Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 38
Articulus II.
De praescientia quantum ad rationem necessitatis.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).
Consequenter est quaestio de secundo articulo, scilicet de divina praescientia quantum ad rationem necessitatis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo quaeritur, utrum divina praescientia ponat necessitatem circa praescitum. Secundo, utrum divina praescientia habeat in se necessitatem.
Quaestio I.
Utrum praescientia Dei rebus praescitis necessitatem imponat.
Et quod divina praescientia ponat necessitatem ostenditur sic.
1. Anselmus in libro de Concordantia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii1: « Quae praescivit Deus, necesse est futura esse ».
2. Item, ratione sic: « ex maiori de necessario et minori de inesse semper concluditur de necessario », sicut dicit Philosophus in primo Priorum2. Fiat ergo talis syllogismus: omne praescitum necesse est esse futurum — hoc patet per Anselmum — sed hoc est praescitum, quolibet demonstrato: ergo necesse est esse futurum.
3. Item, omne quod Deus praescit, est verum; sed ut dicit Philosophus in primo Perihermeneias3: « omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse »: ergo si modo verum, necesse est, praescitum est nunc esse verum. Et futurum est praescitum: ergo modo necessarium est esse futurum: ergo de necessitate eveniet.
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile: Deus praescit aliquid in partem affirmativam; quaero ergo, utrum illud possit non esse: si non: ergo est necessarium; si sic: ergo potest aliter evenire quam Deus praescit: ergo divina praescientia est fallibilis et incerta. Et hoc est argumentum Augustini4 et etiam Boethii in quinto de Consolatione: « Si aliorsum, quam praevisae sunt, detorqueri valent res praevisae, iam non erit firma futuri praescientia ».
5. Item, Deus praescit, aliquid esse futurum: aut ergo possibile est, non esse futurum, aut impossibile: si impossibile, non esse, ergo necesse est esse; si autem possibile; sed omne possibile [poni]bile, et falso possibili posito in esse, quod sequitur non est impossibile5. Ponatur ergo, hoc non esse; et Deus praescivit hoc esse: ergo Deus praescivit falsum. Sed hoc est impossibile: ergo impossibile est aliquod praecedentium.
Contra:
1. Quod non inferat necessitatem, ostenditur auctoritate Augustini, sumta a simili, in libro de Libero arbitrio6: « Sicut mea memoria non cogit, facta esse quae praeterierunt, sic Dei praescientia non cogit, facienda esse quae futura sunt ».
2. Item, ratione ostenditur illud idem: intelligamus, Deum nihil praescire, ergo ex hoc nihil accrescit libero arbitrio: ergo positio praescientiae nihil ei aufert7: ergo cum liberum arbitrium de se sit causa rerum ad utrumlibet et contingentium, divina praescientia hoc non tollit.
3. Item, sicut supra probatum est8, divina praescientia in pluribus aut non est causa, aut non est tota causa; sed quod dat alicui necessitatem, habet rationem causae, quia a quo est esse, est esse necessarium: cum igitur divina praescientia multorum futurorum non sit causa, ut malorum, nullam rebus imponit necessitatem.
4. Item, divina praescientia praescit res, sicut sunt eventurae, cum nihil praesciat nisi verum: ergo cum praescit, aliquem peccaturum, cum peccatum non sit nisi per voluntatem, praescit, istum per voluntatem hoc facere, et praescit, aliud posse facere. Ergo si omne quod praescit, est verum, verum est, quod iste per voluntatem hoc faciet et poterit aliud facere; et si hoc est contingens: ergo, si cum divina praescientia est contingentia circa res, non ergo necessitas.
5. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur rationibus ducentibus ad impossibile. Si imponit praescientia rebus necessitatem, perit ergo casus et fortuna. Secundum impossibile est, quod perit liberum arbitrium et consilium. Tertium, quod perit meritum et demeritum. Quartum, quod perit laus et vituperium9.
Conclusio.
Praescientia divina rebus non imponit necessitatem, sed ipsum modum contingentiae rerum contingentium praescit.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tres circa hoc fuerunt positiones.
Quidam enim dixerunt, quod praescientia necessario, cum sit infallibilis, imponit necessitatem, et ideo abstulerunt liberum arbitrium et peccatum. Et ista positio fuit haeretica et iniqua, quia destruit bonos mores.
