Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 38
Quaestio II.
Utrum praescientia divina sit causata a rebus.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Secundo quaeritur, utrum praescientia divina sit causata a rebus. Et quod sic, ostenditur hoc modo.
1. Origenes super Epistolam ad Romanos1 dicit: «Quia aliquid est futurum, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat». Quia ergo aut dicit causam essendi, aut consequendi. Si consequendi, sicut sequitur: hoc est futurum, ergo praescitum, ita e converso: ergo, sicut dicit: quia futurum est, ideo praescitur, ita deberet dicere e converso: quia scitur, ideo futurum est; et hoc negat in littera2: «Non propterea aliquid erit, quia scit Deus»: ergo dicit causam essendi.
2. Item, ratione videtur, quia intellecto, quod Deus nihil praesciat, potest intelligi aliquid futurum3, sed non e converso: ergo haec est ratio et causa illius.
3. Item, hoc argumentum est bonum: iste mentitur, ergo Deus praescivit, istum mentiri: ergo est ibi aliqua habitudo localis4, et nulla potest inveniri nisi causae ad effectum. Sed Deus non est causa mendacii: restat ergo, quod futurum est causa praescientiae.
4. Item, quaecumque duo sic se habent, quod invicem se consequuntur, aut ambo causantur a tertio, aut unum est causa alterius; sed sic se habent ista duo, scilicet istum mentiri, et Deum praescire, et non est dicere, quod ambo causentur a tertio: ergo unum est causa alterius.
Contra:
1. Augustinus5: «Non enim quae creata sunt ideo Deus novit, quia facta sunt».
2. Item, ratione videtur, quod non sit causata a rebus, quia omnis causa nobilior est suo effectu6: si ergo divina praescientia causatur a re aliqua, cum divina praescientia sit increata, et res creata, ergo creatura nobilior increato.
3. Item, divina praescientia est aeterna: ergo cum res sit temporalis, si causatur a rebus, temporale est causa aeterni; et cum causa sit prior effectu7, ergo temporale prius aeterno.
4. Item, si res sunt causa praescientiae, aut ratione principalis significati, aut ratione connotati; si ratione principalis significati, cum illud sit divina essentia, ergo res sunt causa Dei; si ratione connotati, cum connotata sint res ipsae, tunc sunt causa sui8.
Conclusio.
Praescientia divina tantum secundum rationem inferendi et dicendi in rebus aliquatenus causam habet.
Respondeo: Aliqui9 voluerunt dicere, quod causa dicitur dupliciter: proprie, et communiter; proprie, quod dat alteri esse; et sic nullo modo res sunt causa praescientiae divinae. Alio modo dicitur communiter causa illud, sine quo res non est, et sic dicitur causa sine qua non; et hoc modo, quia praescientia Dei non est, quin res sint futurae, ideo hoc modo dicuntur causa. — Sed quoniam hoc nomen causa semper importat honorabilitatem respectu cuius dicitur causa et quandam superpositionem; ideo non videtur illud adhuc omnino sanum dicere, quod sit causa sine qua non. Et praeterea, illud non solvit ad auctoritatem Origenis, quia ipse negat conversam10.
Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod est causam accipere secundum triplicem modum, scilicet secundum rationem essendi, et secundum rationem inferendi, et secundum rationem dicendi. Dico ergo, quod secundum rationem essendi praescientia potest esse causa aliquorum praescitorum, licet non omnino11, sed nullo modo e converso. Secundum rationem inferendi, sunt mutuo causae, quia mutuo antecedunt et consequuntur; et antecedens est causa consequentis12. Secundum rationem dicendi, futurum est causa praescientiae, et non e converso. Nam praescientia dicitur scientia ante rem. Constat ergo, quod importat ordinem ad posterius; et quoniam, si scitum esset semper praesens, esset scientia, sed non praescientia; ad hoc13, quod praescientia dicatur, venit ex futuritione rei. Et sic intelligit Origenes, et patet primum.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur tertio de habitudine locali, dicendum, quod est locus a convertibili14.
4. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, dicendum, quod habet instantiam in proposito; et quia in solo Deo est instantia, ideo ferenda est. Ratio autem huius est, quia Dei praescientia est respectu veri, et respectu omnis veri; ideo ponit et ponitur. Et quia potest esse respectu veri, quod non est ab ipso
secundum id quod subest, nec e converso15: ideo nec causa est, nec causatur. Ergo praescientia est respectu veri, quia divina; respectu omnis veri, quia nihil latet Deum: ideo ponit et ponitur. Rursus, quia scientia est, quae dicit simplicem notitiam, ideo non causat; quia divina, ideo non causatur. Ideo ponit et ponitur, et non causat, nec causatur.
