Dist. 7, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 7
Quaestio II. Utrum haec sit admittenda: Deus factus est homo.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum haec sit admittenda: Deus factus est homo. Et quod sic, videtur:
(Fundamenta) 1. Ioannis primo4: Verbum caro factum est; sed caro, ut dicit Augustinus, non stat ibi pro parte, sed pro toto homine: ergo si haec est vera: Verbum Dei factum est caro, multo magis haec erit vera: Deus factus est homo.
2. Item, in Symbolo5: « Incarnatus... et homo factus est ».
3. Item, Augustinus6: « Tanta fuit illa unio, quod faceret hominem Deum, et Deum hominem »: ergo si unio illa fecit Deum esse hominem, cum omnis activa inferat suam passivam, igitur Deus factus est homo.
4. Item, post incarnationem Deus est homo, et ante incarnationem non erat homo; sed quicumque modo est homo, et prius non erat homo, est factus homo: ergo si Deus est huiusmodi1b, Deus est factus homo.
5. Item, idem est humanari quod hominem fieri; sed haec simpliciter conceditur: Deus est humanatus2b: ergo simpliciter concedendum est: Deus factus est homo.
(Ad oppositum) Sed contra: 1. Mutatum esse est superius ad factum esse3b; sed haec simpliciter est falsa: Deus est mutatus: ergo et haec: Deus est factus homo.
2. Item, factum esse praesupponit fieri4b; et fieri ponit imperfectionem: ergo de quocumque est dicere factum esse, est dicere imperfectionem. Sed hoc dicere de Deo est falsum: ergo et ista est falsa: Deus factus est homo.
3. Item, quandocumque dicitur: hoc fit illud, terminus habet rationem complementi respectu eius, circa quod fit; ut cum dicitur: homo fit albus, notatur albedo esse complementum hominis5b: ergo cum dicitur: Deus fit homo, notatur fieri complementum Dei. Sed falsum est, quod homo aliquod complementum Deo tribuat: ergo praedicta locutio simpliciter erit falsa.
4. Item, adiectivum ponit rem suam circa suum substantivum; sed hoc adiectivum factus, cum cadit circa subiectum et praedicatum, potius adiacet subiecto quam praedicato — quod patet, quia dicitur: Verbum est factum caro — ergo iste terminus factus ponit circa divinum suppositum rem suam: ergo praedicta locutio nominat aliquam factionem6b circa Deum. Sed hoc est falsum, cum nulla circa Deum possit esse factio vel innovatio: ergo falsa erit praedicta locutio.
5. Item, quandocumque praedicatur aliquid de aliquo cum determinatione non diminuente, potest praedicari simpliciter; sed iste terminus homo non diminuit de ratione eius quod est factus: ergo si haec est vera: Deus est factus homo; haec erit vera: Deus est factus. Sed hoc est contra Symbolum7b, quod dicit, quod « nec factus nec creatus, sed genitus ».
Conclusio
Haec locutio: Deus factus est homo, quocumque sensu accipiatur, vera est, licet semper habeat aliquid improprietatis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaeritur de hac locutione: Deus factus est homo, iuxta illud quod consuetum est8b, (Sensus triplex) praedicta locutio multipliciter est distinguenda, ex hoc quod illud participium potest ponere rem suam super totum, vel circa alterum extremorum absolute, vel circa unum extremum in comparatione ad alterum. — (Conclusio 1) Si ponat rem suam, scilicet ipsam factionem, super totum, vera est locutio, et est sensus: Deus factus est homo, id est, factum est, ut Deus esset homo; et hoc quidem factum fuit in opere incarnationis. — (Conclusio 2) Si autem ponat rem suam circa alterum extremorum absolute, utpote circa praedicatum, tunc est sensus: Deus factus est homo, id est, Deus est homo, qui quidem factus est sive productus; et hoc quidem verum est. — (Conclusio 3) Si autem ponat rem suam circa unum extremum in comparatione ad alterum, sic est sensus: Deus factus est homo, id est, Deus fecit semetipsum hominem per humanitatis assumtionem, sicut homo facit semetipsum doctum per doctrinae acquisitionem.
(Conclusio 1) Et primus quidem sensus est verus et consuetus secundum sensum9b communem, non tamen est secundum locutionis virtutem; quia hoc participium, quod est factus, cum sit masculini generis et adiectivum et adiective retentum, non potest ponere rem suam circa copulatum, sed necessario ponit, quantum est de virtute sermonis, circa subiectum, vel circa praedicatum.
