Bonaventure

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`). The nine footnotes in this chunk all come from the printed-page-742 footer; the three footnotes on the printed-page-741 footer anchor in the preceding part-2 quaestio body and scholion (rendered in `bon-sent-I-d41-p2-a1-q2.md`), not here.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Magister: Opinati tamen sunt quidam, Deum ideo elegisse Iacob, quia talem esse praescivit etc. Videtur quod ista positio non sit opinio, sed haeresis manifesta, quia qui hoc ponit, ponit, gratiam homini non gratis, sed ex meritis dari a Deo: et iste est error pessimus, scilicet error Pelagii.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ideo potest dicere causam meritoriam vel rationem congruitatis. Si p. 742dicat causam meritoriam, sic, quamvis prima fronte non dicat errorem, tamen ad ipsam sequitur error. Si vero dicat rationem congruitatis, sic non dicit errorem; sed tamen temeritatem quandam habet, quia de occulto Dei profundo nititur reddere rationem; et ideo utroque modo erat digna retractatione¹.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo Apostoli, quod dicit Augustinus: Reliquiae per electionem gratiae salvae fient; in qua habitudine construatur ille genitivus; quia gratia nec videtur eligens nec electa; et iterum gratia est solum ex tempore: ergo et electio.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si intelligatur de electione temporali, tunc electio gratiae dicitur, quia fit per gratiam: si autem de aeterna, sic dicitur electio gratiae², non ut gratia dicat habitum, sed ut construatur sicut genitivus ex vi declarationis essentiae; unde dicitur electio gratiae, id est gratuita, quae merita non considerat. Et si obiicitur, quod unus genitivus non construitur ex illa vi³; dicendum, quod verum est, nisi habeat virtutem duorum. Unde bene dicitur vir sanguinis, et homo auctoritatis, similiter electio gratiae dicitur, id est gratuitae bonitatis.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Praecedit aliquid in peccatoribus, quo digni efficiantur iustificatione. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia peccator ante iustificationem manet in peccato, et quamdiu est in peccato, est indignus pane, quo vescitur, sicut dicit auctoritas⁴, et etiam ipsa vita, ut puta Dei inimicus: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aut verbum illud Augustini retractatum est, et retractatum intelligitur in praefata retractatione, quae ponitur in praecedenti capitulo⁵; aut dignitas ibi tantum valet quantum congruitas solum: et multae possunt esse congruitates in peccatoribus ad gratiam gratum facientem per multiplicem gratiam gratis datam.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister, quod Deus praescire futura desinit, cum futura esse desinunt. Videtur enim falsum dicere, quia praescientia dicit quid aeternum; sed nullum aeternum desinit esse: ergo nec praesciens desinit praescire. — Item, Richardus⁶ dicit, quod cum quatuor sint combinationes, quod quoddam est quod habet principium et finem, quoddam quod caret principio et fine, quoddam quod habet principium et non finem, ut anima, quartum, scilicet quod habet finem et non principium, est impossibile. Quod enim caret principio non habet esse aliunde: quod autem tale est, se ipso est: ergo est omnino immutabile, ergo non potest desinere. Si ergo praescire caret principio, necesse est, quod careat fine.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio Magister bene dicit, quod Deus desinit aliqua praescire, cum fiunt praesentia. Si enim praesciebantur, quia futura, et iam desinunt esse futura, constans est, quod desinunt praesciri, non ratione eius quod est scire, sed ratione praepositionis.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur de aeterno, dicendum, quod aliquod nomen pure aeternum importat, aliquod vero nomen importat aeternum connotando temporale. Hoc nomen Deus pure aeternum importat, sed hoc vocabulum praescire dicit aeternum connotando temporale. — Secundum hoc notandum, quod quaedam connotant temporale ut ens in actu. Et quia tale temporale esse potest et desinere potest, ideo tales actus circa Deum dicuntur habere initium et terminum: ut puta si dicatur: Deus conservat hanc rem, conservare dicit essentiam⁷ connotando effectum; ideo incipit et desinit conservare. Quaedam connotant temporale, ut non-ens actu, ens tamen in potentia sive futurum. Et quoniam temporale non potest incipere esse non-ens sive esse futurum, antequam sit, sed potest desinere esse non-ens, cum incipit esse ens, desinere esse futurum, cum incipit esse praesens: hinc est, quod praescientia Dei respectu creati dicitur desinere, sed numquam incipere; et desinit ratione temporalis non desinentis, sed incipientis⁸.

