Bonaventure

Quaestio II.

Utrum necessario Deus praesciat quae praescit.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives first the Latin source text (La.), then the English rendering (En.).

Secundo quaeritur, utrum divina praescientia habeat in se necessitatem, hoc est, utrum sit, Deum praescire quod praescit. Et quod sic, ostenditur:

1. Primo per auctoritatem Anselmi in libro de Concordia praedestinationis et liberi arbitrii¹: «Quod praescit Deus, impossibile est non praescire»: ergo ab aequipollenti, necesse est praescire.

2. Item, ratione videtur, quia omne dictum de praeterito verum est necessarium — unde si cucurrit, necesse est cucurrisse — sed si praescit, praescivit: ergo cum hoc sit dictum de praeterito, ergo necessarium.

3. Item, licet potentia Dei sit indifferens ad exeundum vel non exeundum, tamen ex quo exivit in actum, necesse est exisse. Unde quamvis potuerit creare et non creare, antequam crearet, tamen ex quo creavit, necesse est creasse: ergo ex quo praescivit, necesse est praescisse.

4. Item, si homo voluit et praescivit aliquid, necesse est, hominem scivisse et voluisse: ergo si circa scientiam Dei non est minor certitudo, immo maior, quam circa scientiam hominis, multo fortius est necesse. Si tu dicas, sicut aliqui dicunt², quod in hac: Deus praescivit, totum ex futuro est secundum rem, quamvis intelligatur sub ratione praeteriti, unde nihil plus est dicere: Deus praescit, nisi: Deus est, et hoc erit; contra: tunc, esto quod Deus nullam haberet cognitionem, dum tamen res esset futura, haec esset vera: Deus praescit; quod manifeste falsum est. Praeterea, esto quod praescientiae addatur actus transiens in praeteritum, ut promissio³ vel praedictio vel prophetatio, ibi transit in praeteritum aliquid, et vere fit idem sophisma et idem dubium: ergo hoc non solvit.

5. Item, plus distat esse et non esse, quam necessarium et contingens; sed aliquid, quod simpliciter non est, habet esse in Dei praescientia: ergo multo fortius aliquid, quod in se contingens est, potest esse necessarium in praescientia Dei: ergo etc.

6. Item, omne immutabile est necessarium; sed cum dicitur: Deus praescit, est immutabile: ergo est necessarium. Prima est manifesta, secunda patet, quia cum dicitur: Deus praescit, si mutatur, ut fiat non praesciens, aut⁴ secundum mutationem rei, aut Dei. Rei non, quia res adhuc nihil est, ergo non mutatur nec mutari potest. Si secundum mutationem sui, ergo Deus mutatur.

7. Item, omne aeternum est necessarium, quia unum solum est aeternum, et illud est in quo non cadit contingentia, sed summa necessitas; sed praescire Dei est aeternum: ergo necessarium est, Deum praescire quod praescit.

Contra:

1. Regula est, si antecedens conditionalis est necessarium, et consequens; et si consequens non est necessarium, nec antecedens⁵. Sed sequitur: si Deus praescit, hoc esse futurum, hoc erit, quocumque contingenti demonstrato, quia oppositum non potest stare: ergo cum consequens non sit necessarium, ergo nec antecedens.

2. Item, regula est, quod necessarium compatitur se cum omni possibili. Omne enim repugnans necessario est impossibile⁶; sed demonstrato aliquo qui praescitus est damnari, possibile est, istum salvari: ergo ista duo possunt simul stare, quod sit praescitus damnari, et salvetur: ei hoc est impossibile: ergo etc.

3. Item, regula est, quod oppositum contingentis est contingens, et oppositum necessarii est impossibile. Et regula iterum est, quod si ad antecedens sequitur consequens, ad oppositum consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis⁷. Ex his arguo sic: sit A contingens praescitum a Deo, si Deus praescit, A erit: ergo per regulam⁸, si A non erit, Deus non praescit. Sed A non esse fuit contingens, Deum non praescisse fuit impossibile:

ergo ad contingens sequitur impossibile. Sed hoc est contra artem⁹: necesse est igitur, hoc esse contingens, Deum scilicet praescire hoc.

4. Item, omnis divina actio, quae respicit obiectum, quod potest non esse, potest desinere. Unde cum Deus conservet rem creatam, potest desinere conservare: ergo cum praescire sit respectu contingentis, erit contingens.

Conclusio.