(Conclusio 2) Secundus autem sensus verus quidem est et haberi potest per sermonis virtutem et proprietatem, est tamen praeter usum communem. Cum enim dicimus, quod Deus factus est homo, non volumus dicere, quod Deus sit homo, qui productus est, sed volumus exprimere ipsam incarnationem sive unionem divinae naturae ad humanam.
(Conclusio 3) Tertius vero sensus habetur et secundum usum communem et secundum locutionis proprietatem, habet tamen in se aliquid proprietatis et aliquid improprietatis. (Notandum) Et hoc patet, quia, cum dicitur: iste factus est bonus, vel huiusmodi, hoc participium factus tria importat, videlicet antecessionem ex parte subiecti, et inceptionem ex parte praedicati, et transmutationem ex parte utriusque, quantum1c est ex vi sermonis, pro eo quod factum esse implicat fieri. In proposito autem est reperire antecessionem ex parte subiecti, et inceptionem ex parte praedicati, sed non est reperire transmutationem in supposito Dei; et ideo factus hic cadit a propria significatione quantum ad tertiam conditionem, nec importat transmutationem, sed unionem; nec significatur, quod Filius Dei sit suppositum transmutationis, cum dicitur: Deus factus est homo, sed quod est suppositum naturae factae et sibi unitae.
(Conclusio generalis) Licet igitur praedictus sermo, quocumque modo accipiatur, aliquam habeat improprietatem; quia veritatem habet, nihilominus recipitur, quia in expressione fidei nostrae magis consideratur sermonis veritas quam sermonis congruitas. (Notandum) Ea enim, quae sunt fidei nostrae, ut dicit Augustinus2c, melius intelligimus quam proferimus; unde Gregorius dicit, quod « excelsa Dei balbutiendo resonamus ». — Concedendus est igitur sermo praedictus, et rationes, quae hoc ostendunt, quia veritatem astruunt.
(Solutio oppositorum) 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur primo in contrarium, quod mutatum esse est superius ad factum esse; dicendum, quod verum est, secundum quod factum esse et fieri accipitur proprie; hoc autem est, cum dicit transmutationem circa ipsum suppositum. Non sic autem est in proposito, pro eo quod in incarnationis opere factum est, ut Deus sit homo, non secundum aliquam transmutationem factam in Deo, sed secundum transmutationem factam in altero extremo3c.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod factum esse praesupponit fieri, et fieri dicit imperfectionem; (Notandum) dicendum, quod fieri dicit imperfectionem circa illud quod dicit mutationem; in praesenti autem non dicit circa Deum mutationem nec imperfectionem, sed solum circa hominem; nec circa illum ponit imperfectionem praecedentem tempore, sed natura, quia ibi simul est fieri et factum esse4c.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod terminus factionis est complementum; dicendum, quod illud verum est, quando illud quod notatur fieri circa principium, vel suppositum, facit aliquam innovationem5c secundum aliquam proprietatem absolutam. Non sic autem est in proposito; quia, sicut iam dictum est, ex parte Dei non dicit nisi habitudinem unionis.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod factus, cum sit participium, ponit rem suam circa subiectum, ut cum dicitur: Verbum est factum caro; dicendum, quod etsi trahat nomen a supposito, tamen quia non respicit ipsum absolute, sed in relatione ad praedicatum, ideo non est necesse, quod ponat circa ipsum aliquid absolutum. Ideo ad veritatem sufficit, ut circa subiectum ponatur antecessio, et unio respectu praedicati. Et hoc quidem reperitur in proposito.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ille terminus6c homo non diminuit de ratione huius quod est factus; (Notandum) dicendum, quod verum est; non tamen licet inferre: est factus homo, ergo est factus; non propter diminutionem, sed propter denominationis mutationem. Non enim sequitur: iste est albus monachus, ergo est albus; non quia diminuat de ratione eius quod est albus, sed quia aliter denominat albus, cum dicitur cum adiuncto7c, aliter, cum dicitur absolute. Sic et in proposito intelligendum est, et hoc patet inspicienti8c.
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Question II. Whether this is to be admitted: God was made man.
Secondly it is asked whether this is to be admitted: God was made man. And that it is so seems to be the case:
(Fundamenta) 1. In the first chapter of John4: The Word was made flesh; but "flesh," as Augustine says, does not there stand for a part, but for the whole man: therefore if this is true: The Word of God was made flesh, much more will this be true: God was made man.
2. Likewise, in the Creed5: « Incarnate... and was made man ».
3. Likewise, Augustine6: « So great was that union, that it made the man God, and God man »: therefore if that union made God to be man, since every active [verb] entails its passive, then God was made man.
