Dist. 32, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 32
ARTICULUS UNICUS. De dilectione ipsius Dei.
QUAESTIO I. Utrum Deus dilexerit creaturas aeternaliter.
Circa primum sic proceditur et quaeritur, utrum Deus dilexerit creaturas aeternaliter. Et quod sic, videtur.
1. Ad Ephesios primo2: Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati in ipso; sed nemo eligit nisi quod diligit: si ergo ab aeterno ante mundi constitutionem nos elegit, videtur, quod ab aeterno nos dilexit1.
2. Item, Augustinus quinto de Trinitate3: «Absurdum est, ut Deus aliquid temporaliter diligat»: si ergo
quod diligit diligit aut temporaliter, aut aeternaliter; et non temporaliter, constat: ergo quod diligit diligit aeternaliter.
3. Item, Magister dicit in littera4, quod «dilectio est usia» sive substantia: si ergo substantia Dei non potest non esse aeterna, videtur, quod dilectio Dei similiter aeterna sit: ergo quidquid diligit aeternaliter diligit.
4. Item, aut dilectio Dei praecedit ipsas res, aut sequitur. Si praecedit: ergo ante fuit, quam res essent: ergo Deus dilexit res ante earum productionem, ergo non ex tempore, sed ab aeterno. Si sequitur: ergo videtur, quod dilectio Dei causetur ab ipsis rebus. Quodsi hoc est inconveniens, restat, quod Deus ea quae diligit, diligit5 aeternaliter.
5. Item, si Deus de non-potente efficeretur potens et de non-sapiente sapiens, mutatus esset et imperfectus: ergo pari ratione, si de non-amante fieret amans; cum amor respiciat quod intra est, esset in eo mutatio et imperfectio. Quodsi hoc est impossibile, necesse est, Deum ea quae diligit, aeternaliter diligere.
Sed contra: 1. Dilectio est amor boni; sed «bonum et ens convertuntur6»: ergo quod non est ens non est amabile: ergo si res, antequam producerentur, non fuerunt; videtur, quod antequam producerentur, a Deo non diligerentur.
2. Item, amor est copula amantis et amati7; sed si copula est, necesse est esse extrema: ergo impossibile est, quod Deus creaturam diligat, quousque creatura habeat actualem existentiam. Sed hoc est solum ex tempore: ergo videtur, quod Deus non dilexerit creaturam aliquam aeternaliter.
3. Item, Deus non dicitur aliquem diligere affectu: ergo si diligit, hoc est, quia diligit effectu[^8]; sed effectus divinae bonitatis est solum ex tempore: ergo Deus neminem diligit nisi temporaliter.
4. Item, dilectio Dei est causa sufficiens et proxima et immediata boni creati; sed posita causa efficiente proxima et immediata et sufficiente, ponitur effectus9: ergo si res creatae solum sunt ex tempore, videtur, quod Deus solummodo diligat eas temporaliter.
5. Item, si Deus diligit creaturas, aut diligit fruens, aut utens; sed constat, quod non diligit fruens, quoniam non est creatura fruendum, sicut
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in primo libro10 fuit ostensum, cum illud quo fruendum est, sit summum Bonum: restat ergo, quod si creaturam diligat, diligit ut utens. Sed constat, quod non contingit uti nisi eo quod est actu: ergo nunquam Deus diligit creaturam nisi actu entem: non ergo diligit aliquam creaturam aeternaliter.
