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Dist. 20, Dubia

Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 20

Textus Latinus
p. 432

## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Iuste illo deserente, peccantem peccati auctor illico invasit. Hoc enim videtur inconvenienter dictum. Sicut enim Adam peccavit inp432-3 consentiendo, ita diabolus peccavit seducendo: ergo sicut fuit iustum, hominem tradi in potestatem diaboli, ita iustum fuit, diabolum tradi in potestatem hominis. — Item, gravius peccavit peccati auctor quam consentiens in peccatum: ergo multo fortius debuit tradi diabolus in potestatem hominis, quam homo in potestatem diaboli.

Sed contra hoc est, quodp432-6b est summe iustus et summe potens: ergo nihil potest facere nisi iuste et potenter. — Item, esto quod Deus fuisset usus potentia in liberatione hominis; cum diabolus nullum ius haberet in eo, nullam iniuriam fecisset diabolo.

Respondeo: Dicendum est ad hoc, quod tam diabolum quam Adam invasit sententia iudicis condemnantis; uterque enim punitus fuit, sicut scribitur tertiop432-4 Genesis; sed tamen magis decebat secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, hominem subiugari, quam e converso, propter hoc quod homo sponte subiecit se illi consentiendop432-5.

Dicendum, quod in auctoritate praemissa non separatur iustitia a potentia, ita quod una sit sine altera in operatione divina; sed in hocp432-7 innuitur, quod aliquod est opus, in quo per excellentiam manifestatur iustitia; aliquod, in quo per excellentiam manifestatur potentia; et Deus illum modum elegit, in quo manifestatur iustitia, ut nobis daret imitandi formam. — Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum si liberasset per potentiam, fuisset ibi iustitia; dicendum, quod sic; sed tamen non fuisset ita manifestap432-8.

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Remissio peccatorum, per sanguinem Christi data, a diabolo eruit, ut sic iustitia vincatur diabolus, non potentia. Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod Deus possitp433-1 facere per iustitiam aliquid et non per potentiam, et e converso.

p. 433

Respondeo: [Cf. supra Dub. I, ad fin.]

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Legitur, quod Christus traditus sit a Patre, et quod semetipsum tradidit. Hoc enim videtur falsum. Si enim Deus tradidit eum in mortem, videtur, quod Iudaei eum occiderunt auctoritate Dei: ergo Deus particeps fuit in illo homicidio. Si tu dicas, quod tradidit eum, quia permisit, eum occidi; similiter posset dici de quolibet, qui occiditur, quia quemlibet, qui occiditur, permittit Deus occidi. — Item, qui potest alium liberare ab occisione, et non liberat, dicitur eum occidere interpretative: ergo cum Deus Pater potuerit liberare Filium, ut non occideretur; videtur, quod saltem interpretative debet dici eum occidisse.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod mors est privatio vitae, et haecp433-1b habet comparationem ad inferentem, et ad eum qui sustinet. Et secundum hoc aliquis potest dupliciter tradere alium in mortem: aut quia facit, ut alii inferant ei mortem, aut quia facit, ut ipse sustineat mortem. Quoniam ergo sustinentia mortis fuit a Deo Patre et fuit a Christo, quia Deus Pater voluit, quod ipse sustineret mortem, et ipse voluntarie sustinuit; hinc est, quod traditus dicitur a Patre, traditus etiam dicitur a se. Rursus, quia Iudas et Iudaei procuraverunt, ut alii inferrent ei mortem; hinc est, quod traditus dicitur a Iuda et a Iudaeis. Et quoniam sustinentia mortis fuit laudabilis, illatio autem fuit vituperabilis; hinc est, quod traditio Dei et Christi laudatur, traditio Iudae et Iudaeorum vituperatur. Et sic patet, quod mors a parte sustinentis fuit Deo placita et accepta, sed a parte infligentium fuit tantum permissap433-2. — Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum obiectum.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod permittens alium occidi, cum possit prohibere, est particeps homicidii; dicendum, quod illud fallit in Deo, qui potest peccata omnia prohibere, et non prohibet; hoc enim spectat ad regimen suae providentiae, sicut in primo et in secundo libro fuit ostensump433-3.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Actus Iudae et Iudaeorum mali, quibus operati sunt passionem, quae est bonum. Videtur enim implicare duo opposita. Si enim actus recipit denominationem a terminop433-4; et passio Christi fuit bona: videtur ergo, quod actus eorum fuerunt boni. — Item, mors et vita opponuntur; sed Christi vita et generatio fuit bona: ergo mors et corruptio fuit mala. — Item, iuxta hoc quaeritur, utrum simpliciter dicendum sit, quod passio Christi fuit bona, vel mala. Cum enim habeat auctorem bonum et malum, sicut suprap433-5 dictum est; non est maior ratio, quare magis debeat ab hoc quam ab illo denominari. — Quaeritur etiam, dato quod passio sit bona, utrum concedendum sit, quod Iudaei operati sint bonum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod cum quaerimus de bonitate passionis, non quaerimus de bonitate vel malitia in genere naturae, sed in genere morisp433-6. De hac igitur bonitate absque dubio est concedendum, quod passio Christi fuit simpliciter bona. Si enim pretiosa est in conspectu Domini mors Sanctorum eiusp433-7, multo magis mors Christi fuit pretiosissima. — Triplici autem ex causa debet dici mors Christi simpliciter bona: una est strenuitas virtutis ex parte sustinentis. Sustinebat enim illam passionem virtuosissime, quia patientissime et constantissime. — Secunda est utilitas redemptionis ex parte humani generis, quia per illam totum genus humanum est liberatum. — Tertia est honestas causae moriendi. Mortuus enim fuit pro veritate dicenda; unde Pilatus scripsit super eum causam: Iesus Nazarenus, rex Iudaeorump433-8. — Quamvis autem passio Christi sit bona simpliciter, tamen actio Iudaeorum fuit mala simpliciter, quia ex mala voluntate et radice processit; nec propter bonitatem passionis, quae exinde secuta est, bona dicenda est; hoc enim fuit praeter intentionem ipsorum per operationem divinam, per quam Deus de multis malis elicit multa bonap433-9.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Primum enim patet, quod non est ibi implicatio incompossibilium, sicut iam ostensum est. — Secundum etiam patet, quod mors et vita non opponuntur in genere moris, sed in genere naturae. — Tertium etiam patet, quare passio Christi dicitur simpliciter bona. Passio enim dicitur, ut est in patientep433-10; et ideo magis dicitur passio esse bona, ut est a bona voluntate patientis, quam mala, ut est a mala voluntate inferentis.