I. Huic quaestioni occasionem dederunt verba Origenis a Magistro et S. Bonav. (hic arg. 1. ad oppos.) citata, et etiam ab aliis Patribus secundum sensum repetita, quae rebus futuris quandam causalitatem respectu scientiae divinae tribuere videntur. De intellectu harum sententiarum inde ab illis temporibus usque ad nostram aetatem multum disputatum est.
Prima solutio, quae est ipsius Magistri, distinguit inter causam in sensu proprio, quae manifeste dependentiam scientiae divinae a rebus futuris implicat et nullatenus admitti potest, et causam in sensu improprio, scil. causam sine qua non, qua non tam causa, quam potius occasio, dispositio sive praerequisitum aliquod exprimitur, quod in hac re admitti posse, nonnulli putant. Haec solutio Magistri Seraphico non videtur esse satis sana; cui adstipulatur Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 24. m. 3.), qui vocem causae etiam in sensu improprio non admittit, «quia concedendum non est, quod temporale sit aliquo modo causa aeterni, quia nec per se nec per accidens». Idem tenent S. Thom., B. Albert., Scotus, Richard., aliique. Bene dicit Seraphicus (infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. ad 1.), quod scientia Dei «nullo modo pendet ex praecognito; non enim secundum eius exigentiam cognoscit, sed secundum exigentiam luminis et claritatis aeternae, in qua nulla cadit dubietas, sed certitudo».
II. S. Bonaventurae solutio cum triplici distinctione vix a quopiam improbari potest. Sane secundum rationem dicendi nomen praescientia ideo dicitur, quia refertur ad futura; non e converso aliquid ideo dicitur futurum, quia praescitur. Quodsi non essent futura, sed tantum praesentia, inepte diceretur praescientia, cum non esset nisi scientia. Item manifestum est, quod secundum rationem inferendi liceat concludere ex existentia futuri, quod Deus illud praesciverit, et e converso. Hanc explicationem approbat S. Thom. (de Verit. q. 2. a. 14. ad 1.) dicens, quod in dicto Origenis «non importatur causa essendi, sed causa inferendi» (cfr. S. I. q. 14. a. 8. ad 1.). Sed tunc remanet difficultas, quia verba Origenis «negant conversam» i. e. non admittunt propositionem: quia res a Deo sciuntur, ideo futura sunt; quod tamen, si quia et ideo sumuntur in sensu illativo et non causali, ab ipso concedendum erat. — Tertio modo, secundum rationem essendi, conceditur ab omnibus, nullatenus futura esse posse causam divinae praescientiae; at vix negari posse videtur, in omni praescientia futurorum aliquo modo implicari causalitatem, cum nullum ens possit esse futurum, nisi supposita approbatione divinae voluntatis, nullumque malum sine permissione ipsius.
Aliae etiam ab antiquis doctoribus explicationes horum dictorum afferuntur ad solvendam, ut videtur, iam dictam difficultatem, quod scil. negatur conversa. Unde Alex. Hal. (loc. cit.): «Vel dicendum, quod Origenes non ponit activum, sed passivum; unde non est concedendum: quia futurum est, ideo scit Deus, sed ideo scitur a Deo. Sic enim notatur causa aptitudinis ad sciendum ex parte scibilis. In activo vero magis notatur causa respectu alicuius in sciente». Idem repetit B. Albertus (S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 3.). Thom. praeter modum explicandi iam relatum etiam dicit (Sum. loc. cit.) Origenes locutus est, attendens rationem scientiae, cui non convenit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate»; et (de Verit. loc. cit.): «Intentio Origenis est dicere, quod scientia Dei non est causa, quae inducat necessitatem in scito».
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 24. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3.
---
Question II.
Whether divine foreknowledge is caused by things.
In the second place it is asked, whether divine foreknowledge is caused by things. And that it is so, is shown in this manner.
1. Origen on the Epistle to the Romans1 says: "Because something is going to be, therefore it is known by God, before it comes about." Since therefore [this saying] either states a cause of being or [a cause] of consequence. If of consequence, just as there follows: this is future, therefore foreknown, so [the converse follows]: therefore, just as he says: because it is future, therefore it is foreknown, so he ought to say conversely: because it is known, therefore it is future; and this he denies in the littera2: "Not on this account will something be, because God knows it": therefore [Origen] states a cause of being.
2. Likewise, by reason it appears [that things are the cause]: since, on the supposition that God foreknows nothing, something can [still] be understood as future3, but not conversely: therefore this [the future] is the ratio and cause of that [foreknowledge].