### Conclusio. Creaturae non solum temporaliter, sed etiam aeternaliter a Deo diliguntur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quaedam verba dicuntur de Deo respectu creaturae, quae connotant effectum in actu, sicut verbum creandi; quaedam, quae connotant effectum in habitu, sicut vocabulum praedestinandi; quaedam, quae indifferenter utroque modo, sicut vocabulum diligendi. Dicitur enim Deus aliquem diligere, vel quia actu communicat ei bonum, vel quia proponit communicare. Et quoniam communicatio est effectus in tempore, propositum vero communicandi est ab aeterno; hinc est, quod diligere de Deo aliquando dicitur aeternaliter, aliquando dicitur temporaliter. Unde bene concedi potest, quod creaturae non solum temporaliter, sed etiam aeternaliter a Deo diliguntur, sicut rationes ad primam partem inductae ostendunt. — Verumtamen illa ratio, quam adducit quasi per simile de potentia et sapientia, non valet, quoniam non est simile. Posse enim et scire, quantum est de vi vocabuli, non ita connotat effectum in actu, secundum quod diligere. Nam verbum diligendi impositum est ab ipsa liberalitate affectionis se ipsam alteri communicantis.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
1. Ad illud vero quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod bonum et ens convertuntur; dicendum, quod verum est de bono in actu et ente in actu. Sed cum dicitur, quod dilectio est solummodo boni; dicendum, quod non est verum solummodo de bono, quod est in actu, sed etiam de bono, quod est in causa. Sicut enim ad cognitionem sufficit veritas rei in sua causa, sic ad diligendum sufficit bonitas, secundum quod res habet esse in suo principio producente, etiam antequam exterius producatur. Unde artifex non solummodo diligit bonum, quod fecit, sed etiam bonum, quod proponit et disponit facere.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod amor est copula amantis et amati; dicendum, quod illud est verum, secundum quod amor est quaedam affectio et vinculum amicitiae, quo aliqui ad invicem colligantur; sed hoc modo non accipitur in proposito, cum dicitur, quod Deus diligit creaturam; «dilectio enim Dei est eius usia», non est affectio aliqua unitiva, sicut dicit Magister in littera: et ideo non cogit illa ratio.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non dicitur diligere affectu, sed effectu; dicendum, quod diligere effectu potest esse dupliciter, secundum quod effectus potest dupliciter connotari: actu, vel habitu; et quia res est in habitu et in potentia, antequam sit in actu: hinc est, quod dilectio Dei, quae connotat effectum in habitu, potest esse ante productionem ipsarum rerum. Et propterea ex hoc non habetur, si Deus dicitur diligere effectu, quod tunc solum incipiat diligere, quando effectus in esse producitur.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dilectio Dei est causa, sufficiens proxima et immediata boni creati; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quemadmodum voluntas divina dicitur causa immediata, quia non intervenit alia causa, non tamen, quod semper ponat effectum, sed solum pro tempore, pro quo vult, sicut ab aeterno voluit; sed statim fecit, cum venit tempus, pro quo voluit: sic et in ipsa dilectione Dei oportet intelligi.
5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si diligit, aut ut fruens, aut ut utens; dicendum, quod dilectio Dei una est, qua diligit se et qua diligit creaturam; et haec quidem, relata ad ipsum Deum, est fruitio, comparata vero ad creaturam est usus. Cum ergo dicit, quod non contingit uti nisi eo quod est; dicendum, quod si usus accipiatur pro exteriori actione, verum est; sed si accipiatur pro interiori et habituali ordinatione in finem alicuius effectus producendi, sic non habet veritatem, quia efficiens longe ante refert ad finem illud quod intendit facere, quam etiam producat in re.
I. De quaestionibus huius dist. aliisque ad dilectionem ipsius Dei spectantibus prolixe tractat Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 31. 32, et brevius B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 16. q. 64, quorum doctrinam posteriores Scholastici sequuntur. — S. Bonav. hic praesupponit, quod Deus creaturas diligat, quippe quibus communicat aliquatenus suam bonitatem; unde, cum amet propriam bonitatem, etiam similitudinem eiusdem in creaturis per ipsam suam bonitatem amat (cfr. S. Thom., hic a. 1; S. 1. q. 20. a. 2; S. c. Gent. 1. c. 91.).
II. Solutio primae quaestionis eruitur ex ipsa significatione verbi diligere, quod manifeste non importat principaliter relationem, sed operationem voluntatis, quae quidem, quatenus a voluntate elicitur, intra diligentem manet. Cfr. etiam hic dub. 1. 2.
De hac I. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic a. 3; S. 1. q. 20. a. 2. ad 2. — B. Albert., S. loc. cit. quaest. incid. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic n. 1. q. 2. — Durand., de hac et 2 seqq. qq. hic q. unica. — Dionys. Carth. et Biel, de hac aliisque huius dist. qq. hic q. unica.
