Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 38
Articulus I.
De causalitate praescientiae divinae.
Quaestio I.
Utrum praescientia divina sit causa rerum.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Et quod sit causa rerum, ostenditur sic.
1. Augustinus decimo quinto de Trinitate1: «Ideo res futurae sunt, quia Deus eas novit».
2. Item, ratione sic: omne illud quod antecedit aliud, et ipso posito, ponitur aliud, ipsum est causa illius — hoc patet per definitionem causae2; sed divina praescientia praecedit omne futurum, et iterum ponit futurum, respectu cuius est; ergo praescientia est causa.
3. Item, omnis res aut est a Deo, aut a natura, aut a libero arbitrio, et accipio causas istas large, prout comprehendunt casum et fortunam; sed nulla res a natura esse potest nec a libero arbitrio, nisi operante Deo: ergo omnis res est a Deo sive omne futurum. Sed non est a Deo agente nisi secundum artem et cognitionem: ergo etc.
4. Item, omne quod scitur, aliquo modo est in se, vel in sua causa3; ergo quod praescitur a Deo est in Deo ut in causa: sed omne quod est in Deo, est a Deo: ergo omne futurum praescitum est a divina praecognitione ut causa: ergo etc.
5. Item, omne quod scitur, aut scitur per causam, aut per speciem, aut per effectum: si ergo Deus praescit, ergo aliquo istorum modorum. Non per effectum, quia effectus sequitur; non per speciem sive similitudinem, quia illa est simul vel etiam post rem, cuius est similitudo: ergo per causam, ergo divina praescientia est causa praesciti.
Contra:
1. Deus nullius est causa nisi per voluntatem; sed multa praescit, ad quae non est eius voluntas: ergo etc. Probatio mediae: praescit, te mentiri, et tamen non est dicere, quod velit, te mentiri: ergo non est causa illius.
2. Item, si praescientia est causa, aut ratione scientiae, aut ratione antecessionis. Ratione eius quod est prae, non4, quia non dicit nisi ordinem. Ratione similiter scientiae, non, quia multa cognoscit Deus quae nunquam faciet: ergo nullo modo est causa.
3. Item, si praescientia causa est praesciti, cum praesciat mala, Deus erit causa mali; hoc autem falsum.
4. Item, si est causa, cum communicet alicui praescientiam rei creandae, per consequens communicat causalitatem respectu illius; sed hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.
5. Item, Anselmus de Concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii5 dicit, quod «tantum est dicere: si Deus praescit, erit, quantum hoc: si erit, de necessitate erit»; sed hic nulla notatur causalitas: ergo nec ibi.
Conclusio.
Praescientia et scientia divina aliquo modo semper importat causalitatem, sed non semper respectu praesciti.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praescientia dicit praecognitionem futuri. Est igitur loqui de praescientia aut quantum ad rem significatam, aut prout significatur per illud nomen6. Si quantum ad rationem nominis, sic non significat in ratione causae; si quantum ad rem importatam, sic dicit causam; sed tamen non semper respectu praesciti sive futuri.
Futurum enim in triplici differentia est. Quoddam p. 670enim est, cuius Deus est tota causa, ut sunt illa quae creantur; quoddam, cuius creatura, ut voluntas, est tota causa, ut sunt defectus et peccata; quoddam, cuius Deus et creatura simul sunt causa, ut sunt opera naturalia et opera moralia, quia Deus cooperatur creaturae.
Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod respectu primi futuri divina praescientia est causa et tota causa; respectu vero secundi futuri nec est causa nec tota, quia non habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem7, est tamen causa sui oppositi: respectu vero tertii est causa, sed non tota. Concedendum ergo est, quod divina scientia vel praescientia aliquo modo respectu futurorum est causa. Tamen si accipiatur in sua generalitate, dicendum, quod divina praescientia semper importat causalitatem aliquam, sed non semper respectu praesciti, ut puta cum praescitum est malum. Et in hac ratione procedunt argumenta ostendentia, quod non sit causa.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, quod est causa praesciti per verbum Augustini; dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de scientia rerum sive bonorum, quae a Deo procedunt.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod causa est quae praecedit et ponit aliud; dicendum, quod ponere aliud est dupliciter, scilicet8 secundum productionem, vel secundum consecutionem; et quod ponit secundum productionem est causa vere in essendo, quod vero ponit secundum consecutionem non est causa in essendo, sed solum in consequendo.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod illud quod est a libero arbitrio est a Deo; dicendum, quod verum est de eo quod est a libero arbitrio efficiente, sed vitia et peccata sunt ab ipso deficiente.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod de necessitate omne futurum scitur a Deo per causam; dicendum, quod sicut supra9 tactum fuit de cognitione mali, in omni cognitione est assimilatio; nihil autem assimilatur Deo nisi quod est ab illo: et ideo in omni cognitione Dei est causalitas. Et cum quidem est respectu eius quod dicit entitatem simpliciter, respectu illius est causa et idea; sed cum respectu privationis est praecognitio, tunc ratio causalitatis et ideae est respectu oppositi. Dicendum ergo, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid cognoscatur, necesse est, quod ipsum vel eius oppositum habeat esse in re, vel in causa. Non solum autem oppositum mali, sed etiam ipsa voluntas, quae est mali principium, est in Deo ut in causa; tamen malum non est in Deo ut in causa, nec per se nec per accidens, quia mutatur ratio causandi, sicut postea dicetur10. — Exemplum huius manifestum est. Si artifex operetur11 super materiam nodosam, quae non esset idonea ad receptionem speciei, praesciret, quod defectus futurus est in imagine, sed non ab ipso. Similiter intelligendum in Deo et libero arbitrio, quod facit vitium in opere, dum non conformat se et obedit Deo operanti; et ideo sufficit, quod oppositum mali, sive illud a quo est malum sit in Deo, tanquam in causa, ad hoc quod praesciatur.
I. In hac et sequenti distinctione tractatur difficillima materia de divina praescientia et scientia, de qua definivit Concilium Vaticanum (Constit. I de Fide, c. 1): «Omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius (Hebr. 4, 13.), etiam ea quae libera creaturarum actione futura sunt». De hac quaestione inter theologos catholicos gravissimae controversiae agitatae sunt, quae, licet exortae sint ex differentia opinionum de concordia inter divinam gratiam et liberum arbitrium stabilienda, tamen in hoc loco amplissimum disputationum campum invenerunt. Tanta enim est inter divinam cognitionem et nostram differentia, tam immense nostram capacitatem excedit altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et scientiae Dei (Rom. 11, 33), ut difficultates et obscuritates nobis eo magis augeantur, quo magis ad quaestiones speciales descenditur et quasi receditur ab immensa et simplicissima unitate illius actus purissimi, qui divina scientia simul est et substantia. Attamen satis conveniunt omnes theologi catholici in praecipuis principiis, ad explicationem eiusdem fidei adhibendis. Dum in humana cognitione realiter distinguuntur cognoscens et cognitum, ratio cognoscendi, potentia cognoscendi et actus cognoscendi, omnes concedunt, quod «in Deo intellectus intelligens, et id quod intelligitur, et species intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere sunt omnino unum et idem» (S. Thom., S. I. q. 14. a. 4; cfr. S. Bonav., d. 39. a. 2. q. 1.) — quod eademque divina essentia est ipsa lux omnia illuminans, in comparatione cuius «omnis cognitio, qua creaturarum quamlibet in se ipsa novimus, non immerito nox dici potest» (S. August., de Gen. ad Lit. IV. c. 23.) — quod divina scientia a re nec causatur nec oritur; ideo ab illa non dependet nec discurrit cognoscendo ex causa effectum, sed potius cognoscit effectum in causa (S. Thom., loc. cit. a. 7. ad 2.) — quod divina scientia res cognoscat sub mensura aeternitatis et aeque perfecte praeterita, praesentia et futura. Nos autem res concip. 671pimus sub differentiis temporis et spatii, et res praesentes imperfecte cognoscimus, memorando vero aliqua praeterita adhuc imperfectius scimus, et confidendo tantum pauca futura potius auguramur quam scimus.
