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Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 3

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 7

Textus Latinus
p. 175

Quaestio III. Utrum haec sit concedenda: homo factus est Deus.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum haec sit concedenda: homo est factus Deus. Et quod sic, videtur:

1. (Fundamenta.) Primo auctoritate Augustini9: « Talis fuit illa unio, ut faceret Deum hominem, et hominem Deum »: ergo si fecit hominem Deum, homo ergo factus est Deus.

2. Item, homo est Deus, et ante incarnationem non fuit Deus; et incarnatio est Dei operatio: ergo per incarnationem homo factus est Deus.

3. Item, sicut haec est vera: Deus est homo, ita eius conversa: homo est Deus10: ergo pari ratione, sicut haec est vera: Deus factus est homo, haec erit vera: homo factus est Deus.

p. 176

4. Item, hominem esse Deum est verum1b; aut est verum veritate aeterna, aut veritate temporali. Si veritate aeterna, ergo ab aeterno verum fuit dicere, hominem esse Deum; sed hoc est falsum: ergo etc. Si veritate temporali, ergo hominem esse Deum est temporale; et omne tale est factum: ergo factum est, Deum hominem esse: ergo homo factus est Deus.

Sed contra: 1. (Fundamenta.) Subiectum fieri se habet per modum substantificantis et praecedentis ipsum terminum2b; sed homo respectu Dei neutro modo se habet: ergo haec est falsa simpliciter: homo est factus Deus.

2. Item, cum dicitur: homo est factus Deus, aut homo tenetur ratione suppositi, vel ratione formae. Ratione formae non, quia non praedicatur Deus de homine ratione formae3b; si ergo est verum, intelligitur ratione suppositi vel hypostasis. Sed hypostasis illa est hypostasis Filii Dei, et illa est aeterna: ergo de illa est falsum simpliciter dicere, quod homo ratione illius sit factus homo-Deus.

3. Item, quia Deus factus est homo, Deus est homo novus, ergo a simili, si homo factus est Deus, homo est Deus novus sive recens; sed hoc est impossibile4b: ergo etc.

4. Item, communicatio est idiomatum5b, ergo si homo factus est Deus, Deus est factus Deus; sed haec est falsa: ergo et prima.

Conclusio.

Locutio: homo factus est Deus, falsa est, nisi intelligatur in hoc sensu: factum est, ut homo sit Deus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta locutio, qua dicitur: homo factus est Deus, distingui habet (Triplex sensus.) per hunc modum, quo distincta est6b praedicta: Deus est factus homo, ex eo quod res huius participii factus poni potest circa totum, vel circa praedicatum, vel circa utrumque extremum. In primo sensu locutio est vera, et est sensus: homo factus est Deus, id est factum est, ut homo esset Deus; et hoc quidem verum est. (Conclusio 1.) — Si autem determinet praedicatum, est sensus: homo est Deus, qui7b factus est; et hoc quidem falsum est. (Conclusio 2.) — Si autem cadat circa utrumque extremum et dicat ordinem subiecti ad praedicatum, tunc est sensus: homo factus est Deus, id est, qui prius erat homo factus est Deus posterius; et hoc quidem adhuc falsum est, quia esse hominem nullo modo antecessit in illo supposito esse Deum, nec divinum esse aliquatenus inchoatur. (Conclusio 3.)

Et sic patet, quod ista locutio, si aliquo modo possit concedi in primo sensu, in duobus aliis concedi non potest nec debet: homo factus est Deus. (Conclusio generalis.) Unde magis est impropria: homo factus est Deus, quam haec: Deus factus est homo, et rarius invenitur scripta8b. Si tamen alicubi legatur vel inveniatur, tunc secundum primum sensum est accipienda. (Corollarium.)

Et per hoc patent obiecta ad utramque partem inducta. (Ad argumenta.) Unde rationes, quae ad primam partem inducuntur, procedunt secundum primam viam; aliter enim non concluderent, sicut patet. Rationes vero ad aliam partem inductae procedunt secundum alias duas vias, videlicet prout participium cadit inter extrema, vel prout determinat praedicatum, sicut patet aspicienti.