Et ex hoc patet illud Richardi, quia cum⁹ Deus desinit praescire, non significatur, quod aliquod ens desinat, sed solum quod aliquid incipiat; et sic patet illud.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

DOUBT I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what the Master says: "Some however have held that God chose Jacob for the reason that he foreknew him to be such," etc. It seems that this position is not [merely] an opinion, but a manifest heresy, because whoever lays this down lays down that grace is given to man by God not gratis, but from merits: and this is the worst error, namely the error of Pelagius.

I respond: It must be said that for that reason one can call [it] either a meritorious cause or a ground of congruity. If p. 742he calls [it] a meritorious cause, then, although at first glance he does not state an error, yet an error follows upon it. If, however, he calls [it] a ground of congruity, then he does not state an error; yet he has a certain temerity, because he strives to render a reason from the hidden depth of God; and therefore in either mode it was worthy of retraction¹.

DOUBT II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of the Apostle, which Augustine quotes: "The remnant by the election of grace shall be saved"; in what relation that genitive is to be construed, because grace seems neither to choose nor to be chosen; and again, grace is only in time: therefore [so is] the election.

I respond: It must be said that if it is understood of temporal election, then it is called election of grace, because it comes about through grace; if however [it is understood] of eternal [election], it is in this way called election of grace², not so that grace state a habit, but so that it be construed like a genitive [taken] from the force of declaration of essence; whence it is called election of grace, that is gratuitous, [an election] which does not consider merits. And if it is objected that one genitive is not construed [taken] from that force³; it must be said that this is true, unless it has the power of two [genitives]. Hence it is well said vir sanguinis ("man of blood") and homo auctoritatis ("man of authority"); similarly election of grace is said, that is of gratuitous goodness.

DOUBT III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: "Something precedes in sinners by which they are made worthy of justification." For it seems false to say [this], because a sinner before justification remains in sin, and as long as he is in sin, he is unworthy of the bread by which he is fed, as the authority says⁴, and even of life itself, as for example, [being] God's enemy: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that either that saying of Augustine has been retracted, and is understood to have been retracted in the aforesaid retraction, which is set down in the preceding chapter⁵; or [else] dignity there has only as much force as congruity alone: and there can be many congruities in sinners towards gratum-making grace through manifold grace freely given.

DOUBT IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says, that "God ceases to foreknow future things when the future things cease to be." For it seems false to say [this], because foreknowledge states something eternal; but nothing eternal ceases to be: therefore neither does the one foreknowing cease to foreknow. — Likewise, Richard⁶ says that, since there are four combinations — namely that [there is] something which has beginning and end, something which lacks beginning and end, something which has beginning and not end (as the soul); the fourth, namely [something] which has end and not beginning, is impossible — [for] that which lacks a beginning does not have its being from elsewhere: but what is such, is by itself: therefore it is altogether immutable, therefore it cannot cease. If therefore foreknowing lacks a beginning, it is necessary that it lack an end.

I respond: It must be said that without doubt the Master speaks well in saying that God ceases to foreknow certain things when they become present. For if they were foreknown because they were future, and now cease to be future, it is clear that they cease to be foreknown, not by reason of that which is knowing, but by reason of the prefix.

To that which is objected concerning the eternal, it must be said that one [kind of] name imports the purely eternal, and another [kind of] name imports the eternal with the connotation of the temporal. This name God imports the purely eternal, but this word to-foreknow states the eternal with the connotation of the temporal. — According to this it must be noted that certain things connote the temporal as a being-in-act. And because such a temporal [thing] can both be and cease to be, therefore such acts about God are said to have a beginning and a term: as for example, if it is said: "God preserves this thing," "to preserve" states the essence⁷ with the connotation of the effect; therefore it begins and ceases to preserve. Certain things connote the temporal as a non-being in act, [yet] a being in potency or future. And since the temporal cannot begin to be non-being or to be future, before it is, but can cease to be non-being when it begins to be a being, [and] cease to be future when it begins to be present: hence it is that the foreknowledge of God with respect to the created is said to cease, but never to begin; and it ceases by reason of the temporal not ceasing, but [rather] beginning⁸.

And from this is clear that [point] of Richard, because when⁹ God ceases to foreknow, it is not signified that some being ceases, but only that something begins; and so it is clear.

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