II. Haec una simplicissima scientia Dei, ipsa in se nullo modo diversificatur, licet diversa nomina sortiatur. In quantum enim est cognoscitiva omnium possibilium, dicitur scientia sive cognitio; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium quae in universo fiunt, dicitur visio; in quantum est cognoscitiva omnium quae bene fiunt, dicitur approbatio; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae futura sunt, dicitur praescientia sive praevisio; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae ab ipso Deo fienda sunt, dicitur dispositio; in quantum est cognoscitiva eorum quae praemianda sunt, dicitur praedestinatio; in quantum vero est cognoscitiva eorum quae damnanda sunt, dicitur reprobatio» (S. Bonav., Breviloq. p. 1. c. 8.). — Imprimis notanda est triplex species scientiae divinae, communiter in scholis recepta et a S. Doctore infra d. 39. a. 1. q. 3. explicata (cfr. hic dub. 3, et d. 39. a. 1. q. 2; et d. 36. dub. 3.), scilicet scientia simplicis intelligentiae, quae terminatur ad res mere possibiles vel etiam ad «solum eventum» (hic dub. 3.), scientia approbationis, et scientia visionis. Scientia approbationis «connotat complacentiam voluntatis» (d. 39. a. 1. q. 2.) et «effectum et bonitatem» (hic dub. 3, et d. 36. dub. 3.), unde non est respectu malorum; dicitur etiam practica (d. 40. a. 1. q. 2. ad 2, et dub. 3.). Ideo scientia visionis, quae est omnium quae unquam fuerunt, sunt et erunt, ad plura se extendit quam scientia approbationis; et non pauci theologi (ut notum) scientiam visionis subdividunt in scientiam approbationis et improbationis. — Praecipue autem observandum est, quod proprie loquendo, tribuenda est Deo potius scientia quam praescientia. In praescientia enim notatur non tantum ordo prioris, sed etiam quaedam distantia inter scientiam cognoscentis et rei eventum, cum tempus quasi quoddam medium inter utrumque concipiatur. Revera autem non est hoc medium inter cognitionem Dei et cognitum, unde «non est futurum respectu divinae scientiae, quae, in momento aeternitatis existens, ad omnia praesentialiter se habet» (S. Thom., S. c. G. I. c. 67. Cfr. S. Bonav., infra d. 39. a. 2. q. 3; S. Thom., de Veritate q. 2. a. 12.).
III. Quoad quaestionem hic propositam consentiunt omnes theologi in his: 1. quod «scientia secundum rationem scientiae, non dicit aliquam causalitatem, alias omnis scientia esset causa; sed in quantum est scientia artificis operantis res, sic habet rationem causae respectu rei operatae per artem... Patet etiam, quod principalitas causalitatis consistat penes voluntatem» (S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1.). 2. Quoad causalitatem Dei respectu futurorum omnes admittunt distinctionem hic in corp. positam, quod aliquorum Deus est tota et sola causa, aliquorum est causa simul cum causis secundariis (cfr. infra d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. ad 1.), aliquorum, scilicet malorum, nullo modo dicendus est causa. 3. Praescindendo a cognitione malorum, profitentur plerique, quod scientia Dei, quatenus adiunctam habet voluntatem, «in sua generalitate semper importat causalitatem aliquam» (hic in corp.) et quod «in omni cognitione Dei est causalitas» (cfr. infra d. 46. q. 4. ad 4.). Controvertitur autem de modo huius causalitatis, utrum sit non tantum directim (de quo non est dubium), an insuper proxime et immediate effectim, quod a multis negatur, ne libertati voluntatis creatae praeiudicetur. 4. Respectu mali, formaliter sumti ut privatio, non datur causa efficiens, sed tantum deficiens, et nullatenus in Deo est mali ulla causa, sive efficiens, sive exemplaris, sive finalis; tamen in cognitione mali ratio causalitatis multipliciter implicatur. Nam manifeste hic valet causalitas improprie dicta, quae vocatur consequentiae, de qua agitur in solut. ad 2, et quae explicatur infra a. 2. q. 1. Haec enim non ponit rem producendo, sed simpliciter inferendo consequentiam, scilicet vel ab eventu scientiam, vel a scientia eventum. Sed etiam aliis modis in cognitione mali implicatur ratio causalitatis, scilicet respectu boni, cuius malum est corruptio, sicut hic ad 4. S. explicatur. Plura de hoc vide d. 39. a. 1. q. 2. Scholion.