In dicto, Deum praescire futurum contingens, licet actus Dei in se sit aeternus et necessarius, iudicanda est contingentia in totali dicto, ratione connotati contingentis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, sicut necessario probatum est, illud constat et non est dubium quod Deum praescire contingens aliquod — cum antecedit ad contingens et connotat aliquid, quod habet veritatem contingentem — quod ipsum iudicandum est contingens.

Sed aliqui voluerunt ipsum iudicare contingens, quia totum quod dicit, dicit de futuro. — Et illud improbatum est, quia falsum est, et non intelligibile. Omnis enim intellectus, qui intelligit hoc, quamvis non intelligat tempus circa Deum, intelligit, quod actus divinae praecognitionis ab aeterno fuit in Deo, et ille differt a re futura. Et praeterea, sicut dictum est, hoc non solvit.

Alii voluerunt iudicare contingens, quia, cum sit dictum de praeterito, pendet tamen ex futuro. Et hoc dicunt in credito et prophetico et dicto a Christo, et consimilibus, quae inferunt de necessitate propositionem de futuro. — Et illud est improbabile, ut videtur, quoniam si actus divinae praecognitionis pendet ex futuro, tunc, cum in futuro, quantum est ex parte rei contingentis, nulla sit certitudo, nec in divina praecognitione esset. Praeterea, quomodo dependet, cum ab eo non causetur aliquo modo? Et iterum, quomodo dependet illud quod necessarium est fuisse, ut actus cognoscendi et credendi et praedicendi, ab eo quod futurum est? Non videtur nec probabile nec intelligibile.

Et ideo alio modo dicendum, quod quoddam est dictum de praeterito, et pro praeterito, sicut si dicatur, Petrum legisse; quoddam de praeterito, sed pro futuro, ut antichristus fuit nasciturus; quoddam de praeterito et pro praeterito, tamen dependet ex futuro, ut hoc dictum: Petrum verum dixisse, navale bellum fore; ad hoc enim, quod dictum habeat veritatem, exigitur belli eventus; et ab illo dependet veritas nostrae assertionis et cognitionis, quae causatur a re; quoddam est dictum de praeterito, quod non dependet, sed connotat, sicut si dicatur: Deus praescivit hoc futurum.

Quia enim Dei scientia est solum respectu veri, ideo connotat veritatem circa illud dictum futurum; sed quoniam divina cognitio non habet certitudinem a re, quia ab ipsa nec causatur nec oritur, ideo ab illa non dependet; et propterea falli non potest, quamvis connotet futurum. Unde in praescientia haec duo dicuntur, scilicet actus divinae cognitionis, et hunc necessarium est esse sive fuisse; et ordinatio futuri ad illum actum, et haec ordinatio futuri ad illum actum non est necessaria. Et iudicanda est contingentia in totali dicto, non ratione totalitatis sive principalis significati, sed connotati. Et si ponatur, Deum non praescire aliquid, quod praescit, potest et debet intelligi non per remotionem principalis significati sed ipsius connotati, sive illius ordinis ipsius temporalis ad aeternum, qui quidem est contingens ratione alterius, scilicet temporalis. Contingentia ergo est in totali dicto, quia connotat aliquid esse verum de futuro, quod quidem est contingens.

Et hoc patet sic. Cum enim dicitur: Deus praescit te salvandum; hic duplex includitur actus et

compositio, videlicet hic¹⁰: tu salvaberis, et hic: Deus habet cognitionem de salute tua et habuit cognitionem ab aeterno. Habere quidem cognitionem est actus aeternus et necessarius, quia non dependet a re; sed salvari est actus futurus et contingens. Quoniam igitur actus divinae cognitionis non dependet a cognito, ideo potest esse certitudo in ipso, re contingente existente. Sed quoniam, ut significatur per modum praescientiae, connotat futurum contingens, et omne dictum, quod claudit in se contingens, iudicandum est contingens; ideo totale contingens iudicatur. — Et haec solutio est vera et generalis. Nam actus credulitatis, actus prophetationis et divinae assertionis propter hoc, quod currunt secundum illustrationem divinae praescientiae, ideo connotant, et non dependent; ideo certi et infallibiles sunt de rebus in se non certis.

Ad argumenta:

Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod necesse est praescire quod praescit; dicendum, quod hoc intelligit quantum ad actum praecognitionis, quem necesse est fuisse, sed non quantum ad connotationem futuritionis.

Ad 2, 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dictum est de praeterito: dicendum, quod quantum est de ratione praeteritionis, necessarium est: sed quoniam connotatur futurum, ideo est contingens. Et ex hoc patet sequens, quia quantum ad illud futurum non est adhuc potentia in actu, immo adhuc potest exire, ideo etc.