Ad illud tamen quod ultimo obiicitur de communicatione idiomatum, dicendum, quod cum dicitur, quod unio illa facit communicari idiomata; (Ad 4. fundamentum.) dicendum, quod ab hac generalitate excipiuntur illa nomina, quae important unionem. (Notandum.) Unde non sequitur: divina natura assumsit humanam naturam, ergo homo assumsit humanam naturam; sic nec et in proposito sequitur. Cum enim dico, hominem esse factum Deum, dico, hominem esse Deo unitum; et tale idioma Deo non communicatur per unionem, pro eo quod ipsa unio inter unibilia importat diversitatem et distinctionem, et eam praesupponi oportet ad idiomatum communicationem; et ideo talia idiomata unionem importantia non sunt communicabilia. Et per hoc responderi potest ad ultimum obiectum et consimilia9b.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether this is to be conceded: man was made God.

Thirdly it is asked whether this is to be conceded: man was made God. And that it is so, it seems:

1. (Fundamenta.) First, on the authority of Augustine9: "Such was that union, that it made God man, and man God": therefore if it made man God, then man was made God.

2. Likewise, man is God, and before the incarnation he was not God; and the incarnation is an operation of God: therefore through the incarnation man was made God.

3. Likewise, just as this is true: God is man, so its converse: man is God10: therefore by parity of reasoning, just as this is true: God was made man, this will be true: man was made God.

4. Likewise, that man is God is true1b; either it is true by an eternal truth, or by a temporal truth. If by an eternal truth, then from eternity it was true to say that man is God; but this is false: therefore etc. If by a temporal truth, then that man is God is temporal; and everything such has been made: therefore it has been made that God is man: therefore man was made God.

On the contrary: 1. (Fundamenta.) A subject of becoming stands in the manner of something that gives substance to and precedes the term itself2b; but man with respect to God stands in neither manner: therefore this is false simply: man was made God.

2. Likewise, when it is said: man was made God, either "man" is taken by reason of the supposit, or by reason of the form. Not by reason of the form, because God is not predicated of man by reason of the form3b; if therefore it is true, it is understood by reason of the supposit or hypostasis. But that hypostasis is the hypostasis of the Son of God, and it is eternal: therefore concerning it, it is false simply to say that man, by reason of it, was made a God-man.

3. Likewise, because God was made man, God is a new man; therefore by a similar reasoning, if man was made God, man is a new or recent God; but this is impossible4b: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, there is a communication of idioms5b; therefore if man was made God, God was made God; but this is false: therefore the first is too.

Conclusion.

The locution "man was made God" is false, unless it is understood in this sense: it has been brought about that man is God.

I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid locution, by which it is said "man was made God," is to be distinguished (The threefold sense.) in this manner, by which the aforesaid was distinguished6b: "God was made man," from the fact that the reality of this participle made can be placed about the whole, or about the predicate, or about both extremes. In the first sense the locution is true, and the sense is: man was made God, that is, it has been brought about that man should be God; and this indeed is true. (Conclusion 1.) — But if it determine the predicate, the sense is: man is God, who7b was made; and this indeed is false. (Conclusion 2.) — But if it fall about both extremes and assert an order of the subject to the predicate, then the sense is: man was made God, that is, he who was previously man was afterwards made God; and this indeed is still false, because being man in no way preceded being God in that supposit, nor is the divine being in any way begun. (Conclusion 3.)

And so it is clear that this locution, if in any way it can be conceded in the first sense, in the two others cannot and ought not be conceded: man was made God. (General conclusion.) Hence "man was made God" is more improper than this: "God was made man," and is more rarely found written8b. If nevertheless it is anywhere read or found, then it is to be taken according to the first sense. (Corollary.)

And by this the objections brought for both parts are made clear. (To the arguments.) Hence the reasons that are brought for the first part proceed according to the first way; for otherwise they would not conclude, as is clear. But the reasons brought for the other part proceed according to the other two ways, namely insofar as the participle falls between the extremes, or insofar as it determines the predicate, as is clear to one who looks.