IV. Pro illustratione et confirmatione conclusionum serviunt verba S. Thomae (de Verit. q. 2. a. 14.): «Scientia in quantum scientia non dicit causam activam, sicut nec forma in quantum est forma». «Inter scientiam Dei, quae est causa rei, et ipsam rem causatam invenitur duplex medium: unum ex parte Dei, scilicet divina voluntas; aliud ex parte ipsarum rerum quantum ad quosdam effectus, scilicet causae secundae, quibus mediantibus proveniunt res a scientia Dei. Omnis autem effectus non solum sequitur conditionem causae primae, sed etiam mediae; et ideo res scitae a Deo procedunt ab eius scientia per modum voluntatis et per modum causarum secundarum, nec oportet, quod in omnibus modum scientiae sequantur».
Auctores: Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 24. m. 2. — S. Thom. de hac, et seq. q. hic q. unica, a. 1; S. I. q. 14. a. 8. — B. Albert., hic a. 11; S. p. I. tr. 18. q. 61. m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. Med., hic q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 36. q. 4. — Durand., hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 35. q. 6.
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Article I.
On the causality of divine foreknowledge.
Question I.
Whether divine foreknowledge is the cause of things.
That it is the cause of things is shown thus.
1. Augustine in On the Trinity XV1: "Things are future for this reason, that God knows them."
2. Likewise, by reason thus: everything which precedes another, and, when it is posited, [the other] is posited, is itself the cause of that — this is plain by the definition of cause2; but divine foreknowledge precedes every future thing, and again posits the future, with respect to which it is; therefore foreknowledge is a cause.
3. Likewise, every thing is either from God, or from nature, or from free choice, and I take these causes broadly, as comprehending chance and fortune; but no thing can be from nature nor from free choice, except by God's operation: therefore every thing — that is, every future — is from God. But it is not from God acting except according to art and cognition: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, everything that is known is in some way in itself, or in its cause3; therefore what is foreknown by God is in God as in [its] cause: but everything which is in God is from God: therefore every future thing foreknown is from divine pre-cognition as from a cause: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, everything that is known is known either through a cause, or through a species, or through an effect: if therefore God foreknows, then [it is] in some one of these modes. Not through an effect, since the effect comes after; not through a species or likeness, since that is simultaneous with, or even after, the thing of which it is the likeness: therefore through a cause, therefore divine foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown.
On the contrary:
1. God is the cause of nothing except through [his] will; but he foreknows many things to which his will does not extend: therefore etc. Proof of the middle [proposition]: he foreknows you to lie, and yet it is not to be said that he wills you to lie: therefore he is not the cause of that.
2. Likewise, if foreknowledge is a cause, [it is so] either by reason of [its being] knowledge, or by reason of [its] precedence. By reason of that which is prae ["before"], not4, because it expresses nothing but order. By reason of knowledge likewise, not, because God knows many things which he will never make: therefore in no way is it a cause.
3. Likewise, if foreknowledge is the cause of the foreknown, since he foreknows evils, God will be the cause of evil; but this is false.
4. Likewise, if it is a cause, since he communicates to someone foreknowledge of a thing-to-be-created, consequently he communicates causality with respect to it; but this is impossible: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, Anselm in On the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Choice5 says, that "it is just as much to say: 'if God foreknows [it], it will be,' as this: 'if it will be, of necessity it will be'"; but here no causality is noted: therefore neither there.
Conclusion.
Foreknowledge and divine knowledge always import some causality, but not always with respect to the foreknown.
I respond: It must be said that foreknowledge expresses pre-cognition of the future. There is therefore [room] to speak of foreknowledge either as regards the thing signified, or as it is signified through that name6. If as regards the meaning of the name, so it does not signify in the character of cause; if as regards the thing imported, so it expresses a cause; yet not always with respect to the foreknown or the future.
For the future is in a threefold difference. There is [a future] of which God is the whole cause, as are those things which are created; p. 670[another] of which the creature, as the will, is the whole cause, as are defects and sins; [another] of which God and creature are at once the cause, as are natural works and moral works, since God cooperates with the creature.
According to this it must be understood, that with respect to the first kind of future divine foreknowledge is a cause, and the whole cause; but with respect to the second kind of future it is neither a cause nor the whole, since it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one7, yet it is the cause of its opposite: with respect to the third it is a cause, but not the whole. It is therefore to be conceded, that divine knowledge or foreknowledge is in some manner a cause with respect to future things. Yet if it is taken in its generality, it must be said that divine foreknowledge always imports some causality, but not always with respect to the foreknown — as for instance when the foreknown is an evil. And in this sense the arguments proceed which show that it is not a cause.