Alia positio fuit, quod divina praescientia, si esset, necessitatem imponeret, et sic omnis virtus et laus periret. Et quia dilexerunt rem publicam, ideo abstulerunt a Deo praescientiam, et a propositionibus de futuro abstulerunt veritatem. — Et haec haeretica fuit et impia, quia derogat nobilitati divinae.
Tertia positio est catholica, quae Deum honorat et bonos mores conservat, et ideo iusta, pia et vera: quod divina praescientia est, et tamen non imponit rebus necessitatem. Omnia enim sic praecognoscit esse eventura, sicut eventura sunt; et ideo, cum multa sint eventura contingenter, ut illa quae sunt a libero arbitrio et casu et fortuna, sicut praescit, haec esse futura ab istis, sic praescit modum contingentiae secundum quem sunt ab istis.
Ad intelligentiam autem obiectorum notandum, quod duplex est necessitas, scilicet absoluta, et respectiva. Necessitas absoluta, quae opponitur contingentiae, dicitur necessitas consequentis. Necessitas respectiva dicitur necessitas consequentiae; et haec non opponitur contingenti. Nam aliquod contingens necessario sequitur, ut si ambulet, necessario sequitur, quod movetur.
Ad argumenta pro parte affirmativa:
Ad 1. Dicendum ergo, quod in praescito non est necessitas absoluta, sed solum consequentiae, quia necessario sequitur: Deus praescit hoc, ergo hoc erit. Et hoc modo intelligitur auctoritas Anselmi, et consimiles auctoritates, quae proponuntur cum modo necessitatis; et sic patet primum.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur de syllogismo ex maiori de necessario et minori de inesse; dicendum, quod sicut patet, et Philosophus exponit, hoc intelligitur de ea propositione, quae est de inesse simpliciter, quod aequivalet necessario; sed minor huius syllogismi, scilicet: hoc est praescitum, non est de inesse simpliciter; sicut enim infra patebit, non est necessaria.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de praescito, quod verum est, et si verum est, necessario est modo; dicendum, quod istam rationem facit Philosophus ad ostendendum, quod in futuris non est veritas; et est sophistica10. Nam quando dicitur: omne quod est, quando est, necessario est; intelligitur de eo, quod ponit aliquid in actu circa suppositum, quod ex quo positum est, impossibile est non esse positum; sed verum de futuro nihil ponit circa subiectum, quia non est verum pro praesenti, sed solum pro futuro: et ideo nulla est necessitas, neque simpliciter, neque ut nunc, quia nihil ponit ut nunc.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur per impossibile, quod si posset aliter esse, posset falli etc.; dicendum, quod11 falsitas venit ex discordia intellectus ad cognitum, similiter potentia fallendi ex potentia discordandi. Dico igitur, quoniam necessario praescitum sequitur ad praescientiam, ideo non possunt discordare: et ideo nunquam fallitur, nec potest falli.
Ad 5. Quod ergo obiicitur, utrum aliter possit esse; dicendum, quod aliter potest esse, quia Deus potest aliter praescisse; et cum ponitur, quod aliter sit12, ponitur, quod aliter praescit. Quando ergo infertur: potest aliter esse, quam sit: et Deus praescivit sic: ergo aliter13 quam Deus praescit, distinguenda est conclusio: quia potest intelligi divisim, et sic vera est; et est sensus: Deus praescit hoc posse evenire, et possibile est, illud non evenire; si autem coniunctim, falsa; et est sensus: illud est possibile, quod Deus praescit uno modo, et eveniat alio. Et est fallacia compositionis in illo processu, sicut hic: currens potest non moveri: ergo possibile est, quod aliquis currat et non moveatur; non sequitur. Similiter, cum quaeritur, quod ponatur: ponendum est; sed cum assumit: Deus praescivit, hoc; est oppositum ponenti14: et ideo est negandum.