But to that which is objected last concerning the communication of idioms, it must be said that, when it is said that that union causes idioms to be communicated; (To the 4th of the Fundamenta.) it must be said that from this generality are excepted those names which imply union. (Note.) Hence it does not follow: the divine nature assumed the human nature, therefore man assumed the human nature; so neither in the case at issue does it follow. For when I say that man was made God, I say that man is united to God; and such an idiom is not communicated to God through the union, because the union itself between things that can be united implies diversity and distinction, and it is required that this be presupposed for the communication of idioms; and therefore such idioms implying union are not communicable. And by this an answer can be given to the last objection and to those like it9b.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. I.
    Augustine, On the Trinity, Book I, c. 13, n. 28. See here the Master's text, c. I.
  2. Nam, ut supra q. I. in fine dicitur, haec propositio: Deus est homo, « partem habet naturae indefinitae, partem naturae singularis ». Sed secundum Petr. Hispan. (Summul., tr. de Proposition.), qui sequitur Aristot. (I. Prior. c. 2.), « eadem est conversio particularis, indefinitae et singularis », conversio scilicet simplex. Ratio est, quia sicut singularis propositio conversa pro uno supposito verificatur, ita et particularis et indefinita. — Edd. perperam, quia contra processum arg.: Deus factus est homo; ita eius conversa: homo factus est Deus.
    For, as is said above in q. I at the end, this proposition "God is man" "has part of an indefinite nature, part of a singular nature." But according to Peter of Spain (Summulae, tract On the Proposition), who follows Aristotle (Prior [Analytics] I, c. 2), "the conversion of a particular, of an indefinite, and of a singular [proposition] is the same," namely a simple conversion. The reason is that, just as a converted singular proposition is verified for one supposit, so too the particular and the indefinite. — The editions wrongly [read otherwise], for it is against the course of the argument: "God was made man; so its converse: man was made God."
  3. Ut ostensum est supra q. I.
    As was shown above in q. I.
  4. Ut, si homo dicitur fieri albus, albedo recipitur (substantificatur) in ipso, et praesupponitur, quod prius sit homo, quam albus. — De minori vide supra d. 6. a. I. q. I. ad 3; a. 2. q. I. ad 4; d. 3. p. II. a. 3. q. 2.
    As, if man is said to become white, whiteness is received (made substantial) in him, and it is presupposed that he is man prior to being white. — On the minor premise see above d. 6, a. I, q. I, ad 3; a. 2, q. I, ad 4; d. 3, p. II, a. 3, q. 2.
  5. Non enim dicitur: humanitas est Deus. Cfr. supra d. 6. a. I. q. I. ad 5. — In fine arg. pro homo — Deus, quam lectionem ex codd. P R delibavimus, alii codd. et edd. 1, 2 perperam solum homo, Vat. Deus tantum.
    For it is not said: humanity is God. Cf. above d. 6, a. I, q. I, ad 5. — At the end of the argument, for man — God, which reading we have drawn from codices P R, the other codices and editions 1, 2 wrongly [read] only man, the Vatican [edition] only God.
  6. Psalm. 80, 10: Non erit in te Deus recens. — Post Deus est homo novus cod. U adiicit sive recens.
    Psalm 80:10 [Vulgate]: "There shall be no new God in thee." — After "God is a new man" codex U adds "or recent."
  7. Cfr. supra pag. 14, nota 3.
    Cf. above p. 14, note 3.
  8. Quaest. praeced. — Mox pro circa totum codd. H (K a secunda manu) M O Y perperam circa subiectum. Dein pro circa praedicatum cod. S circa partem.
    The preceding question. — Shortly after, for about the whole the codices H (K by a second hand) M O Y wrongly [read] about the subject. Then for about the predicate codex S [reads] about the part.
  9. Cod. U qui Deus. Aliquanto inferius pro nullo modo edd. nunquam.
    Codex U [reads] who [is] God. Somewhat below, for in no way the editions [read] never.
  10. Codd. M O U Z in scriptura.
    Codices M O U Z [read] in writing.
  11. Vide scholion ad 1. huius articuli quaest.
    See the scholion to the 1st question of this article.
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