Ad illud quod ultimo quaeritur, utrum concedendum sit, quod Iudaei operati sint bonum, dicendum, quod est opus operans et est opus operatump433-11. Cum ergo quaeritur, utrum Iudaei operati sint bonum; bonum potest dicere bonitatem circa opus operans, vel circa opus operatum. Si circa opus operans, simpliciter est negandum, quia tale opus in Iudaeis simpliciter fuit malum. — Si circa opus operatum, quod quidem fuit mors et passio Christi, hoc dupliciter potest intelligi: aut primo et per se; et sic falsum estp433-12, quod Iudaei operati sunt bo-

p. 434

num. Illud enim opus operatum bonitatem non habuit ex intentione Iudaeorum. Si autem intelligatur per accidens et ex consequenti, sic habet veritatem. Iudaei enim fuerunt operati passionem Christi, quae quidem fuit maximum bonum et saluberrimum toti mundop434-1.

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English Translation

## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part are the doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: Justly, when He abandoned [him], the author of sin straightway invaded the sinner. For this seems unfittingly said. For just as Adam sinned inp432-3 consenting, so the devil sinned in seducing: therefore just as it was just that the man be handed over into the power of the devil, so it was just that the devil be handed over into the power of the man. — Likewise, the author of sin sinned more gravely than the one consenting to sin: therefore much more strongly ought the devil to have been handed over into the power of the man, than the man into the power of the devil.

But against this is, that Hep432-6b is supremely just and supremely powerful: therefore He can do nothing except justly and powerfully. — Likewise, suppose that God had used power in the liberation of man; since the devil had no right in him, He would have done no injury to the devil.

I respond: It must be said to this, that the sentence of the condemning judge invaded both the devil and Adam; for each was punished, as is written in the third [chapter] ofp432-4 Genesis; but nevertheless it more befitted, according to the order of divine justice, that the man be subjugated, rather than the converse, on account of the fact that the man of his own accord subjected himself to him by consentingp432-5.

It must be said that in the aforesaid authority justice is not separated from power, such that the one would be without the other in the divine operation; but in thisp432-7 it is implied, that there is some work, in which justice is manifested by excellence; some, in which power is manifested by excellence; and God chose that mode, in which justice is manifested, so that He might give us a form to imitate. — To that which is asked, whether, if He had liberated by power, justice would have been there; it must be said that yes; but nevertheless it would not have been so manifestp432-8.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: The remission of sins, given through the blood of Christ, snatched [man] from the devil, so that thus the devil is conquered by justice, not by power. For according to this it seems, that God couldp433-1 do something by justice and not by power, and conversely.

p. 433

I respond: [Cf. above, Doubt I, at the end.]