I. Utramque opinionem, quae vel libertatem creaturae negat, ut divinam praescientiam salvet, vel praescientiam tollit, ut libertatem salvet, ut iam respuendam esse, catholica fide constat. Cum autem divinae praescientiae conveniat omnimoda infallibilitas et immutabilitas in sciendo, et in ea etiam implicetur quaedam causalitas respectu sciti, ex utroque capite libertati creati arbitrii praeiudicari posse videtur. Secundum hanc difficultatem S. Doctor hic 3. et 5. argg. in fundam. breviter elidit; plura vide hic a. 1. q. 2. in corp., et infra d. 40. dub. 7, et ibid. a. 2. q. 1. d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. Omnino constat, quod causalitas illa, qua Deus influit in causas secundas et cooperatur liberis actibus creaturarum intellectualium, congruit naturae agentium nec libertatem tollit, sed potius ponit: tamen de modo, quo fiat hic concursus et quo libertas sit salvanda, inter theologos catholicos disceptatur. — Prima autem difficultas hic cum communi sententia evidenter solvitur, adhibita illa distinctione inter necessitatem consequentis et consequentiae, quam ex Boethio (de Consolat. V. pros. 6.) scholae catholicae sub variis nominibus receperunt. Verba Boethii sunt: « Duae sunt necessitates: simplex una, veluti quod necesse est, omnes homines esse mortales: altera conditionis, ut si aliquem ambulare scias, eum ambulare necesse est. Quod enim quisque novit, id esse aliter ac notum est nequit. Sed haec conditio minime secum illam simplicem trahit. Hanc enim necessitatem non propria facit natura, sed conditionis adiectio. Nulla enim necessitas cogit incedere voluntarie gradientem, quamvis eum tamen, cum graditur, incedere necessarium sit ». Deinde idem auctor hanc distinctionem adhibet ad demonstrandum, divinam providentiam non laedi libertatem creatam. — Eandem distinctionem S. Doctor adhibet infra d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 47. q. 1. et alibi.
II. Solutiones ad 2. 3. fundantur in distinctione rei actu existentis et rei futurae. Quoad rem existentem vera est sententia Aristotelis, quod omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse, necessitate scilicet, quae consequitur ex suppositione, quod subiectum nunc existit (unde vocatur a S. Doctore « necessitas ut nunc »), quia existentia excludit non-existentiam; non autem verum est de eo quod nondum est, sed futurum est, quia pro nunc nihil ponit in re circa subiectum. — In 5. ad opposit. supponitur, aliquid esse a Deo praescitum, et tamen non esse futurum. Ad eludendum sophisma opponentium S. Doctor utitur celebri distinctione sensus compositi et divisi, uti ex littera patet. Eandem obiectionem S. Thom. (hic a. 3. ad 3.) in eodem sensu solvit, adhibita distinctione, « quod potest esse (propositio) de dicto, vel de re; et si sit de dicto, vera est (scil. quod omne scitum a Deo necesse est esse), et si sit de re, falsa est ».
III. Alex. Hal., S. p. 1. q. 24. m. 4. 5. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 39. q. unica; de Rerum principio, q. 4. a. 2. sectio 5. — S. Thom., hic q. unica, a. 5; S. I. q. 14. a. 13; S. c. Gent. I. c. 67; de Verit. q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert., hic a. 4; S. p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 3. — Durand., hic q. 3. n. 19. seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic [q. unica?].
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Article II.
On foreknowledge with respect to the account of necessity.
Consequently there is a question concerning the second article, namely, on divine foreknowledge with respect to the account of necessity. And about this two things are asked. First it is asked whether divine foreknowledge imposes necessity on the foreknown. Second, whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in itself.
Question I.
Whether God's foreknowledge imposes necessity on things foreknown.
That divine foreknowledge imposes necessity is shown thus.
1. Anselm in the book On the Concordance of Foreknowledge and Free Choice1: "What God has foreknown, it is necessary that it be future."
2. Likewise, by reason thus: "From a major premise concerning the necessary and a minor premise concerning the de inesse (in-being), there is always concluded a proposition concerning the necessary," as the Philosopher says in the first book of the Prior Analytics2. Let then such a syllogism be made: every foreknown thing is necessarily going to be — this is clear by Anselm — but this thing, whatever be pointed out, is foreknown: therefore it is necessarily going to be.
3. Likewise, everything that God foreknows is true; but as the Philosopher says in the first book of On Interpretation3: "Everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be": therefore if it is now true, it is necessary that what is foreknown be now true. And the future is foreknown: therefore now it is necessary that it be future: therefore it will come about by necessity.