3. Likewise, this argument is good: this man is lying, therefore God foreknew that this man would lie: therefore there is there some local relation4, and none can be found except [that] of cause to effect. But God is not the cause of falsehood: it remains therefore that the future is the cause of foreknowledge.
4. Likewise, whatever two [things] so stand to each other that they mutually follow upon one another, either both are caused by a third, or one is the cause of the other; but these two so stand to each other, namely this man's lying and God's foreknowing, and one cannot say that both are caused by a third: therefore one is the cause of the other.
On the contrary:
1. Augustine5: "For the things that are created, God did not know on this account, that they were made."
2. Likewise, by reason it appears that [foreknowledge] is not caused by things, since every cause is nobler than its effect6: if therefore divine foreknowledge is caused by some thing, since divine foreknowledge is uncreated, and the thing is created, therefore the creature is nobler than the uncreated.
3. Likewise, divine foreknowledge is eternal: therefore since the thing is temporal, if it is caused by things, the temporal is the cause of the eternal; and since the cause is prior to the effect7, therefore the temporal is prior to the eternal.
4. Likewise, if things are the cause of foreknowledge, [it is] either by reason of [the term's] principal signification, or by reason of [its] connotation; if by reason of the principal signification, since that is the divine essence, then things are the cause of God; if by reason of the connotation, since the things connoted are the things themselves, then they are the cause of themselves8.
Conclusion.
Divine foreknowledge in some measure has a cause in things only according to the ratio of inferring and of speaking.
I respond: Some9 have wished to say that cause is so called in two ways: properly, and commonly; properly, that which gives being to another; and in this sense things are in no way the cause of divine foreknowledge. In another way cause is called commonly that without which the thing is not, and so it is called causa sine qua non [a cause-without-which-not]; and in this manner, since the foreknowledge of God does not exist without things being future, therefore in this manner [things] are called a cause. — But since the noun cause always imports a [certain] dignity in respect of that of which it is called cause, and a certain superposition; therefore it does not yet seem altogether sound to say that it is causa sine qua non. And besides, that does not resolve [the appeal] to the authority of Origen, since he denies the converse10.
And therefore otherwise it must be said, that cause can be taken in a threefold manner, namely according to the ratio of being, according to the ratio of inferring, and according to the ratio of speaking. I say therefore, that according to the ratio of being, foreknowledge can be the cause of some foreknown things, although not of all11, but in no way conversely. According to the ratio of inferring, [foreknowledge and the future] are mutually causes, since they mutually antecede and consequent each other; and the antecedent is the cause of the consequent12. According to the ratio of speaking, the future is the cause of foreknowledge, and not conversely. For praescientia is called knowledge before the thing. It is clear therefore that it imports an order to something posterior; and since, if the known were always present, it would be knowledge, but not foreknowledge; that13 foreknowledge be so called, comes from the futurity of the thing. And so Origen understands it, and the first [argument] is plain.
3. To that which is objected in the third [argument] concerning the local relation, it must be said that it is a locus a convertibili14 [a topic from a convertible].
4. To that which is objected in the last [argument], it must be said that it has an instance in the matter at hand; and since in God alone is the instance, therefore it is to be brought forward. The reason of this is, that God's foreknowledge is with respect to the true, and with respect to every truth; therefore it posits and is posited. And since [foreknowledge] can be with respect to a truth that is not from him
according to that which underlies [it], nor conversely15: therefore neither is it the cause, nor is it caused. Therefore foreknowledge is with respect to the true, because [it is] divine; with respect to every truth, because nothing is hidden from God: therefore it posits and is posited. Again, since [foreknowledge] is knowledge, which states simple cognition, therefore it does not cause; since [it is] divine, therefore it is not caused. Therefore it posits and is posited, and neither causes nor is caused.
I. This question was occasioned by the words of Origen cited by the Master and St. Bonaventure (here, in the first argument ad oppositum), and likewise repeated according to their sense by other Fathers, [words] which seem to attribute to future things a certain causality with respect to divine knowledge. Concerning the meaning of these statements there has been from those times down to our own age much disputed.