To the arguments for the affirmative side:
To 1. To that which is first objected, that it is the cause of the foreknown by the word of Augustine; it must be said that Augustine speaks of the knowledge of things or goods which proceed from God.
To 2. To that which is objected, that the cause is what precedes and posits another; it must be said that to posit another is twofold, namely8 according to production, or according to consequence; and what posits according to production is truly a cause in being, but what posits according to consequence is not a cause in being, but only in consequence.
To 3. To that which is objected, that what is from free choice is from God; it must be said that this is true of what is from free choice as efficient, but vices and sins are from it as deficient.
To 4. To that which is objected, that of necessity every future is known by God through a cause; it must be said that, as was touched above9 concerning the cognition of evil, in every cognition there is assimilation; but nothing is assimilated to God except what is from him: and therefore in every cognition of God there is causality. And when indeed it is with respect to that which expresses being simply, with respect to that it is cause and idea; but when with respect to a privation it is pre-cognition, then the character of causality and of idea is with respect to the opposite. It must therefore be said that, in order that something be cognized, it is necessary that it itself or its opposite have being in reality, or in [its] cause. Now not only the opposite of evil, but also the will itself, which is the principle of evil, is in God as in [its] cause; yet evil is not in God as in [its] cause, neither per se nor per accidens, since the ratio of causing is changed, as will be said afterwards10. — The example of this is plain. If a craftsman were to work11 upon knotty material, which would not be fit for the reception of the form, he would foreknow that a defect will be in the image, but not from himself. Likewise it is to be understood in [the case of] God and free choice, which makes a fault in the work, when it does not conform itself and obey God working; and therefore it suffices that the opposite of the evil, or that from which the evil is, be in God, as in [its] cause, in order that [the evil] be foreknown.
I. In this and the following distinction is treated the most difficult matter concerning divine foreknowledge and knowledge, of which the Vatican Council defined (Constitution I On the Faith, c. 1): "All things are bare and open to his eyes (Heb. 4:13), even those things which are to be by the free action of creatures." Concerning this question among Catholic theologians the gravest controversies have been waged, which, although they arose from a difference of opinions concerning how to establish the concord between divine grace and free choice, nevertheless have found here the amplest field of disputation. For so great is the difference between divine cognition and ours, so immensely does the height of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God (Rom. 11:33) exceed our capacity, that the difficulties and obscurities are increased for us all the more, the more one descends to particular questions and as it were withdraws from the immense and most simple unity of that purest act, which is at once divine knowledge and substance. Nevertheless, all Catholic theologians sufficiently agree on the chief principles to be employed in the explanation of the same faith. While in human cognition the knower and the known, the ratio of knowing, the power of knowing, and the act of knowing are really distinguished, all concede that "in God the intellect understanding, and that which is understood, and the intelligible species, and the very act of understanding are altogether one and the same" (St. Thomas, S. I. q. 14, a. 4; cf. St. Bonaventure, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1) — and that the same divine essence is itself the light illuminating all, in comparison with which "every cognition by which we know any creature in itself can not undeservedly be called night" (St. Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter IV, c. 23) — that divine knowledge is neither caused nor arises from a thing; therefore it does not depend on it, nor does it discursively know the effect from the cause, but rather knows the effect in the cause (St. Thomas, loc. cit. a. 7, ad 2) — and that divine knowledge knows things under the measure of eternity and equally perfectly the past, the present, and the future. We, however, conceive things p. 671under the differences of time and space, and we know present things imperfectly; recalling some past things we know still more imperfectly, and trusting only [in such recall] we rather divine than know a few future things.