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: It is read, that Christ was handed over by the Father, and that He handed Himself over. For this seems false. For if God handed Him over to death, it seems, that the Jews killed Him by the authority of God: therefore God was a participant in that homicide. If you say, that He handed Him over, because He permitted Him to be killed; likewise it could be said of anyone, who is killed, since God permits anyone, who is killed, to be killed. — Likewise, he who can liberate another from being killed, and does not liberate, is said to kill him interpretatively: therefore since God the Father could have liberated the Son, that He not be killed; it seems, that at least interpretatively He must be said to have killed Him.

I respond: It must be said, that death is the privation of life, and thisp433-1b has a relation to the one inflicting [it], and to him who undergoes [it]. And according to this someone can hand another over to death in two ways: either because he brings it about, that others inflict death on him, or because he brings it about, that he himself undergoes death. Since therefore the undergoing of death was from God the Father and was from Christ, because God the Father willed, that He undergo death, and He of His own will underwent [it]; hence it is, that He is said to be handed over by the Father, He is also said to be handed over by Himself. Again, because Judas and the Jews procured, that others inflict death on Him; hence it is, that He is said to be handed over by Judas and by the Jews. And since the undergoing of death was praiseworthy, but the infliction was blameworthy; hence it is, that the handing over of God and of Christ is praised, [but] the handing over of Judas and of the Jews is blamed. And thus it is clear, that death on the part of the one undergoing it was pleasing and acceptable to God, but on the part of those inflicting it was only permittedp433-2. — And by this the response to the first objection is clear.

But to that which is objected, that one who permits another to be killed, when he could prohibit [it], is a participant in homicide; it must be said, that this fails in [the case of] God, who can prohibit all sins, and does not prohibit [them]; for this pertains to the governance of His providence, as was shown in the first and in the second bookp433-3.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: The acts of Judas and of the Jews [were] evil, by which they wrought the passion, which is a good. For this seems to imply two opposites. For if an act receives its denomination from its terminusp433-4; and the passion of Christ was good: it seems therefore, that their acts were good. — Likewise, death and life are opposed; but the life and generation of Christ was good: therefore death and corruption was evil. — Likewise, along with this it is asked, whether it must be said without qualification, that the passion of Christ was good, or evil. For since it has an author good and evil, as was said abovep433-5; there is no greater reason, why it should be denominated more from the one than from the other. — It is also asked, granted that the passion is good, whether it must be conceded, that the Jews wrought a good.

I respond: It must be said, that when we ask concerning the goodness of the passion, we are not asking concerning goodness or malice in the genus of nature, but in the genus of moralsp433-6. Concerning this goodness, therefore, it is without doubt to be conceded, that the passion of Christ was without qualification good. For if precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of His Saintsp433-7, much more was the death of Christ most precious. — Now from a threefold cause the death of Christ must be called without qualification good: one is the strenuousness of virtue on the part of the one undergoing it. For He underwent that passion most virtuously, because most patiently and most constantly. — The second is the usefulness of the redemption on the part of the human race, because through it the whole human race was liberated. — The third is the honorableness of the cause of dying. For He died for the truth to be spoken; whence Pilate wrote over Him the cause: Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jewsp433-8. — But although the passion of Christ is good without qualification, nevertheless the action of the Jews was evil without qualification, because it proceeded from an evil will and root; nor on account of the goodness of the passion, which followed from it, is it to be called good; for this was beyond their intention, through the divine operation, by which God draws many goods out of many evilsp433-9.

And by this the response to the objections is clear. For the first is clear, that there is no implication of incompossibles there, as has already been shown. — The second also is clear, that death and life are not opposed in the genus of morals, but in the genus of nature. — The third also is clear, why the passion of Christ is called good without qualification. For it is called a passion, as it is in the one sufferingp433-10; and therefore the passion is rather called to be good, as it is from the good will of the one suffering, than evil, as it is from the evil will of the one inflicting.

To that which is asked last, whether it must be conceded, that the Jews wrought a good, it must be said, that there is the work as operating and there is the work as operatedp433-11. When therefore it is asked, whether the Jews wrought a good; "good" can signify goodness with respect to the work as operating, or with respect to the work as operated. If with respect to the work as operating, it must be denied without qualification, because such a work in the Jews was without qualification evil. — If with respect to the work as operated, which indeed was the death and passion of Christ, this can be understood in two ways: either firstly and per se; and thus it is falsep433-12, that the Jews wrought a good.