Ad 4, 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod est cognitio sine existentia rei, ergo necessitatis sine rei necessitate; dicendum, quod verum est, quod in actu cognitionis est necessitas, sed non in toto. Nec est simile, quia praecognitio non connotat actualem rei existentiam, sed connotat rei futuritionem; et ad hoc, quod dictum sit necessarium, necesse est, quod sit necessitas in connotato.

Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omne immutabile necessarium; dicendum, quod ad esse mutabilis duo concurrunt: quod se habeat uno modo prius, et alio modo posterius; et per oppositum immutabile potest dici dupliciter: aut quia nihil actu est, aut quia actu est et non potest aliter se habere. Illud ergo immutabile, quod est et non potest aliter se habere, convertitur cum necessario, sed illud quod dicitur immutabile, quod non est aliquid actu, non convertitur. Et sic est verum contingens de futuro, antequam res sit. Hoc dictum antichristum fore, est modo verum immutabile, quia si ponatur, esse verum, ponitur, quod semper fuerit; et similiter si falsum, et hoc, quia nihil actu ponit. Quoniam igitur Deum praescisse connotat futurum contingens, ideo est dictum immutabile; nec ex hoc sequitur, quod sit necessarium, ut visum est.

Tamen aliqui volunt aliter dicere quod Deum praescire hoc futurum contingens est immutabile a parte praescientis, sed a parte rei praescitae est mutabile, et ideo ex parte illa contingens. Sed tamen illud difficile est dicere; quod enim praescitur semel semper praescitum fuit, et Deus potest non praescire futurum contingens, ita quod nihil fiat circa futurum, et ita nulla mutatio. Et propter hoc modus alius dicendi est rationabilior.

Ad 7. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod nihil ens aeternum est contingens; dicendum, quod ens aeternum est dupliciter: aut pure aeternum, aut quod connotat temporale de futuro; et pure aeternum est necessarium, sed connotans temporale de futuro ratione connotati potest iudicari contingens, sicut etiam ratione illius potest desinere.

Summa dictorum est ista, quod Deum praescire futurum contingens est quoddam dictum, quod claudit in se actum divinae cognitionis aeternum, et ordinationem dicit ad futurum contingens. Et quamvis actus divinae cognitionis ponat aliquid existens necessarium et aeternum; illa tamen ordinatio ponit futurum, quod contingens est. Et iterum, quamvis dicat ordinationem, non tamen dicit dependentiam, sed solum connotationem; et ideo non ponit incertitudinem. Et hinc est, quod Deum praescire futurum est contingens ratione connotationis ad contingens; est immutabile ratione ordinationis ad futurum, quod potest non esse, nulla facta mutatione; est certum ratione independentiae ab eodem. Et hoc patebit infra planius in distinctione de praedestinatione.

Question II.

Whether God necessarily foreknows what he foreknows.

Secondly it is asked whether divine foreknowledge has necessity in itself, that is, whether it is [the case] that God [necessarily] foreknows what he foreknows. And that he does, is shown:

1. First, by the authority of Anselm in the book On the Concord of Predestination and Free Choice¹: "What God foreknows, it is impossible that he should not foreknow": therefore by equivalence, it is necessary that he foreknow [it].

2. Likewise, by reason it appears [so], because every saying about the past is necessarily true — whence if [someone] ran, it is necessary that he ran — but if he foreknows, he foreknew: therefore since this is a saying about the past, therefore [it is] necessary.

3. Likewise, although God's potency is indifferent to going forth or not going forth, nevertheless from the [moment] it has gone forth into act, it is necessary that it has gone forth. Hence although he could have created and not created, before he created, nevertheless from the [moment] he created, it is necessary that he has created: therefore from the [moment] he foreknew, it is necessary that he has foreknown.

4. Likewise, if a man willed and foreknew something, it is necessary that the man knew and willed: therefore if concerning God's knowledge there is no lesser certitude, indeed greater, than concerning man's knowledge, much more strongly is it necessary. If you say, as some say², that in this [proposition] Deus praescivit ["God foreknew"], the whole is from the future according to the thing, although it is understood under the formal character of the past, whence to say Deus praescit ["God foreknows"] is to say nothing more than Deus est, et hoc erit ["God is, and this will be"]; on the contrary: then, supposing that God had no cognition, while nevertheless the thing were future, this would be true: Deus praescit; which is manifestly false. Furthermore, supposing that to the foreknowledge there be added an act passing into the past, such as a promise³ or a prediction or a prophecy, there [too] something passes into the past, and there truly arises the same sophism and the same doubt: therefore this does not solve [the question].