II. This one most simple knowledge of God is in itself in no way diversified, although it receives diverse names. For inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of all possibles, it is called knowledge or cognition; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of all things which come to pass in the universe, it is called vision; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of all things which come to pass well, it is called approbation; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of those things which are future, it is called foreknowledge or prevision; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of those things which are to be done by God himself, it is called disposition; inasmuch as it is cognoscitive of those things which are to be rewarded, it is called predestination; inasmuch indeed as it is cognoscitive of those things which are to be condemned, it is called reprobation" (St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium p. 1, c. 8). — Especially to be noted is the threefold species of divine knowledge, commonly received in the schools and explained by the Holy Doctor below at d. 39, a. 1, q. 3 (cf. here dub. 3, and d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; and d. 36, dub. 3), namely the knowledge of simple intelligence, which is terminated to merely possible things or even to "the bare event" (here dub. 3), the knowledge of approbation, and the knowledge of vision. The knowledge of approbation "connotes the complacency of the will" (d. 39, a. 1, q. 2) and "effect and goodness" (here dub. 3, and d. 36, dub. 3), whence it is not with respect to evils; it is also called practical (d. 40, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2, and dub. 3). Therefore the knowledge of vision, which is of all the things which ever were, are, or will be, extends itself to more than the knowledge of approbation; and not a few theologians (as is known) subdivide the knowledge of vision into the knowledge of approbation and of disapprobation. — Especially it must be observed that, properly speaking, knowledge rather than foreknowledge is to be attributed to God. For in foreknowledge there is noted not only the order of the prior, but also a certain distance between the knowledge of the knower and the event of the thing, since time is conceived as a sort of medium between the two. But truly there is no such medium between God's cognition and the cognized; whence "[a thing] is not future with respect to divine knowledge, which, existing in the moment of eternity, is related presentially to all things" (St. Thomas, S. c. G. I, c. 67. Cf. St. Bonaventure, below d. 39, a. 2, q. 3; St. Thomas, de Veritate q. 2, a. 12).
III. As to the question here proposed, all theologians agree in these [points]: 1. that "knowledge in respect of the ratio of knowledge does not state any causality, otherwise every knowledge would be a cause; but inasmuch as it is the knowledge of an artisan working things, so it has the ratio of cause with respect to the thing produced through art... It is also plain that the chief part of causality consists in the will" (St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1). 2. As to God's causality with respect to future things, all admit the distinction here placed in the body, that of some [futures] God is the whole and sole cause, of some he is cause together with secondary causes (cf. below d. 45, a. 2, q. 2, ad 1), of some — namely evils — he is in no way to be called cause. 3. Setting aside the cognition of evils, very many profess that the knowledge of God, inasmuch as it has the will joined to it, "in its generality always imports some causality" (here in corp.) and that "in every cognition of God there is causality" (cf. below d. 46, q. 4, ad 4). But it is controverted concerning the mode of this causality, whether it is not only directim [directively] (concerning which there is no doubt), but also next-and-immediately effectim [effectively], which is denied by many, lest the liberty of the created will be prejudiced. 4. With respect to evil, formally taken as privation, no efficient cause is given, but only deficient, and in no way is there in God any cause of evil, whether efficient, exemplar, or final; nevertheless in the cognition of evil the ratio of causality is implicated in many ways. For manifestly here that causality holds which is improperly called [the causality] of consequence, of which there is treatment in the solution to [argument] 2, and which is explained below at a. 2, q. 1. For this [kind] does not posit a thing by producing it, but simply by inferring a consequence, namely either knowledge from the event, or the event from knowledge. But also in other modes is the ratio of causality implicated in the cognition of evil, namely with respect to the good, of which evil is the corruption, as is here explained at [reply to obj.] 4. See more on this at d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, Scholion.
IV. For the illustration and confirmation of the conclusions, the words of St. Thomas serve (de Verit. q. 2, a. 14): "Knowledge inasmuch as it is knowledge does not state an active cause, just as neither does form inasmuch as it is form." "Between the knowledge of God, which is the cause of the thing, and the caused thing itself there are found two media: one on God's side, namely the divine will; the other on the side of the things themselves, as regards certain effects, namely the secondary causes, by whose mediation things proceed from the knowledge of God. Now every effect not only follows the condition of the first cause, but also of the middle [cause]; and therefore things known by God proceed from his knowledge in the manner of will and in the manner of secondary causes, nor must it be that in all things they follow the manner of the knowledge."
Authors: Alex. Hal., S. p. 1, q. 24, m. 2. — St. Thomas on this and the following question, here q. unica, a. 1; S. I, q. 14, a. 8. — B. Albert, here a. 11; S. p. I, tr. 18, q. 61, m. 2. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. Med., here q. 2. — Aegid. R., here 1 princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 36, q. 4. — Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1. — Biel, I Sent. d. 35, q. 6.