III. In seq. (2.) quaestione solutio fit per distinctionem communiter receptam inter dilectionem generalem, qua Deus vult bonum quodcumque ordinis naturalis, et dilectionem specialem, qua aliquibus vult bona ordinis supernaturalis (cfr. solut. ad 1.). — Notanda est solut. ad 2, qua explicantur principia communiter recepta, quod amor Dei sit effectivus, non affectivus, et quod ipse causet bonitatem in rebus, dum amor noster causatur a bonitate in rebus. Attamen ad rem dicit Dionys. Carth. (hic q. unica, in fine): «Nihilominus sub correctione existimo, quod amor et caritas tam vere et proprie competunt Deo, sicut sapientia et scientia, et diligere, sicut scire... Si de ratione dilectionis seu amoris sit affectio, sequi videtur, quod dilectio Dei ad creaturas sit vere affectiva, sicut et volitiva» etc. Quae verba concedi possunt, si intelliguntur secundum doctrinam S. Thomae, S. 1. q. 20. a. 1. in corp. et ad 1. 2.
De hac quaestione specialiter tractant: S. Thom., hic a. 2; S. loc. cit. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic n. 1. q. 1.
IV. De 3. quaestione: Alex. Hal., loc. cit. m. 3. — Scot., in utroque Scripto hic q. unica. — S. Thom., hic a. 4; S. loc. cit. a. 3. — B. Albert., S. loc. cit. q. incid. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2.
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THE SOLE ARTICLE. On the love of God himself.
QUESTION I. Whether God loved creatures eternally.
Concerning the first [matter] one proceeds thus and it is asked whether God loved creatures eternally. And that he did, it seems.
1. To the Ephesians, chapter one2: He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and immaculate in him; but no one chooses except what he loves: if therefore from eternity, before the foundation of the world, he chose us, it seems that from eternity he loved us1.
2. Likewise, Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity3: «It is absurd that God should love anything temporally»: if therefore
what he loves he loves either temporally or eternally; and not temporally, that is established: therefore what he loves he loves eternally.
3. Likewise, the Master says in the text4 that «love is usia» or substance: if therefore the substance of God cannot but be eternal, it seems that the love of God is likewise eternal: therefore whatever he loves he loves eternally.
4. Likewise, either the love of God precedes the things themselves, or it follows. If it precedes: then it was before the things were: therefore God loved the things before their production, therefore not from time, but from eternity. If it follows: then it seems that the love of God is caused by the things themselves. But if this is unfitting, it remains that God loves the things which he loves5 eternally.
5. Likewise, if God were made powerful from non-powerful and wise from non-wise, he would be changed and imperfect: therefore by parity of reasoning, if from non-loving he became loving; since love regards what is within, there would be in him change and imperfection. But if this is impossible, it is necessary that God love eternally the things which he loves.
On the contrary: 1. Love is the love of the good; but «good and being are convertible6»: therefore what is not being is not lovable: therefore if things, before they were produced, did not exist; it seems that before they were produced, they were not loved by God.
2. Likewise, love is the bond of the lover and the beloved7; but if there is a bond, the extremes must necessarily exist: therefore it is impossible that God love a creature, until the creature has actual existence. But this is only from time: therefore it seems that God did not love any creature eternally.
3. Likewise, God is not said to love anyone by affection: therefore if he loves, this is because he loves by effect[^8]; but the effect of the divine goodness is only from time: therefore God loves no one except temporally.
4. Likewise, the love of God is the sufficient and proximate and immediate cause of the created good; but the efficient cause being posited, proximate and immediate and sufficient, the effect is posited9: therefore if created things are only from time, it seems that God loves them only temporally.
5. Likewise, if God loves creatures, either he loves them as enjoying, or as using; but it is established that he does not love them as enjoying, since a creature is not something to be enjoyed, as
was shown in the first book10, since that which is to be enjoyed is the highest Good: it remains therefore that if he loves a creature, he loves it as using. But it is established that one cannot use except that which is in act: therefore God never loves a creature except one being in act: therefore he does not love any creature eternally.
### Conclusion. Creatures are loved by God not only temporally, but also eternally.
I respond: It must be said that certain words are said of God with respect to a creature which connote an effect in act, like the word to create; certain ones which connote an effect in habit, like the term to predestine; certain ones which [connote] indifferently in either way, like the term to love. For God is said to love someone either because he actually communicates a good to him, or because he proposes to communicate it. And since communication is an effect in time, while the proposal of communicating is from eternity; hence it is that to love is said of God sometimes eternally, sometimes temporally. Hence it can well be conceded that creatures are loved by God not only temporally, but also eternally, as the reasons adduced for the first part show. — Nevertheless that reason which he brings forward as if by way of similitude concerning power and wisdom does not hold, since it is not similar. For to be able and to know, as far as concerns the force of the word, do not connote an effect in act in the way that to love does. For the word to love is imposed from the very liberality of an affection communicating itself to another.