4. Likewise, after the incarnation God is man, and before the incarnation he was not man; but whoever in any mode is man, and previously was not man, has been made man: therefore if God is of this kind1b, God has been made man.
5. Likewise, "to be made human" is the same as "to become a man"; but this is conceded without qualification: God has been made human2b: therefore it is to be conceded without qualification: God was made man.
(Ad oppositum) On the contrary: 1. To have been changed is superior to to have been made3b; but this is simply false: God has been changed: therefore also this: God has been made man.
2. Likewise, to have been made presupposes to become4b; and to become posits imperfection: therefore of whatever it is possible to say to have been made, it is to say imperfection. But to say this of God is false: therefore this too is false: God was made man.
3. Likewise, whenever it is said: this becomes that, the term has the character of a completion with respect to that about which the becoming takes place; as when it is said: a man becomes white, whiteness is noted to be the completion of the man5b: therefore when it is said: God becomes man, becoming is noted to be the completion of God. But it is false that man contributes any completion to God: therefore the aforesaid locution will simply be false.
4. Likewise, an adjective posits its reality about its substantive; but this adjective factus ("made"), when it falls about both subject and predicate, lies rather alongside the subject than the predicate — which is evident, because it is said: The Word was made flesh — therefore this term factus posits its reality about the divine supposit: therefore the aforesaid locution names some making6b about God. But this is false, since there can be no making or innovation about God: therefore the aforesaid locution will be false.
5. Likewise, whenever something is predicated of something with a non-diminishing determination, it can be predicated without qualification; but this term man does not diminish from the account of that which is made: therefore if this is true: God is made man; this will be true: God is made. But this is against the Creed7b, which says that he is « neither made nor created, but begotten ».
Conclusion
This locution: "God was made man," in whatever sense it is taken, is true, although it always has something of impropriety.
I respond: It must be said that, when it is asked concerning this locution: "God was made man," according to what is customary8b, (Threefold sense) the aforesaid locution is to be distinguished in many ways, from this fact, that that participle can posit its reality upon the whole, or about either of the extremes absolutely, or about one extreme in comparison to the other. — (Conclusion 1) If it posits its reality, namely the making itself, upon the whole, the locution is true, and the sense is: God was made man, that is, it was made [to be], that God should be man; and this indeed was done in the work of the incarnation. — (Conclusion 2) But if it posits its reality about either of the extremes absolutely, namely about the predicate, then the sense is: God was made man, that is, God is man, who indeed was made or produced; and this indeed is true. — (Conclusion 3) But if it posits its reality about one extreme in comparison to the other, then the sense is: God was made man, that is, God made himself man through the assumption of humanity, just as a man makes himself learned through the acquisition of doctrine.
(Conclusion 1) And the first sense indeed is true and customary according to the common sense9b, yet it is not [true] according to the force of the locution; because this participle, which is factus, since it is of the masculine gender and an adjective and retained adjectivally, cannot posit its reality about the copula, but necessarily posits [it], so far as it pertains to the force of the discourse, about the subject, or about the predicate.
(Conclusion 2) But the second sense indeed is true and can be had through the force and propriety of the discourse, yet it is beyond common usage. For when we say that God was made man, we do not wish to say that God is a man who was produced, but we wish to express the incarnation itself, that is, the union of the divine nature to the human.
(Conclusion 3) But the third sense is had both according to common usage and according to the propriety of the locution, yet it has in itself something of propriety and something of impropriety. (Note) And this is evident, because, when it is said: this man was made good, or the like, this participle factus implies three things, namely antecedence on the part of the subject, and inception on the part of the predicate, and transmutation on the part of both, so far as1c it pertains to the force of the discourse, for the reason that to have been made implies to become. But in the matter at hand there is found antecedence on the part of the subject, and inception on the part of the predicate, but there is not found transmutation in the supposit of God; and therefore factus here falls away from its proper signification with respect to the third condition, nor does it imply transmutation, but union; nor is it signified that the Son of God is the supposit of a transmutation, when it is said: God was made man, but that he is the supposit of a nature made and united to himself.
(General conclusion) Therefore, although the aforesaid discourse, in whatever way it is taken, has some impropriety; because it has truth, it is nonetheless received, because in the expression of our faith the truth of the discourse is considered more than the fittingness of the discourse. (Note) For those things which belong to our faith, as Augustine says2c, we understand better than we utter; whence Gregory says that « we echo the lofty things of God by stammering ». — The aforesaid discourse, therefore, is to be conceded, and the reasons which show this, because they establish the truth.