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- Cap. 13. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.Chapter 13, n. 22. See here the littera of the Master, c. 1.
- De qua vide supra d. 3. a. 2. cf. 2. fundam. 2. et ibid. dub. 3.On which see above d. 3, a. 2, [contra 2 — fundament 2], and ibidem dub. 3.
- Vat. cum edd. 1, 8: est in sciente vt in sua causa. Nostra lectio confirmatur ex solutione ad ult. arg. — Mox pro ut in causa codd. DEK ut sua causa, alii codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 ut causa. — De propositione minori sed omne quod est in Deo, est a Deo, vide supra d. XXXVI. c. 2. seq. et ibid. Comment. a. 1. q. 1. nec non a. 3. q. 1. seq. — Dein post praescitum Vat. addit necessario, et proxime post pro praecognitione cod. T substituit cognitione.The Vatican [edition] together with edd. 1, 8 [reads]: est in sciente vt in sua causa ["is in the knower as in its cause"]. Our reading is confirmed from the solution to the last argument. — Soon, in place of ut in causa codd. DEK [read] ut sua causa, other codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 ut causa. — Concerning the minor proposition sed omne quod est in Deo, est a Deo ["but everything which is in God is from God"], see above d. XXXVI, c. 2 seq. and ibidem Commentary, a. 1, q. 1, and also a. 3, q. 1 seq. — Then after praescitum the Vatican adds necessario ["necessarily"], and immediately after, in place of praecognitione codex T substitutes cognitione.
- Vat. sic: Ratione antecessionis non, quia hoc quod est ante, non dicit etc.The Vatican [reads] thus: Ratione antecessionis non, quia hoc quod est ante, non dicit etc. ["By reason of precedence, no, because that which is ante ['before'] expresses etc."].
- Quaest. 1. c. 2: Quare cum dico, quia si praescit Deus aliquid, necesse est, illud esse futurum; quod idem est ac si dicam: si erit, ex necessitate erit.Question 1, c. 2: "Wherefore when I say, that if God foreknows something, it is necessary that it be future; which is the same as if I were to say: if it will be, of necessity it will be."
- Scilicet praescientia, qui terminus nihil significat nisi notitiam scientiae. Similiter dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 24. m. 2.). Praescientia approbationis potest dicere causam ratione [rei] intellectae, non ratione antecessionis, quae intelligitur per ante.That is, foreknowledge, which term signifies nothing except the cognizance of knowledge. Likewise says Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 24, m. 2). The foreknowledge of approbation can express a cause by reason of the [thing] understood, not by reason of precedence, which is understood through ante ["before"].
- Cfr. August., XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 7, et Enchir. c. 23. — Mox pro oppositi cod. T suppositi.Cf. Augustine, City of God XII, c. 7, and Enchiridion c. 23. — Soon, in place of oppositi codex T [reads] suppositi.
- Cod. T vel.Codex T [reads] vel ["or"].
- Dist. 36. a. 3. q. 1.Distinction 36, a. 3, q. 1.
- Dist. 46. q. 3, ubi exponitur differentia inter ducere in finem per modum causae, vel per modum casus, vel per modum occasionis, et quomodo in casu, de quo hic agitur, ratio mutetur causandi, in quantum scilicet transitur a ratione causae proprie dictae ad rationem occasionis.Distinction 46, q. 3, where is expounded the difference between to lead to an end through the mode of cause, or through the mode of chance, or through the mode of occasion, and how in the case of which we treat here, the ratio of causing is changed, namely inasmuch as one passes from the ratio of cause properly so called to the ratio of occasion.
- Non pauci codd. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 voculam cum in tamen. Paulo inferius pro sed cum nonnulli codd. et dictae edd. sed tamen, Vat. si autem. — Mox pro operetur codd. AB operaretur, et subinde pro super Vat. cum cod. cc secundum.Not a few codices with edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 [change] the little word cum into tamen. A little below, in place of sed cum several codices and the said editions [read] sed tamen, the Vatican si autem. — Soon, in place of operetur codd. AB [read] operaretur, and thereupon in place of super the Vatican together with codex cc [reads] secundum.