4. Likewise, the same thing is shown by [reduction to the] impossible: God foreknows something on the affirmative side; I ask therefore whether it could not be: if it could not, then it is necessary; if it could, then it can come about otherwise than as God foreknows: therefore divine foreknowledge is fallible and uncertain. And this is the argument of Augustine4 and also of Boethius in the fifth book of On Consolation: "If foreseen things can be turned otherwise than as they were foreseen, then there will no longer be a firm foreknowledge of the future."
5. Likewise, God foreknows that something will be future: either then it is possible for it not to be future, or it is impossible: if it is impossible for it not to be, therefore it is necessary that it be; but if it is possible, then since every possible is ponibile (capable of being posited), and when a false possible has been posited as in being, what follows is not impossible5. Let it be posited, then, that this thing not be; and God has foreknown this thing to be: therefore God has foreknown a falsehood. But this is impossible: therefore one of the preceding [premises] is impossible.
On the contrary:
1. That it does not introduce necessity is shown by the authority of Augustine, taken from a likeness, in the book On Free Choice6: "Just as my memory does not compel things to have happened that have already passed, so God's foreknowledge does not compel things to be done that are future."
2. Likewise, the same thing is shown by reason: let us understand that God foreknows nothing — therefore from this nothing accrues to free choice; therefore the positing of foreknowledge takes nothing from it7: therefore, since free choice is of itself a cause of things in either direction and of contingents, divine foreknowledge does not take this away.
3. Likewise, as has been proved above8, divine foreknowledge in many cases is either not the cause, or not the entire cause; but that which gives necessity to anything has the account of a cause, since from that which is comes being, and necessary being: since therefore divine foreknowledge is not the cause of many future things, such as evils, it imposes no necessity on things.
4. Likewise, divine foreknowledge foreknows things as they are going to come about, since it foreknows nothing but the true: therefore when it foreknows that someone will sin, since sin is only by the will, it foreknows that this person will do this through his will, and it foreknows that he could do otherwise. Therefore if everything that it foreknows is true, it is true that this man will do this through his will and will be able to do otherwise; and if this is contingent: therefore, since with divine foreknowledge there is contingency about things, there is therefore not necessity.
5. Likewise, the same is shown by reasonings leading to an impossible. If foreknowledge imposes necessity on things, then chance and fortune perish. The second impossible is that free choice and counsel perish. The third, that merit and demerit perish. The fourth, that praise and blame perish9.
Conclusion.
Divine foreknowledge does not impose necessity on things, but rather foreknows the very mode of contingency of contingent things.
I respond: It must be said that there were three positions about this.
For some said that foreknowledge, since it is infallible, necessarily imposes necessity, and so they took away free choice and sin. And this position was heretical and iniquitous, because it destroys good morals.
Another position was that divine foreknowledge, if it existed, would impose necessity, and so all virtue and praise would perish. And because they loved the commonwealth, they took away foreknowledge from God, and from propositions about the future they took away truth. — And this was heretical and impious, because it derogates from the divine nobility.
The third position is the catholic one, which honors God and preserves good morals, and is therefore just, pious and true: namely, that divine foreknowledge exists, and yet it does not impose necessity on things. For it foreknows all things to be going to come about exactly as they are going to come about; and therefore, since many things are going to come about contingently, like those that are from free choice and from chance and fortune, just as it foreknows that these things will be future from these [causes], so it foreknows the mode of contingency according to which they are from these.
For the understanding of the objections it should be noted that necessity is twofold, namely absolute and relative. Absolute necessity, which is opposed to contingency, is called the necessity of the consequent. Relative necessity is called the necessity of the consequence; and this is not opposed to the contingent. For some contingent thing necessarily follows, as if he walks, it necessarily follows that he is moved.
Replies to the affirmative arguments:
To 1. It must be said, then, that in the foreknown there is no absolute necessity, but only [necessity] of the consequence, since it follows necessarily: God foreknows this, therefore this will be. And in this way is to be understood the authority of Anselm, and the like authorities, which are propounded with the mode of necessity; and so the first is clear.
To 2. As to what is objected secondly about the syllogism from a major de necessario and a minor de inesse; it must be said that, as is clear, and as the Philosopher expounds, this is to be understood of that proposition which is de inesse simpliciter, which is equivalent to the necessary; but the minor of this syllogism, namely, this is foreknown, is not de inesse simpliciter; for as will be clear below, it is not necessary.