To the arguments to the contrary:
1. To that indeed which is first objected to the contrary, that good and being are convertible; it must be said that this is true of the good in act and being in act. But when it is said that love is only of the good; it must be said that it is not true only of the good which is in act, but also of the good which is in cause. For just as for cognition the truth of a thing in its cause suffices, so for loving the goodness suffices, according as the thing has being in its producing principle, even before it is produced externally. Hence the artisan loves not only the good which he has made, but also the good which he proposes and disposes to make.
2. To that which is objected, that love is the bond of the lover and the beloved; it must be said that this is true insofar as love is a certain affection and bond of friendship, by which some are bound to one another; but in this way it is not taken in the matter at hand, when it is said that God loves a creature; for «the love of God is his usia», it is not some unitive affection, as the Master says in the text: and therefore that reasoning does not compel.
3. To that which is objected, that God is not said to love by affection, but by effect; it must be said that to love by effect can be in two ways, according as the effect can be connoted in two ways: by act, or by habit; and since a thing is in habit and in potency, before it is in act: hence it is that the love of God, which connotes an effect in habit, can be before the production of the things themselves. And therefore from this it does not follow, if God is said to love by effect, that he then only begins to love when the effect is produced into being.
4. To that which is objected, that the love of God is the cause, sufficient proximate and immediate, of the created good; it must be said that this is true; but just as the divine will is said to be an immediate cause, because no other cause intervenes, yet not such that it always posits the effect, but only for the time for which it wills, as it willed from eternity; but it made [it] at once, when the time came for which it willed: so too it must be understood in the very love of God.
5. To that which is objected, that if he loves, either as enjoying, or as using; it must be said that the love of God is one, by which he loves himself and by which he loves the creature; and this indeed, referred to God himself, is enjoyment, but compared to the creature is use. When therefore he says that one cannot use except that which is; it must be said that if use is taken for exterior action, it is true; but if it is taken for the interior and habitual ordering toward the end of some effect to be produced, thus it does not hold true, because the efficient cause refers to the end, long before, that which it intends to make, before it even produces it in reality.
I. Concerning the questions of this distinction and others pertaining to the love of God himself, Alexander of Hales treats at length, Summa p. I, q. 31, 32, and more briefly Bl. Albert, Summa p. I, tr. 16, q. 64, whose doctrine the later Scholastics follow. — St. Bonaventure here presupposes that God loves creatures, inasmuch as he communicates to them in some measure his own goodness; whence, since he loves his own goodness, he also loves the likeness of the same in creatures through his own goodness (cf. St. Thomas, here a. 1; Summa I, q. 20, a. 2; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 91.).
II. The solution of the first question is drawn from the very signification of the verb to love, which manifestly does not principally import a relation, but an operation of the will, which indeed, insofar as it is elicited by the will, remains within the one loving. Cf. also here dub. 1, 2.
On this first question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 4. — St. Thomas, here a. 3; Summa I, q. 20, a. 2, ad 2. — Bl. Albert, Summa loc. cit. incidental q. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here n. 1, q. 2. — Durandus, on this and the 2 following questions, here q. unica. — Dionysius the Carthusian and Biel, on this and the other questions of this distinction, here q. unica.
III. In the following (2nd) question the solution is made through the distinction commonly received between the general love, by which God wills some good or other of the natural order, and the special love, by which he wills for some certain ones goods of the supernatural order (cf. solution to 1.). — Note is to be taken of the solution to 2, by which are explained the commonly received principles, that the love of God is effective, not affective, and that he himself causes goodness in things, while our love is caused by goodness in things. Nevertheless, to the point Dionysius the Carthusian says (here q. unica, at the end): «Nonetheless, under correction, I judge that love and charity belong to God as truly and properly as wisdom and knowledge, and to love as to know... If affection belongs to the nature of love or affection, it seems to follow that the love of God toward creatures is truly affective, just as it is also volitive» etc. Which words can be conceded, if they are understood according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 20, a. 1, in the body and ad 1, 2.