5. Likewise, to be and not to be are further apart than necessary and contingent; but something which simply is not has being in God's foreknowledge: therefore much more strongly can something which in itself is contingent be necessary in God's foreknowledge: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, every immutable [thing] is necessary; but when one says Deus praescit ["God foreknows"], it is immutable: therefore it is necessary. The first [premise] is manifest, the second is clear, because when one says Deus praescit, if it is changed, so as to become non praesciens [not-foreknowing], either⁴ it is according to a change in the thing, or in God. Not in the thing, because the thing as yet is nothing, therefore it is not changed nor can it be changed. If according to a change in itself, then God is changed.

7. Likewise, every eternal [thing] is necessary, because there is only one eternal, and that is [the one] in which contingency does not fall, but the highest necessity; but praescire Dei [God's foreknowing] is eternal: therefore it is necessary that God foreknow what he foreknows.

On the contrary:

1. There is a rule: if the antecedent of a conditional is necessary, so is the consequent; and if the consequent is not necessary, neither is the antecedent⁵. But it follows: if God foreknows that this will be future, this will be — given any contingent whatsoever — because the opposite cannot stand: therefore since the consequent is not necessary, neither, then, is the antecedent.

2. Likewise, there is a rule, that the necessary is compatible with every possible. For everything that conflicts with the necessary is impossible⁶; but given some [person] who is foreknown to be damned, it is possible that he be saved: therefore these two can stand together, that he be foreknown to be damned, and that he be saved: but this is impossible: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, there is a rule that the opposite of the contingent is contingent, and the opposite of the necessary is impossible. And again the rule is, that if the consequent follows from the antecedent, the opposite of the antecedent follows from the opposite of the consequent⁷. From these I argue thus: let A be a contingent foreknown by God; if God foreknows, A will be: therefore by the rule⁸, if A will not be, God does not foreknow. But A's not being was contingent, [yet] God's not having foreknown was impossible:

therefore from a contingent there follows an impossible. But this is contrary to the [logical] art⁹: it is necessary therefore that this be contingent — namely, that God foreknow this.

4. Likewise, every divine action which regards an object that can not be can cease. Hence since God conserves the created thing, he can cease to conserve [it]: therefore since to foreknow is in respect of the contingent, it will be contingent.

Conclusion.

In the saying "God foreknows a future contingent," although the act of God in itself is eternal and necessary, contingency is to be judged of the total saying, by reason of the contingent connotatum.

I respond: It must be said that, as has been necessarily proven, it is established and not in doubt that God's foreknowing some contingent — since it precedes [as antecedent] to a contingent and connotes something which has contingent truth — is itself to be judged contingent.

But some have wished to judge it contingent because all that it says, it says about the future. — And that has been disproved, because it is false, and unintelligible. For every intellect that understands this, although it does not understand time with respect to God, understands that the act of divine pre-cognition was in God from eternity, and that [act] differs from the future thing. And furthermore, as has been said, this does not solve [the problem].

Others have wished to judge it contingent because, although it be a saying about the past, it nevertheless depends on the future. And this they say in the credited and the prophetic and what is said by Christ, and the like, which infer the necessity of a proposition about the future. — And that is improbable, as it seems, because if the act of divine pre-cognition depends on the future, then, since in the future, as far as is on the side of the contingent thing, there is no certitude, neither would there be in the divine pre-cognition. Furthermore, how does it depend, since by it [the future] is in no way caused? And again, how does that which is necessarily to have been depend — such as the act of knowing and believing and predicting — on that which is future? It does not seem either probable or intelligible.

And therefore it must be said in another way, that one [kind] of saying is about the past and for the past, as if one says Petrum legisse ["that Peter has read"]; another about the past, but for the future, as antichristus fuit nasciturus ["antichrist was about to be born"]; another about the past and for the past, yet [it] depends on the future, as this saying: Petrum verum dixisse, navale bellum fore ["that Peter spoke truly that there will be a naval battle"]; for the saying, in order to have truth, requires the outcome of the battle; and on that depends the truth of our assertion and cognition, which is caused by the thing; another is a saying about the past which does not depend [on the future] but [merely] connotes [it], as if one says: Deus praescivit hoc futurum ["God foreknew this [as] future"].