To 3. As to what is objected concerning the foreknown, that it is true, and if it is true, it is now necessarily so; it must be said that the Philosopher makes this argument to show that in future things there is no truth; and it is sophistical10. For when it is said: everything that is, when it is, is necessarily; it is understood of that which posits something in act about the supposit, in such a way that, since it has been posited, it is impossible for it not to be posited; but the true about the future posits nothing about the subject, since it is not true for the present, but only for the future: and therefore there is no necessity, neither absolutely, nor as-of-now, since it posits nothing as-of-now.
To 4. As to what is objected by [reduction to the] impossible, that if it could be otherwise, it could be deceived etc.; it must be said that11 falsity comes from a discord between the intellect and what is known, just as the power of being deceived comes from the power of discord. I say therefore, since the foreknown follows necessarily upon foreknowledge, that they cannot discord: and therefore [foreknowledge] is never deceived, nor can it be deceived.
To 5. As to what is objected, whether it could be otherwise; it must be said that it could be otherwise, because God could have foreknown otherwise; and when it is posited that it be otherwise12, it is posited that he foreknows otherwise. When therefore it is inferred: it can be otherwise than it is: and God foreknew thus: therefore otherwise13 than God foreknows — the conclusion must be distinguished: because it can be understood divisively, and so it is true; and the sense is: God foreknows this can come about, and it is possible that it not come about; but if [taken] compositely, [it is] false; and the sense is: it is possible that what God foreknows in one way come about in another. And there is a fallacy of composition in that process, as here: the running man can not-be-moved: therefore it is possible that someone be running and not be moved; this does not follow. Likewise, when it is asked that something be posited: it is to be posited; but when it assumes: God has foreknown this; this is the opposite of what is being posited14: and therefore it is to be denied.
I. Both opinions — the one which [removes] the freedom of the creature in order to safeguard divine foreknowledge, the other which [removes] foreknowledge in order to safeguard freedom — that they are now to be rejected, is established by the catholic faith. But since to divine foreknowledge there belongs every kind of infallibility and immutability in knowing, and since there is also implied in it a certain causality with respect to the thing known, on both heads it can seem that prejudice is done to the freedom of created choice. According to this difficulty the Holy Doctor here briefly disposes of arguments 3 and 5 in the fundamenta; for more, see here a. 1. q. 2. in corp., and below d. 40. dub. 7, and ibid. a. 2. q. 1, d. 45. a. 2. q. 2. It is altogether established that the causality by which God flows into secondary causes and cooperates with the free acts of intellectual creatures is congruous with the nature of the agents and does not [destroy?] freedom, but rather posits it: yet about the manner in which this concurrence comes about, and how freedom is to be safeguarded, catholic theologians dispute. — But the first difficulty is here clearly resolved with the common opinion, by employing that distinction between the necessity of the consequent and of the consequence, which the catholic schools, under various names, received from Boethius (On Consolation V, prose 6). Boethius's words are: "There are two necessities: a simple one, as that it is necessary that all men be mortal; and one of condition, as that, if you know someone to be walking, he must necessarily be walking. For what each one knows cannot be otherwise than as it is known. But this conditional [necessity] does not at all draw with itself the simple one. For its own nature does not make this necessity, but the addition of the condition. For no necessity compels him to walk who is walking voluntarily, although nevertheless, when he walks, it is necessary that he walk." Thereafter the same author employs this distinction to show that divine providence does not damage created liberty. — The Holy Doctor employs the same distinction below d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. 2, d. 47. q. 1. and elsewhere.
II. The solutions to 2 and 3 are founded on the distinction of the actually existing thing and the future thing. As to the existing thing, the saying of Aristotle is true, that everything that is, when it is, must necessarily be — by a necessity, namely, that follows from the supposition that the subject now exists (whence it is called by the Holy Doctor "necessity as-of-now"), since existence excludes non-existence; but this is not true of that which does not yet exist, but is future, because for now it posits nothing in reality about the subject. — In argument 5 ad oppositum it is supposed that something is foreknown by God and yet is not future. To elude the sophism of the opponents the Holy Doctor uses the celebrated distinction of composite and divided sense, as is clear from the text. The same objection St. Thomas (here a. 5. ad 3.) solves in the same sense, employing the distinction "that the proposition can be de dicto or de re; and if it be de dicto, it is true (namely, that everything known by God must necessarily be), and if it be de re, it is false."
