnantia; et tale est vocabulum praedestinationis et consimilia, sicut melius manifestabitur infra distinctione undecima6b, ubi quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: Filius Dei est creatura.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod magis repugnat temporale aeterno, quam aeternum aeterno; dicendum, quod verum est de eo quod est pure aeternum; de eo autem, quod est sic aeternum, quod de suo primario intellectu dicit et nominat7b aliquid temporale, non habet veritatem, maxime quando sic importat illud temporale, quod directe habet oppositionem ad aeternum, sicut est hoc participium praedestinatus.

4. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de missione, quod quamvis sit temporale, conceditur8b Filius Dei esse missus; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia, (Notandum.) etsi mitti dicat quid temporale, tamen illud temporale non dicitur poni circa divinam personam, sed circa aliquid creatum; circa vero divinam personam ponit solam emanationem. Sed praedestinatio circa ipsum praedestinatum triplicem ponit intellectum, qui repugnat personae aeternae; et ideo, quamvis sane possit concedi: Filius Dei est missus; non sane potest concedi: Filius Dei est praedestinatus.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Filio Dei praeparata fuit gratia in praesenti et gloria in futuro; dicendum, quod etsi Christo praeparata fuit gratia9b ratione humanae naturae, non tamen ratione divinae. Et ideo sicut prima locutio negatur, qua dicitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus, nisi addatur determinatio, secundum quam et ratione cuius attendatur ipsa praedestinatio; sic neganda est alia locutio, in qua ponitur praedestinationis definitio, nisi addatur haec determinatio: secundum quod homo.

6. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod haec determinatio: secundum quod homo, non diminuit; dicendum, quod quamvis non diminuat de ratione praedestinationis; facit tamen, quod praedestinatio rem suam ponat circa hypostasim Christi ratione humanae naturae, non ratione divinae; et sic tollit repugnantiam intellectuum. Cum autem simpliciter infertur et dicitur: Filius Dei est praedestinatus; cum Filius Dei denominet personam Christi secundum

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divinam naturam tantum, est ibi repugnantia intellectuum. Et ideo non tenet ille processus, non quia ibi est paralogismus secundum quid et simpliciter, sed quia ibi est paralogismus secundum accidens1c. Quod enim convenit Christo ratione humanae naturae est extraneum ratione divinae.

Scholion

I. In tribus huius articuli quaestionibus iterum de proprietate trium locutionum agitur, non de ipsa praedestinatione Christi in se considerata. De praedestinatione in genere cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. 41; de praedestinatione Christi infra d. 11. a. 1. — Praesupponendum est, ad rationem praedestinationis proprie dictam tria requiri, scilicet quod praedestinatio praecedat praedestinatum; quod res praedestinata concedatur per gratiam; quod eadem aliquando reapse concedatur. Hinc iam patet, primam locutionem (q. I.) esse falsam; aliae duae cum quibusdam restrictionibus communiter conceduntur, contrarium tamen docente Durando. De aliis similibus locutionibus vide infra d. 10. a. 1. et 11. a. 2.

II. De his tribus quaestionibus et locutionibus, mutato tantum interdum ordine, tractant: Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 3. m. 1–4. — Scot., hic q. 3; Report. hic q. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2; S. III. q. 24. a. 1. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 2, infra d. 10. a. 4–7. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 3. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1–4. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1–3. — Durand., hic q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Article II. On the locutions expressing the predestination of the union.

Next, with regard to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the locutions expressing the predestination of the union. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God is predestined. Second, inquiry is made concerning this: the Son of God is predestined to be man. Third, inquiry is made concerning this: the man is predestined to be the Son of God.

Question I. Whether the Son of God is predestined.

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the Son of God is predestined. And that he is, seems [to be the case].

(To the contrary side.) 1. This is conceded: the Son of God is man; but every man is either foreknown, or predestined1; but the Son of God is not a foreknown man: therefore predestined.

2. Likewise, excepting the words importing the union, there must be a communication of idioms2; but the word "predestination" does not import the union, so far as it is of itself: therefore, since that man is predestined, and that man is the Son of God, it necessarily follows that the Son of God is predestined.

3. Likewise, the temporal is more repugnant to the eternal than the eternal to the eternal; but to be predestined says something eternal3; but to be conceived and born [says] something temporal; but this is conceded: the Son of God was born of the Virgin: therefore this also: the Son of God is predestined.

4. Likewise, nothing belongs to anyone except from time, in that it says a temporal effect4; but it is conceded without qualification: the Son of God was sent into the flesh: therefore much more must this be conceded: the Son of God is predestined.