For since God's knowledge is only in respect of the true, therefore it connotes truth concerning that future saying; but since divine cognition does not have its certitude from the thing, since it is neither caused nor arises from it, therefore it does not depend on it; and accordingly it cannot be deceived, although it connotes the future. Hence in foreknowledge two things are said, namely the act of divine cognition — and this is necessary to be or to have been; and the ordering of the future to that act, and this ordering of the future to that act is not necessary. And contingency is to be judged of the total saying — not by reason of the totality or the principal significatum, but of the connotatum. And if it be supposed that God does not foreknow something which he foreknows, this can and ought to be understood not as the removal of the principal significatum but of the connotatum itself, that is, of that order of the temporal itself to the eternal, which is indeed contingent by reason of the other, namely the temporal. Therefore contingency is in the total saying, because it connotes something to be true about the future, which indeed is contingent.

And this is clear thus. For when it is said Deus praescit te salvandum ["God foreknows that you are to be saved"], two acts and a composition are here included, namely this¹⁰: tu salvaberis ["you will be saved"], and this: Deus habet cognitionem de salute tua ["God has cognition of your salvation"] — and he had cognition from eternity. To have cognition is indeed an eternal and necessary act, because it does not depend on the thing; but to be saved is a future and contingent act. Since therefore the act of divine cognition does not depend on the [thing] cognized, therefore there can be certitude in it, [even] when the contingent thing exists. But since, as it is signified through the mode of foreknowledge, it connotes a future contingent, and every saying which encloses a contingent in itself is to be judged contingent; therefore the total [saying] is judged contingent. — And this solution is true and general. For the act of believing, the act of prophesying, and of divine assertion — because they run according to the illumination of divine foreknowledge — therefore connote, and do not depend; therefore they are certain and infallible about things in themselves not certain.

To the arguments:

To 1. To that which is objected from Anselm, that it is necessary to foreknow what he foreknows; it must be said that this is to be understood as regards the act of pre-cognition, which it is necessary to have been, but not as regards the connotation of futurition.

To 2, 3. To that which is objected, that it is a saying about the past: it must be said that, as far as the formal character of past-ness is concerned, it is necessary; but since the future is connoted, therefore it is contingent. And from this the following [argument] is clear, because as regards that future, the potency is not yet in act, indeed it can still go forth — therefore etc.

To 4, 5. To that which is objected, that there is cognition without the existence of the thing, therefore [there is the existence] of necessity without the necessity of the thing; it must be said that it is true that in the act of cognition there is necessity, but not in the whole. Nor is the case parallel, because pre-cognition does not connote the actual existence of the thing, but connotes the futuritio [futurition, future-ness] of the thing; and for the saying to be necessary, it is necessary that there be necessity in the connotatum.

To 6. To that which is objected, that every immutable [thing] is necessary; it must be said that for the being of the mutable, two [conditions] concur: that it have itself in one mode prior, and in another mode afterwards; and conversely the immutable can be called [so] in two ways: either because nothing is in act, or because it is in act and cannot have itself otherwise. That immutable, then, which is and cannot have itself otherwise, is convertible with the necessary; but that which is called immutable [merely] because it is not something in act, is not convertible. And so a future contingent is true, before the thing is. This saying, antichristum fore ["that antichrist will be"], is now an immutable truth, because if it be supposed to be true, it is supposed that it always was [true]; and likewise if false; and this, because it puts nothing in act. Since therefore Deum praescisse ["that God foreknew"] connotes a future contingent, therefore the saying is immutable; nor from this does it follow that it is necessary, as has been seen.

Yet some wish to say otherwise, that that God foreknows this future contingent is immutable on the side of the foreknower, but on the side of the thing foreknown is mutable, and therefore on that side contingent. But nevertheless this is difficult to say; for what is foreknown once was always foreknown, and God can not-foreknow a future contingent — in such a way that nothing happen concerning the future, and so [there be] no change. And on this account the other manner of speaking is more reasonable.

To 7. To that which is objected last — that no eternal being is contingent; it must be said that an eternal being is so in two ways: either purely eternal, or [eternal in such a way] that it connotes a temporal [thing] of the future; and the purely eternal is necessary, but [that which is] connoting a temporal [thing] of the future, by reason of the connotatum, can be judged contingent — just as also by reason of that [connotatum] it can cease.

The summary of what has been said is this: that that God foreknows a future contingent is a certain saying which encloses in itself the eternal act of divine cognition, and bespeaks an ordering toward a future contingent. And although the act of divine cognition posits something existing as necessary and eternal; nevertheless that ordering posits a future, which is contingent. And again, although it speaks an ordering, yet it does not speak a dependence, but only a connotation; and therefore it does not posit uncertainty. And hence it is that that God foreknows the future is contingent by reason of the connotation to the contingent; is immutable by reason of the ordering to the future, which can not-be, with no change made; is certain by reason of the independence from the same. And this will appear more plainly below in the distinction on predestination.