III. Alex. of Hales, Summa p. 1. q. 24. m. 4. 5. — Scotus, I Sent. d. 39. q. unica; On the Principle of Things, q. 4. a. 2. section 5. — St. Thomas, here q. unica, a. 5; Summa I. q. 14. a. 13; Summa contra Gentiles I. c. 67; On Truth q. 2. a. 12. — B. Albert, here a. 4; Summa p. I. tr. 13. q. 61. m. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 6. — Giles of Rome, here 2. princ. q. 3. — Durandus, here q. 3. n. 19 ff. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2. — Biel, here [q. unica?].
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- Quaest. 1. c. 1. — Paulo ante verbo necessitatem cod. V adiungit circa praescitum.Question 1, c. 1. — A little earlier, after the word necessitatem, codex V adds circa praescitum.
- Cap. 9. — Duae generatim species propositionum, duce Aristotele (loc. cit. c. 2.), distinguuntur, scil. absoluta et modalis. Prior est illa, in qua simpliciter dicitur, praedicatum convenire (inesse), vel non convenire subiecto; posterior autem est illa, in qua etiam exprimitur modus, quo praedicatum convenit, vel non convenit subiecto. Prior vocatur etiam propositio de inesse, quae duplex est, scilicet de inesse simpliciter, et de inesse ut nunc, prout praedicatum subiecto convenit aut necessario (v. g. homo est animal), aut contingenter. Similiter propositio de necessario duplex est, scilicet de necessario simpliciter, et de necessario ut nunc. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 28. m. 4. a. 3. ad 2, et S. Thom., de Verit. q. 2. a. 12. obiect. 4, secundum antiquiores Aristotelis expositores, Theophrastum, Eudemium et Themistium, dicunt, in tali syllogismo non sequi conclusionem de necessario. At S. Bonaventura et etiam S. Thomas, hic q. 1. a. 5. obiect. 5. contrarium dicunt cum ipso Aristotele, nec non cum Averroe, qui in Comment. in hunc textum, de hac controversia disserens, illos interpretes multis verbis impugnat. Ceterum hae duae opiniones contrariae bene conciliari possunt, si dicatur, unam opinionem loqui de inesse simpliciter, alteram de inesse ut nunc. Cfr. Scot., I. Prior. q. 28, ubi cum distinctione tam unam quam alteram opinionem approbat. — Verba Anselmi, ad quae P. Doctor mox provocat, sunt citata in argum. praecedenti.Chapter 9. — Two general kinds of propositions are distinguished, with Aristotle as guide (loc. cit. c. 2), namely the absolute and the modal. The former is that in which the predicate is simply said to belong (inesse), or not to belong, to the subject; the latter is that in which the manner in which the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject is also expressed. The former is also called the de inesse proposition, which is twofold, namely de inesse simpliciter and de inesse ut nunc, according as the predicate belongs to the subject either necessarily (e.g. man is an animal) or contingently. Likewise the de necessario proposition is twofold, namely de necessario simpliciter and de necessario ut nunc. — Alex. of Hales, S. p. I. q. 28. m. 4. a. 3. ad 2, and St. Thomas, On Truth q. 2. a. 12. obj. 4, following the older expositors of Aristotle — Theophrastus, Eudemius, and Themistius — say that in such a syllogism the conclusion de necessario does not follow. But St. Bonaventure and also St. Thomas, here q. 1. a. 5. obj. 5, say the contrary with Aristotle himself, and also with Averroes, who in his commentary on this passage, discussing this controversy, attacks those interpreters with many words. Moreover, these two contrary opinions can be well reconciled if one says that the one opinion speaks de inesse simpliciter, the other de inesse ut nunc. Cf. Scotus, I. Prior. q. 28, where, with a distinction, he approves both opinions. — The words of Anselm to which the Holy Doctor presently appeals are cited in the preceding argument.
- Cap. 7. (c. 9.), ubi agitur de veritate et falsitate propositionum, quae respiciunt futura contingentia. « Igitur, ait ibi Philosophus, esse quod est, quando est, et non esse quod non est, quando non est, necesse est ».Chapter 7 (c. 9), where he treats of the truth and falsity of propositions concerning future contingents. "Therefore," says the Philosopher there, "it is necessary that what is be, when it is, and that what is not be not, when it is not."