The first solution, which is that of the Master himself, distinguishes between cause in the proper sense, which manifestly implies a dependency of the divine knowledge on future things and can in no way be admitted, and cause in the improper sense, namely causa sine qua non, by which there is expressed not so much a cause as rather an occasion, a disposition, or some prerequisite, which some think can in this matter be admitted. This solution of the Master does not seem to the Seraphic [Doctor] to be quite sound; with him agrees Alex. Hal. (S. p. I, q. 24, m. 3), who does not admit the term cause even in an improper sense, "since it is not to be conceded, that a temporal [thing] is in any way the cause of an eternal [thing], because [it is so] neither per se nor per accidens." The same is held by St. Thomas, B. Albert, Scotus, Richard, and others. Well does the Seraphic [Doctor] say (below, d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1), that the knowledge of God "in no way depends upon the foreknown; for it does not know according to the [foreknown's] requirement, but according to the requirement of eternal light and clarity, in which no doubt falls, but [only] certitude."
II. St. Bonaventure's solution with its threefold distinction can scarcely be disapproved by anyone. Indeed according to the ratio of speaking the noun praescientia is so called, because it refers to future things; and not conversely is something called future because it is foreknown. For if [things] were not future, but only present, praescientia would be ineptly so called, since it would be nothing but scientia [knowledge]. Likewise it is manifest, that according to the ratio of inferring it is permitted to conclude from the existence of the future that God has foreknown it, and conversely. This explanation is approved by St. Thomas (de Verit. q. 2, a. 14, ad 1), saying that in Origen's saying "there is not implied a cause of being, but a cause of inferring" (cf. S. I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1). But then the difficulty remains, since Origen's words "deny the converse," i.e., do not admit the proposition: because things are known by God, therefore they are future; which nevertheless, if because and therefore are taken in an illative and not causal sense, ought to have been conceded by him. — In the third way, according to the ratio of being, it is conceded by all, that future things can in no way be the cause of divine foreknowledge; yet it can scarcely seem to be denied, that in every foreknowledge of future things some causality is implied, since no being can be future, except on the supposition of the approval of the divine will, and no evil without the permission of [God] himself.
Other explanations of these sayings are also adduced by the ancient doctors to resolve, as it seems, the difficulty just mentioned, namely that the converse is denied. Whence Alex. Hal. (loc. cit.): "Or it must be said, that Origen does not posit [the relation] actively, but passively; whence it is not to be conceded: because the future is, therefore God knows, but rather therefore it is known by God. For thus is noted the cause of fitness for being known on the part of the knowable (scibilis). In the active [predication], however, the cause is rather noted with respect to someone in the knower." The same is repeated by B. Albert (S. p. I, tr. 13, q. 61, m. 3). Thomas, besides the manner of explaining already related, also says (Sum. loc. cit.) [that] "Origen has spoken, attending to the ratio of knowledge, to which the ratio of causality does not pertain, except with the will adjoined"; and (de Verit. loc. cit.): "Origen's intention is to say, that the knowledge of God is not a cause which induces necessity in the thing known."
III. Authors: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 24, m. 3. — B. Albert, here a. 3; S. p. I, tr. 13, q. 61, m. 3. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 2. — Richard. a Med., here q. 3.
---
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi et invenies expositionem textus Origenis hic citati. — Aliquanto inferius post ita e converso in plurimis codd. desideratur ergo.See here the Master's littera, c. 1, where you will also find an exposition of the text of Origen here cited. — A little below, after ita e converso in very many codices ergo is wanting.
- Intellige: Origenes. Nam verba, quae sequuntur, sunt Origenis loc. cit. — Loco Origenis cod. Z post negat supplet Magister, qui tamen conversam non negat.Understand: Origen [is the subject]. For the words which follow are Origen's at the place cited. — In place of Origenis, codex Z after negat supplies Magister, who however does not deny the converse.
- Cod. M et ed. 1 futurum praefigunt esse. Huius argumenti sensus est: in hypothesi, quod Deus nihil praesciat, adhuc intelligi potest aliquid futurum; sed in hypothesi, quod nihil sit futurum, praescientia neque intelligi neque haberi potest: ergo futurum est causa praescientiae. Sive, ut ait Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 24. m. 3: Item, quo posito, ponitur aliud, quo remoto, removetur aliud, illud est aliquo modo causa illius; sed re futura posita, ponitur, et re futura remota, removetur praescientia: ergo res futura est causa praescientiae Dei.Codex M and ed. 1 prefix esse to futurum. The sense of this argument is: on the supposition that God foreknows nothing, something can still be understood as future; but on the supposition that nothing is future, foreknowledge can neither be understood nor had: therefore the future is the cause of foreknowledge. Or, as Alex. Hal. says (S. p. I, q. 24, m. 3): "Likewise, [if] when one is posited, another is posited, [and] when one is removed, another is removed, that [first] is in some way the cause of [the second's] being"; but with the future thing posited, [foreknowledge] is posited, and with the future thing removed, foreknowledge is removed: therefore the future thing is the cause of God's foreknowledge.