5. Likewise, predestination is nothing other than the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future5; but to the Son of God, Christ, grace and glory were conferred in time and foreseen from eternity to be conferred upon him; but to whatever the definition belongs, the thing defined [also belongs]: therefore one must necessarily concede that the Son of God is predestined.

6. Likewise, this is true: the Son of God is predestined, insofar as he is man; but that qualification "man" does not diminish anything with respect to the subject: therefore, it being removed, it is permissible to infer that the Son of God is predestined without qualification. Since therefore "from the true nothing but the true follows6," it seems that the aforesaid locution, namely "the Son of God is predestined," is to be conceded as true.

(Fundamental arguments.) On the contrary: 1. Origen7: "He is predestined who does not yet exist; these words are said on account of those who speak impiety against the Only-begotten of God. For they think that he is to be numbered among those who, before they came to be, were predestined to be": therefore it is impious to say that the Son of God is predestined.

2. Likewise, upon that text of Romans 88: Whom he predestined, them he also called; the Gloss: "He predestined those not existing, he called them before they had turned away": if therefore predestination is of the non-existent, and the Son of God always exists, he never seems to be predestined.

3. Likewise, predestination by the meaning of the name says a precedence of the one predestining over the one predestined9; but nothing precedes the Son of God, since he is eternal: therefore in no way does it befit him to be numbered among the predestined.

4. Likewise, no one predestined himself1b — for just as one is who is created, another who creates; so also one who predestines, and another who is predestined — but all, however many are predestined, are predestined by the Son of God: therefore it is in no way to be conceded: the Son of God is predestined.

Conclusion

The locution "the Son of God is predestined" is not admitted by the theologians.

I respond: It must be said that, although this is to be conceded: "Christ is predestined," in that "Christ" names the hypostasis in two natures; and this: "Christ is predestined, insofar as he is man," by reason of the adjoined qualification; (Conclusion.) nevertheless this is commonly not received: "the Son of God is predestined." — And the reason for this is on account of the repugnance of the intelligible contents, (Threefold reason.) which is indeed found between the subject and the predicate.

Now a threefold repugnance is found there. For the word "predestination," with regard to the one predestined, (Three things in predestination.) imports three things, namely a relation of effects2b with respect to a cause, an acceptation through the gift of grace, and an inchoation as regards the being of [the] nature. And it has the first intelligible content because it descends from a passive verb; it has the second intelligible content because it descends from an act expressing an ordering to an end3b; it has the third intelligible content because it is compounded from a preposition expressing precedence, namely from this preposition "pre-." — On the contrary, "the Son of God" signifies that (Threefold repugnance.) person as cause, not as effect. It also signifies that person inasmuch as sonship belongs to him by nature, not by the gift of grace. It also signifies that person as eternal, not as having a beginning. And thus there is expressly a repugnance of the intelligible contents between (Corollary.) subject and predicate. — And this repugnance can be reduced to the threefold genus of opposition, namely of contradiction, of contrariety, and of relation4b. And on account of this threefold repugnance the masters do not admit the aforesaid locution. — Hence the reasonings which are on this side are to be conceded.

(Solution of the opposing arguments.) 1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that this is conceded: "the Son of God is man"; it must be said that there is not there a repugnance of the intelligible contents, but rather a consonance. For "man" names a nature apt for the union, but not so this predicate "predestined"5b. And therefore it does not follow from this, that if the Son of God is man, that on account of this he is foreknown or predestined, unless there be added to him: insofar as he is man.

2. To that which is objected, that the communication of idioms is in all [terms], excepting the names importing the union; it must be said that not only (Note.) are those names to be excepted, but also those words from which a repugnance of intelligible contents arises; and such is the word "predestination" and the like, as will be better made clear below in the eleventh distinction6b, where it is asked whether this is to be conceded: the Son of God is a creature.

3. To that which is objected, that the temporal is more repugnant to the eternal than the eternal to the eternal; it must be said that this is true of that which is purely eternal; but of that which is so eternal that of its primary intelligible content it expresses and names7b something temporal, it does not hold true, especially when it so imports that temporal [thing] which has a direct opposition to the eternal, as is this participle "predestined."

4. To that which is objected concerning the mission, that although it is temporal, it is conceded8b that the Son of God was sent; it must be said that it is not alike, because, (Note.) although "to be sent" expresses something temporal, nevertheless that temporal [thing] is not said to be placed about the divine person, but about something created; whereas about the divine person it places only an emanation. But predestination places about the very one predestined a threefold intelligible content, which is repugnant to the eternal person; and therefore, although it may soundly be conceded "the Son of God was sent," it cannot soundly be conceded "the Son of God is predestined."