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. in fine. Verba Boethii invenies loc. cit. prosa 3. — Aliquanto superius post utrum illud Vat. inserit non, quod repugnat et sententiae argumenti et codd. H P Q T Z etc.Cf. here the littera of the Master, c. 1, at the end. The words of Boethius are found loc. cit., prose 3. — A little earlier, after the word utrum, the Vatican edition inserts non, which conflicts both with the sense of the argument and with codices H P Q T Z etc.
- Respicitur illa contingentis definitio, quam Aristoteles proponit I. Prior. c. 12: « Dico autem contingere et contingens, quo non existente necessario, posito autem in esse, nihil erit propter hoc impossibile »; et VIII. Phys. text. 36. (c. 5.): « Si ergo ponamus possibile esse, nullum impossibile accidet, falsum autem fortassis »; quae verba Scholastici sic reddere solebant: Possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile (cfr. Gilb. Porret., de Sex princ. circa finem).Reference is made to that definition of the contingent which Aristotle proposes in Prior Analytics I. c. 12: "I call to contingere and contingent that which, although it does not exist necessarily, when posited in being, nothing on this account will be impossible"; and Physics VIII. text 36 (c. 5): "If therefore we suppose what is possible to be, no impossible will occur, but perhaps a false will." Which words the Scholastics used to render thus: When the possible has been posited as in being, nothing impossible follows (cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, On the Six Principles, near the end).
- Libr. III. c. 4. n. 11. In textu originali verba citata sic sonant: Sicut enim in memoria tua non cogis, facta esse quae praeterierunt etc.Book III, c. 4, n. 11. In the original text the cited words run thus: "For just as you do not in your memory compel things which have passed by to have happened" etc.
- Sensus est: sicut si fingeremus, Deum nihil praescire, libero arbitrio nihil accresceret, sive liberum arbitrium esset omnino indifferens ad utrumlibet: ita, posita praescientia, nihil ei aufertur, sed ipsum manet indifferens.The sense is: just as if we were to imagine that God foreknows nothing, nothing would accrue to free choice, that is, free choice would be wholly indifferent to either side: so, with foreknowledge posited, nothing is taken from it, but it itself remains indifferent.
- Art. praeced. q. 1. — Cfr. et Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. I. c. 7.The preceding article, q. 1. — Cf. also Anselm, On the Concordance of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice, q. I. c. 7.
- Plurimi codd. nec non edd. 1, 2, 3 indebite omittunt cum. — Cfr. de hoc argumento Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 3. seq., et Anselm., de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 2. c. 3. — Cfr. de his Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 7. (c. 9.) et Boeth., Comment. in hunc locum, nec non August., III. de Lib. Arb. c. 2. seqq., et V. de Civ. Dei c. 9. seq., ubi recensentur diversae opiniones, quae mox in corpore quaestionis a S. Doctore adducuntur. — In cod. Y additur et imponitur Tullio et sequacibus eius. — Cod. R scilicet quod; Vat. cum cod. cc quia. — Secundum Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 3. et 6. haec duplex necessitas vocatur absoluta et conditionalis; secundum Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 17, et de Concord. praesc. Dei cum lib. arb. q. 1. c. 3. dicitur antecedens et consequens. — Paulo superius post sequitur cod. addit ad aliud contingens. Mox post Dicendum in plurimis mss. et ed. 1 desideratur ergo.Very many codices, as well as editions 1, 2, and 3, unduly omit cum. — Cf. on this argument Boethius, V On Consolation prose 3 ff., and Anselm, On the Concordance of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice, q. 2. c. 3. — Cf. on these points Aristotle, I On Interpretation c. 7 (c. 9) and Boethius, Commentary on this passage, as well as Augustine, III On Free Choice c. 2 ff., and V On the City of God c. 9 ff., where the various opinions are reviewed which are presently adduced by the Holy Doctor in the body of the question. — In codex Y is added and it is imputed to Tully and his followers. — Codex R, scilicet quod; the Vatican edition with codex cc, quia. — According to Boethius, V On Consolation prose 3 and 6, this twofold necessity is called absolute and conditional; according to Anselm, II Cur Deus homo c. 17, and On the Concordance of God's Foreknowledge with Free Choice q. 1. c. 3, it is called antecedent and consequent. — A little earlier, after sequitur, a codex adds ad aliud contingens. Soon after Dicendum in very many manuscripts and edition 1 ergo is lacking.