p. 434

For that work as operated did not have goodness from the intention of the Jews. But if it is understood per accidens and consequently, thus it has truth. For the Jews wrought the passion of Christ, which indeed was the greatest good and most healthful to the whole worldp434-1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. AK omittunt in, quam praepositionem edd. subinde praefigunt verbo seducendo.
    Codices AK omit in, which preposition the editions thereafter prefix to the word seducendo ("seducing").
  2. Vers. 14. seqq. — Mox codd. C D L N X aa verbo subiugari praemittunt diabolo.
    Verse 14 ff. — Presently codices C D L N X aa prefix diabolo ("to the devil") to the word subiugari ("to be subjugated").
  3. Cfr. supra d. 19. dub. 3. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 8; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    Cf. above, d. 19, dub. 3. — Concerning this doubt cf. B. Albert, here a. 8; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
  4. Supple cum cod. V Deus. — De obiect. seq. cfr. supra d. 19. dub. 3.
    Supply with codex V Deus ("God"). — Concerning the following objection cf. above, d. 19, dub. 3.
  5. Edd. sed hic, cod. W sed ex hoc, alii codd. sed hoc. Nostra lectio sumta est ex codd. AK. — Paulo inferius pro in quo manifestatur [cod. V manifestaretur] iustitia cod. K in quo manifestaret iustitiam. Subinde pro imitandi cod. M vivendi, cod. O vincendi.
    The editions [read] sed hic, codex W sed ex hoc, the other codices sed hoc. Our reading is taken from codices AK. — A little below, for in quo manifestatur [codex V manifestaretur] iustitia codex K [reads] in quo manifestaret iustitiam. Thereafter for imitandi ("to imitate") codex M [reads] vivendi ("of living"), codex O vincendi ("of conquering").
  6. Edd. manifestata. — Cfr. de hoc dubio supra q. 6; B. Albert., hic a. 9; Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    The editions [read] manifestata. — Concerning this doubt cf. above, q. 6; B. Albert, here a. 9; Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.
  7. Codd. A H L aa bb possimus. Paulo superius pro potuit liberare edd. potuit liberari.
    Codices A H L aa bb [read] possimus ("we could"). A little above, for potuit liberare ("could liberate") the editions [read] potuit liberari ("could be liberated").
  8. Cod. K et in hoc, alii codd. et hoc.
    Codex K [reads] et in hoc, the other codices et hoc.
  9. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seq.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5 f.
  10. Libr. I. d. 47. q. 3. Cfr. ibid. d. 46. q. 2. seqq., et II. Sent. d. 23. a. 1. q. 1. — Cfr. de hoc dubio Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 18. m. 7; B. Albert., hic a. 11; S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 5; Petr. a Tar., hic a. 8; Richard. a Med., hic q. 6.
    Book I, d. 47, q. 3. Cf. ibid. d. 46, q. 2 ff., and II Sent. d. 23, a. 1, q. 1. — Concerning this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. III, q. 18, m. 7; B. Albert, here a. 11; St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 5; Peter of Tarentaise, here a. 8; Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6.
  11. Cfr. supra pag. 174, nota 5. et pag. 192, nota 2.
    Cf. above, p. 174, note 5, and p. 192, note 2.
  12. Dub. praeced. — Paulo superius pro fuit bona non pauci codd. fuerit bona. Paulo inferius post dato quod passio codd. L aa supplent Christi.
    The preceding Doubt. — A little above, for fuit bona ("was good") not a few codices [read] fuerit bona ("may have been good"). A little below, after dato quod passio ("granted that the passion") codices L aa supply Christi ("of Christ").
  13. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 36. dub. 5.
    Cf. II Sent. d. 36, dub. 5.
  14. Psalm. 115, 6.
    Psalm 115:6.
  15. Matth. 27, 37, et Ioan. 19, 19.
    Matthew 27:37, and John 19:19.
  16. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. seq. — Mox pro ibi implicatio edd. multiplicatio. Subinde pro quod mors edd. cum pluribus codd. quia mors. Demum pro Tertium etiam cod. P Tertium autem.
    Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 5 f. — Presently for ibi implicatio ("there an implication") the editions [read] multiplicatio ("a multiplication"). Thereafter for quod mors ("that death") the editions with several codices [read] quia mors ("because death"). Lastly for Tertium etiam ("Thirdly also") codex P [reads] Tertium autem ("but thirdly").
  17. Ut insinuat Aristot., III. Phys. text. 19. (c. 3.), nec non Gilbertus Porret., de Sex Princip. c. de Passione.
    As Aristotle intimates, Physics III, text 19 (c. 3), and also Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, the chapter On Passion.
  18. Vel aliis verbis: ipsa agentis operatio et effectus actionis. Cfr. I. Sent. d. 43. q. 3. ad 1. et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2.
    Or in other words: the operation itself of the agent and the effect of the action. Cf. I Sent. d. 43, q. 3, ad 1, and II Sent. d. 37, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2.
  19. Codd. A K P Q V bb addunt adhuc.
    Codices A K P Q V bb add adhuc ("still").
  20. Cfr. de hoc dubio B. Albert., hic a. 12. seq.; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard., hic circa lit.
    Concerning this doubt cf. B. Albert, here a. 12 f.; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard [of Mediavilla], here on the text. ---
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