5. To that which is objected, that for the Son of God grace was prepared in the present and glory in the future; it must be said that, although for Christ grace was prepared9b by reason of the human nature, nevertheless not by reason of the divine. And therefore, just as the first locution is denied, by which it is said "the Son of God is predestined," unless a qualification be added, according to which and by reason of which the predestination itself is regarded; so the other locution is to be denied, in which the definition of predestination is placed, unless this qualification be added: insofar as he is man.

6. To that which is objected, that this qualification "insofar as he is man" does not diminish; it must be said that, although it does not diminish [anything] of the meaning of predestination, it nevertheless brings it about that predestination places its reality about the hypostasis of Christ by reason of the human nature, not by reason of the divine; and thus it removes the repugnance of the intelligible contents. But when it is inferred and said without qualification "the Son of God is predestined," since "the Son of God" denominates the person of Christ according to

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the divine nature only, there is there a repugnance of the intelligible contents. And therefore that reasoning does not hold, not because there is there a paralogism of the qualified and the unqualified, but because there is there a paralogism of accident1c. For what belongs to Christ by reason of the human nature is foreign [to him] by reason of the divine.

Scholion

I. In the three questions of this article, again it is the propriety of the three locutions that is treated, not the predestination of Christ considered in itself. On predestination in general, cf. I Sent. d. 40, 41; on the predestination of Christ, below d. 11, a. 1. — It must be presupposed that, for the properly-so-called meaning of predestination, three things are required, namely that predestination precede the one predestined; that the predestined reality be conferred through grace; that the same be at some time actually conferred. Hence it is now clear that the first locution (q. I) is false; the other two, with certain restrictions, are commonly conceded, Durand, however, teaching the contrary. On other similar locutions see below d. 10, a. 1, and 11, a. 2.