On this question specially treat: St. Thomas, here a. 2; Summa loc. cit. a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here n. 1, q. 1.
IV. On the 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. m. 3. — Scotus, in both works here q. unica. — St. Thomas, here a. 4; Summa loc. cit. a. 3. — Bl. Albert, Summa loc. cit. incidental q. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2.
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- Edd. quos, et paulo inferius quos non pro quos.The editions read quos, and a little below quos non for quos.
- Vers. 4. — Quoad minorem vide I. Sent. d. 10. dub. 1, [et] d. 10. a. 3. q. 2; tom. II. pag. 599, nota 5.Verse 4. — As to the minor [premise], see Sentences I, d. 10, dub. 1, [and] d. 10, a. 3, q. 2; vol. II, p. 599, note 5.
- Cap. 16. n. 17. Cfr. hic III. Magistri, c. 3, ubi pro aliquid legitur aliquem, sicut et in textu originali. — Deinde pro quod diligit permulti codd. quos diligit, codd. A bb omnes quos diligit, qui in fine arg. cum codd. H N semel omittunt diligit.Chapter 16, n. 17. Cf. here the Master's [text], III, c. 3, where for aliquid one reads aliquem, as also in the original text. — Then for quod diligit very many codices [read] quos diligit, codices A bb omnes quos diligit, which at the end of the argument, with codices H N, once omit diligit.
- Hic c. 1. Codd. K Z bb dilectio Dei est usia, cod. A dilectio est Dei usia. Post pauca pro non esse cod. aa nisi esse.Here c. 1. Codices K Z bb [read] dilectio Dei est usia, codex A dilectio est Dei usia. A little after, for non esse codex aa [reads] nisi esse.
- Cod. A dilexit.Codex A [reads] dilexit.
- Secundum Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. § 2. Cfr. tom. I. pag. 32, nota 2. Vide etiam Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 6.According to Dionysius, On the Divine Names c. 5, § 2. Cf. vol. I, p. 32, note 2. See also Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6.
- Cfr. supra pag. 613, nota 8. et 16. — Paulo inferius Vat. verbo habeat praefigit non.Cf. above p. 613, note 8 and 16. — A little below the Vatican [edition] prefixes non to the word habeat.
- Vide quaest. seq. in corp. et ad 2.See the following question, in the body and ad 2.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. Phys. text. 37. (c. 3.), et supra pag. 22, nota 1.Cf. Aristotle, Physics II, text 37 (c. 3.), and above p. 22, note 1.
- Dist. 1. a. 3. q. 2. August., I. de Doctr. christ. c. 31. n. 34: Diligit enim nos Deus, et multum nobis dilectionem eius erga nos divina Scriptura commendat; quomodo ergo diligit? ut nobis utatur, an ut fruatur? Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit... Non ergo fruitur nobis, sed utitur. Nam si neque fruitur neque utitur, non invenio, quemadmodum diligat. — Paulo superius pro quod non diligit codd. A F I R L N T V X aa quod non diligat. Paulo inferius pro contingit cod. A habet.Dist. 1, a. 3, q. 2. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine I, c. 31, n. 34: For God loves us, and divine Scripture much commends to us his love toward us; how then does he love? that he may use us, or that he may enjoy us? But if he enjoys, he needs our good, which no sane man would say... Therefore he does not enjoy us, but uses us. For if he neither enjoys nor uses, I do not find in what manner he loves. — A little above, for quod non diligit codices A F I R L N T V X aa [read] quod non diligat. A little below, for contingit codex A [reads] habet.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 30. q. 1. seqq. et d. 40. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. Sentences I, d. 30, q. 1 and following, and d. 40, a. 1, q. 1.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 2.See here the Master's text, c. 2.
- Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 7. (VIII. c. 3.) docet, ipsa non-entia intelligibilia et desiderabilia esse, non autem mota; a hoc autem, ait Philosophus, quia, cum non sint actu, erunt actu; non-entium enim quaedam potentia sunt, non autem sunt, quoniam actu non sunt».Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 7 (VIII, c. 3.), teaches that non-beings themselves are intelligible and desirable, but not moved; and this, says the Philosopher, because, since they are not in act, they will be in act; for some of non-beings are in potency, yet are not, since in act they are not».