(Solution of the opposing arguments) 1. To that which is objected in the first place to the contrary, that to have been changed is superior to to have been made; it must be said that this is true, insofar as to have been made and to become are taken properly; and this is so, when it expresses a transmutation about the supposit itself. But it is not so in the matter at hand, for the reason that in the work of the incarnation it was made [to be], that God should be man, not according to any transmutation made in God, but according to a transmutation made in the other extreme3c.
2. To that which is objected, that to have been made presupposes to become, and to become expresses imperfection; (Note) it must be said that to become expresses imperfection about that which it [signifies as] expressing change; but in the present case it does not express, about God, change or imperfection, but only about the man; nor does it posit about him an imperfection preceding in time, but in nature, because there the becoming and the to have been made are at once4c.
3. To that which is objected, that the term of a making is a completion; it must be said that that is true, when that which is noted to become about the principle, or supposit, makes some innovation5c according to some absolute property. But it is not so in the matter at hand; because, as has already been said, on the part of God it expresses nothing but the relation of union.
4. To that which is objected, that factus, since it is a participle, posits its reality about the subject, as when it is said: The Word was made flesh; it must be said that, although it draws its name from the supposit, yet because it does not regard it absolutely, but in relation to the predicate, therefore it is not necessary that it posit about it anything absolute. Therefore for truth it suffices that about the subject there be posited antecedence, and union with respect to the predicate. And this indeed is found in the matter at hand.
5. To that which is objected, that this term6c man does not diminish from the account of that which is made; (Note) it must be said that this is true; yet it is not permissible to infer: he is made man, therefore he is made; not on account of diminution, but on account of the change of denomination. For it does not follow: this man is a white monk, therefore he is white; not because it diminishes from the account of that which is white, but because "white" denominates one way when it is said with an adjunct7c, another way when it is said absolutely. So too in the matter at hand it must be understood, and this is evident to one who considers it8c.
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- Vers. 14. — August., Epist. 140. (alias 120.) c. 4. n. 12; 83 Qq. q. 80. n. 2; XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 2. n. 1; II. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11.Verse 14. — Augustine, Letter 140 (formerly 120), c. 4, n. 12; Eighty-Three Questions, q. 80, n. 2; On the City of God XIV, c. 2, n. 1; On the Trinity II, c. 6, n. 11.
- Nicaeno. — Cod. K Incarnatus est de Spiritu S. ex Maria Virgine, et homo factus est (ex Symb. Nicaeno-Constantinopolitano).[The] Nicene [Creed]. — Codex K: Incarnate of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary, and was made man (from the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed).
- Libr. I. de Trin. c. 13. n. 28. — Pro Tanta in testim. allegato textus origin. et Vat. exhibent Talis. In seq. quaest. arg. 1. ad oppos. etiam codd. habent Talis. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.On the Trinity, Book I, c. 13, n. 28. — For Tanta ("So great") in the cited testimony the original text and the Vatican edition exhibit Talis ("Such was"). In the following question, the first argument to the contrary, the codices likewise have Talis. Cf. here the Master's text, c. 1.
- Pro huiusmodi edd. homo.For huiusmodi ("of this kind") the editions read homo ("man").
- Graece θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας i. e. Deus inhumanatus. Hac locutione Ecclesia contra Apollinaristas utebatur in explicando verbo « incarnatus est », et nihil aliud dicit ista locutio nisi: Deus assumsit perfectum hominem, animam scil. et corpus et mentem et omnia, quae ad verum hominem constituendum requiruntur. Cfr. Epist. Concil. Constant. I. ad Damasum Papam, et Epiphan., Ancor. n. 121. — Subinde pro simpliciter cod. U similiter.In Greek θεὸς ἐνανθρωπήσας, that is, God made-human. The Church used this expression against the Apollinarists in explaining the word « he was incarnate », and that expression says nothing else than: God assumed a perfect man, namely a soul and a body and a mind and all the things which are required for the constituting of a true man. Cf. the Letter of the First Council of Constantinople to Pope Damasus, and Epiphanius, Ancoratus, n. 121. — Thereupon for simpliciter ("without qualification") codex U [reads] similiter ("likewise").
- Omne siquidem quod fit, mutatur, sed non vice versa; quare et Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. (c. 1.) sub genere transmutationis tanquam species ponit non tantum generationem et corruptionem, sed etiam motum (alterationem, augmentationem etc.). Vide II. Sent. d. 1. p. 1. a. 3. q. 1.For indeed everything that comes to be is changed, but not vice versa; wherefore Aristotle too, Physics V, text 7 (c. 1), places under the genus of transmutation, as species, not only generation and corruption, but also motion (alteration, augmentation, etc.). See II Sentences, d. 1, p. 1, a. 3, q. 1.