- Nomine locus (τόπος) Scholastici significant sedem argumenti vel id, a quo ad propositam quaestionem trahitur argumentum, et consistit locus in habitudine aliquorum terminorum inter se. Sic v. g. locus a causa, qui mox a S. Doctore tangitur, est habitudo ipsius causae ad suum effectum.By the noun locus (τόπος [topos]) the Scholastics signify the seat of an argument or that from which an argument is drawn to the proposed question, and the locus consists in the relation of certain terms among themselves. Thus, for example, locus a causa, which is soon touched on by the Holy Doctor, is the relation of the cause itself to its effect.
- Libr. XV. de Trin. c. 13. n. 22. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1.On the Trinity XV, c. 13, n. 22. See here the Master's littera, c. 1.
- Avicenna, VI. Metaph. c. 3: Causa dignior est causato.Avicenna, Metaphysics VI, c. 3: "The cause is more worthy than the caused."
- Aristot., II. Poster. c. 17. (c. 14.).Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] II, c. 17 (c. 14).
- Quod absurdum esset dicere. Generat enim nihil ipsum se ipsum, ut dicit Aristot. II. de Anima text. 47. (c. 4.).Which it would be absurd to say. For nothing generates itself, as Aristotle says, On the Soul II, text 47 (c. 4).
- Inter quos Magister Sent., hic c. 1.Among whom is the Master of the Sentences, here c. 1.
- Intellige: res sive futurum, vel substitue pro sit cum cod. R sint, scil. res futurae.Understand: the thing or the future, or substitute for sit with codex R sint, namely res futurae [future things].
- Scilicet propositionis: quia aliquid est futurum, ideo scitur a Deo. Conversa est: quia scitur a Deo, ideo erit futurum.Namely, of the proposition: because something is future, therefore it is known by God. The converse is: because it is known by God, therefore it will be future.
- Cod. Z omni. Mallemus omnium pro omnino.Codex Z [reads] omni. We would prefer omnium in place of omnino.
- Supple cum cod. secundum rationem inferendi (non essendi); nam aeque bene concluditur: hoc Deus praescit, ergo erit, ac: hoc erit, ergo Deus praescit. Hoc est quod in solut. ad 4. vocat ponit et ponitur. Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Priori, ubi haec prioritas vocatur prioritas «eorum quae convertuntur secundum esse consequentiam», et proponitur hoc exemplum: «Si homo est, vera est oratio, qua dicimus, quod homo est; et convertitur, nam si vera est oratio qua dicimus, quod homo est, est homo».Supply with codex secundum rationem inferendi [according to the ratio of inferring] (not essendi [of being]); for it is just as well concluded: this God foreknows, therefore it will be, as: this will be, therefore God foreknows it. This is what in the solution to [argument] 4 he calls ponit et ponitur [it posits and is posited]. Cf. Aristotle, Categories, chapter On the Prior, where this priority is called the priority "of those things which are convertible according to the being of consequence," and this example is proposed: "If man is, the speech is true by which we say that man is; and it converts, for if the speech is true by which we say that man is, [then] man is."
- Cod. R ideo ad hoc; cod. W ad hoc ergo.Codex R [reads] ideo ad hoc; codex W [reads] ad hoc ergo.
- Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. ad 1. similem obiectionem solvit sic: Dico, quod verum est (scil. quod sit ibi aliqua habitudo localis); sed illa habitudo est habitudo relativi ad relativum, sicut hic: praescientia est: ergo aliquid praescitum est, et e converso, et loquor de relatione secundum rationem. — Pro tertio codd. cum edd. falso secundo. — Ex cod. X restituimus Deo, quam vocem ceteri codd. et ed. 1 omittunt, et pro qua Vat. hoc. — Vera esset, si hic immediate ageretur de actione mala. Paulo inferius post nec causatur eadem Vat. cum cod. cc et ed. 1 subiicit quia.Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3, ad 1, resolves a similar objection thus: "I say that it is true" (namely that there is some local relation there); "but that relation is the relation of a relative to a relative," as here: foreknowledge exists: therefore something foreknown exists, and conversely, and I speak of relation according to ratio. — For tertio the codices with the [printed] editions falsely [read] secundo. — From codex X we have restored Deo, which word the other codices and ed. 1 omit, and for which the Vatican [edition reads] hoc. — [The argument] would be true, if [the matter] were immediately treated here of an evil action. A little below, after nec causatur, the Vatican [edition] together with codex cc and ed. 1 inserts quia.