- Sophistica est illa ratio non in sensu, quod illud principium Aristotelis sit falsum, sed quatenus applicatur ad probandum, vel quod in propositionibus de futuro nulla sit veritas, etiam supposito respectu ad primam causam (ut vult opinio 2. in corp. relata), vel quod etiam futurum contingens praescitum necessario eveniat (ut vult opinio 1. et opponens). Ceterum quod in futuro, quantum est ex parte rei contingentis, nulla sit certitudo, cum S. Thoma docet S. Bonav. infra q. 2. Aliter loquendum de futuro sub ratione divinae praescientiae. — Codd. R X sic: veritas determinata; et ista ratio est sophistica. Pro sophistica ed. 1 sophisma. Mox pro omne quod multi codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 esse quod. — Cod. T particulam quia, hic suppressam, paulo ante interiicit post verba de futuro. In fine solutionis verba quia nihil ponit, ut nunc, sic sunt explicanda: quia nullum ponit subiectum actu existens.This argument is sophistical not in the sense that the Aristotelian principle is false, but inasmuch as it is applied to prove either that in propositions concerning the future there is no truth — even granting reference to the first cause (as the second opinion reported in the body holds) — or that even a foreknown future contingent necessarily comes about (as the first opinion and the opponent hold). However, that in the future, as far as concerns the contingent thing itself, there is no certainty, St. Bonaventure teaches with St. Thomas below in q. 2. One must speak otherwise of the future under the formality of divine foreknowledge. — Codices R, X read thus: veritas determinata; et ista ratio est sophistica. For sophistica edition 1 has sophisma. Soon after, for omne quod many codices and editions 1, 2, 3 have esse quod. — Codex T inserts the particle quia, here suppressed, a little earlier, after the words de futuro. At the end of the solution the words quia nihil ponit, ut nunc are to be explained thus: because it posits no actually existing subject.
- Sicut veritas venit ex concordia intellectus ad rem cognitam, haec autem concordia non est aliud, quam adaequatio rei et intellectus: sic [intelligendum est de potentia fallendi]. Mox post Dico igitur codd. H T interserunt quod.Just as truth comes from the concord of the intellect with the thing known — and this concord is nothing other than the adequation of thing and intellect — so [is the power of being deceived to be understood]. Soon after Dico igitur, codices H and T insert quod.
- Fide codd. A F H K T et plurium aliorum, postulante insuper contextu, cum ed. 1 substituimus sit pro scit, quae est vitiosa lectio Vat. Paulo ante pro praescisse cod. V praescire.On the authority of codices A F H K T and many others, with the context further requiring it, with edition 1 we have substituted sit for scit, which is the corrupt reading of the Vatican edition. A little earlier, for praescisse codex V has praescire.
- Vat. cum edd. 4, 5, nullo codice suffragante, addit volunt; conclusio potest intelligi in sensu diviso et in sensu composito.The Vatican edition, together with editions 4 and 5, with no codex supporting it, adds volunt; the conclusion can be understood in the divided sense and in the composite sense.
- Intelligo: hoc potest esse sive evenire. — Verba quae mox sequuntur: potest intelligi divisim... coniunctim, dicere [volunt? possibile]: conclusio potest intelligi in sensu diviso et in sensu composito. — Vat. posito, et paulo ante ponitur pro ponatur. Utraque lectio est obscura ob brevitatem et ambiguum sensum verbi ponere, quod vel inferre, vel supponere poterit significare. Facilior explicatio videtur esse haec: post ponatur supple: etc., scil. hoc non esse, ut legitur in 4. ad opposit. Verba Ponendum est concedunt applicationem principii ibi memorati: omne possibile [est] ponibile.I take it as: this can be or come about. — The words which presently follow, potest intelligi divisim... coniunctim, [seem to] mean: the conclusion can be understood in the divided sense and in the composite sense. — The Vatican edition has posito, and a little earlier ponitur for ponatur. Either reading is obscure on account of brevity and the ambiguous sense of the verb ponere, which can signify either to infer or to suppose. The easier explanation seems to be this: after ponatur supply etc., namely hoc non esse, as is read in argument 4 ad oppositum. The words Ponendum est concede the application of the principle there mentioned: every possible is positable.