- Aristot., VI. Phys. text. 59. (c. 6.): Manifestum est igitur, quod et id quod factum est, necesse est fieri prius.Aristotle, Physics VI, text 59 (c. 6): It is manifest, therefore, that that which has been made must necessarily come to be first.
- Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 8. (XI. c. 2.): Omne mutatur ex potentia ente in actu ens, ut ex potentia albo in actu album. Cfr. V. Phys. text. 4. et 8. (c. 1. et 5.), ubi docetur, mutationem denominandam esse ex termino. — Edd. voci terminus addunt factionis.Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 8 (XI, c. 2): Everything is changed from being in potency to being in act, as from being potentially white to being actually white. Cf. Physics V, texts 4 and 8 (c. 1 and 5), where it is taught that change is to be denominated from its terminus. — The editions add to the word terminus the word factionis ("of making").
- Codd. A T actionem, et paulo inferius pariter actio pro factio. Aliquanto superius pro circa subiectum cod. K inter subiectum.Codices A T [read] actionem ("action"), and a little below likewise actio for factio ("making"). Somewhat above, for circa subiectum ("about the subject") codex K [reads] inter subiectum ("between the subject").
- Athanasianum. — Pro Sed hoc codd. A G H I L N T U aa Sed haec. In maiori post diminuente codd. M O adiungunt rationem eius.[The] Athanasian [Creed]. — For Sed hoc codices A G H I L N T U aa [read] Sed haec. In the major [premise], after diminuente ("non-diminishing"), codices M O add rationem eius ("its account").
- Codd. K, Z (aa a secunda manu) addunt dici.Codices K, Z (aa by a second hand) add dici ("to be said").
- Codd. A K U aa bb cc usum. Codd. A G H I K (T a prima manu) Z bb post consuetus interiiciunt et. Paulo inferius post et adiectivum Vat. omittit et.Codices A K U aa bb cc [read] usum ("usage"). Codices A G H I K (T by a first hand) Z bb insert et after consuetus. A little below, after et adiectivum, the Vatican edition omits et.
- Codd. A F H I L T U W aa hic incongrue inserunt enim.Codices A F H I L T U W aa here incongruously insert enim ("for").
- Libr. VII. de Trin. c. 4. n. 7, de ineffabili Trinitatis mysterio agens, ait: « Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur ». Dictum Gregorii, quod hic respicitur, quodque habetur in eius V. Moral. c. 36. n. 66., sic ibi sonat: « Eum [Deum] aliquatenus balbutiendo resonamus ». Cfr. I. Sent. lit. Magistri, d. IX. c. 4.On the Trinity, Book VII, c. 4, n. 7, treating of the ineffable mystery of the Trinity, says: « For God is more truly thought than spoken ». The saying of Gregory, which is here regarded, and which is found in his Morals V, c. 36, n. 66, there runs thus: « We echo Him [God] in some measure by stammering ». Cf. I Sentences, the Master's text, d. IX, c. 4.
- Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. above, d. 1, a. 1, q. 1.
- Cfr. supra d. 3. p. 2. a. 3. q. 2. — Post simul codd. A E I L N (T U a prima manu) W aa subdunt sibi.Cf. above, d. 3, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2. — After simul ("at once") codices A E I L N (T U by a first hand) W aa add sibi.
- Cod. bb immutationem vel innovationem.Codex bb [reads] immutationem vel innovationem ("a change or an innovation").
- Plurimi codd. omittunt ille terminus et codd. A I L T aa etiam homo.Very many codices omit ille terminus ("this term"), and codices A I L T aa also omit homo ("man").
- Cuiusmodi in allato exemplo esset vestis seu habitus. Petr. Hispan., in Summul., tr. de Fallaciis, sub fallacia accidentis idem exemplum afferens ait: Nam albedo [in exemplo allato] non est in subiecto secundum se, sed secundum habitum. — Paulo superius post diminuat cod. bb subiungit aliquid.Of which kind, in the example adduced, would be garment or habit. Peter of Spain, in the Summulae, treatise On Fallacies, adducing the same example under the fallacy of accident, says: For whiteness [in the example adduced] is not in the subject in itself, but by way of habit. — A little above, after diminuat ("diminishes"), codex bb adds aliquid ("anything").
- Vide scholion ad praecedentem quaest.See the scholion to the preceding question. ---