II. On these three questions and locutions — with only the order sometimes changed — treat: Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 3, m. 1–4. — Scotus, here q. 3; Reportata here q. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 3, a. 1, 2; Summa III, q. 24, a. 1, 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 2, below d. 10, a. 4–7. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 3, a. 1, 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 1–4. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2, a. 1–3. — Durand, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XL.
    Cf. I Sent., text of the Master, d. 40.
  2. Vide supra a. I. q. 3. in fine.
    See above, a. 1, q. 3, near the end.
  3. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1. — Subinde pro sed esse conceptum et natum quid etc. codd. AELNTXYaa sed omne conceptum est natum quid etc. Pro sed esse cod. K et esse, edd. esse tantum.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 40, a. 1, q. 1. — Thereupon, for sed esse conceptum et natum quid etc., codices AELNTXYaa read sed omne conceptum est natum quid etc. For sed esse, cod. K reads et esse, the editions esse only.
  4. De quo vide I. Sent. d. 15. p. I. q. 2. — Deinde post sed edd. inserunt ista.
    On which see I Sent., d. 15, p. 1, q. 2. — Then, after sed, the editions insert ista.
  5. De hac definitione cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. XL. c. 2. et hic c. 2. in fine. — Paulo inferius post definitio edd. cum paucis codd. repetunt convenit. Cfr. Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 1. seq., et Boeth., II. et III. de Differentiis topic.
    On this definition cf. I Sent., text of the Master, d. 40, c. 2, and here c. 2, near the end. — A little below, after definitio, the editions with a few codices repeat convenit. Cf. Aristotle, Topics VI, c. 1 ff., and Boethius, On Topical Differences II and III.
  6. Aristot., II. Prior. c. 2: «Ex veris ergo non est falsum syllogizare». I. Poster. c. 25. (c. 32.): Vera autem [conclusio] ex veris.
    Aristotle, Prior Analytics II, c. 2: "From true [premises], therefore, one cannot syllogize a falsehood." Posterior Analytics I, c. 25 (c. 32): And a true [conclusion follows] from true [premises].
  7. Libr. I. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. n. 5, ubi illa verba: Qui praedestinatus est Filius Dei etc. (1, 4.) enucleans ait: Quamvis enim in Latinis exemplaribus praedestinatus soleat inveniri, tamen secundum quod interpretationis veritas habet, destinatus scriptum est, non praedestinatus. Destinatur enim ille qui est, praedestinatur vero ille qui nondum est, sicut hi, de quibus dicit Apostolus: Quos autem praescivit, illos et praedestinavit (Rom. 8, 30.). Praesciri ergo et praedestinari possunt illi qui nondum sunt; ille autem, qui est et semper est, non praedestinatur, sed destinatur. Haec dicta sint a nobis propter eos qui in unigenitum Filium Dei impietatem loquuntur et ignorantes differentiam destinati et praedestinati, putant eum inter eos qui, cum ante non fuerint, praedestinati sunt ut essent, numerandum (ed. Migne).
    Book I, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, n. 5, where, expounding those words Who was predestined Son of God etc. (1:4), he says: For although in the Latin exemplars "predestined" is wont to be found, nevertheless, according to what the truth of the interpretation holds, "destined" is written, not "predestined." For he is destined who is, but he is predestined who does not yet exist, like those of whom the Apostle says: But whom he foreknew, them he also predestined (Rom. 8:30). Therefore those can be foreknown and predestined who do not yet exist; but he who is and always is, is not predestined, but destined. Let these things be said by us on account of those who speak impiety against the only-begotten Son of God and, ignorant of the difference between "destined" and "predestined," think that he is to be numbered among those who, since they did not before exist, were predestined to be (Migne's edition).
  8. Vers. 30. — Glossa, quae est interlinearis et habetur apud Lyranum, sumta est ex August., Serm. 158. (alias 16. de Verbis Apostoli) c. 1. n. 1: Praedestinavit, antequam essemus; vocavit, cum aversi essemus. Cfr. ibid. c. 3. n. 3. seq. — Pro ante aversos codd. AEFSHKNTXZ (aa a secunda manu) bb adversos, cod. U adversarios.
    Verse 30. — The Gloss, which is interlinear and is found in [Nicholas of] Lyra, is taken from Augustine, Sermon 158 (otherwise 16, On the Words of the Apostle), c. 1, n. 1: He predestined [us] before we were; he called [us] when we had turned away. Cf. ibid. c. 3, n. 3 ff. — For ante aversos codices AEFSHKNTXZ (aa by a second hand) bb read adversos, cod. U adversarios.
  9. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 40. a. 1. q. 1.
    Cf. I Sent., d. 40, a. 1, q. 1.
  10. Codd. GKZbb praedestinat.
    Codices GKZbb read praedestinat.
  11. Cod. Z effectus. Paulo ante pro praedestinationis edd. praedestinatus.
    Cod. Z reads effectus. A little before, for praedestinationis the editions read praedestinatus.
  12. Codd. FGHILUZaabb in finem. Immediate ante pro ab actu dicente edd. 1, 2 a verbo dicente.
    Codices FGHILUZaabb read in finem. Immediately before, for ab actu dicente the editions 1, 2 read a verbo dicente.
  13. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis.
    Cf. Aristotle, Categories, the chapter On Opposites.
  14. Cod. bb praedestinatus.
    Cod. bb reads praedestinatus.
  15. Art. 2. q. 1.
    Article 2, q. 1.
  16. Codd. EFHLNXZaa connominat, codd. IY connotat.
    Codices EFHLNXZaa read connominat, codices IY connotat.
  17. Edd. hic ante conceditur et in fine arg. inter non et sane potest interserunt tamen. In medio arg. pro solam emanationem codd. AGIKLNTUZaabb solum emanationem [codd. IL (T a prima manu) Yaa et edd. 1, 2 emanabilitatem].
    Here the editions insert tamen before conceditur and, at the end of the argument, between non and sane potest. In the middle of the argument, for solam emanationem codices AGIKLNTUZaabb read solum emanationem [codices IL (T by a first hand), Yaa, and editions 1, 2 read emanabilitatem].
  18. Cod. U addit in praesenti et gloria in futuro.
    Cod. U adds in the present and glory in the future.
  19. Cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. (c. 5.). Petr. Hispan., Summul. tr. de Fallaciis, fallaciam secundum quid ad simpliciter describens ait: «Dictum secundum quid appellatur hic determinatio diminuens de ratione vel de esse eius cui adiungitur, ut, cum dico: homo mortuus, ibi mortuum diminuit de ratione hominis... Fit autem haec fallacia tot modis, quot modis contingit alicui addere determinationem diminuentem; et ponuntur quinque modi» etc. Describens autem fallaciam secundum accidens dicit: Accidens, ut hic sumitur, idem est quod extraneum in parte idem et in parte diversum etc. Cfr. supra pag. 175, nota 7. — Pro sed quia ibi est codd. AHILNTUXaa sed est ibi.
    Cf. Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 4 (c. 5). Peter of Spain, Summulae, tract On Fallacies, describing the fallacy of the qualified leading to the unqualified, says: "A statement made in a qualified sense is here called a determination that diminishes from the formal account or from the being of that to which it is joined, as when I say 'a dead man,' there 'dead' diminishes from the formal account of man... Now this fallacy occurs in as many ways as it happens that one adds to something a diminishing determination; and five ways are set down," etc. But describing the fallacy of accident he says: Accident, as it is taken here, is the same as what is extraneous, in part the same and in part diverse, etc. Cf. above p. 175, note 7. — For sed quia ibi est codices AHILNTUXaa read sed est ibi. ---
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